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INTRODUCTION

9About the Project
This publication is the result of two years of intensive work by the research staff 
of the Centre of Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), and its associates. It contains the 
collated results and findings of our research project “Mapping and Monitoring 
of Security Sector Reform in Serbia”. The project began in 2006 and was com-
pleted by the end of 2008. The target audience of this publication are all those 
interested in the theory and practice of security sector reform (SSR). It should be 
of particular interest for students of national and international security studies 
and to those professionals working in the defence and security sector in Serbia, 
who aim to deepen their knowledge and understanding of the reform of the 
country’s security sector. 
In this book the concept of security sector reform is understood holistically, 
as a collection of policies and processes contributing to improved efficiency 
and effectiveness in the provision of human and state security within the frame-
work of democratic governance. Consequently, the wide-ranging analytical 
framework encapsulates not only those state institutions tasked with the use of 
force and those responsible for control and oversight and supervision of the se-
curity sector, but also private organisations providing security and surveillance 
services. The project covers the period from 2000 to 2008. However, year 2006 
is chosen as a starting point to measure and assess progress in the reform of 
security sector in Serbia. This is due to the fact that just after the proclamation of 
independence of Montenegro and the adoption of its own Constitution (2006), 
Serbia fully took over the jurisdiction over the security sector and its actors. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that this is the first research project of 
this kind to apply a conceptually holistic, theoretically well-founded and meth-
odologically systematic approach to the analysis of the current state of security 
sector reform in Serbia and of any progress made in this field.
The Political and Security Context
The democratic reforms that began in Serbia on October 5th 2000 have not af-
fected all areas of Serbian society and government in equal measure. Though 
some aspects of government, such as the economic and financial spheres, have 
to some extent been successfully reformed, the security sector is still burdened 
with the legacy of the 1990s and has been unable to find solutions to newly 
arisen security challenges. The assassination of Serbia’s first democratic Prime 
Minister in March 2003 - which members of the state security forces were in-
volved in - and the inability of subsequent governments to achieve full coopera-
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tion with the International Criminal Tribunal in Hague, are just two of the many 
unresolved problems that still affect the pace and reach of the reform of Serbia’s 
security sector. Additionally, in the absence of blanket policy documents, such 
as a National Security Strategy and a Defence Strategy, Serbia cannot be said to 
have a clear security policy. Furthermore, it is not yet known when, and how, the 
2007 Resolution of the National Assembly (NA) on the “Protection of the Sover-
eignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia” 
on military neutrality will be implemented. It is no wonder, therefore, that the 
situation came to a head in the form of a very public “conceptual disagreement” 
between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Army High Command. This ex-
change culminated in December 2008 when the Chief of General Staff publicly 
proclaimed that Serbia had not yet defined its defence policy. 
Problems such as these, unfortunately, also exist outside the defence sec-
tor. For example, the number of government bodies entitled to apply police-
like and/or other special powers has risen significantly over the last few years, 
directly affecting citizens’ basic human rights and freedoms. As a result, in ad-
dition to those actors traditionally so empowered, such as the security forces, 
police and judiciary, these powers are now also available to the tax police, the 
customs service and to the service for the prevention of money laundering.1 
Various procedures are in place to regulate the use of such powers, and those in-
stitutions which are now enabled to apply these powers are subject to different 
degrees of parliamentary, judicial and public control and oversight. The state of 
the security sector is also reflected in the fact that there is as yet no legislation 
regulating the status of private security companies, despite the fact that an es-
timated 50,000 people are employed in this sector - more, in other words, than 
in the military or the police.2
Motivation for the Project
Security sector reform has been one of the declared aims of every democratic 
government in Serbia since 2000. Significant financial resources and political 
energy have been invested in the reform of a sector that has long been more 
part of the problem than part of the solution to security-related issues in Ser-
bia. Many positive changes have taken place but much still remains to be done. 
However, until now no attempt has been made to systematically review the 
achievements to date and the challenges to be overcome in the process of se-
curity sector reform in Serbia. The purpose of this publication is to compensate 
1 Miroslav Hadžić and Predrag Petrović, eds., Democratic Oversight over the Use of Spe-
cial Powers (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 7.
2 Sonja Stojanovic, ed. Private Security Companies: A friend or a foe? (Belgrade: Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 51-58.
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for these short-comings. 
As already mentioned above, this publication is the product of two years’ 
work by the research staff of the CCMR and its associates, under the research 
project, “Mapping and Monitoring of the Security Sector in Serbia”. With this aim 
in mind, the first part of the project was designed to develop the methodology 
required for a comprehensive mapping and monitoring of security sector re-
form in Serbia. Once devised, the methodology was, with the necessary adjust-
ments, used to analyse and gain systematic insight into the current state, extent 
of and impediments to security sector reform in Serbia. In this way the Centre 
aims to afford additional operative support to further reform of this sector and 
to the integration of Serbian institutions into the Euro-Atlantic security com-
munity. The findings presented in this publication should, in the years to come, 
facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of both the process of security sector 
reform and the level of Serbia’s security cooperation and integration. 
By publishing the findings of its research the Centre aims to raise public 
awareness of these issues and to ease the flow of security-related information 
between political decision-makers, security professionals and independent 
experts. This should lead to the betterment of national security policy - with 
policy-making based on academic research - and a democratic security culture. 
The research team hopes that the applied methodology will arouse the inter-
est of both the domestic and international academic communities and, in turn, 
contribute to the advancement of the field of security studies.
Project Evolution
During 2007, the first year of the project, the research team concentrated on 
developing the theoretical and methodological framework with which the 
research would be carried out. The greatest challenge was to determine the 
techniques and instruments to measure the extent of security sector reform. 
In attempting to do so the researchers were faced with a series of theoretical 
and methodological problems and unanswered questions. It was necessary to 
first determine whether measurement and numeric evaluation of the extent of 
security sector reform was even possible. If so, what would the measurement 
relate to? And according to which indicators would it be measured? Would the 
indicators be universal or would they be specific to the Western Balkan region? 
These are just some of the many questions we had to deal with during the first 
phase of the project, but remained relevant throughout the entire project.
 Although they were unable to formulate absolute, definitive answers to all 
of these questions, the research team did determine a set of techniques and 
instruments to measure the extent of security sector reform. This allowed the 
researchers to identify three main dimensions of the reform of this sector and 
its actors which they used afterwards to follow and evaluate progress: (I) dem-
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ocratic management of the sector and/or actors; (II) efficiency and (III) effec-
tiveness. At the same time, they chose and defined key indicators for each of 
these dimensions which allowed them to define a starting point (point zero) 
from which reform of this sector and/or its actors in Serbia began. In this way, a 
standard was created and afterwards used to record and measure the changes 
with the usage of same indicators
During the second year of the project a complex methodological approach, 
based on the analytical, theoretical and methodological framework developed 
during the first phase, was applied to the measurement of the extent of secu-
rity sector reform in Serbia. The first task was to determine who in Serbia is re-
sponsible for and authorised to provide security. The analysis then progressed 
in several directions and on several levels. The first of these was an analysis of 
the legislative regulation of the security sector. This required an examination of 
existing constitutional and legislative solutions in the security sector and their 
compatibility. This examination was concerned with, of course, all the regula-
tions and bylaws available to the public. Special emphasis was placed on the 
analysis of powers, procedures and instruments for democratic civilian control 
and public control and oversight of the security sector and its constituents. For 
this it was necessary to verify whether the aforementioned actors were inter-
linked or connected in any way, and if so, in what way. The aim was, therefore, to 
confirm whether or not Serbia had a unified and operational - holistic - national 
security system. This further required an analysis of the political, conceptual, 
strategic and doctrinal foundation for the conventional way of thinking about 
and providing security in Serbia. This analysis was carried out with the existing 
social, political, economic and security context in mind. On the basis of the in-
formation gathered, separate indices were produced for each actor, as well as a 
unified index for the Serbian security sector as a whole.
By developing the methodology for the periodical monitoring of the proc-
ess of security sector reform and the Security Sector Reform Index (SSRI), the 
CCMR has sought to create a unique instrument to measure not only perform-
ance, but also the extent of security sector reform. The index identifies the pri-
orities of the reform process, not only at any given moment, but also in relation 
to the available resources and current requirements. In this way, future annual 
or biannual publication of the Index will make it possible to appraise the suc-
cess or failure of political leaders and elites in implementing security sector re-
form. Also, the resulting public pressure would be focused on priority tasks, as 
identified by the Index, and would contribute to improved planning and coor-
dination of reforms throughout the security sector. It appeared, however that in 
this phase of research it was impossible to develop a single unified Index, which 
would encompass the whole sector and all of its actors. The first difficulty was 
related to the impossibility of establishing the same indicators and applying 
the same procedures to record precisely the type, scope, direction, content and 
range of changes for four different groups of actors: (1) state actors that have 
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the right to use force; (2) state actors that do not have the right to use force; (3) 
non-state actors that have the right to use force; (4) non-state actors that do not 
have the right to use force. Changes could eventually have been made for each 
dimension, but these could not have been measured in a methodologically ro-
bust manner and graded according to the same criteria. Therefore, in this phase 
the research team decided to develop and implement different indices for each 
group of actors.
It quickly became clear that, presently, it is not possible to measure the 
progress of the reforms of each group of actors using the efficiency and effec-
tiveness dimension. This is above all due to the fact that these dimensions have 
different meanings for different actors, and therefore cannot be measured ac-
cording to the same criteria. It is also linked to the fact that the information 
with which to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the army, police, secu-
rity services and/or state institutions which use certain police powers were not 
available to the researchers, especially in the case of the state actors that have 
the right to use force. Additionally, the research team realised that it lacked spe-
cialist and technical knowledge to carry out this project. On top of that neither 
do professionals, nor their civil commanders, have the necessarily instruments 
and procedures to evaluate the security capabilities of the state force appara-
tus. Therefore, progress along these two dimensions was only measured using 
the indicators for good governance over the whole sector, as well as over the 
group of actors. Those indices offer a reliable insight into the level of democracy 
within the security sector in Serbia.  In other words, once they are applied, it 
will be easier to assess the extent to which this sector and its actors operate un-
der democratic civilian control and supervision. The results of the mapping and 
monitoring project, however incomplete, will be the first systematic knowledge 
base on security sector reform in Serbia and will facilitate policy development, 
decision-making, and greater public control and oversight of the security sector, 
based on continuous, independent and multidisciplinary empirical research.
The next phase of the research project (2009-2011) will unfold in two direc-
tions. Firstly, the continued monitoring of the reform process will be followed 
by the practical application and further development of the instruments and 
indicators created during the first two phases. Thereafter, the adopted meth-
odology and the SSRI will be applied to the analysis of the rest of the Western 
Balkans in cooperation with local researchers and think-tanks. The CCMR has, 
in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces (DCAF), already formed a partnership with six research organisations 
from across the Western Balkan region. This phase of the Mapping and Monitor-
ing Security Sector Reform project will culminate in a comparative quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the extent of security sector reform in the regional 
context, through the publication of a Regional SSR Yearbook.
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Secondary Products
In order to maintain a comprehensive record of the process of security sector 
reform in Serbia, the Centre’s research team and their associates have during 
the course of this project produced a number of secondary papers and anal-
yses. One of these is a complete political chronology of Serbia for the period 
from 5th October 2000 to the end of 2008. This chronology documents and gives 
brief summaries of key political events and actors. Similar chronologies have 
also been produced for all state actors authorised to use force. Other secondary 
products of the project include bibliographies of relevant publications and lists 
of significant electronic resources relating to the security sector and its reform 
in Serbia. The CVs of significant security actors in Serbia have also been drawn 
up. Key issues and concepts, however, are covered in the Centre’s Backgrounder 
series of publications.
The Research Team
A significant number of researchers, both those working in the CCMR, or rather 
the Centre’s ‘Belgrade School of Security Studies’, and its international associ-
ates, has participated in this endeavour. Roles were assigned according to the 
respective expertise and personal fields of interest of each of the researchers 
and associates, and to the requirements of the project. In this sense the results 
achieved are the work of individual authors and researchers, but they are also 
the fruits of collaborative labour. Therefore, whilst responsibility for the qual-
ity of both analysis and findings lies squarely with the authors themselves, all 
participants share partial liability for any potential shortcomings. In gathering 
empirical data, the Centre was aided by governmental institutions which readily 
completed questionnaires and agreed to be interviewed where necessary.
The Centre hopes to acquire the necessary funds for the annual or biannual 
publication of a report on the processes and achievements of security sector 
reform in Serbia. This will enable the Centre to further develop and perfect the 
concept, the methodological techniques and the Index. Also, the existing part-
nership between Western Balkan think-tanks, together with the CCMR and the 
Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, will apply and adapt 
this methodology to a similar comparative study on a regional level. Last, but 
not least, the CCMR wishes to express its deepest gratitude to the Royal Nor-
wegian Government, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, the Balkan Trust for Democracy and the Fund for an Open Society, whose 
financial help have made this project possible.
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Summary of Security Sector 
Reform in Serbia
by Miroslav Hadzic
Over the last eight years (2000-2008) we have seen important and positive 
changes in the security sector of the Republic of Serbia. Those changes are one 
of the main products of Serbia’s gradual, sometimes laborious, yet ongoing de-
mocratization and liberalisation. The local elite and current power-bearers are 
slowly and gradually taking in the meaning of a broader and deeper concept of 
security, and intend to use it as a foundation for developing a modern concept 
of national security. As a result, Serbia has ceased to be a crisis-generator in the 
region and a potential threat to its immediate neighbours, and countries of the 
Western Balkans / Southeast Europe. By taking part in international processes 
of security cooperation, Serbia, with its partners, enhances the achievements of 
and promotes sustainable national and (sub)regional security.
The Serbian state, at the same time, has ceased to represent a security 
threat to its citizens. Governmental apparatuses of power have been to a cer-
tain extent depoliticised (taken out of political control) and put under the effi-
cient and legitimate control of legal power-bearers. The highest ranking officials 
from both the military and the police have retired, irrevocably, from the political 
scene. The initial constitutional and legal framework has been established in 
order to apply and to help promote further civilian democratic control over the 
main state actors in the security sector. Some of the independent governmental 
bodies which have been set up - Ombudsperson, State audit, Commissioner for 
Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection - are now slowly 
taking over the control and supervision of the state apparatuses of force. At the 
same time, public transparency has increased when it comes to government 
work and that of its institutions in the field of security. Besides, public and civil 
society organization now play a partial role in supervising some of the activi-
ties of the state apparatuses of force. The level of respect for human rights in 
security sector has substantially increased, not just for citizens, but also for the 
armed forces. 
Since the adoption of the new Constitution (of the Republic of Serbia) in 
2006, a new political environment has been created for the continuous and ac-
celerated reform of the local security sector. In the Constitution and the subse-
quent systemic laws, Serbia now has more clearly defined missions, tasks and 
responsibilities for the army, police and law enforcement agencies. In addition, 
Serbia now has a clear civil chain of command, and defined responsibilities for 
the government and responsible Ministries (such as the Ministry of Defence and 
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the Ministry of Interior). Since the establishment of the National Security Coun-
cil Serbia has started to create a joint and functional system of national (state) 
security. This, in return, has helped to link chief political decision-makers with 
central security practitioners within this system. Conditions have been created 
for enhanced cooperation and for firmer control by the executive over the state 
security sector. The Council is at the same time responsible for the joint opera-
tions of civil and military intelligence/security services.
The central apparatuses of state force, since the end of the previous regime 
in Serbia, have been undergoing a process of reorganisation and gradual mod-
ernisation. Among the changes, there has been a reduction in the numbers of 
police and army staff, and a professionalisation of the commanding officers and 
personnel. As a result, the security forces have begun to adopt a structure better 
suited to the country’s security needs and financial capacity. In parallel, there is 
an aim to adopt standards and procedures for the interoperability of the Ser-
bian army and for a more successful inclusion of police forces and other state 
security forces into international cooperation initiatives. For that purpose, and 
in accordance with the growing belief amongst the political elite that national 
security is now more endangered by non-military threats, the rapid diversifica-
tion and specialisation of security forces is now being implemented. The army 
and the police, nowadays, have a range of specialised and joint operation units 
primarily trained for anti-terrorist combat, for preventing the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and for the fight against various forms of organ-
ised crime. At the same time, some governmental institutions, for example the 
customs administration, the tax police, and the Administration for the Preven-
tion of the Money Laundering (AMPL) received partial police powers which they 
can use in their line of work. With the recent adoption of a set of new laws on the 
Judiciary and by setting up specialised courts and prosecutor’s offices, Serbia 
has enhanced its capacity for the prosecution and punishment of war criminals 
and members of organised crime groups.
Summarising all SSR achievements over the last eight years in Serbia, it ap-
pears that the first phase/generation of SSR has been more or less successfully 
completed. However it is also apparent that the government which came into 
power after the Milosevic era missed an opportunity to radically - by that we 
mean comprehensively, systematically and with clearly defined aims - reform 
the security sector which it had inherited, including in particular the state ap-
paratus of force. A partial explanation for this lies in the fact that throughout the 
whole period Serbia was reforming its security sector in a fairly hostile environ-
ment, with opposition both at the national and international levels.
It became evident immediately after 5th October 2000 that international 
support for the democratisation process in Serbia was fading by the day, and 
that was inevitably reflected in the field of security sector reform. The failure by 
the national government of the time to complete the delivery and fulfilment 
of previously accepted and signed agreements, in particular with regard to the 
23
agreement with the International Tribunal in the Hague, did not help matters. 
Any achievements in terms of gained foreign support were gradually lost be-
cause of the rigid and inconsistent policies towards Serbia by the USA, EU and 
NATO. By constantly adding to and amending the list of requests and conditions 
which Serbia had to meet, it was increasingly difficult to follow the path of ac-
cession and inclusion into European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. 
This thorny situation reached its lowest point when most EU member countries 
supported and recognised the unilateral and illegal formation of the so-called 
state of Kosovo on the territory of the Republic of Serbia
All the elements mentioned above in a way fed pre-existing internal debates 
and helped further increase the gap between political parties and their antago-
nisms over the future course to be followed in terms of Serbia’s foreign policy 
and security orientation. No wonder then that in this period successive govern-
ments in Serbia shifted from complete readiness for the Serbian security sector 
to take part in European and Euro-Atlantic initiatives to, as Kosovo’s declara-
tion of independence became increasingly unavoidable, Serbia’s declaration of 
military neutrality. Therefore, it seems that potential NATO accession has been 
taken off Serbia’s list of priorities for a while to come; current cooperation with 
the Alliance is limited to the symbolic Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. 
Building on the above, the entire foreign and internal policy of Serbia is 
geared to fast-track Serbia’s EU accession. The present government has chosen 
to put an emphasis on developing the economical and legal frameworks, in 
order to make the legislative system compatible with EU standards, whilst the 
security aspect of this process is limited to meeting all preconditions necessary 
to get onto the so-called “Schengen white list”. It is then no surprise that reform 
of the national security system is clearly absent from Euro-integration debates 
in Serbia. This might also be the case because the EU has not yet accepted the 
full holistic concept of SSR, nor does it apply it in monitoring and assessing the 
achievements of candidate countries.
An unfavorable international context has helped, amongst other things, to 
strengthen the debate surrounding the security dilemma. The “state-centric” 
approach, which focuses on the need for military defence of the Serbian na-
tion, state and territory, is at the heart of national security debates. After the 
recent events in and around Kosovo, parts of the political elite have indicated, 
although implicitly, that they are ready, in the name of the preservation of the 
national territory of Serbia to slow down and even postpone further democrati-
sation. Because of that stance, internal political debates regarding the main se-
curity needs and interests of Serbia, and above all about the concept and goals 
of military reform, have resurfaced. Further professionalisation of the army has 
thus been put on hold along with any further reduction in personnel. Finally, re-
percussions of the current global financial crisis on Serbia should also be taken 
into account.
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The limited progress in SSR in Serbia is also the result of specific political 
environmental and internal factors, including the status of Serbia’s relationship 
with Montenegro, which was maintained in the third Yugoslavia (1992-2003) 
and more loosely in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro – SCG (2003-
2006). After gaining power in Serbia in 2000 DOS intended to include both 
member states under its programme of reforms. However, since government of-
ficials from Montenegro refused to recognise the legitimacy of the state led by 
Milosevic, they declined to participate in any joint reforms. Government officials 
from Montenegro thus refused to take part in the creation and implementation 
of any mutually planned SSR. From that point in FRY (and later on in SCG) three 
mutually exclusive, and even occasionally hostile, security systems co-existed: 
one at the federal level - the army; and another in each of the two member 
states - the local police forces and intelligence services.
The Government of Montenegro did not want to participate under any cir-
cumstances in the restoration of a mutual security area, and was particularly 
opposed to the creation of any unified or joint (coordinated) security systems. 
This was emphasised by the fact that a militarised police force and intelligence 
services constituted key pillars of power which helped preserve absolute pow-
er in Montenegro. Even more important was the conviction that the road to 
independence would be secured by a strong armed police force as a defence 
against the Serbia and Montenegro Armed Forces. From this point of view, gov-
ernment officials in Montenegro were only interested in a process where the 
Federal Armed Forces and intelligence services would be firmly controlled by 
the Supreme Defence Council and the Federal Parliament. This was to prevent 
any possible intervention by the Federal Army when Montenegro would finally 
secede from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
During this prolonged period, Serbia and its new government slowed the 
tempo of reform in the security sector. In turn this led to the loss of ‘reform mo-
mentum’, not just among the public, but also among the members of the state 
apparatuses of force. The high expectations of extensive reforms that accompa-
nied the fall of the previous regime deflated. A huge amount of time and money 
which had been allocated to security sector reform was wasted. The short-lived 
military reform is testimony to that. After the secession of Montenegro, Serbia 
was once again obliged to reorganise its armed forces, now according to a new 
set of parameters. The main responsibility lay with Serbia’s government officials, 
and in particular with Vojislav Kostunica, the newly elected President of FRY 
and one of the DOS leaders who had direct command over the Yugoslav Army. 
Montenegro did not play any role, simply because any changes in the army 
structure at the time would have been directly connected with the daily politi-
cal decisions and intentions of Kostunica himself. In the same way, changes in 
the police and state security service directly were connected to the daily needs 
and ideas of the other main component of DOS, initially under the leadership of 
Zoran Djindjic and later on of his successors.
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Difficult and sometimes conflicting tendencies inherent in Serbia’s transi-
tion period clearly demonstrate that the newly elected government, in the form 
of DOS and its various subsequent coalitions, was not able to provide suitable 
solutions to the problems it was facing. This lack of ‘good ideas’ can be partially 
explained by the fact that socio-economic and political dynamics at the time 
were still strongly shaped by the post-authoritarian and post-conflict heritage. 
Besides, the new government was often required to redefine the status of the 
state on an ad hoc basis in the hope of preserving territorial integrity.
Serbia’s protracted way out from the years of authoritarianism and conflict 
was accompanied by numerous security unknowns and internal risks. Moreo-
ver, in the period after Milosevic the new government avoided any political 
sanctioning of war losses/gains in Serbia, but also any public resposibility for 
prolonged internal and external abuses by police, army and state security serv-
ices. At the same time, they avoided radical changes of personnel in the upper 
echelons of the government apparatus in return, for example, for the non-dis-
closure of secret files about a vast number of citizens (which remain closed to 
this day). Further, the government made no attempt to take those secret files 
out of the jurisdiction of these services and deliver them to the independent 
governmental body regulating the scope of state security services’ work, even 
though it was bound to do so by the law adopted in 2002. Paradoxically, the 
leaders of DOS also promoted persons once close to Milosevic to positions 
where they had responsibility for SSR. In that lies one of the main reasons due 
to which the later snags in its economic and social development, coupled with 
political resistances to the transition, permanently threatened to outgrow into 
internal, but violent conflicts. Throughout this period the process of democra-
tisation was under constant pressure from political instability. The political as-
sassination of Prime Minister Djindjic on 12th March 2003 was a demonstration 
that hidden parts of the police, military and state secret services were ready to 
support violent restoration of the old regime through violence.
After the split with Montenegro, Serbia managed formally to bring all inher-
ited state apparatuses of force under its command. From that moment on, the 
pace and level of change in Serbia’s security sector became the sole responsibil-
ity of government officials and the ruling parties. This presented Serbia with the 
chance to restart its SSR from scratch, particularly since the ties to the previous 
security system of FRY/SCG had been legally and formally discontinued. How-
ever, despite the formal change of the state, the social environment and context 
within which reforms were to be implemented remained largely the same.
If anything, the context of reforms became even more complex, and hav-
ing regained its statehood, Serbia saw slow, chaotic and undefined reform in 
the security sector. The Serbian government still faced problems in removing 
structural and other obstacles on the path to SSR. In addition, it became clear 
that Serbia lacked the constitutional, conceptual, strategic-doctrinaire and insti-
tutional foundations for a clearly defined and planned process of reform of the 
26
security sector. The government of Serbia had almost completely failed to pre-
pare the foundations for reform and hardly any progress was made between the 
initiation of the strategy for reform in October 2000 under the FRY/SCG and the 
actual implementation of security reform in Serbia in 2006. An additional reason 
for this was that the ruling parties of the various coalitions all had originated 
from DOS. The fact that Milosevic’s SPS successors joined the ruling coalition 
after the 2008 elections did not change the context of reform.
It is clear that all these missed opportunities (but also positive changes), in 
terms of SSR were the result of differing and antagonistic internal political proc-
esses and tensions within Serbia. Since October 2000 the pace of SSR has been 
pulled in different directions according to interests of the ruling political parties. 
These divergent interests were just another expression of the lack of basic con-
sensus between the actors, about the ways and means to achieving the demo-
cratic transformation of Serbia. The result was a constant battle between the 
actors on the strategy and methods of reform on the one hand, and expenses 
and costs of transition on the other.
However, the constant political disagreements and in-fighting between the 
DOS factions and their partners around the process of SSR could not mask the 
fact that all parties lacked a clear understanding about the concept of national 
security. Nor did they have (or want to have) an operational plan for the fu-
ture reform of the security sector. Once in power they found themselves in a 
reactive, rather than proactive, position, and were sometimes forced to perform 
changes with little time or political vision, or by responding to frequent security 
incidents. The interests of the ruling parties and coalitions in terms of SSR were 
primarily linked to obtaining party and/or personal control over the state ap-
paratus of force. As a result, the directions and goals of reform changed accord-
ing to the pace of power shifts in the country. At the same time, in line with the 
demands of daily political and party needs, frequent personnel changes took 
place in the police, army and state security services, and related ministries. Con-
sequently, these apparatuses of force remained permanent clients to the ruling 
political parties. In summary, there was no significant difference in the ways in 
which the various political groups intervened in the security sector during their 
time in power and they all obtained similar results.
The strongest evidence for this is the fact that none of the ruling political 
parties in the past eight years managed to develop and then implement a rela-
tively well-defined concept and policy of national security. Moreover, they failed 
to arouse public interest in security-related matters. As a result, the debate on 
reform revolved around party and/or ideological interpretations of national se-
curity. This in turn created a monopoly for the ruling parties over the creation 
and implementation of national security policy. But the ruling parties could not 
even agree over what the basic national interests were, and consequently how 
to protect them. This is why Serbia still does not have an official National Se-
curity Strategy.  It is not even stipulated in the new constitution. Meanwhile, 
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Serbia has not even yet adopted the National Defence Strategy or the Military 
Doctrine, even though they are legally bound to do so by the Constitution. It 
is no wonder then that Serbia does not have a strategy for fighting against key 
security threats such as terrorism, organised crime and corruption.
The points made above demonstrate that the Serbian public has been de-
nied answers from their elected officials and the institutions in charge regarding 
their personal and collective security. At the same time, citizens do not know 
how and with what means the state is to provide security and at what costs, or 
whether protection is in place against existing security threats. For example, the 
government still has not specified the full cost of Serbia’s potential accession 
into European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration initiatives, nor the price of its 
newly proclaimed military neutrality.
All this can be understood as the unavoidable consequence of bad political 
strategies of governing parties and their coalitions with the result that transi-
tion and SSR are treated as conceptually separate and therefore proceed on par-
allel tracks. The biggest testimony to this is the attempt of political parties to or-
dain a (pro) democratic system, whilst failing to implement a parallel process of 
radically reforming of the state apparatus of force. Similarly, they attempted to 
reorganise the state security sector without creating the necessary democratic 
preconditions and climate to frame such actions. These political parties, as a re-
sult of their (in)action have actually held back the democratic process in Serbia. 
Because of this, they have consistently tried to fill these conceptual gaps with 
talk of “new reform” and wide media promotions of grand promises and goals. 
They also have with equal enthusiasm, continuously dramatised and securitised 
the position of Serbia, thereby creating additional internal obstacles to SSR.
There is also little evidence that the ruling parties since the Milosevic era 
have actually adopted a holistic approach to understanding the security sector 
and its reform. The Constitution of Serbia does not envisage creation or define 
a specific sector, or system of national security. Moreover, all other non-state 
actors are outside of this constitutional regulation. To make things worse, since 
there is no law on private sector security companies they operate without any 
legal framework, outside the framework of the security sector in Serbia. In addi-
tion, under the constitutional umbrella there is no place for those governmental 
institutions and agencies which have become part of the security system since 
they have some police powers such as the secret collection of citizens’ personal 
data.
Those in power have failed to constitutionally and legally develop and im-
plement procedures for democratic civilian control and oversight of the security 
sector and its actors. One must note that the authors of the Constitution have 
empowered the National Assembly to control and oversight the traditional gov-
ernmental apparatuses of power. On the other hand, all parliamentary parties, 
both ruling and opposition, stripped the parliament of its political power and 
real strength to carry out its functions. Hence, control of the state apparatus of 
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force in Serbia, has remained de facto in the hands of the executive branch of 
government and of its leaders.
In addition, under the Constitution democratic civilian control can be ex-
ecuted over the army, but not over the police force. An additional law, adopted 
much later, actually regulates this type of control over civil and military security 
and intelligence agencies. However, private security companies and all actors 
which have the right to use police powers operate without any legal regulation, 
despite the fact that, by nature, those agencies could actually endanger citizens’ 
basic constitutional rights. These entities, as opposed to the police and state 
security agencies, are able to gather secret data and information about citizens 
and other subjects, without having to provide a court order and are beyond 
parliamentary oversight.
In the absence of any defined concept, strategy or system of security, Ser-
bia does not have a clearly formulated security policy. The Serbian government 
has made no attempt to create or adopt a state-level plan for the synchronised 
reorganization and reform of the security sector. It is thus not surprising that so 
far none of the necessary laws, which would enable a consistent and system-
atic regulation of the national security system, have been adopted. It is there-
fore difficult to identify the logic and parameters used by previous and present 
governments in determining the country’s security needs, how they planned 
and defined future requirements for the modernisation and reform of the state 
security actors. Even less is known about how much has been spent so far and 
how much is needed to invest in order to complete the reforms.
Secondly, the pace and achievements of SSR have been directly connected 
to the party and individual interests within the responsible governmental bod-
ies. As a result, SSR has reflected personal and party preferences, as well as the 
political interests and needs of civilian leaders. Consequently, the reform of the 
security sector and stae apparatus of force in Serbia throughout the whole pe-
riod has been partial, slow and divided.
By means of conclusion we could say that initial, but insufficient precondi-
tions were set for the implementation of the second generation of SSR in Serbia. 
It is to be expected that this process will be as slow and as long as witnessed 
during the previous generation, and that chances for fast-track security sector 
reform or radical changes in the stae apparatus of force are slim.
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Main research findings3
            DIMENSION I: DEMOCRATIC gOVERNANCE
1. Representativeness
State actors in the Serbian security sector are obliged, when hiring and manag-
ing their personnel, to follow the principle of representativeness, or equality 
and/or proportionality in gender and national representation. This obligation is 
ensured by the Constitution, which guarantees equality of all citizens and pro-
hibition of discrimination. These guarantees are elaborated in more detail in the 
accompanying legislation about state administration and labour, and are bind-
ing for the state authorities in charge of security. The Constitution sets out, at 
the same time, that discrimination shall not include any specific regulations and 
provisional measures which the Republic of Serbia may use in order to achieve 
full gender equality, and equality between the members of minorities and the 
members of national majority. However, constitutional and legislative provi-
sions are insufficiently precise to provide a legal framework for the elimination 
or suppression of discrimination. Consequently, state authorities are responsi-
ble for stipulating the employment and career development procedures and 
criteria in their bylaws that will promote gender equality and proportional rep-
resentation of national minorities. 
a. Representation of Women
However, not all state authorities belonging to the security sector have, in 
their respective bylaws, uniformly stipulated the application of the principle of 
representativeness. This explains the variations in their respective application of 
this principle. Research findings show that, in the past period, the Ministry of In-
terior (MoI) has made the largest progress in the enhancement of representative-
ness. This is primarily true for the application of the principle of gender equality. 
Thus, the number of women in the army operating ranks has in the meantime 
risen to almost three thousand, accounting for 32.6% of the total number of 
women who are employed by the MoI today. Also visible is the progress made 
by the National Assembly where 23% of deputies are women. However, there 
is only one (5.8%) female member of the parliamentary Defence and Security 
3 Main findings, based on the reports of the members of the Research Team, were summed up 
and composed by Mr. Predrag Petrović, CCMR Research Coordinator. 
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Committee. Satisfactory representation of women has been achieved in the ju-
dicial system and in the Administration for Execution of Criminal Sanctions. By 
ensuring equal requirements for admittance into military service and admitting, 
for the first time, women to be schooled in the Military Academy, the Army of 
Serbia has made an essential step forward in this direction.
 
b. Representation of Ethnic Minorities
Ethnic minorities, however, are not adequately represented in the state au-
thorities responsible for security. Despite progress in the National Assembly, the 
same level of representation has not been achieved in the election of deputies 
to the Defence and Security Committee. For instance, only representatives from 
the Bosniak minority can be found among its members. Nevertheless, certain 
progress has been made by the MoI in certain parts of the country. Police sta-
tions in three municipalities in the south of Serbia employ a larger number of 
people from the ethnic Albanian minority. Other state institutions, however, 
have seen no improvement in the representation of ethnic minorities. In addi-
tion, there has been no progress in formulating policies to encourage higher 
representation. One exception is the Security Information Agency (SIA) which 
has invited and encouraged, although only in a single sentence, members of 
ethnic minorities to apply for employment with this institution.
2. Transparency
a. General Transparency
In the observed period, Serbia has created the initial regulatory premises and 
the environment conducive for improving visibility of the operations of state 
actors in the security sector. This is primarily due to the fact that the right of free 
access to information of public interest is guaranteed by the new Constitution 
of Serbia. The exercising of this right is elaborated in more detail in the Law 
on Free Access to Information of Public Interest. The same piece of legislation 
also created the post of Commissioner for Information of Public Importance. 
Likewise, all state authorities are obliged to publish a publicly available bulletin 
about their operations. 
There is no doubt that the operations of the National Assembly have be-
come more transparent. The most important factor in this development is the 
direct broadcasting of Assembly sessions by the state-owned broadcasting 
service Radio Television Serbia (RTS). Also, most sessions of its Defence and Se-
curity Committee are public. These sessions are recorded and summaries of de-
bates are made available to the general public through the (regularly updated) 
website of the National Assembly.
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Communication between civil society associations, academic institutions, 
and state actors in the security sector has also visibily improved.  This is illus-
trated by their joint participation at a larger number of conferences and round 
tables. A particular notable development is that most competent ministries are 
organising more frequent public debates about draft laws and draft strategies. 
Despite this progress, major problems still exist in the practical implementa-
tion of the right of free access to information of public importance. One of the 
main reasons is the absence of a law on data classification with the result that, 
for example, security services often deny requests for information to deputies, 
journalists, and the general public, citing reasons of state secret.  
b. Financial Transparency
The findings show that financial transparency in the security sector, and 
particularly in state actors, is still unsatisfactory, despite the establishment of in-
itial regulatory and institutional premises to allow for improvement in this area. 
Some progress was made in 2006 with the Law on the Budget which stated 
that data about general expenditures of the security services should be made 
public. The continued lack of visibility in the financial operations of this sector, 
however, can be attributed to the fact that the Law on Supreme Audit Insti-
tution has still not been implemented in practice. Likewise, the parliamentary 
Defence and Security Committee, and the Finance Committee do not release 
information on state expenditures, such as the budgets of the military, police, 
and security services, and particularly whether these public funds are spent in a 
lawful and proper manner. A further issue that contributes to the lack of finan-
cial transparency is the exemption of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Interior, and security services from the legal procedures for public procurement. 
It is also important to note that low financial transparency is also present in 
civil society organisations (CSOs). Research show that most of these organisa-
tions do not make their annual budgets publicly available, partly because there 
is still no specific law that regulates their status.
3. Participation of citizens and their associations
As noted above, there is an increasing tendency for public and civil society par-
ticipation in the creation, implementation and evaluation of Serbian security 
policy, in clear contrast to the situation during the authoritarian regime. This de-
velopment has been encouraged by the establishment of normative premises 
for the involvement of the public and civil society organisations. In particular, 
the Constitution of 2006 guaranteed the right for citizens to participate in the 
administering of public affairs. Following this, the Law on Public Administration 
(2005) stated that public authorities must introduce public debate during the 
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process of drafing laws which modify the legal regime in a specific area, or laws 
which regulate issues of particular public interest. On one level change can be 
observed in the fact that state actors no longer, at least not in public, refer to 
civil society organisations as ‘national enemies’ and ‘foreign hirelings’. Also, pro-
fessional and academic cooperation between state actors and local universities 
and faculties, as well as with civil society organisations is more common. 
It has also become customary for state authorities to allow public access to 
individual draft laws and strategies in the sphere of security. Some of them, such 
as the Ministry of Defence, allowed only short periods for public debate, which 
prevented a thorough debate. In general, however, most state authorities make 
no effort to encourage public participation in debates on security issues. As a 
result, there is still much mystification surrounding some actors in the security 
sector, particularly the security services, and there is widespread sentiment that 
any involvement in these issues can be dangerous. 
One reason for inadequate public participation is the nature of civil society 
organisations in Serbia. There are many CSOs in Serbia that deal with security 
issues, but the majority do so on an ad hoc basis. In addition, few have a strate-
gic plan of development, or long-term budgetary projections, nor do they have 
dependable funding sources. Consequently, their choice of topics is to a great 
extent subject to circumstances.
4. Accountability – democratic civilian control and 
public control and oversight
With the adoption of the new Constitution in 2006 and the set of systemic laws 
relating to defence and security in December 2007, the initial normative frame-
work was created for democratic civilian control and control and oversight over 
most actors in the security sector. Although this framework is not complete, it 
represents a marked improvement on the period before 2000. Nevertheless, 
public authorities with police-like powers (such as the customs authorities, the 
fiscal police, and the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering) 
and the private security sector are still exempt from control and oversight. 
a. Executive Power
More detailed regulation of the civilian chain of command and manage-
ment, and establishment of mechanisms for the executive control over the state 
enforcement apparatuses are among the most significant achievements accom-
plished to date in security sector reform. Institutions of the executive govern-
ment – the President of the Republic, the Government, the Ministries, and the 
National Security Council – now have broader functional, organisational and 
personnel-related authority which enables them not only to effectively control 
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state actors in the security sector, but also to control their operations. Moreover, 
re-subordination of military security services under the Minister of Defence is an 
important step in the reform process. At the same time, internal control bodies 
have been set up in most security institutions.
There are, however, a number of shortcomings in the mechanisms for ef-
fective executive government control over the security sector. Due to impre-
cise legislation, too much room has been left for interference by the executive 
government in the work of the organisations subordinated to it. This is can be 
observed in the MoI, whose minister enjoys vast discretionary powers. As a re-
sult, the public is still under the impression that state security institutions act in 
the interests of the government and politicians. A public opinion survey found 
that 74% of respondents do not consider that the police serve the public, and 
that the government and the politicians exercise great influence. Public trust is 
further undermined by the continued practice of making appointments based 
on political coalitions and agreements. This in turn puts a question mark over 
both the competency and the willingness of the Government and its ministries 
to create and implement a common security policy that ensures effective coop-
eration between the relevant state bodies. 
The present government attempted to offset this deficiency by establish-
ing the National Security Council, a move which should provide for better com-
munication between competent state authorities. Legislators have, however, 
missed the opportunity to lay down the competences and procedures for par-
liamentary and public control and oversight over the operations of the Council. 
A similar omission was made in drafting the Constitution since it does provide 
for the accountability of the President of the Republic for any omissions in their 
command of the Serbian Armed Forces. These omissions allow the President of 
the Republic (who presides over the Council) to acquire, contrary to the Consti-
tution, significant formal and also informal authority over the army, police, and 
security services.  
In addition, the entire security sector is beyond any control or oversight. No 
law has been adopted to regulate the security sector, and the control mecha-
nisms which do exist are not implemented. For instance, even though the MoI 
has the right (as specified by the Law on Weapons and Ammunition) to conduct 
inspection of private security companies, it has never exercised this right. Or, if it 
has done, there is no evidence that it notified its findings either to the National 
Assembly or the public.
  
b. Parliamentary control and control and oversight 
According to existing legislation, the National Assembly and the Defence 
and Security Committee enjoy considerable powers of control and oversight 
and control over the state security sector. This is particularly true for the right to 
oversee security service operations.  However, we better note that now if force 
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are three laws on these services, which makes the job much more difficult for 
the deputies. 
Although the legal grounds are adequate, in reality parliamentary control 
and oversight have been ineffective. The authority and political power are for 
the most part in the hands of the executive branch; effectively the parties in 
power. This has seriously undermined the principle of the division of govern-
ment and thus the National Assembly is often used for the legalisation of the 
decisions which were earlier made at the top level of coalition parties, i.e. in the 
executive power bodies. 
In Serbia, the election of representatives from the opposition parties to 
head the key parliamentary committees does not necessarily, or does not at all, 
lead to better control and control and oversight over the government and state 
apparatuses of force. The most powerful opposition parties (for reasons known 
only to them) fail to, through the Defence and Security Committee, systemati-
cally control and oversee the operations of the competent ministries and state 
apparatuses of force subordinated to them. The Rules of Procedure currently 
in force provide only for the Committee to consider, or adopt, security related 
legislative proposals. Moreover, the Committee often adopts these proposals 
in emergency procedures, thus depriving it of the opportunity, for instance, 
to consult independent organisations and experts about the proposals. Also, 
the time frame during which the Committee frequently considers its findings 
is insufficient to analyse in any depth the reports submitted to it by competent 
ministers or the director of the SIA. In addition, the National Assembly and its 
Defence and Security Committee have not taken the opportunity, offered by 
the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, to engage in control and over-
sight over the spending of budget funds or the procurement of weapons and 
equipment. 
Evidence shows that parliamentary parties and their deputies have little 
interest in the control and control and oversight over the security sector and 
its state actors.  Consequently, they do not make use of existing instruments 
of control. A further issue is that the Defence and Security Committee has re-
sponsibility for the entire security sector. This means that Committee members 
are expected to have adequate knowledge of all sections of the security serv-
ices; the military, police, and the private security sector. Deputies’ time is further 
stretched by their membership of several other parliamentary committees. In 
addition, the Committee has very limited administrative and professional sup-
port. Finally, in the absence of a law on data classification, members of the Com-
mittee often do no know what information they are entitled to request and re-
ceive, and from which sources. 
Prisons and the private security sector are also completely outside parlia-
mentary control and control and oversight. For example, the National Assembly 
has still not set up the specific commission, as envisaged by the law, for exter-
nal and independent control of the prison system. Other state authorities with 
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police-like powers (such as the customs administration, the fiscal police, and 
the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering) are beyond par-
liamentary control and oversight. Consequently, there is no body charged with 
overseeing how and for what purposes they use police powers, and the impact 
of their operations upon rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
c. Judicial Control
The Constitution and the law regulate the basic mechanisms for judicial 
control over state actors in the security sector. This primarily concerns control 
over the lawfulness of applying the measures for secret data collection.  The se-
curity services and police must obtain written judicial consent before applying 
these measures. The courts are competent to decide also about the lawfulness 
of final administrative acts in disputes concerning criminal liability of the mem-
bers of service, as well as in cases of compensation for any damage incurred to 
citizens. Such competences lie with district courts and the Supreme Court of 
Serbia. The Supreme Court of Serbia has judicial control over the prison system 
and rules on appeals and parole applications.
However, the implementation of judicial control is still fraught with prob-
lems. Thus representatives of the court underline that issuance of approvals 
for resorting to specific evidentiary procedures is more frequent than in other 
countries. In addition, the courts do not usually have technical capacity to phys-
ically keep and destroy the data collected through specific measures and thus 
some of this data is leaked into the public domain.  It should also be added that 
the courts are overwhelmed by their caseload and that court proceedings take 
too long. 
d. Public control and oversight
In the observed period, control and oversight has been somewhat improved 
thanks to the work of civil society organisations, academic institutions, as well 
as the establishment of the institutions of the Commissioner for Information of 
Public Importance, Protector of Citizens, and Supreme Audit Institution. How-
ever, these institutions have started to operate only recently and are thus yet to 
overcome many obstacles that hinder their work. 
5. Rule of law
a. Rechstaat (Legal State)
In the observed period, significant progress was made in implementing the rule 
of law in the Serbian security sector, in part because the rule of law has a very 
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important place in the Constitution and domestic legislation. The fact that al-
most all systemic laws regulating the security sector have now been adopted 
confirms that progress has been made. Thus, in the recent period (for the first 
time since WW II) the law has regulated the status and scope of activities of the 
military security services. This also entailed the regulation of procedures for im-
plementation of specific measures for secret data collection. 
However, there are a number of omissions in the legislative regulation of 
the security sector. For example, systemic laws were not adopted according to 
a preset plan, or at the time and in the scope required for a successful reform. 
Therefore, legislative regulation of this sector was largely subject to the politi-
cal needs and will of the competent ministries and their leaders. An additional 
problem is that some laws and strategic documents were adopted before the 
adoption of the Constitution. Consequently, there remains a need to adopt new 
laws or to ensure that existing ones comply with the Constitution. 
A further complication is that the Constitution incompletely regulates the 
security sector. For instance, the Constitution did not foresee the creation of 
the National Security Strategy. Consequently, it was the Law on the Basics of 
Security Services that provided for the existence of the Strategy, but it too did 
not regulate the procedure of its drafting and adoption.  Further aggravating 
the situation is the fact that Serbia inherited a number of laws from the former 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, some of which are still in force, such as 
the Law on the Security Services of FRY.  It is thus unsurprising that some laws 
are inconsistent with the new Constitution and that existing laws do not appro-
priately regulate some specific areas within the security sector.
This is particularly obvious in the case of legislative provisions regulating 
the implementation of specific measures, in particular authorisations for secret 
data collection. First, secret data collection is regulated in several laws. This re-
duces the degree of legal protection for citizens and impedes parliamentary 
control and oversight over the implementation of those measures. An increase 
in the number of state authorities which are now allowed to resort to specific 
measures represents an addition problem. A number of valid security reasons 
exist for giving this right to the customs administration, the tax authorities, or 
the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, but there is no jus-
tification that, as opposed to the security services and police, they do not need 
previous court approval to apply those measures.  Also, the law does not say 
who is responsible to control and oversee the manner in which these state au-
thorities apply the above measures and how they keep records, i.e. how they 
archive and destroy the collected data.
The rule of law is further undermined by the absence of a specific law to 
regulate the status of the private security sector. Also, the Law on Data Confi-
dentiality is still not adopted. Finally, the regulations of civil society organisa-
tions should be updated. 
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b. Protection of Human Rights
Since 2000, Serbia has made huge steps in the protection of civil rights 
and the rights of personnel in the state security sector. The MoI has made great 
progress in this respect since the majority of relevant legislation now complies 
with international standards for the protection of human rights. Moreover, the 
provisions concerning the protection of human rights and non-discriminatory 
conduct of police are incorporated in basic police training, and annual addi-
tional training programmes for personnel of the MoI and the Internal Control 
Division have been established. Despite the progress made, reports by both in-
ternational organisations and local CSOs highlight cases of police brutality and 
unsatisfactory conditions for persons detained in police cells. 
Other institutions have been less successful in creating a conducive envi-
ronment for the protection of human rights. The security services have as yet 
not established an internal control division. Likewise, after the adoption of the 
Law on the Basics of Security Services, those employed in the military security 
services lost the right to refer to the parliamentary control body in cases where 
their rights in the service are infringed. Also, according to the findings of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the human rights of prison-
ers in Serbia are poorly served. Finally, a general deficiency is that information 
about human rights infringements are not made publicly available.
DIMENSION II: EFFICIENCY
a. Human Resources Management
Efficiency of state actors in the security sector is very hard to assess for several 
reasons. Firstly, the data on which the assessment could be made is not acces-
sible to the public. Public appearances made by the leaders of security institu-
tions are the only source of information, and on such occasions they generally 
state that they have done a great deal to reorganise, revitalise and rejuvenate 
their personnel; that much was done on training and education of the person-
nel. An additional problem is that such statements made by heads of security 
institutions cannot be verified by independent sources.  Moreover, state bod-
ies competent for security sector control do not notify the National Assembly 
about the efficiency of the army, police, or security services.
b. Material Resources Management
Based on analysis of available information, efficiency in the institutions in-
volved in security issues is not satisfactory.  One reason is the cost of investment 
in sophisticated equipment and training of personnel, which can be prohibi-
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tively expensive for a country in transition. Another important reason is that the 
management style of the state administration is overly centralised and politi-
cised, as well as expensive and outdated in relation to modern principles of hu-
man and material resources management in public administration.
DIMENSION III: EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness of security sector actors is affected by the absence of an in-
tegrated system of national security. The Constitution also fails (at least implic-
itly) to force the authorities to establish an integrated national security system. 
This problem is partly compensated by the establishment of the National Secu-
rity Council, but the Council is a hybrid body comprising top political decision 
makers and professional heads of individual portfolios that are subordinated to 
them. Also, it is not clear why the minister of foreign affairs is not a permanent 
member of the Council when security policy is, or should be, an integral and 
constituent part of Serbian foreign policy. Further, the law does not provide for 
any control and oversight over the Council, leaving it unaccountable. 
Also, there are clear overlaps in the competences of some security institu-
tions, such as those dealing with terrorism and organised crime. Another seri-
ous problem for achieving full effectiveness of the security system is that the 
private sector is ignored despite the fact that is now an important industry. Also, 
Serbia the only country in South-Eastern Europe that not adopted a Strategy 
of National Security. With the adoption of this document, which should define 
security objectives and means, bodies which are responsible for control and 
oversight would obtain important parameters for the effectiveness assessment 
of the sector and its actors. 
Chart 1:  Reform index of statutory actors 
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REFORM INDEX TABLES
REFORM INDEX OF STATUTORY ACTORS THAT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE 
FORCE
Dimension Military Police Intelligence Services
Institutions 
with Policing 
Competencies
Democratic 
Governance 2.73 2.47 2.1 1.97
Efficiency 2.75 2,5 2 3
Effectiveness 2.66 2.5 2.33 2
Actors’ 
Reform Index 2.71 2.49 2.14 2.32
Reform Index        2.41
Table 1:  Reform index of statutory actors that have the right to use force
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DIMENSION: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Criteria Subcriteria Military Police Intelligence Services
Institutions 
with Policing 
Competencies
Representativeness
Representation of 
Women 2.5 3 2 3
Representation of 
Ethnic Minorities 2 3 2 2.5
Average Grade 2.25 3 2 2.75
Transparency
General 
Transparency 3 2 2 3
Financial 
Transparency 2.5 2 2 2.5
Average Grade 2.75 2 2 2.75
Participation 
of Citizens and 
Civil Society 
Organisations in 
Security Policy
Participation in 
Policy-Making 3 2 2  1
Participation in 
Implementation 
and Evaluation of 
Policy
3 2.5 2  2.5
Average Grade 3 2.25 2 1.75
Accountability 
Control by the 
Executive 3,5 3 3 2,5
Parliamentary 
Control and 
Oversight
2 2 2 1
Judicial Control 2 2,5 2,5 1
Public Control 
and Oversight 3 3 2  1
Average Grade 2.63 2.62 2.37  1.37
Rule of Law
Rechtstaat (Legal 
State) 3 3 2 1,5
Protection of 
Human Rights 3 3 2 1,5
Average Grade 3 3 2  1.5
Actors’ Average Grade for Democratic 
Governance 2.73 2.47 2.1 1.97
Average Grade for Democratic Governance                       2.32
STATUTORY ACTORS THAT HAVE RIGHT TO USE FORCE
Table 2:  Statutory actors that have right to use force
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DIMENSION: EFFICIENCY
Criteria Military Police Intelligence Services
Institutions 
with Policing 
Competencies Average 
Grade for 
Efficiency
2.56
Human Resources 
Management 3 2 2 3
Material Resources 
Management 2.5 3 2 3
Actors’ Average 
Grade 2.75 2.5  2 3
Table 3: Efficiency statutory actors that have the right to use force
EFFICIENCY
STATUTORY ACTORS THAT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE
Chart 2 Democratic governance of statutory actors that have the right use force
DIMENSION: EFFECTIVENESS
Criteria Military Police Intelligence Services
Institutions 
with Policing 
Competencies
Average 
Grade for 
Effectiveness
2.37
Integratedness 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5
The Ratio 
between Aims, 
Resources and 
Outcomes
2.5 2 2.5 2.5
Legitimacy 3  3 2  2
Actors’ Average 
Grade 2.66 2.5 2.33 2
Table 4: Effetieveness statutory actors that have the right to use force
EFFECTIVENESS
STATUTORY ACTORS THAT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE 
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Criteria Sub-criteria Judiciary Prisons
Representativeness
Representation of Women 2.5 3
Representation of Ethnic 
Minorities 2 3
Average Grade 2.25 3
Transparency
General Transparency 3 2
Financial Transparency 2.5 2
Average Grade 2.75 2
Participation 
of Citizens and 
Civil Society 
Organisations in 
Security Policy
Participation in Policy-
Making 3 2
Participation in 
Implementation and 
Evaluation of Policy
3 2.5
Average Grade 3 2.25
Accountability
Control by the Executive 3.5 3
Parliamentary Control 
and Oversight 2 2
Judicial Control 2 2,5
Public Control and 
oversight 3 3
Average Grade 2.63 2.62
Rule of Law
Rechtstaat (Legal State) 3 3
Protection of Human 
Rights 3 3
Average Grade 3 3
Efficiency
Human Resources 
Management 2 2
Material Resources 
Management 2 2
Average Grade 2 2
Effectiveness
Integratedness of System 2 2
The Ratio between Aims, 
Resources and Outcomes 2 2
Legitimacy 2 1
Average Grade 2 1.66
Reform Index 2.55 2.11
Table 5: Statutory actors that do not have the right to use force
STATUTORY ACTORS THAT DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE
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STATUTORY ACTORS THAT DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE
National Assembly/Parliament 
                           Criteria Grade
Competencies 3
Resources 1.5
Practice 2
Legitimacy 2
Transparency 3
Reform Index      2.3
Table 6: Statutory actors that do not have the right to use force
NON-STATUTORY ACTORS THAT USE FORCE
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
Criteria Grade
Transparency 2
Accountability 1.5
Rule of Law 1
Protection of Human Rights 2
Integratedness of Private Security 
Companies 1
Legitimacy 1.5
Reform Index    1.5
Table 7: Non-statutory actors that use force
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NON-STATUTORY ACTORS THAT DON’T USE FORCE
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)
Criteria Grade
Capacity for Exerting Control and 
oversight of Security Sector 3
Rule of Law 2
Transparency 2.5
Integratedness of CSOs 2
Legitimacy 2
Reform Index       2.3
Table 8: Non-statutory actors that don’t use force
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Recommendations for further 
security sector reform
1. A National Security Strategy, based on the strategies for social development, 
foreign policy and other complementary strategies, should be created and 
adopted by the National Assembly.
2. The National Security Strategy should lay the foundations for a unified secu-
rity apparatus for the Republic of Serbia and also outline the general struc-
ture and principles of operation for such an apparatus.
3. The Law on the National Assembly should be expanded in order to more 
precisely determine the powers which the National Assembly and its vari-
ous parliamentary bodies can use to exercise control and control and over-
sight of the security apparatus and all actors involved therein.
4. New legislation should be passed in order to precisely define the powers 
which the National Defence Council can use to direct, coordinate and moni-
tor both the security apparatus and the nature of its accountability to the 
National Assembly.
5. New legislation should be passed on democratic civilian control and pub-
lic control and oversight of the security apparatus and the actors engaged 
therein, with particular reference to state and non-state actors authorised to 
bear arms and use force.
6. New legislation on the protection of information should be passed and 
should clearly outline how information is classified and declassified and 
who is authorised to access it.
7. New anti-discrimination legislation should be passed, and special govern-
ment bodies should be set up to monitor its implementation and the devel-
opment of this field as a whole.
8. The National Strategy on the Improvement of Women’s Rights and the Law 
on the Equality of the Sexes should be adopted in order to reaffirm anti-
discriminatory measures for the employment of women and the advance-
ment of women’s rights.
9. A Law on Associations of Citizens should be passed in order to provide a le-
gal basis for the work of civil society organisations operating in the security 
sector.
10. New legislation should be adopted, or existing legislation amended, in or-
der to facilitate the protection of human rights both of the personnel of 
state institutions authorised to use force and of ordinary citizens which they 
interact with.
11. Existing legislation should be amended to make it compulsory for all actors 
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in the security apparatus to report regularly to the National Assembly and 
the public on the status and possible breaches of human rights, both of the 
personnel working in the relevant state institutions and of ordinary citizens.
12. Existing legislation and ordinances should be amended in order to more 
precisely define the responsibilities of actors in the security apparatus in 
relation to independent government bodies.
13. The necessary conditions for the unhindered operation of the State Audi-
tor’s Office should be ensured in order to enable this institution to carry 
out regular checks of budget expenditure by all actors engaged in the state 
security apparatus. 
14. Complimentary regulations, in particular the Law on the Classification of Se-
cret Information, should be passed as a matter of urgency in order to create 
the conditions for the full enforcement of the Law on Freedom of Access to 
Information of Public Importance.
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Statutory actors that have right to use force
ThE ARMED FORCES OF SERBIA
1. The Strategic Defence Overview and the White Paper on Defence should be 
proposed for adoption by the Minister of Defence and brought before the 
National Assembly.
2. The National Defence Strategy and Military Doctrine should be completed 
and adopted.
3. Legislation should be passed in order to regulate the procedures and par-
ties responsible for democratic civilian control and public control and over-
sight of the Armed Forces of Serbia and the defence apparatus.
4. New legislation should be passed on military intelligence services.
5. Contradictions present in the wording of the Constitution, the Law on De-
fence and the Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia, regarding the command 
responsibilities of the President of the Republic and the overall control of 
the defence apparatus should be resolved.
6. The Law on Defence and the Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia should be 
amended in order to properly delineate the responsibilities of the Minister 
of Defence and of the Chief of Staff and to regulate relations between them.
7. The Law on Defence and the Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia should be 
amended in order to clearly define the responsibilities of the Minister of De-
fence as well as the position of this office in the civilian chain of command 
of the Armed Forces and the defence apparatus.
8. The President of the Republic should be required by law to consult the rel-
evant National Assembly Committee prior to the appointment or dismissal 
of the Chief of Staff or the head of a military intelligence.
9. Existing legislation and ordinances should be amended in order to facilitate 
greater transparency regarding declassified decisions made by the Defence 
Inspectorate, as well as any steps taken to implement recommendations 
made by this office.
10. New legislation should be passed in order to establish a state fund for the 
reform of the armed forces. This fund would, amongst other functions, regu-
late and manage the conversion and sale of excess state assets used by the 
Armed Forces of Serbia, the proceeds of which would be returned to the 
fund.
11. The Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia should provide adequate proce-
dures and criteria to address the issue of irregular promotion of professional 
servicemen.
12. The Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia should be amended in order to 
clearly define the responsibilities and modus operandi of the Military Po-
lice. Alternatively, new legislation should be passed to regulate this branch 
of the Armed Forces.
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13. The Minister of Defence should propose measures, procedures and dead-
lines for the introduction of a scale to regulate the numbers and responsibil-
ities of civilian and military employees working in the Ministry of Defence.
14. The number of State Secretaries employed by the Ministry of Defence 
should be restricted, and their responsibilities and duties clearly defined, by 
Governmental Decree.
15. The Minister of Defence should propose a special act for the introduction of 
systematic measures for the realisation of gender equality within the Armed 
Forces and the defence apparatus.
16. The Minister of Defence should propose a special act for the introduction 
of systematic measures for the realisation of representative participation by 
ethnic minorities in the Armed Forces and the defence apparatus.
17. The Minister of Defence should present regular reports to the National 
Assembly and keep the public informed on budgetary allocations to the 
Armed Forces.
18. The Minister of Defence should propose the adoption of a strategy on mili-
tary education reform.
19. Procedures should be put in place regarding the reporting of any breaches 
of legal norms, particularly human rights abuses, to the National Assembly, 
the Government and the President of the Republic and to the public.
POLICE
1. The limitations for enrolment of women into police training and education 
should be abolished. It should also be made possible that all the female 
candidates who fulfil the necessary conditions and who pass the entrance 
exams for attending the Basic Police Training and the Academy for Criminal 
and Police Studies be admitted to courses, as well as that their education is 
funded from the budget resources.   
2. Pro-active measures should be developed and endorsed for keeping wom-
en in police jobs, as well as for encouraging their career development to-
wards management positions within the operational force, without positive 
discrimination.
3. Separate budgetary resources should be allocated for publishing calls for 
applications for police jobs in minority languages and in minority commu-
nities’ media. It should be ensured that the minority members that had been 
admitted to police training and education are not discriminated against by 
their peers.
4. The term “justifiable interest” should be erased from the Article 5 of the Law 
on Police, because it stands in contradiction with the international stand-
ards on free access to information of public interest.  
5.  The Information Booklet of the MoI should be broadened to include infor-
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mation relating to the kinds of services provided by the MoI, procedures 
for exercising rights, and relevant information on the enforcement of laws 
that are most important to the public. It should also be regularly updated. 
The Information Booklet should be expanded to include data relating to 
available budgetary and other funds, including their use. It should be ex-
panded to include the data about the number of employees, salary scales, 
public procurements, available equipment and other resources. It should 
provide an overview of the revenue made by acquiring additional means 
through provision of services of the MoI (Article 182 LoP), as well as on the 
information relating to extra-budgetary means gathered for the enhance-
ment of the work of police, such as aid or donations from national or foreign 
non-governmental and other legal entities (Article 18 LoP). This should be 
published either within the Information Booklet or in a separate report. In 
addition to the list of laws enforced by the police, explanations regarding 
the most important legislative changes should be published at least twice 
a year.
6. Economic budget classification should be replaced, as soon as possible, by 
a functional budget classification so as to have a more clear presentation of 
purpose of the budgetary appropriations. All necessary conditions for the 
work of the Supreme Audit Institution should be ensured as soon as pos-
sible, and its employees should be additionally trained for the control of 
financial operations of the police and the MoI as a whole.  
7. Mechanisms should be established for regular consultations of the MoI with 
representatives from civil society and citizens regarding the policy priorities 
both at the national and at the local level.  Furthermore, permanent consul-
tation bodies in cooperation with Civil Society Organisations should be set 
up in order to enhance the process of policy and law making in the areas 
that are within the competencies of the MoI and which are crucial for Ser-
bia’s progression towards the EU, as well as for applying for the pre-acces-
sion assistance from the IPA funds.  
8. The National Community Policing Plan should be adopted and resources 
for its implementation should be allocated. As a part of the implementation 
of this plan, support should be given to the establishment and the work of 
Citizens’ Advisory Groups at the level of local communities, as well as to the 
work of the inter-agency bodies for cooperation between the police and the 
local authorities and citizens in all municipalities throughout Serbia. 
9. De-centralisation of decision-making in operational work should be pro-
moted and prescribed through regulation so as to have a more successful 
re-organisation of the MoI and police service. 
10. Possibilities for politicisation of operational work should be reduced 
through the increase of the Police Director General’s competencies. In ad-
dition, it should be ensured that police is operationally independent from 
the line ministry. 
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11. Articles 177, 178 and 175 of the Law on Police, which reduce operational 
independence necessary for efficient performance of internal control and 
oversight, should be changed. Furthermore, regional centres of the Internal 
Affairs Sector should be equipped and better staffed so as to enable more 
efficient control of police work outside Belgrade. The Internal Affairs Sector 
should be encouraged to focus particular attention on investigating and 
combating of corruption in police. 
12. Members of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, and especially mem-
bers of the Security and Defence Committee, should oversee of the work of 
the MoI and use all the mechanisms at their disposal. In addition to review-
ing the Report on the Ministry’s activities and on the security situation in 
the Republic of Serbia, which the Minister is obliged under the Law on Po-
lice (Article 9) to submit once a year, the Committee can request a separate 
report on the work of the Internal Affairs Sector of the MoI (Article 179), as 
well as other reports from within the area of competence of the Ministry. 
The Committee can pose verbal and written questions about concrete ac-
tivities of the MoI. 
13. Reports on the work of courts and public prosecutors should especially in-
corporate the data on the results regarding certain forms of police control 
and oversight, as well as the data that would indicate possible difficulties in 
conducting the control and oversight. These data should be also available to 
the public. 
14. Public prosecution and courts (judiciary) should pay special attention to ef-
ficient prosecution and sanctioning of all unlawful acts by the police; they 
should also make their rulings without undue delay on compensation of 
damages stemming from unlawful or irregular police work.
15. Courts should enhance their ruling on lawfulness of final administrative en-
actments of police bodies, including the administrative enactments relating 
to the rights and responsibilities of police officers.
16. All necessary conditions for the functioning of the Ombudsman, the Com-
missioner for Free Access to Information and the Supreme Audit Institution 
should be secured as soon as possible, and their staff should be additionally 
trained to perform the control and control and oversight of the police. A 
mechanism ensuring enforcement of decisions of these independent bod-
ies within the MoI and police should be adopted. 
17. The Government of the Republic of Serbia should adopt the plan for the 
harmonisation of the existing legal framework of police work and organi-
sation with the Constitution and the ratified international agreements, the 
goals of police reform and commitments stemming from the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (Articles 80 – 87), as well as with the commit-
ments undertaken within the regional cooperation framework (substantial 
harmonisation).
18. A thorough revision of the laws and bylaws regulating the police should be 
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conducted to ensure the protection of human rights and to verify that they 
are harmonised with international regulations. Particular attention should 
be paid to the internal police regulations that deal with certain issues rel-
evant for its performance (internal instructions and directives).
19. Overall analysis and revision of human resources should be conducted in 
line with the strategic plan. Based on the analysis, appropriate social pro-
gramme should be developed, and financial resources should be allocated 
to reduce the number of employees. Furthermore, an independent audit 
of salaries in the MoI should be conducted based on the revision of human 
resources. 
20. The Directorate for Human Resources should be enabled to recruit and train 
personnel in line with quality criteria, and to enhance and develop the ca-
reers of all police officers and supporting staff in a transparent manner and 
in line with modern principles of human resources management.
21. Mechanisms for efficient coordination and standardisation of specialised 
training within the MoI should be further developed. In addition, the Di-
rectorate for Police Education, Training, Professional Development and Sci-
ence should be tasked with the planning and implementation of this type 
of training in cooperation with the organisational units of the MoI and the 
Directorate for Human Resources. 
22. Priority should be given to the development of functional and sustainable 
capacities of criminal intelligence in the police service, thus making their 
findings available to all operational units that need them. 
23. The Ministry of Interior should develop special campaigns to enhance trust 
among groups that have the least trust in the police, such as the young ur-
ban population and members of some ethnic minorities. 
24. A strategy of the MoI, which would clearly set forth the priorities of police 
reform in the next three to five years, should be adopted. 
25. Analytical capacities of the MoI in all organisational units should be further 
developed, and especially within the Directorate for Analytics of the Gen-
eral Police Directorate. Furthermore, additional efforts should be made to 
enhance the status of analytics within the MoI. This should enable the police 
to adopt knowledge-based policing.
26. The possibility of transferring administrative work (issuing of personal doc-
uments, etc.) from the competence of the MoI under the competence of 
the Ministry for Public Administration and Local Self-Government should 
be considered.
SECURITY-INTELLIgENCE SERVICES
1. Amendments to the existing laws and provisions of new legislation on civil-
ian and military intelligence services should uniformly regulate the powers, 
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competences and procedures for the approval of special measures, as well 
as control and oversight of special measures temporarily limiting constitu-
tionally guaranteed human rights, and thus fully affirm the principles of the 
Serbian Constitution regarding the rule of law, respect of human rights and 
observance of the highest European standards in this area.
2. A new law on the Security-Intelligence Agency should be passed in order 
to precisely regulate the competences, procedures and instruments for the 
democratic civilian control and control and oversight of the Agency’s work.
3. A plan for the reform of intelligence services should be adopted by the Gov-
ernment and accompanied by budgetary appropriations.
4. The Prime Minster should be legally obliged to solicit the views of the parlia-
mentary Security and Defence Committee and the National Security Coun-
cil prior to the appointment or relief of the BIA director. 
5. A special law should regulate the procedure of secret files of citizens kept by 
the Serbian and Yugoslavian security services from 13 May 1944, and order 
their removal from the services to the state archives or another state body 
established specifically for that purpose.
6. The new laws on civilian and military intelligence services should elaborate 
and specify their obligations towards supervisory bodies and supplement 
them with the forms of control and control and oversight missing from the 
Law on the Basic Organisation of Security and Intelligence System of the RS.
7. Public information on the findings of the State Audit Institution, Defence 
and Security Committee and the Committee for Finance of the National As-
sembly, deriving from the audit of intelligence services’ financial operations, 
should be improved.
8. Legislative and systemic measures should support full independence of the 
courts from the executive, so that they can successfully oversee the work 
of intelligence services and oblige them to inform the public on the results 
and possible difficulties in the performance of this role.
9. A special act and measures should ensure full the compliance of the intel-
ligence services with obligations stemming from the Law on Free Access to 
Information of Public Importance as well as Article 15 of the Law on the Basic 
Organisation of the Security and Intelligence System of the RS.
10. All conditions for the operation of the State Audit Institution should be pro-
vided as soon as possible and its employees additionally trained for the con-
trol of intelligence services’ financial operations.
11. A special act should define systemic measures to encourage and achieve 
gender equality in the intelligence services and envisage their enforcement.
12. A special act should define systemic measures to encourage and achieve 
proportional representation of ethnic communities in intelligence services 
and envisage their enforcement. 
13. A strategy for communication with the public should be developed and 
implemented in each of the intelligence services, in order to, inter alia, im-
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prove public information on the role of intelligence services in a democratic 
society and ensure that the public is regularly informed on security phe-
nomena and events in Serbia and the region.
14. Reports on the work of intelligence submitted to state supervisory bodies 
should include information that enables reliable evaluation of their efficien-
cy.
15.  Reports on the work of intelligence submitted to state supervisory bodies 
should include information that enables reliable evaluation of their effec-
tiveness.
16. Academic and civil society organisations should encourage public dis-
course on the purpose, role and competences of the intelligence services in 
Serbia’s democratic transition.
17. The views of Serbian citizens on intelligence services and their reform 
should be systematically surveyed, and the results of this survey regularly 
presented to the public and competent state bodies.
18. Promotion of civil society organisations and independent state institutions 
and the media should contribute to the strengthening of public control and 
oversight of intelligence services.
INSTITUTIONS WITh POLICINg COMPETENCES
1. The Customs Law should be amended with provisions on parliamentary 
control and public control and oversight of the use of arms and use of force, 
as well as methods of covert collection of data on the subjects of customs 
regulations.
2. Amendments to the law should permanently regulate the procedures and 
competences for archiving and destroying intelligence available to the Cus-
toms Administration, the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laun-
dering and the Tax Police. 
3. The draft of the new Customs Law should include provisions on non-dis-
crimination.
4. The Law on Arms and Military Equipment Manufacturing and Trade should 
be amended with provisions on procedures and competences of public au-
thority bodies in the process of procurement of arms and military equip-
ment. 
5. Short-term and mid-term priorities of the Customs Administration, set forth 
in the National Programme for Integration with the EU, should be imple-
mented consistently.
6. The conditions should be created for faster modernisation of the CA’s Inter-
nal Control Department.
7. The new Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
should stipulate which body controls the Administration for the Prevention 
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of Money Laundering in terms of personal data.      
Statutory actors that do not have right to use force
PARLIAMENT
1. The Law on the National Assembly and the National Assembly Rules of Pro-
cedure should precisely define the responsibilities of the Security and De-
fence Committee and the National Assembly Finance Committee with re-
gards to control and control and oversight of the expenditure of budgetary 
resources allocated to Security and Intelligence Services and other actors 
engaged in the defence apparatus, as well as their responsibility to present 
their findings to the National Assembly and the public.
2. A programme for the additional technical training of members of the Na-
tional Assembly engaged in the Security and Defence Committee and the 
National Assembly Finance Committee is necessary to enable them to ex-
ecute effective control and control and oversight of the defence apparatus 
and the various actors therein. 
3. A separate commission for control and oversight of the security services 
should be established within the framework of the Security and Defence 
Committee. 
4. Guidelines on parliamentary control and control and oversight of the na-
tional security apparatus and the actors engaged therein should be pub-
lished and made available to members of the National Assembly.
5. A medium-term programme and an annual plan should be produced for 
control and oversight of the national security apparatus by the Security and 
Defence Committee. 
6. An annual plan for budgetary control of the security services and state ac-
tors in the national security apparatus by the Security and Defence Com-
mittee and the National Assembly Finance Committee should be produced.
7. Additional budgetary resources should be secured in order to establish a 
specialised expert panel for the Security and Defence Committee staffed by 
independent experts.
8. Amendments to existing legislation or a Governmental Decree should be 
enacted to ensure that all state institutions adhere to Article 77 of the Law 
on State Administration according to which any draft legislation that will 
“significantly change any part of the legal codex or which will cover issues 
of public interest” should be subject to public debate. The relevant institu-
tions are obliged to provide the right conditions and allow enough time for 
such a debate.
9. The Law on the National Assembly and the National Assembly Rules of Pro-
cedure should determine the responsibilities of the Security and Defence 
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Committee with regards to the control and control and oversight of the ap-
plication of police-like powers by private security companies.
10. Cooperation between the Security and Defence Committee and academic 
institutions and civil society think-tanks should be improved.
11. Occasional joint sessions between the Security and Defence Committee 
and other committees such as the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Judicial 
Committee and the Finance Committee should be encouraged.
12. A unified National Assembly Committee for Foreign Affairs, Security and 
Defence (to include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Security Inte-
gration, the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency) 
should be established, and a unified internal security committee (to include 
the Ministry of Interior, the Security Information Agency and private secu-
rity companies) should be seriously considered.
13. A public relations strategy for the National Assembly should be created and 
adopted.
ThE JUDICIARY
1. The amendment of, or an addendum to, the criminal proceedings legisla-
tion, and of the laws on civilian and military security and intelligence agen-
cies, should be made in order to create procedures for the authorisation 
of the use of surveillance that temporarily deviate from the constitution-
ally guaranteed rights and freedoms of citizens. These changes to existing 
legislation should also cover judicial control and oversight of any measures 
authorised by the courts and the obligation of the judiciary to make the 
information gathered available to the citizens in question. 
2. In further reforming the judiciary, special attention should be paid to the 
development of the role of courts and public prosecutors in the control of 
the armed forces, the police and the security services. An independent judi-
ciary is a crucial precondition for for achieving effective control.
3. Training plans and programmes for the judiciary and prosecutors should 
be designed to improve knowledge on the control of actors engaged in the 
national security apparatus.
4. Reports by the courts and public prosecutors should contain information 
on the performance of specific forms of control of the armed forces, police 
and security services, including any difficulties encountered in exercising 
such control. This information should be made available to the public. 
5. Public prosecutors’ offices should pay particular attention to the effective-
ness of prosecution and punishment of all illegal activity within the police, 
armed forces and security services and should, in a timely fashion, decide 
upon any compensation deemed necessary.
6. Courts should improve the decision-making process on the legality of ad-
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ministrative measures adopted by police or armed forces institutions, in-
cluding those measures intended to protect the rights of police officers or 
servicemen.
7. Judicial control should extend to the operations of detention centres and 
prisons, as well as customs services, the Tax Police and the Administration 
for the Prevention of Money Laundering, all of which are authorised to em-
ploy police-like powers.
8. Members of the Judicial Committee and the National Assembly administra-
tion should have the right to access court decisions that call for the use of 
special evidence gathering techniques.
9.  The capacity of the Control and oversight Committee and the Complaints 
and Petitions Service of the Supreme Court of Serbia to quickly process 
claims should be increased
PRISONS
1. It is necessary to produce and adopt a strategy outlining the aims and tasks 
of   incarceration institutions and forms of cooperation with all other insti-
tutions that can contribute to the successful reintroduction into society of 
individuals who have completed a prison sentence.
2. Resources sufficient for the application of alternative sentencing (suspend-
ed sentences, protective monitoring, community service etc.) should be 
made available.
3. A National Assembly Commission for the Control and oversight of Criminal 
Sentencing, along with the accompanying Rules of Procedure, should be 
established in the shortest possible time. 
4. The report of the Administration for the Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions, 
including information on the financial operation of such institutions, should 
be made available to the public.
5. The Administration for the Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions should, by 
Governmental Decree, be required to regularly inform the public on the 
state of prisons and on any occurrences relevant to the safety of prisoners 
or the security of the community.
6. There needs to be marked improvement in prisoner conditions. Prisoners 
must also be informed of their rights with regards to the Supreme Court and 
other institutions and must have access to free legal advice should they wish 
to appeal any court decision. Furthermore, an ordinance should be passed 
to regulate the procedure according to which prisoners can file complaints.
7. The powers of the Republic Ombudsman and the Regional Ombudsman to 
deal with prisoner complaints should be improved, as should the ability of 
the civil society sector to exercise control and oversight over the execution 
of criminal sanction and the functioning of prisons.
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8. It is necessary to protect the rights of prisoners from ethnic and religious 
minorities to use their own language, practice their religious customs and 
have access to special diets.
9. The manpower of the prison services should be expanded. All employees 
of the prison services should receive special training in the protection of 
prisoners’ human rights.
Non-statutory actors that use force
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
1. New legislation should be passed in order to regulate the powers available 
to private security companies and to regulate their relations with state ac-
tors in the field of national security.
2. The new legislation on the private provision of security should regulate the 
conditions necessary for the issuing of licences to companies and individu-
als operating in the private security sector.
3. The National Security Strategy and the National Defence Strategy should 
clearly define the role of private security companies.
4. New legislation, or an amendment of existing legislation, is necessary to 
regulate cooperation between private and state actors in the field of na-
tional security.
5. Amendments to the Constitution, existing legislation and Rules of Proce-
dure are required in order to define the authority of the National Assembly 
to exercise control and control and oversight over the way private security 
companies use weapons, apply force and employ covert surveillance tech-
niques.
6. The standards required for the training and education of private security 
sector workers should be regulated by law. The training and educational 
programmes should include content on the protection of human rights.
7. The existing Law on Weapons and Ammunition should be amended in or-
der to avoid deviations created by the application of the current law – such 
as lengthy verification procedures.
8. It is necessary to reaffirm legal obligations of the owners or managers of 
private security companies to fully comply with regulations governing the 
classification of information and the protection of personal information.
9. The operability of laws such as the Law on Freedom of Access to Informa-
tion of Public Importance, the Law on Defence and the Law on Criminal Pro-
ceedings must be improved.
10. A central database of private security companies (whether as an independ-
ent body or as a department within the Ministry of Interior), which would 
maintain up-to-date information on the activities of private security compa-
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nies, should be established.
11. On the basis of comparative research projects, it is necessary to encourage 
insurance companies to introduce premiums for high-quality security, i.e. 
penalties for low-quality security.
12. It is necessary to research public opinion with regards to the private security 
sector and to determine the level of public trust in private security compa-
nies.
Non-statutory actors that do not use force 
CIVIL SOCIETY
1. National Security Strategy and Strategy of Defence should define the role of 
CSOs in the security and defence of the Republic of Serbia.  
2. Existing laws governing the security sector and actors should be amended 
to create legal grounds for cooperation between CSOs and security system 
actors. 
3. Legislative provisions should further regulate the competences, proce-
dures, processes and instruments of the control and oversight of security 
sector and security system in the Republic of Serbia. 
4. It is necessary to adopt the Law on Associations to regulate the activities 
and funding of CSOs.
5. Tax and import duty relief should be introduced for non-profit civil society 
organisations.
6. Civil society organisations can increase their creditability among the actors 
of security sector and the society by striving to upgrade their expertise for 
participation in the public control and oversight of security system.
7. An increased number of joint activities of CSOs will strengthen their influ-
ence and, in all likelihood, result in increased trust in their activities.
8. It is necessary that civil society organisations and other security sector ac-
tors pursue the development of measures and procedures which will in-
crease the security system actors’ trust in CSOs. 
9. Civil society organisations can increase the trust of the representatives of 
security sector and the society if they raise the visibility level of their opera-
tions and financial transactions.

PART TWO
 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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1. Concept of Security 
Sector Reform
Filip Ejdus
Since it emerged from the donor and academic communities in the 1990s, the 
concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been through numerous transfor-
mations.4 SSR can be defined as “the process through which security sector ac-
tors adapt to the political and organizational demands of transformation.”5 The 
aim of SSR is “the efficient and effective provision of state and human secu-
rity within a framework of democratic governance.”6 This definition of SSR has 
five main elements. First, efficiency which can be seen as the match between 
achieved results and means. Second, effectiveness can be defined as harmony 
between aims and achieved outcomes. Third, human security refers to freedom 
from fear and protection of human rights. Human security has two further as-
pects: freedom from chronic threats, such as murder, hunger, illness and repres-
sion; and protection from sudden and damaging disruptions in all aspects of 
life, either at home, in work or in the community.7 Fourth, national security is de-
fined as the preservation of territorial integrity, national independence and sov-
ereignty, and the political stability of government institutions.8 Fifth, democratic 
governance within the concept of SSR refers to legitimacy, representativeness, 
transparency, participativeness (participation of citizens), legality and account-
ability in the governing of the security sector. Thus, given the criteria of demo-
cratic governance SSR is not an easy, simple technical process of the reorganisa-
tion of the security sector. The concept of SSR also incorporates the values of 
liberal democracy and the efforts invested in the adoption of those values.9
4 Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform (Geneva: Demo-
cratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF, 2003).
5 Timothy Edmunds, Security sector reform in transforming societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montene-
gro (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). (p.25)
6 Heiner Hänggi, Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction, p. 3, in Alan 
Bryden, Heiner Hänggi, Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2004.
7 United Nations Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
8 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: an agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold 
war era (London: Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
9 Wilfried Bredow and Wilhelm N. German, Assessing Success and -Practical needs and Theoretical 
Responses-DCAF Working Paper No.12 (Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces-DCAF, 2002) 
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 The Elements of the Concept
Security sector reform is comprised of three elements. These elements, which 
are analysed in detail below, are actors, context, aims and dimensions. Actors of 
SSR are the organisations which are responsible for the protection of the state 
and society.10 The researchers adopted an holistic approach to SSR11 actors and 
divided them into four groups:
a. Statutory actors who have the 
right to use force
(military, police, intelligence service 
etc.)
c. Non-statutory actors who have 
the right to use force
(private security companies, 
paramilitary units, etc.)
b. Statutory actors that do not have 
the right to use force (parliament, 
judiciary, independent bodies, etc.)
d. Non-statutory actors that do 
not have the right to use force 
(civil society organisations, media, 
universities, etc.)
Table 9:  Holistic matrix of security sector actors
The first group includes statutory actors that have the right to use force, such 
as the military, the police, the intelligence services and other governmental 
bodies which are authorised to use some police powers. These governmental 
apparatuses which have a monopoly over the legitimate use of power form the 
“hard core” of the security sector. The second group are statutory actors that do 
not have the right to use power, and are directly in charge of managing the secu-
rity sector. These include parliament, government, the Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the judiciary. These institutions 
are at the same time in charge of democratic civilian control and control and 
oversight of government apparatuses of power, and therefore have a central 
role for SSR. The third group of actors in the security sector are non-statutory ac-
tors who have the right to use power. These include private organisations which 
legitimately use force, such as private security companies, intelligence services 
10 Nicole Ball, Spreading Good Practices [in] Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British 
Government (London: Saferworld, 1998).
11 For more on the difference between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of the security sector see: 
Timothy Edmunds, ‘Security sector reform: Concepts and Implementation’ in Towards security 
sector reform in post Cold War Europe: A framework for assessment, eds. Wilhelm N. Germann and 
Timothy Edmunds. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 15–31.
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and military companies.12 Finally, the fourth group includes all civil society insti-
tutions which do not use force, but are involved in public control and oversight 
and discourse on security issues. These are civil society organisations (CSOs), the 
media, universities and social movements.13   
The authors believe that a holistic approach has several advantages over 
one that analyses only the statutory actors directly in charge for providing secu-
rity services (A and B in Table 1). Firstly, in practice, by not conceptualising SSR 
with civil society and the private security sector, it is impossible to fully capture 
the extent of demand for security in a pluralistic society, which consequently 
impacts upon the development of policies for reform. Secondly, the holistic ap-
proach creates better preconditions for a security system in which a coherent 
and consistent security policy is implemented. However, this approach has its 
flaws. The biggest challenge is to clearly define actors and clearly draw bounda-
ries in order to avoid an approach which is too broad.14 
Context is the second important element in Security Sector Reform (SSR). In 
the literature, three types of contexts are discussed - post-authoritarian, post-
conflict and developmental.15 Further, there is also SSR in developed countries. 
Each context provides its own set of particularities and problems. In the post-
authoritarian context, the most important is the democratisation of the secu-
rity sector, which includes the introduction of civilian and democratic control of 
the armed forces, the opening of secret files and lustration of former members 
of security sector directly involved in human rights abuses. Such issues were 
faced, for instance, by countries in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. In 
the post-conflict context, the key task is the gradual pacification of the security 
sector, an issue that involves demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration, de-
mining and prevention of proliferation of small and personal weapons. Lebanon 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina are examples of states which are facing such post-
conflict problems. The developmental context is characteristic of economically 
under-developed countries.  Under these circumstances, SSR is mostly focused 
12 Here, to an extent, we can include those private actors which use force illegally, such as 
organised criminal groups and terrorist groups, etc. These groups represent part of the so called 
‘unsecured sector’ of the security sector and pose a threat to the state and individual security. 
We believe these should be singled out for special attention. These groups should be studied ac-
cording to the degree they interact with the legitimate security system within the third group of 
the aforementioned actors (for example the connection of state security service and organised 
crime, integration of ex-terrorist organisations into the political system and so on).
13 For the more detailed information, see Directory of Organizations and Institutions interested for 
security topics/issues (Belgrade: Center for Civil Military Relations 2008.)
14 For example, the boundaries of the sector, could in theory include sexual education in el-
ementary schools, because the health of the nation is also a part of the security sector.
15 Heiner Hänggi, Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction (Geneva: Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces – DCAF, 2004), 275.
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on the reduction of the security apparatus and a reallocation of funds.16 In real-
ity, many states, including those in the Western Balkans, face a combination of 
these problems. Serbia is no exception. Previous authoritarian systems - pred-
ecessors of the parliamentary democracy in Serbia - have left the country with 
a weak parliament, hidden centres of power within the security sector, and the 
infiltration of organised crime in the state. A further set of problems can be at-
tributed to the legacy of four wars during the 1990s. First, there are unsolved 
security issues which, due to a lack of political will, threaten to further desta-
bilise the region, including the unresolved status of Kosovo and Metohija and 
potential ‘flare’ points in south Serbia and the Sandzak region. Further, there 
are the problems with demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, of both 
regular units and paramilitary units such as the Special Operations Unit and the 
so called ‘Scorpions’. Members of the security community also have to confront 
past actions and war crimes. Finally, important quesions remain over Serbia’s 
integration in Euro-Atlantic alliances.
The fourth context of transformation concerns economically developed 
countries. New, asymmetrical threats to security, such as global terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have precipitated a transfor-
mation process of the armed forces in developed states. However, this research 
does not concentrate on these states. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the secu-
rity sector in Serbia in terms of the technological gap between the capacity 
and compatibility of the Serbian Armed Forces and NATO and (established) EU 
member states, some of which are also undergoing a transformation process in 
military affairs.17 
The next element of SSR can be described according to three principal aims: 
enlargement of security capacities; democratisation; and, economic develop-
ment. However, these aims have the potential to be in conflict with each other. 
For example, the expansion of security capacities requires enormous material 
and social resources, which can be detrimental to economic development. Al-
ternatively, a reduction of security capacities can accelerate economic devel-
opment, but at the same time leave the security sector without adequate re-
sponses to deal with internal and external threats. Also, democratisation can 
temporarily weaken a state’s security capacity. For example, in societies where 
16 State distribution of security to all its citizens corresponds with standards developed within 
the concept of ‘good governance’. Incapability of the state to fulfil this function in distribut-
ing security as a public good, generates new security problems, because the state (in this case 
defined as ‘weak’ or ‘ ruined’) endangers the security of all of its citizens and becomes the source 
of insecurity.
17 In established democracies, the problem of executing democratic civilian control over the 
armed forces is still an issue, especially in the context of the use of domestic armed forces in mis-
sions under international authority (for example missions in Afghanistan and Iraq)
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institutions are extremely weak18, and civil society is undeveloped, opportu-
nities can arise for domestic or foreign actors to abuse the main principles of 
democratic control. On the other hand, increasing the number of actors who 
have powers to gather security-related data, can actually reduce transparency, 
responsibility and legality of the security sector, and narrow the scope of hu-
man rights, endangering the process of democratisation. Thus, it is necessary 
to create adequate and specific priorities to achieve these aims. These priorities 
must be based on valid and objectively founded assessments of internal and 
external security challenges and risks, material and human capacities, as well 
as assessments of political processes in the broader social context. The authors 
believe that such a holistic approach to SSR is the most appropriate for such as-
sessments and for describing a ‘broader picture’ about security sector.
Levels of analysis
In this research, the focus of SSR analysis is at the state and individual levels.19 
Local, regional and trans-regional analysis is not considered in this research.20 
The state level includes the security dynamics connected to the stability of insti-
tutions and the territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia. The individual 
level includes security dynamics related to individuals who live or are based on 
the territory of the Republic of Serbia. This level of analysis has several advan-
tages. First, it gives clear demarcation of the research topic. Second, it provides 
the potential for influencing policy formation processes and decision-making 
at the state level. However, by focusing on the individual, the research also un-
derlines the fact that individuals must be the primary referential object of se-
curity. The state, or region, will not be safe unless all individuals present there 
are safe. However, the authors are aware that the security and political dynam-
ics of the security sector in Serbia cannot be understood without reference to 
regional dynamics.21 Certain security threats facing Serbia and its citizens exist 
at the regional level, and countries in the region need to cooperate in order to 
tackle such security issues. Thus, upon completion of the mapping of the secu-
18 This referes to low levels of public trust in the institutions and the lack of socio-political cohe-
sion between citizens and governmental institutions.
19 In Anglo-Saxon literature those two levels are called national security and human security. 
See in: Burry Burzan, People, State and Fear: and agenda for International Security in the post-
cold war era, London, Prentice Hall, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) and Rolan Paris,” Human 
Security:Paradigm Shift or Hot Air”. International Security, Vol 26,no.2(2001): 87-102
20 During 2009 CCMR in cooperation with DCAF and consortium of research organizations from 
the region of the Western Balkan, will conduct regional mapping and control and oversight of 
the SSR, using the methodology which is presented in this  Yearbook
21 The theory of regional security complex see at: Burry Burzan and Ole Weaver,Regions and Pow-
ers: The Structure of International Security(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2003)
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rity sector in Serbia (phase one), the authors will apply the same instruments 
and methods to the regional level of the Western Balkans (phase two). The sub-
national level (south of Serbia, Sandzak, etc) and the trans-regional level (the 
Euro-Atlantic region; EU, NATO and PfP) will be included in the research phases 
as a secondary level of analysis.22
22 The example of trans- regional analysis of security sector see: David Law. Security Sector Re-
form in the Euro Atlantic region: unfinished business in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security 
Sector  eds Alan Byden and Heiner Haggi( Geneva: DCAF. 2004)
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An Approach to Mapping
and Measuring Security 
Sector Reform
by Sonja Stojanović
A man who knows the price of everything, does not know the value of anything.
 (Lord Darlington in Lady Windermere’s Fan, by Oscar Wilde, 1896) 
In this paper we will present the assumptions underlying the research con-
ducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations team within the “Mapping and 
Monitoring Security Sector Reform in Serbia” project. The rationale for measur-
ing Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Serbia will be explained in the first part. We 
will then go on to show how this rationale has influenced the shaping of the 
research topic, the method of measurement and the choice of criteria.  For this 
purpose a brief overview of the method used in analysing the context of securi-
ty sector reform will also be given, including a look at the effects of the findings 
on formulating the key research question. Next, we will describe the process of 
developing the Security Sector Reform Index (SSRI), including the challenges 
that the research team was faced with whilst testing the methods for measuring 
the progress of security sector reform in the case of Serbia. In addition, we will 
present some of the lessons learnt and dilemmas which arose while monitoring 
the trends and assessing the achievements of SSR in Serbia. Certain insights 
gained during the research are offered, as we believe they may be of use for 
the research and measurement of SSR in other countries. This paper concludes 
with an outline of the research team’s plan for further future development of the 
methods presented.
The Rationale for Measuring the Progress of SSR 
There were several distinct sets of reasons why the Centre’s researchers decid-
ed to undertake the measurement of SSR progress. First, the intention was to 
make up for the lack of methods and instruments for monitoring and measuring 
the progress of reform across the security sector as a whole, from the perspec-
tive of the citizens of countries in transition. It was obvious that civil society 
organisations, not only in Serbia, lacked reliable methods and instruments for 
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monitoring the process and measuring the progress made in the reform of this 
sector. We were also inspired by the new concept of a holistic approach to se-
curity sector reform, which endeavours to treat the human/individual security 
and national security as equal goals of security policy, while acknowledging the 
contribution of both non-state and traditional state actors in the realisation of 
these goals. This is a relatively new concept which developed quite rapidly dur-
ing the mid and late 1990s, predominantly in developed countries.23 The con-
cept was developed in the developed countries of the north inspired by the 
need to provide development assistance to post-conflict countries, as well as 
to act more coherently in the context of peace missions.24 The concept of SSR 
was also inspired by the broad reforms undertaken in developed countries and 
known under the term of “new public management”. One of the approaches 
recommended in these reforms was to develop the horizontal coordination of 
different state actors with the aim of finding suitable and optimal answers to 
contemporary security challenges, risks and threats.25
The other set of reasons for this research stems from the fact that the ma-
jority of methods and instruments used to assess SSR range are devised to suit 
donors’ needs and interests. This applies equally to individual donor countries26 
and international organizations which endorse reform in candidate countries 
seeking membership (NATO, EU) or in their own member countries (OSCE, UN). 
This could be an explanation, at least in part, why none of these organisations 
23 For a good overview of the development of the concept of SSR see: Brzoska, M. (2000) ‘The 
concept of security sector reform’, in: BICC Brief 15 – Security Sector Reform (Bonn International 
Center for Conversion) and Brzoska, M. (2003). Development Donors and the Concept of Security 
Sector Reform, DCAF Geneva. 
24 The UN is developing a new concept of integrated peace missions, while NATO is working on a 
comprehensive approach to peace missions. For more details see Hanggi, Heiner  and Scherrer, 
Vincenza (2008) ‘Towards an Integrated Security Sector Reform Approach in UN Peace Opera-
tions’, International Peacekeeping, Volume 15, Issue 4 August 2008, pp. 486 - 500
25 See theoretical work on joined-up governance i.e., cooperation within state governance, look 
in: G. Peters (2003) Handbook of Public Administration (London: Sage). About the whole-of-
government approach to security policy reform, see: Bailes, Alyson (2005). ”Terrorism and the 
International Security Agenda since 2001.” In Combating Terrorism and its Implications for the 
Security Sector, edited by Alyson Bailes et al. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of the Armed Forces.
26 The most conceptualization of security sector  reform came from United Kingdom, the Nether-
lands and Germany. For the key sources from Great Bretain see: Jeniffer Sugden, „Security Sector 
Reform: the role of epistemic communities in the UK,“ Journal of Security Sector Management, 
Vol. 4, No. 4 (2006), http://www.ssronline.org/jofssm/index.cfm, yatim Safety, Security and Acces-
sible Justice – Putting Policy into Practice (London: Departmenr for International Development, 
2004). Za holandske modele videti: Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, Enhancing 
Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework (The 
Hague: Netherlands. Ministry of Foregin Affairs, 2003) i Suzanne Verstegen, Luc van de Goor and 
Jeroen de Zeeuw. The stabillity assesment framework: designing integrated responsens for secu-
rity, governance and development (The Hague: Netherlands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).
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have developed a comprehensive approach to measuring progress in security 
sector reform; or to be more precise, why they only draw their beneficiaries’ at-
tention to certain parts and aspects of SSR. For example, NATO has established 
numerous indicators for measuring the success of military and defence system 
reform. Conversely, the EU, in the course of its enlargement, focuses mostly on 
police reform and the reform of other bodies with certain police competences. 
Similarly, the OSCE and the Council of Europe mostly focus on assessing the ex-
tent to which human rights of ordinary citizens and employees in security forces 
are observed. Furthermore, the World Bank and the IMF focus on measuring 
good governance and progress in combating corruption across state security 
institutions, while the UN concentrates on security sector reform in the post-
conflict context.27 So far, the OECD has been the only organisation which has 
developed, in the Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and 
Justice28 in 2007, guidelines and instruments for an implementation of holistic 
approach to SSR and for measuring its progress. However, these are primarily 
intended for donor countries which are members of the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee29. The Handbook contains guidelines that donors should 
follow in assisting security system reform in beneficiary countries. During the 
preparation of the Handbook, the authors consulted a large number of organi-
sations and individuals from both underdeveloped countries and countries in 
transition. However, the fact remains that the methods and criteria described 
for the assessment of SSR progress are primarily tailored to donors’ needs.  
For this reason the Centre’s research team has endeavoured over the past 
two years to develop methods first for mapping security sector reform, and then 
for measuring the progress of this reform in countries in transition, mostly from 
the standpoint of the needs and role of citizens and civil society. In accordance 
with this, the criteria for assessing progress in SSR were formulated with a view 
to monitoring the role that civil society should play in this reform. Therefore, 
the criteria should encompass and express the characteristics of the context in 
which SSR is carried out in the countries in transition.
The second important motive is to publicly advocate - based on clearly set 
criteria and empirical data - for greater democratic governance in the security 
sector, as well as for increased efficiency and effectiveness in providing national 
and individual security in Serbia. The guiding principle here is the claim that 
27 For a detailed list of standards and models for the SSR promoted by different international 
organizations, look in: Law, D. (ed.) (2007) Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector 
Reform (DCAF).
28 OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice (2007) 
available at: www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr 
29 DAC-Development Assistance Committee is the main body within which the OECD member 
countries coordinate their assistance programs (www.oecd.org/dac) 
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“What gets measured, gets managed.”30 This claim is based on the assumption 
that the main problems in SSR, as well as the correlations between these identi-
fied problems, the measures undertaken and their results, can only be identi-
fied during such an evaluation process. Therefore, measuring should provide 
better insight into actual problems in Serbia’s SSR and assist with development 
of the corresponding recommendations for improving security sector govern-
ance.  Another assumption is that the attention of the government and the pub-
lic can only be drawn to the reform process and potential setbacks in its course 
once regular monitoring and assessment of progress across the entire sector 
has been conducted.
In accordance with the points mentioned above, we hope that the publica-
tion of the results of this research will create favourable conditions for a public 
debate about improving the security sector governance. The results could fur-
ther be used as an empirical and objective starting point for a debate about the 
contribution of current agents of power to SSR progress, or about their respon-
sibility for potential setbacks and delays in the process. This should also help 
reduce the scope for the politicisation and securitisation of public demands for 
the regular monitoring and assessment of SSR progress. This is of great impor-
tance, as SSR belongs to the domain of high politics31, i.e., a public policy domain 
which is of particular importance for the sovereignty of a state and the pro-
tection of its citizens’ national identity. It is different from so-called low politics, 
i.e., public policies dealing with issues affecting citizens’ daily lives, in which the 
authorities are generally more willing to allow the results of their actions to be 
brought under public scrutiny and to accept that some of their competencies 
might be limited in the process of international integrations. National security 
and foreign affairs policies generally fall into the category of high politics. As 
these deal with the preservation of the physical existence of the (political) com-
munity, they are often exempt from public scrutiny.  These policies are difficult 
to be put under public scrutiny as they more easily trigger emotions, prejudice, 
beliefs and ideology laden arguments than rational evidence-based discussion. 
Therefore, we expect to create environment for a debate on these topics to be 
based on rational arguments by putting forward evidence which has been col-
lected in a systematic manner and clear criteria for measuring the success or 
failure of each policy. This is particularly important for young democracies such 
as Serbia which do not have a long tradition of citizen participation in the con-
trol and oversight of the security sector and where traditional security actors 
benefit more from improved public reputation and experience than civil society 
30 „What gets measured gets managed“, quoted  from reviewed text on performance  measure-
ment ant its shortcomings in the reform of new public administration in: Christopher Pollitt, 
„How Do We Know How Good Public Services Are,“ in Governance for the Twentz-First Century, 
eds., B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 121.
31 Hoffmann, S. (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of West-
ern Europe.’ Daedalus. No. 95, pp. 892-908.
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organisations. The results of this research and the Index model could contribute 
to the increased visibility of civil society organisations amongst the expert and 
general public in Serbia. They could also, if such expert evaluation justifies their 
validity, instigate a public debate on the desirable goals of SSR in Serbia. 
The Centre’s research team has not given up on the ambition to contrib-
ute to the academic pool of knowledge by devising and analysing methods for 
measuring the effectiveness of SSR. This refers particularly to findings about the 
multiple interconnections between the level of SSR and the processes of de-
mocratisation and economic development in a society. Academic research gen-
erally aims to identify and determine the specific features of certain processes in 
one state and to uncover and explain their similarities with the same processes 
taking place in other states, e.g., those underway in states in transition. For this 
reason, when methods for measuring the progress of SSR were being devised, 
great attention was given to analysing the specificities of this process in Serbia. 
Consequently, a great share of the research focused on the context analysis in 
order to fully examine the impact of local political events on SSR. At the same 
time, great attention was paid to determining whether the same procedures 
and instruments are applicable, i.e., verifiable (when submitted to falsification) 
in other countries as well. We tried, to the best of our abilities, to formulate the 
criteria and indicators in the SSR Index in such a way that they can be used in 
other country settings. The primary aim of this publication is to contribute to the 
development of practical policies in Serbia. However, we hope that the empiri-
cal data and insights presented in the publication will raise readers’ awareness 
about the potential difficulties occurring in measuring the process, as well as 
encourage further academic research on the SSR process in states in transition. 
To sum up, the aim of devising the SSR Index was to devise a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to expose the dynamics 
of SSR, identify its “critical points” and provide tools for the longitudinal tracking 
of this process in Serbia and other countries. We opted for a two-phase meth-
odology in order to establish a measuring system which would reflect the spe-
cificities of the reform process in the state we were analysing and enable the 
comparison with reforms in other states. The first phase of empirical research 
involves the analysis of a wider social context of SSR. The second phase involves 
the application of the SSRI model to the reform of this sector in Serbia.  
The Analysis of the SSR Context
If we accept the fact that SSR is primarily a political process which has been tak-
ing place in many countries at an uneven pace, then we also need to analyse 
and understand the local context in which reform is being carried out. Despite 
the fact that both security and political dynamics in a country are largely de-
termined by international and regional contexts, the meaning of security chal-
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lenges, risks and threats, as well as the need to find potential solutions to them, 
is mostly defined at the level of the political community, which, in the European 
context, is represented by the state. As this is the first attempt at mapping and 
assessing SSR progress in Serbia, only the local context was analysed in the pi-
lot-phase of the project. If the project continues, a wider (regional) context will 
be analysed over the coming phases, including the evaluation of the EU and 
NATO policy of pre-conditioning. For this reason, the model method for carry-
ing out a SSR context analysis will be presented (based on literature review) 
in further text . The results of its application to the context of SSR in Serbia are 
presented in the text by Miroslav Hadzic32 which is included in this publication.
The analysis of the SSR context within a state is usually carried out on three 
levels. The wider socio-political context is analysed first. This is followed by an 
analysis of the dynamics and main characteristics of the security sector, as well 
as their constituting elements. The actions of key political actors are analysed 
last. The rationale for a three-level approach is that progress or delays in SSR 
cannot be measured out of context, nor solely on the basis of an ideal model 
of reform. The interpretation and measurement of the level of reform depend 
mostly on the political legacy, types of actors and their motives for selecting a 
specific security policy. 
We would like to emphasise that our interpretation of the term ’key politi-
cal actors’ is somewhat different from Hanggi’s33 interpretation. He identified 
four groups of institutions and actors by placing them on a two-dimensional 
scale: state and non-state, the ones using force and the ones not using force. 
The Centre’s research team adopted and used this classification in measuring 
SSR progress in Serbia. Nonetheless, in the context analysis, and unlike Hanggi, 
we classified as political actors all social groups which actively participate in de-
fining and implementing security policies – from political parties and business 
elites, professional stakeholders within the security sector, to organised groups 
which monitor their activities. This implies that all formal and informal groups 
which may influence political decision-making in the field of SSR, i.e., groups 
which may either support or obstruct reform out of their own interest, were also 
regarded as political actors. This is important to note, as the underlying assump-
tion of this research was that SSR trends in Serbia were only partly influenced 
by the situation at the begining of transition, which means that the local politi-
cal actors were powerful enough and able to mould this situation according to 
their own concept of SSR. 
32 Text M. Hadžić, p. 105.
33 Text F. Ejdus, p. 65.
75
Scheme1: Levels of the SSR context analysis
1. Characteristics of the socio-political context
If the entire security sector and the dynamics of change within it are to be in-
cluded in the measurement of SSR progress, it is necessary to first analyse the 
wider socio-political context in which this sector has developed and is being 
reformed.34 A list of the key features of the given context should be compiled 
34 For detailed parameters for the scanning of the socio-political context in OECD,DAC see: The 
Handbook on Security System Reform – Supporting Security and Justice (2007), str. 50-57 i Ver-
stegen, S., van de Goor, L. and de Zeuuw (2005), The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing 
Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (The Hague: Clingendael Institute 
for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp. 25-35 and 46-48
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on the basis of this analysis.35 In other words, the results of this analysis should 
make it possible to answer four key questions, which, once they are answered, 
can and should be further sub-divided:
1. What is the security context like? Is the country in question enjoying the 
benefits of a long period of peace or has it recently experienced an exter-
nally imposed or internal conflict? What are the consequences of that con-
flict on the society and how are these manifested across the security sector?
2. What is the political context (Does the state exist or is it in the making? What 
is the type of rule? To what extent are human rights and freedoms protected 
and exercised? What is the level of autonomy and development of civil soci-
ety? What marginalised groups are there, etc.)?
3. What is the level of economic development (What are the obstacles to eco-
nomic development? Does spending on the state bodies operating in the 
security sector affect the provision of other public assets? Is there wide-
spread corruption? What are the differences in economic development 
across the country, etc.)? 
4. Is there a “demand” for security sector reform? And if such a demand exists, 
what part or goal of the reform matters most to the public (citizens)?36 Who 
creates expectations from SSR in the public discourse and what are these? 
A chronology of reform should be drawn up, based on the answers provid-
ed to the questions above, with clearly defined key phases and turning points 
which have influenced the current context of reform. Only a few key phases and 
events from the recent past, in which the political and/or public expectations of 
the security sector as a whole and of its constituent parts were negotiated and 
formulated should be defined, provided that a zero point has been determined. 
To determine the periodisation of the reform, “specific threshold” and “tipping 
points”37 - marking significant changes in the perception of the local security 
35 Researchers from the Dutch Intitute of International Relations Clingendel have developed a 
trend analysis using 12 key indicators to determine the degree and nature of (in)stability in a 
society: (1) indicators of good governance: (a) state legitimacy, (b) provision of public services, 
(c) the rule of law and human rights, (d) leadership models – the elite; (2) security indicators: (a) 
security apparatus, (b) regional environment; (3) socio-economic indicators: (a) demographic 
pressure, (b) refugees and internally displaced persons, (c) hostility stemming from group 
identity  (d) emigration from the country, (e) economic opportunities for all groups, (f ) the state 
of economy. Source: Verstegen, S., van de Goor, L. and de Zeuuw (2005), The Stability Assess-
ment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development (The 
Hague: Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs), p. 26
36 Look for a more detailed questionnaire in the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System 
Reform – Supporting Security and Justice (2007), pp. 52-56 for  (a) the analysis of conflicts and 
political economy, (b) capacity and type of management of judicial and security institutions, (c) 
the need of people, especially the poor, for security and justice.
37 Terminology was borrowed from transition theories and in English these terms are as follows: 
specific tresholds , tipping points  and  critical junctures..
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sector and/or in the course of national security policy - should be identified in 
the processes of political transformation. In identifying the tipping points, for-
mal developments in the political system, such as peace treaties, the adoption 
of a new constitution or elections which marked a turning point in society are 
to be taken into consideration. Changes in citizens’ expectations of the security 
sector should also be recorded, as well as any changes in the degree of the sec-
tor’s legitimacy. Variations in the degree of legitimacy of the security sector and 
its actors could then be interpreted as an important indicator of change in the 
public demand for reform. 
Changes in the “demand for reform” in a given country can be identified by 
analysing the results of local public opinion polls and by applying the securitisa-
tion theory (Buzan et al. 1998) to political processes. This should help determine 
when and how SSR became a part of the state (national) policy agenda. Conse-
quently, based on the findings of specialised public polls38 and of the sections of 
regular public polls examining citizens’ confidence in the state institutions, it is 
possible to assess citizens’ attitudes about the (il)legitimacy of the security sec-
tor, what they expect from the changes and what their reactions to changes are. 
This approach is in keeping with the normative assumption of the SSR concept, 
which postulates that reform should enable the fulfilment of citizens’ rights and 
needs for security in accordance with the concept of human security. An analy-
sis of the distribution of the trends and attitudes expressed in public surveys will 
also show what significance the respondents (citizens) give to SSR, and if they 
consider it as more important than reforms in other state government sectors. 
The degree of the security sector’s legitimacy is also an indicator of how 
much “social” capital the enactors of the reform have at their disposal, that is, 
how much patience the public will show and how much room for manoeuvre 
the elites have at the beginning of the transition. 
The findings collated from the public opinion research can be of great as-
sistance in interpreting the political elites’ prioritising in SSR. Answers can be 
provided as to why the agents of power considered some changes in the parts 
of the sector as less important and therefore did not initiate them at all. For 
example, the indifference of the new authorities in Serbia after 2000 with re-
gard to the civilian protection sector reform or to the legal regulation of the 
private security sector status can be at least partially explained by the fact that 
the public did not find these topic to be of great significance, nor were these 
issues perceived as a threat to their security. Consequently, these topics are 
not easily securitised, unlike the ones pertaining to the military, police or intel-
ligence services’ reforms. During the early transition period, the Serbian public 
viewed the police, the intelligence services and the military top ranks as the 
38 In Serbia these include public surveys on the military reform, security issues, and Euro-Atlantic 
security integrations which the CCMR conducted in 2003-2005, victimological reaserch carried 
out by the Serbian Victimological Society, the research conducted on the police activities which 
was commissioned by the OSCE in 2002 and 2008, etc. 
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main mechanisms of repression of the previous regime. The public thus expect-
ed and demanded that they be rapidly and radically reformed. Conversely, the 
area of civilian protection remained removed from public scrutiny up until great 
incidents and natural disasters occured, such as the explosion in the ammuni-
tion warehouse in Paracin in 2007 or the floods in 2006.     
An analysis of the dominant processes of securitisation in Serbia should 
be added to the findings of the public polls in order to get a valid insight into 
the nature and the characteristics of the context. Securitisation is understood 
here as a discursive process, whereby a specific situation is labelled as a security 
threat to the existence of the political community, which entails the need to 
resort to extraordinary measures (which are not applied under ordinary political 
circumstances)39. The analysis of the key securitising actors, types of threats and 
required special measures provides greater insight into the trends and mecha-
nisms of the legitimisation of reforms, as well as into the ways some actors of 
the reform gain public authority.40 The fact that we are talking about a turbulent 
transitional period in which, in shaping a new common identity, the agents of 
transition lead intensive debates on numerous social norms – only adds to the 
importance of applying this approach. The Centre’s assumption, based on all 
the points mentioned above, is that SSR cannot be objectively measured on 
the basis of visible material indicators only. To understand and measure SSR it is 
necessary to bear in mind the fact that both the security threats and the reform 
priorities are constructs which are shaped by the discursive actions undertaken 
by the local actors. For this reason it is difficult to measure and describe the 
complex political nature of this process and the contradictory trends within it 
by using exclusively material indicators.  
Lastly, the analysis of the socio-political context should help establish which 
are the dominant processes to have influenced the shaping of SSR in a country. 
Is it mainly a post-conflict, post-authoritarian, developmental or a strong-state 
context?41 A combination of contexts is also possible as long as the dynamics 
and the mechanisms which influence these processes are explained as precise-
ly and thoroughly as possible for the country at stake. A wider socio-political 
analysis should provide a brief periodisation and an analysis of the key events 
or tipping points from the recent past which have influenced citizens’ expecta-
tions and the capacity of political actors to guide reform at the present moment. 
This analysis should also shed light on the resonance of the reforms among the 
public, the security sector and the public discourse.
39 Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A New Framework For Analysis. (London/
Boulder: Lynne Rienner).
40 Loader, I. (2002), ‘Policing, securitization and democratization in Europe’, Criminal Justice, 2 (2), 
pp. 125-153.
41 For potential contexts of reform, see table SSR. For more information about Hanggi’s defini-
tion of the four possible contexts, see text about the SSR concept. For further information about 
the difficulties of their operationalisation in the case of Serbia, see text about SSR context.
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2. Sector Analysis
In the next stage we “step away” from the socio-political level and delve into the 
analysis of the characteristics pertaining to the security sector and their relation 
to the rest of the state administration, as well as towards the analysis of the sec-
tor’s internal dynamics. This analysis should result in:
1) a list of all statutory and non-statutory actors across the security sector,
2) a description of the current state and types of relations across the sector, 
particularly between those who have power and its civilian counterpart42,
3) an assessment of each group of actors’ capacity,
4) an overview of each group of actors’ field of expertise and 
5) an outline of the dominant patterns of sector management and the man-
agement of each separate group of actors 
By analysing the existing capacity and expertise we are trying to indentify 
the type, scope and quality of the material, financial and human resources which 
the sector and its actors have at disposal. Institutional framework within which 
the state administration operates has to be determined as well. That should help 
identify both potential obstacles to and opportunities for reform. The analysis 
of quality of governance provides an insight into the level of democracy within 
the sector, as a closer examination of “the relations across security institutions, 
wider governmental apparatuses and the public” reveals “the level of clarity, 
openness and responsiveness of state apparatuses to the needs of citizens.”43 
The OECD manual44 provides additional parameters for determining the level 
of democracy in relations across the sector, such as: responsibility, legitimacy 
(trust), autonomy (de-politicisation), rule of law, system of control and balance 
(distribution of power), horizontal responsibility and participation (opportunity 
for citizens to influence the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the 
policy in this field). 
The following step in this type of analysis is to determine the specific fea-
tures of the organisation and practical management within the security sector 
that distinguish it from the rest of state administration.  For example, the secu-
rity sector in all countries is characterised by a special relation between pro-
fessionals and civilian decision-makers. The reason for this is that the former 
have specialised knowledge and skills which the latter cannot acquire easily. 
Consequently, the professionals can greatly influence the process, scope and 
aims of SSR. This is particularly evident in a post-authoritarian reform context, 
42 But should describe and unwritten power relations between the military and police, security 
intelligence agencies and the rest of the sector. This can be visually illustrated by circles of differ-
ent sizes, which reflect the relative power of different parts within the security sector, which is an 
integral part of the mapping sector.
43 DFID (Safety and Accessible Justice - Putting Policy into Practice (London) p. 18
44 OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) Supporting Security and Justice (2007) 
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CONTEXT DOMINANT ACTORS THREATS PRIORITIES
Post-
authoritarian
	Statutory actors that use force
	Political parties or groups 
which participated in the 
change of  power (so-called 
opposition), and the elite from 
the former regime
	Actors that are less visible or 
developed
	Statutory actors that do 
not use force (particularly 
those in charge of control) 
e.g., the judiciary and other 
independent institutions, 
legislative bodies
	Civil society
	Danger of re-
establishing the old 
regime
	Illegitimacy of 
statutory actors that 
use force
	Systemic violation of 
human rights
	Primary goal: 
democratisation of 
society
	Depolitisation of 
statutory actors, 
primarily those that 
use force
	Development of 
institutions for control 
and control and 
oversight
	Lustration and 
processing of  human 
rights violations
Pre-conflict 
	Non-statutory actors that use 
force (paramilitary formations)
	Political and economic elites 
who benefit from conflicts
	External actors (e.g., private 
military companies...)
	Ethnic/religious 
tensions
	Separatist tendencies
	Armed conflict 
prevention
	Civilian rights 
protection
	Demilitarization of 
society and provision 
of public safety
Conflict
(it is disputable 
whether SSR 
can actually 
take place 
during conflict, 
in the absence 
of a democratic 
system)
	Non-statutory actors that use 
force  (paramilitary formations)
	External actors (foreign, 
private military companies, 
peace-keeping missions and 
intermediaries...)
	Crime syndicates connected 
to main participants in the 
conflict
	Demonopolisation 
of power and the 
absence of rule
	War crimes
	Internal displacement 
of civilians
	Termination of 
conflicts
	Protection of civilian 
rights (refugees, 
displaced persons)
	Demobilization and 
disarmament 
	Establishment of 
control
Post-conflict
	Statutory and non-
statutory actors that use 
force(paramilitary formations)
	External actors
	Veterans
(these actors lack visibility just 
as much as those in the post-
authoritarian context)
	A lot of armament 
in the possession of 
civilians
	Mining of territories
	Refugees and expelled 
persons
	Lack of effective 
control over the whole 
territory
	Crime related to 
specific groups in 
conflict
	Privatisation of the 
security
	Primary goal: 
transition from 
violence and armed 
conflict to peace
	Demobilization and 
disarmament
	Reintegration of 
veterans in the civilian 
life
	Demining
	Demilitarization of the 
society and provision 
of public security
	Increased presence of 
minorities and other 
marginalized groups 
among the statutory 
actors that use force
	Transitional justice 
(war crime courts, 
trust committees, 
lustration across 
statutory actors) 
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Integration
	Executive bodies
	External actors such as the 
Council of Europe, EU, NATO - 
whose conditionality requires 
the fulfilment of the criteria for 
membership
	Civil society
	Loss of identity 
(vertical threats)
	Neglect of 
democratisation and 
focus on ways to 
increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of 
security management 
	Primary goal: 
membership 
in  international 
organisations
	Interoperability 
of armed forces 
participation in 
peace-keeping  
operations outside 
your own territory 
	Increasingly 
important role 
of international 
cooperation in 
security policy 
management 
Developmental
	Statutory actors that use force
	External actors (especially 
the World Bank, the IMF, who 
condition economic support 
upon political criteria)
	Socio–economic 
problems, especially 
poverty issues
	Excessive military 
expenditure 
and inefficient 
management of 
statutory actors that 
use force, as well as 
insufficient provision 
of public security 
	Primary goal: 
transition from  an 
underdeveloped to a 
developed economy
Strong state
	Statutory actors that do not 
use force
	Non-statutory actors both 
using and not using force
	New challenges, risks 
and threats (crime, 
terrorism, global 
warming…)
	Alienation of citizens 
from statutory actors 
that use force
	Introduction of 
reforms aimed 
at improving the 
efficiency of security 
management
	Reforms stemming 
from the need to take 
action outside the 
state territory (new 
generation of peace-
keeping missions)
	New forms of civil-
military cooperation 
both inside the 
country and (e.g., the 
police in the local 
community) and 
abroad (integrated 
peace-keeping 
missions)
State building
	Elites which have “won” the 
status of the state 
	Actors which use force and 
have participated in acquiring 
the state
	External actors (protectorate 
and peace-keeping missions)
	Inability to govern the 
entire territory
	External and internal 
lack of legitimacy
	Institution building 
(e.g., army forces or 
ministries that did not 
exist before)
	Gaining international 
recognition (e.g., via 
membership in some 
organisations)
Table 10: Characteristics of different types of SSR context
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as the entire security-related education in an undemocratic society is regulated 
within a closed educational and training system run by the military, the police 
and intelligence services. Therefore, it is to be expected that new political deci-
sion-makers in the security sector, particularly civilian heads of governmental 
apparatuses of power, do not always possess sufficient knowledge to manage 
the reform successfully. In addition, the level of transparency of statutory actors’ 
work in the security sector is always lower than in the rest of public adminis-
tration institutions. The differences in management style in the security sector 
and the rest of governmental institutions are even more evident in cases where 
there is a combination of post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts or in the 
context of a weak state. It is common in such contexts that statutory actors that 
use power were not only exempt from public scrutiny but were also granted 
privileges and were highly politicised, being one of the key instruments of the 
non-democratic governance.
 The purpose of the security sector analysis is also to identify and register 
differences among various entities (units) that comprise it. For this reason, the 
analysis should take into account both formal characteristics of the sector and 
its actors (such as the existence of an adequate judicial system) and the informal 
ones (the predominant organisational culture, the prestige of particular profes-
sional groups within the sector, etc.). For instance, the Serbian public has tradi-
tionally laid greater trust in the military than in any other segment of the secu-
rity sector, greater than in some civilian institutions such as the government or 
the parliament. In order to understand the specific differences among the actors 
in this sector, it is necessary to conduct additional analysis of the institutional 
heritage of each of the actors within the sector, which would shed more light on 
their performance (the number of personnel, the level of training, equipment, 
legal regulations, etc.) and informal characteristics of management. A deeper 
insight into the “logic of an appropriate/desirable”45 management in these in-
stitutions will enable us to identify reasons for the internal blockade or uncon-
solidated reform, particularly in cases where a formal framework for the reform 
exists (competent institutions and legislation)46. For example, despite the fact 
that centralised decision-making within the MoI was criticised after democratic 
reforms had been carried out, broad administrative competencies of the MoI47 
45 March, G.J. and Olsen, P.J. ‘Elaborating the“New Institutionalism”.Arena Working Papers, (2005). 
Available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/wp05_11.pdf
46 Jacoby, W (2001)” Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and 
Western Models” Governance,14,92) p 169-200
47 Administrative authorities comprise a broad range of activities: from the registration of civil 
society organisations and public gatherings, to the issuing of travel documents and ID cards, the 
maintenance of the registers of citizens and other public documents.
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preserved their “logic of appropriateness”48 for quite a while after the process 
of democratisation had started in the successor states of SFRY. This can be ex-
plained by the corporative nature of the newly formed political communities. In 
all post-Yugoslav states, citizens’ view of the police as the most efficient institu-
tion of central administration which should continue with providing adminis-
trative services49 in a uniform way has “survived”, instead of decentralising and 
delegating these services to local municipal authorities. The expectation that 
“legitimacy comes from above”50, that is, from a centralised government, is a key 
characteristic of the continental police system and its logic in terms of organisa-
tion has been present in Serbian police to this day. 
Graphic illustration of the actors’ capacity and their relations
It should be added that all relevant and available public sources pertaining 
to this sector should be listed at the onset of the research, in order to identify 
48 March, G.J. and Olsen, P.J. (2005) ‘Elaborating the “new institutionalism”. [online] Arena Working 
Papers, 11/2005. Available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/pa-
pers/05_11.xml
49 Issuing identity cards, residential registration and similar.
50 Arianit Koci, “Legitimation and culturalism: towards policing changes in the European ‘post-
socialist’ countries”, in Policing in Central And Eastern Europe: Comparing  Firsthand Knowledge 
with Experience from the West, ed. Milan Pagon (Ljubljana: college of police and Security studies, 
1996).
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specific characteristics of the security sector in question. Bibliographies of the 
reform of each segment of the security sector should follow. Detailed bibliogra-
phies and the review of the existing literature in a given country are not only an 
effective way of collecting data, but also useful sources of information regard-
ing local authors’ views of the importance of SSR. In addition, a chronology of 
the reform of the entire security sector should be drawn up, as well as detailed 
chronologies of each of its constituent parts’ reform (E.g. military reform chro-
nology, police reform chronology, etc.). This will all make possible to determine 
the particularities of the narrower (micro) contexts in which reform of each of 
the actors was carried out. This will, in turn, facilitate the analysis of character-
istic political dynamics across different segments of the security sector and the 
establishing of benchmarks for measuring the progress by means of utilising 
the SSR Index. Similarly, by examining the reform in a short historical span, we 
endeavoured to pinpoint the demands of the reform. There has to be a period of 
time before the results of the reform become evident, that is, visible to a wider 
public. Along the same lines, the expectations that the public has of various 
institutions can be dramatically altered in the periods of crises or after dramatic 
events. The mini-analyses of reform contexts for each of the actors will enable us 
to link actors’ political decisions with institutional changes. 
CCMR researchers particularly focused on analysing the contexts in which 
reform of each of the actors had been carried out in order to gain a greater 
insight into the dynamics of the security sector. The purpose of this approach 
was to facilitate the researchers’ better understanding of different starting posi-
tions from which the actors whose progress was measured had undertaken the 
reform process. It is for this reason that each chapter on specific actors’ reform 
opens with a summary of their heritage and of the micro-context in which it had 
been carried out. By analysing the micro-context we tried to determine if there 
had been public demand for the reform of a given sector. We also tried to estab-
lish if there had been any threats that were specifically securitised in this seg-
ment of public policy and which important institutional and political changes 
had occurred since the beginning of the transition. Most importantly, a descrip-
tion of the trends and a list of the previous changes enabled the researchers to 
establish benchmarks against which subsequent progress would be measured 
for each of the actors. 
3. Analysis of the SSR political actors
This analysis should encompass all key political actors who have the power of 
official or unofficial decision-making with regard to SSR, that is, to influence its 
implementation, or the absence of it.  The list of political actors will of course 
differ from country to country, but might include political parties, churches, un-
ions, crime syndicates, paramilitary units and various stakeholders within state 
apparatuses of power. For the analysis of key political actors to be valid and to 
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provide insight into the potential and motives for action of each actor, it should 
be based on the following indicators51:
1) Type of actor (statutory or unstatutory)
2) Actor’s interest (political agenda) or their motivation to contribute to stabil-
ity, instability or internal conflicts
3) Type of strategy and/or usual methods which the actor applies in order to 
achieve its goals (special attention should be paid to their tendency to use 
force and violate human rights of all citizens or specific groups)
4) Potential (available financial assets, armament, control over a part of terri-
tory, group cohesion, type of leadership, type of expertise, possibilities for 
networking, etc.)
5) Main relations  with other actors (who are the allies/opponents, ability to 
gain support or politically mobilize certain groups of citizens, what their so-
cial and political base is)
Type of 
actors
Interests Strategies Potential Relations 
Government,  
political 
system
(democratic, 
authoritarian, 
etc.)
Political 
orientation 
(socialist, 
neo-liberal, 
etc.)
Motivation 
(E.g. 
economic 
gain)
Methods 
of political 
action and 
governance 
Respect 
of human 
rights
Democratic 
credentials
The size of 
support base 
Group 
cohesion 
Material 
resources
Capacity to 
stop, slow 
down or 
delay reform
Main allies
Main 
opponents
Table 11: Analysis of political actors
By using the results of such analysis, it will be possible to determine whether 
and in what manner the inherited state (citizens’ expectations, material and hu-
man resources, good governance models) was changed as a result of interven-
tion of different political actors. Consequently, when creating lists of actors, it 
is important to determine if any of the actors have been omitted or excessively 
51 Suzanne Verstegen, Luc van de Goor and Jereon de Zeeuw, The stabillity assessment frame-
work: designing integrated responses for security, governance and development (The Hague: Neth-
erlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005), 46-48.
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present on the list. It should further be determined if any of them can be a “veto 
player”, that is, which of them are “agents of change”. Finally, it is also realistic to 
assume that a number of actors and the extent of their influence can at certain 
point indicate the presence or absence of difficulties in the reform process. For 
example, it is often said that without civil society organisations which have the 
know-how and skills to carry out public control and oversight over the security 
sector, there can be no adequate democratic control. It is also often believed 
that some interest groups, comprised of members of governmental apparatus-
es that have the right to use power, might constitute “veto players” in the reform 
process, since they hold the power and knowledge. Some authors claim that 
intelligence circles had the greatest influence over political decision-makers be-
fore and after the fall of Milosevic’s regime, and were thus in a position to block 
reforms.52 
However, such claims are not easily substantiated with hard evidence. That 
is why the biggest obstacle for researchers in carrying out their analysis is the 
lack of solid and publicly available data on actors’ actions as well as an insuffi-
cient timeframe. Consequently, this part of the analysis usually ends with a list 
of actors and descriptions of their potential, based on the opinions and findings 
of general public and experts.
The Key Research Question 
The results obtained from the analysis of the wider socio-political and security 
sector contexts, as well as from the analysis of key political actors should facili-
tate the precise identification of the dominant context in which SSR is carried 
out. Once that context is identified it then becomes possible to determine with 
certainty which generation of reform is being undertaken in a given country.53 
For this purpose we will adopt Timothy Edmunds’s theory that there are a first 
and a second generation of SSR. According to Edmunds, the first generation 
includes putting in place constitutional norms, basic laws and structures neces-
sary for putting security sector under the control of democratically elected civil 
authorities. However, this is just one of the first steps in the democratisation 
process. The focus of the reform in the first generation is on the establishment of 
formal structures of civilian control as well as on a clearer division of competen-
cies among different actors within the security sector, which would also result in 
52 Andreas, P. (2004) ‘Criminalized Legacies of War The Clandestine Political Economy of the 
Western Balkans.’ Problems of Post-Communism, 51 (3) May/June,str.3–9 i Shentov, O., Todorov, B. 
and Stoyanov, A. (2004) Partners in Crime – The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and 
Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, (Sofia: Centre for the Study of Democracy).
53 Edmunds, T. (2003) ‘Security sector reform: concepts and implementation’, in German, W. N. 
and Edmunds, T. (eds.) Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for 
Assessment (DCAF / BICC), pp. 11-25.
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setting the foundation for democratic control within the sector. In addition, the 
demilitarisation and depoliticisation of the security sector governance should 
also take place during the first generation. These steps seek to remove the po-
tential danger arising from the fact that the state or non-state using force might 
jeopardise the democratic functioning of the political community in question.
The second generation of reforms coincides with the process of democratic 
consolidation.54 Of course, this only applies if the process of state creation is 
completed in the given community, that is, that all threats to its sovereignty 
have been removed. If that is the case, it is expected that during the second 
generation civil society, which has been empowered, will become an active par-
ticipant of democratic civilian control and control and oversight, alongside poli-
ticians. This would considerably contribute to the social legitimisation of secu-
rity institutions in society. It is equally expected that the first generation reforms 
will be consolidated at lower levels of management and that the mid-managers 
will identify with the reform. Fundamental democratic values should in effect 
become part of the organisational and professional culture of state actors using 
force. These organisations should act on the principles of political and interest 
neutrality in the future. The key question in this phase is not whether the securi-
ty sector should be reformed or why, but how to accomplish reform in the most 
efficient and effective way. It is therefore necessary, in order to consolidate the 
first generation reforms, to build the so-called administrative capacities of state 
agencies for the management of resources within the security sector during the 
second phase.  The pre-requisite here is that civil servants and institutions are 
trained in effective planning, budgeting, programming, monitoring, overseeing 
and implementing reform policies. 
It becomes evident from the above-mentioned outline of ideal-type SSR 
phases that the second generation of SSR does not have a clearly defined end-
point. This phase corresponds to the consolidated democracy model, whose 
coming into being requires not only the establishment of new structures but 
also changes in the behaviour and attitudes of security sector personnel. The 
conclusion is that only after such change occurs can democratic and effective 
security sector governance become “the only game in town”.55
In keeping with this, SSR in Serbia was analysed from the perspective of the 
process of democratisation and post-conflict recovery. The underlying assump-
tion was that the broader context in which SSR in Serbia began was influenced 
by the need for a simultaneous four-fold transition: from a non-democratic to 
a democratic political system; from a planned to a market-led economy; from 
54 Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1998), Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 
(Belgrade:Filip Višnjić), p. 6 state five arenas of democracy: (1) an autonomous and valued politi-
cal society, (2) conditions for the development of a free and lively civil society  (3) the rule of law 
(4) an institutionalized economic society, and  (5) a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new 
democratic government
55 The paraphrased definition of a consolidated democracy by Linz&Stepan.
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monotype social relations to pluralistic ones; from conflict to a period of post-
conflict normalisation, stabilisation and reconstruction. It was, therefore, nec-
essary to examine carefully how the trends of such a complex transition had 
affected the security sector reform. Only after this examination was it possible 
to determine with certainty whether the first generation of reforms had been 
completed and consolidated and whether it had progressed into the second 
phase. The research findings should provide the CCMR team with an answer to 
the key question of their research, that is, to assess whether SSR in Serbia has 
finally crossed “the point of no return” after which this sector and/or some of its 
actors will not be able and will not want to jeopardise the democratic function-
ing of the state and/or of the political community.    
Development of methods for measuring progress 
in SSR
As the issue of measuring SSR progress has not been researched enough, and 
that the topic in question is a complex phenomenon, it was decided that the 
grounded theory approach would be used in planning the research. This ap-
proach implies that the theory is developed in the course of research, by means 
of “continuing interaction between analysis and the obtained data.”56 The find-
ings of Silverman57 about the three stages in theory building (developed by 
Glazer and Strauss in 1967)58 were our starting point. 
1) In the first step, categories which will shed light on data and give them 
meaning must be defined. In our case it meant that the definition of the 
reformed security sector had to be operationalised into relevant criteria 
for assessing the level of realisation of three aspects of reform: democratic 
governance, efficiency and effectiveness of providing national and human 
security. The criteria were further developed into indicators, which resulted 
in the creation of the Security Sector Reform Index (SSRI). A special category 
within the Index which we wanted to analyse was the holisticness, that is, 
the degree of integratedness within the national security sector.
2) In the second step, content is added to the categories in order to examine 
their relevance. In the case of Serbia, it meant that the SSR Index was to be 
applied to four distinct types of actors (according to Hanggi’s classification). 
However, it immediately became apparent that the application of the same 
56 Halmi, Aleksandar (1996): Kvantitativna metodologija u društvenim znanostima. Zagreb: 
Pravni fakultet u Zagrebu, studijski centar socijalnog rada, 278.
57 David Silvermann (2005) Doing Qualitative Research – A Practical Handbook (London: Sage 
Publications), str. 179.
58 Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine.
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criteria to the four distinct groups of actors would create difficulties. This 
was resolved by fine-tuning the methods of measurement and the instru-
ments so that the specificities of the different types of organisations within 
the sector could be identified. The next step was to develop the methods 
and criteria for analysing the social context of the reform in order to uncover 
its specificities in the case of Serbia. During the context analysis a zero point 
has to be determined against which the progress of the reform would be 
measured.   
3) Once the previous steps have been carried out successfully, the chosen 
categories should be fitted into a larger analytical framework so that they 
can also be applied outside the original context. On the basis of experience 
gained from the application of SSRI, the original instrument and measuring 
tools were further fine-tuned and major trends in Serbian SSR were identi-
fied.
1. Devising Measuring Tools
Before the gathering of empirical data started, the researchers had to find an 
answer to the question of “what a reformed security sector meant”. According to 
Timothy Edmunds59, the answer can be found from three perspectives: a) from 
the perspective of an ideal type of reformed sector, b) on the basis of regional 
standards of reform and c) on the basis of the reform process assessment in a 
given state. 
The first approach requires a previously defined generic framework or an 
ideal type of a reformed sector. Hanggi’s definition was used for that purpose 
in this research, from which three aggregate dimensions of SSR emerged: 1) 
democratic governance, 2) efficient security provision and 3) effective provision 
of human and national security. These dimensions can also be interpreted as 
final goals of any SSR but these have not yet been achieved even in developed 
democracies. As Wilfried von Bredow and Wilhelm N. Germann60 observe, the 
issue here is “success without a clearly defined end: the protective role of the 
security sector should be increased to a maximum, while reducing the risk of 
resorting to coercive measures which endanger democratic culture”. Success is 
usually measured in situations of crisis and avoiding these is also one of the 
goals of the reform.
In understanding SSR as a process, the CCMR team’s standpoint was that it 
is only possible to measure with certainty the level of SSR at a specified point 
59 Edmunds, Timothy ’Security Sector: Concept and Implementation’ In Wilhelm N. Germann and 
Timothy Edmunds (eds.) Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for 
Assessment (DCAF / BICC), pp. 11-25. 
60 Von Bredow, Wilfried and Germann, Wilhelm N. (2003) ‘Assessing success and failure: practical 
needs and theoretical answers’, in Germann, W. and Edmunds, T. Towards Security Sector Reform 
in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment, (DCAF / BICC), pp 161-174.
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in time and that this is only achievable by using a previously determined scale 
based on the model of a reformed sector. To develop the measurement scale, 
it was necessary to further define the criteria and their content for each of the 
dimensions of reform. Each dimension had to be operationalised into criteria 
and the criteria were further to be developed into a list of specific indicators for 
each of the four groups of actors. For example, the participation of citizens and 
civil society organisations in security policy was adopted as one of the criteria to 
be used under the democratic governance dimension.  That criterion was then 
further divided into two sub-criteria: a) the participation of citizens in policy-
making, b) the participation of citizens in policy implementation and evalua-
tion. Consequently, different indicators were established within the first sub-
criterion, such as: setting up consultative meetings with citizens on the topic 
of security in their neighbourhood (indicator for the police), or setting up focus 
groups to check the effects of new policies before they are introduced (indicator 
for both the police and the military).
It was also taken into consideration that the three dimensions contained in 
the SSR definition were not absolute nor that they manifested themselves in the 
same way in different countries. Therefore, they were open to researchers’ sub-
jective interpretation in the process of their operationalisation and transforma-
tion into specific criteria and indicators. In addition, the general definition of SSR 
builds on the normative assumption of the existence of a democratic political 
system or on the aspiration of developing such system. However, how this norm 
will be implemented will mainly depend on the dominant political culture, as 
well as the public administration tradition in a given country. For example, the 
same norm of democratic control and oversight over security intelligence agen-
cies has been “operationalised” differently in different countries, depending on 
the relations among the executive, legislative and judiciary authorities and their 
relations with the civil society. Consequently, the control and oversight over 
security-intelligence agencies carried out by the government-appointed com-
mittee (UK) is as democratic and legitimate as that carried out by the parliamen-
tary committee (Germany) or by the security and defence committee which also 
oversees the police and the military (Serbia), or when a special body, consist-
ing of civil society representatives, is included in the parliamentary control and 
oversight, as is the case of the Civic Control and oversight Committee in Croatia. 
There is no value-neutral measuring. The tools chosen for measuring are 
based on certain values and norms, usually those of the actual researcher or of 
the party on whose behalf the measuring is undertaken. It is therefore impor-
tant to know what logic of appropriateness the CCMR team was guided by in 
defining the criteria for each dimension and in determining the indicators. The 
Index model used in this research was developed according to the normative 
assumption that the reformed security sector is based on the principles of de-
mocracy, which thus makes the measuring of its progress against the achieved 
level of democracy possible. In addition, this Index model relies on the conti-
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nental legal and public administration legacy, as well as on standards set by in-
ternational organisations, particularly from the European region. Since the idea 
of a state as a desirable model of social organisation is presupposed here, this 
model will probably not be applicable in parts of the world where the concept 
of the state was imposed from the outside and has not yet been embedded. 
DIMENSION CRITERIA SUB - CRITERIA
DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE
Representativeness Representation of Women
Representation of Ethnic 
Minorities 
Transparency General Transparency
Financial Transparency
Participation of Citizens 
and Civil Society 
Organisations
Participation in Policy - 
Making
Participation in 
Implementation and 
Evaluation of Policy
Accountability – 
Democratic Civil Control 
and Public Control and 
oversight 
Control by the Executive
Parliamentary Control and 
Control and oversight
Judicial Control
Public Control and 
oversight 
Rule of Law Rechstaat (Legal state)
Protection of human rights
EFFICIENCY Good Governance
Human resources 
Management
Financial Management
EFFECTIVENESS Integratedness of 
System 
Legitimacy of the sector 
or actors
The Ratio between 
Aims, Resources and 
Outcomes
Table 12: dimensions, criteria and sub-criteria of the level of reform of the security 
sector
This is the reason why the operationalisation of the various dimensions of 
an ideally reformed security sector was done in line with the standards of the 
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UN and European regional organisations (OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, NATO). 
This was in line with the so-called regional approach to the measurement of 
reform. However, the disadvantage of the aforementioned approach is that it 
did not provide the right tools for measurement of the holistic progress of SSR 
and assessment of the achievements of each specific reform. Nonetheless, the 
list of basic analytical units was derived from the analysis of minimum common 
standards and the units were then turned into the criteria of SSR across sepa-
rate dimensions. This was how the first version of the SSR index was created 
- it comprised a list of 22 relatively differentiated criteria. After this61, the rel-
evance of different criteria was debated in workshops held in the Centre, and 
with participation of foreign experts. Later on, their number was reduced so 
that the collection of data could start during the first year of project implemen-
tation.62 After seven versions of the index, the selection was narrowed down 
to five groups of criteria, which were seen as key for assessment of the level of 
democratic governance in Serbia’s security sector. The following criteria were 
chosen (1) representation of women and ethnic minorities (2) general and fi-
nancial transparency, (3) participation of citizens and civil society organisations 
in the making, implementation and evaluation of policy, (4) accountability, i.e., 
democratic civilian control and public control and oversight and (5) the rule of 
law. The starting point was the conviction that the mentioned above criteria 
could be applicable to all the states where security sector reforms were taking 
place in accordance with democratic principles.
After this process, most criteria were further operationalised into sub-cri-
teria, which function as an auxiliary analytical units used to assess the success 
of the reform in fulfilling each criterion’s requirements. To illustrate this, it was 
decided that representativeness was to be assessed only on the basis of the 
representation of women and ethnic minorities in the security sector, that is, the 
number of their actors. It was estimated that, in the initial phase of the project, 
these sub-criteria could provide at least a partial picture of the level of repre-
61 Apart from the contribution by the  Centre researchers, and the presence of associates such 
as Mr, Djordje Vukovic (CESID), Mr Bogoljub Milosavljavic and Mr David Love, who were all 
included in the process of operationalitisation of the Index, we received useful comments form 
Ms. Helene Ziherl from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, research-
ers from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs after the presentation held in May 2008, 
and from the group of students attending the Master’s programme on International Security at 
the Faculty of Political Sciences and also, from the participants of the Young Faces programme 
with whom, during their exercises, we partially tested this instrument.
62 An interesting tool for determining the level of importance of each criterion was designed by 
the team from the Institute for Democratisation which worked on the development of the Index 
of ‘open society’. Within the framework of this research, two questionnaires were given to the 
experts containing the list of criteria for the society openness. The first questionnaire was used 
to access the level of implementation of the criteria for openness in Croatian society. The second 
one was a scale of importance, on which the experts judged the importance of each criterion for 
achieving an ideal level of openness in any society. For more details, see Goldstein, Simon (2006) 
Index of Open Society, Croatia 2006 (DEMO: Zagreb)
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sentation of certain social groups in state institutions belonging to the security 
sector. It was also decided that in this phase, data collection related to the repre-
sentation of other social groups - such as religious minorities or minority groups 
based on sexual orientation - should be omitted. The reason for this was partly 
the lack of available data and partly because these are not priority areas in the 
current phase of reform Serbia. 
In the next phase a consensus was reached regarding the scope of working 
definitions of the sub-criteria. The intention was to avoid the danger of meas-
uring the same events several times under the different criteria. In accordance 
with this, under the “public control and oversight” sub-criterion, the results of 
the work by the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance were omit-
ted, because this had already been assessed under the “transparency” criterion. 
Furthermore, we agreed to exclude the control and oversight practiced by citi-
zens and/or civil society organisations from the same criterion, as this was meas-
ured under the “participation”. The longest debate ensued regarding the opera-
tional definition of the “legitimacy” criterion. For the purpose of this research it 
was decided that the observation and evaluation of the level of democracy at 
elections was to be excluded from the scope of the “legitimacy” criterion. We 
focused instead on the level of public trust in the state security institutions and 
their leadership as well as on the public perception of threats to safety of Serbia 
and its citizens. Within this criterion we also analysed whether there were any 
significant differences in the level of trust or perception of threats between vari-
ous social groups (such as ethnic minorities, youth or women) and the majority 
of the citizens. In the following phases of the research this could provide a basis 
for determining potential security threats stemming from such differences in 
opinion.
The process of selecting and shaping of optimal procedure was - tempo-
rarily - finalised by devising a two-dimensional scale for measuring the SSR 
progress. . On the vertical axis, under label “dimensions”, general (ideal-typic) 
characteristics of democratic security sector have been listed. These have been 
then grouped under separate criteria and sub-criteria on a horizontal axis for 
each of the security sector elements. However, as Jane Chanaa reminds, “while 
it is relatively easy to draw up a check-list for the SSR agenda, it is much more 
difficult to see how that summary can be implemented.”63 For this reason the 
indicators were selected and listed, which were meant to be used in analys-
ing the collected materials and data in order to find out which actors, if any, 
and to what extent, had applied and fulfilled the criteria. During this phase, the 
CCMR researchers spent most of their time developing indicators which would 
encompass and express both a specific function and different - professional, in-
stitutional, social, ethical, cultural - characteristics of each actor in the security 
63 Quoted in Martinusz, Zoltán (2003) ‘Measuring success in security sector reform: a proposal to 
improve the toolbox and establish criteria’, in Germann, W. and Edmunds, T.(eds.) Towards Secu-
rity Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment (DCAF / BICC), p.13
94
sector. Attention had to be paid that selected indicators were applicable to at 
least the majority of actors in one group in order to make the obtained findings 
comparable and measurable. This was not an easy task, which is best illustrated 
by the following example: it is an indisputable fact that an equal representation 
of women in the operational units of the military and police is not expected. 
The Beijing Declaration sets forth a standard according to which up to 30% of 
the operational police force should comprise women, whilst 10% women in op-
erational military units is considered a considerable achievement even in devel-
oped democracies.
Because of the aforementioned differences, each researcher had a task, 
based on defined dimensions and criteria of reforms, to develop indicators for 
the actors whose reform he or she was monitoring. During this process, an as-
sumption was confirmed that general dimensions and reform criteria were not 
of equal importance for all the actors, and they could not be equally applied to 
all of them. For example, it cannot be expected that the transparency of work 
and management is the same in private security companies and in statutory 
actors that use force and which are authorised by the Constitution. Similarly, it 
would be pointless to expect that citizens will participate in creating and imple-
menting of the security policies of private security companies as the latter are 
commercial non-governmental agencies. However, from the point of view of 
national and human security, it makes sense to research whether theses com-
panies are integrated into the security system. It is even more important, to find 
out if and how the use of means and methods that can jeopardise citizens’ hu-
man rights has been regulated and whether there is any control and oversight 
over that implementation. The comparison of the activities of the parliament, 
civil society organisations and the judiciary within the security sector would re-
sult in similar findings. As these entities have different roles, competencies and 
sources of power, it was possible to establish only if and to what extent each of 
them participates in the control and control and oversight of the statutory ac-
tors in the security sector. 
As a result of preliminary analysis of collected data and insights gained, 
it was concluded that progress in SSR with all four groups of actors could be 
measured only against three common criteria: integrity, transparency and legit-
imacy. As other criteria could not be applied without making serious mistakes 
and problems, it was decided that instead of one index model, three models 
would be developed which should take into consideration different functions 
of the actors. Separate indexes were developed for (1) government institutions 
that use force (2) non-statutory actors that use force and (3) both statutory and 
non-statutory actors which have supervisory and controlling roles in the secu-
rity sector. A list of nine actors was created, followed by a separate list for each 
of them of specific indicators and questionnaires for assessing their progress in 
reform.
The list of chosen criteria indicates clearly that measurement was undertak-
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en from the perspective of local civil society and that the focus was on obtaining 
better insight into the level of democracy reached in Serbia’s security sector. 
This is the reason why the indicators and methods for measuring of efficacy 
and effectiveness of security sector actors’ actions, and of statutory actors in 
particular, have not been fully developed yet. There were two more important 
reasons for this. The first stems from the fact that for a serious evaluation of 
efficiency of actions of statutory actors that use force (the police, the military 
and intelligence services) to be carried out, it is essential to possess specialised 
knowledge and technical expertise. For example, in order to measure the ef-
ficiency of police actions, that is, in order to define adequate indicators of its 
efficacy in the suppression of crime, it is necessary to have a profound criminal 
expertise. However, this kind of expertise can hardly be achieved without years 
of work in the police force. The second reason stems from the unavailability of 
authentic and valid data which would enable a more precise measurement of 
each actor’s efficiency in providing, for instance, physical safety to citizens of 
Serbia. Internal assessments of combat readiness of militarised police sectors, 
or of the military itself, are even less available. Quite understandably so, as such 
data are deemed classified in any country. Hence, it was decided that within the 
“efficiency” dimension only the aspects of efficiency pertaining to all Serbian 
public administration institutions should be measured. In accordance with this, 
the management of human and material resources was assessed, as well as the 
procedures for creating and implementation of policies (planning, budgeting 
and assessment). Intelligence services, due to the type of their activities, have 
escaped any serious measuring of efficiency, even after additional narrowing 
has been carried out.  
To define and then measure the effectiveness of security sector actors 
proved to be the most difficult task. This even more so as the same reasons 
which created difficulties in measuring efficiency appeared here as well. Lastly, 
the effectiveness of certain statutory actors, such as the military or intelligence 
services, can be measured with great difficulty under regular (peaceful) circum-
stances. In other words, the effectiveness of any armed forces can be evaluated 
with greater certainty only in the state of war or after it. However, then it might 
be too late or even pointless, in case of a defeat. Similarly, the effectiveness of 
intelligence services can be assessed in principle only on the basis of informa-
tion publicly released by their civilian superiors or expert officials, that is, after 
some damage (the prevention of which falls under their jurisdiction) has been 
done. This largely applies to state institutions with certain police powers as well. 
For instance, only customs officers and maybe the police can make a roughly 
accurate estimate as to how much smuggling over state border has been done 
over a period of time. Similarly, only tax police can, to some extent, estimate the 
damage done to the state by the so-called “black market” or “grey economy” 
whereas the Anti-Laundering Administration can estimate the amount of mon-
ey “laundered” in Serbia and at what price. 
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Therefore, the effectiveness was measured in this research only against 
three criteria: legitimacy, integratedness and the relation between goals, means 
and results. Necessary clarification of the “legitimacy” criterion has already been 
given in the previous text. Within the integratedness criterion, “integratedness 
upwards” was measured first. It should demonstrate if and to what extent each 
actor was included in the integrated sector, namely the national security system 
and whether such system existed at all. Parallel to this, the so-called “integrat-
edness downwards” was considered, which should show the level of internal 
integration of each of the actors. Strategic and legislative acts that should deter-
mine the elements of the sector (system) and the roles of all actors were also an-
alysed in order to check the vertical axis. It was necessary to determine whether 
the National Security Strategy existed at all and whether the Constitution of the 
Republic of Serbia mentions and/or regulates in a holistic manner at least some 
segments of the security sector. We also had to determine the manner in which 
the roles of different actors in the security sector were defined and distributed 
in these acts. The team also checked if minor acts were in accordance with the 
Constitution and Strategy Outline. In addition, we were looking for defined pro-
cedures and instances for horizontal coordination and cooperation within the 
sector, such as cooperation between the military and the police in the state of 
emergency. “Integratedness downwards” was analysed in the same way, i.e., we 
analysed if the horizontal communication and coordination within each of the 
actors had been arranged appropriately. 
When we tried to develop indicators for assessing the relation among goals, 
means and results, problems occurred similar to the ones we had been dealing 
with when efficiency had been considered. First, the data on invested resources 
and results achieved are not available. This applies especially to security-intelli-
gence services as information about their operations are well hidden from the 
public eye. Even when the results of some of their activities are released, the 
public cannot find out about the costs or whether these operations have been 
carried out successfully and effectively. This is how the problem of defining and 
measuring the effectiveness of the security sector and its actors arose. Is the 
effective sector the one which through preventive measures and actions man-
ages to prevent or diminish the violence in the country, or the one which suc-
cessfully reacts to violence or any other security threat (E.g., natural disasters). 
Whatever the answer may be, the problem remains how to assess if, say, too 
much was spent on solving some security problem. This further requires that 
we also take into consideration how security goals are ranked in the political 
arena or in the public. If, on the other hand, we assess effectiveness solely on the 
basis of public expectations and current political priorities, it can turn out later 
that such effectiveness has had negative consequences on other parts of public 
administration or on the entire society.  
In the end, decision was made that in this phase of research the focus would 
be on measuring only if and to what extent the achieved results were in keeping 
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with the reform goals formulated in the country’s strategic papers and politi-
cians’ speeches at the onset of the transition. The assessment of effectiveness 
was additionally hampered by the fact that, in Serbia, only defense sector pos-
sessed the strategic document, which was, in all fairness, a relic of the previous 
state. The fact that Serbian society was deeply divided regarding the perception 
of goals for future development, including the goals and costs of the security 
sector reform – presented even a greater problem. That is why there is no con-
sensus on the future effective national security system and its traditional actors. 
For example, a part of society advocates a big conscript army whose main task 
would be to defend the territorial integrity of the country. This would require 
greater budget expenditure for the military, probably at the expense of other 
parts of the sector or state administration. Another part of the society advocates 
a smaller, professional army which would defend the country in cooperation 
with other international actors. However, there are no data available regarding 
the costs of such an army. 
 
2. Narrowing the research scope
The aforementioned problems forced the research team to harmonise its meas-
uring criteria with the importance given to them in providing human and na-
tional security and to harmonise the planned scope with their own resources. 
For this purpose, foreign influences on the SSR in Serbia were excluded from the 
context analysis first. The effectiveness of providing security was then evaluated 
only on the national level, and according to the requirements for the respect 
and protection of human rights, whereas the evaluation at the level of provid-
ing local security was excluded. Only in the case of the police it was evaluated 
whether its reform was in line with the requirements for providing security 
in the local community. As all reform criteria imply some of the basic human 
rights, we are convinced that the offered index model is in accordance with the 
human security concept. 
It was also decided that the pilot phase of the project would not include 
all actors who, according to a broader definition, could belong to the security 
sector. The progress in the reform of several groups of actors was measured 
instead. It is our estimate that the fate of the first generation of SSR in Serbia 
depends on the success of their reform. The groups are as follows: (1) statutory 
actors that use force – the police, the military, intelligence services and state in-
stitutions with certain police powers; (2) statutory actors that do not use force – 
The National Assembly and the judiciary; (3) non-statutory actors that use force 
- private security companies and (4) non-statutory actors that do not use force 
- civil society organisations. Due to limited research resources and difficulties in 
accessing data, we gave up on analysing the impact of the media and acadeMoI 
(non-statutory actors that do not use force), the role of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other parts of the government which participate in the security sec-
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tor management (statutory actors that do not use force) as well as on analysing 
the paramilitary formations and crime syndicates (non-statutory actors that use 
force). The research of other organisations and civil society forms, such as local 
initiatives and marginalised groups, was left out as well. 
In accordance with the aforementioned, the aims were narrowed and as a 
result the scope of this research was limited. In addition, the quality of the find-
ings depended largely on the availability of relevant data and the level of previ-
ous research of the security sector in Serbia. Despite this, the researchers paid 
attention that all four groups of actors were represented in the research sample. 
The actors whose activities had not been explored sufficiently until then were 
also included in the sample. They were marked as state institutions with certain 
police powers (such as customs, tax police and Anti-Laundering Administra-
tion), due to the fact that all of them have some powers to apply coercive meas-
ures or other measures which can affect the citizens’ rights to privacy.
 The choice of the reform starting point, against which all subsequent 
progress was to be measured, represented a special challenge for the research 
team. This choice, even more importantly, determines the manner in which 
the success of the reform is defined. In case of Serbia, we decided to measure 
the SSR reform in the period from 2006, when Serbia became an independent 
state, until the end of 2008, when this research was completed. However, the re-
searchers were asked to keep in mind the previous state of affairs as well, and to 
include in their analysis and findings the scope of changes which had occurred 
in this sector or in its actors after the toppling of Milosevic’s regime in October 
2000. Consequently, they had to keep in mind, when calculating the SSR Index, 
the context analysis results, the heritage of the security sector and some of its 
institutions and the expectations of the citizens from the SSR. As a result, the 
findings obtained in this phase can be used as parameters for further measuring 
of the SSR in Serbia, which, in turn, would facilitate the development of tools for 
measuring progress in the unit of time and identifying the key reform trends. 
3.  Assessment method
Once the object of assessment was redefined and the list of dimensions, criteria 
and reform indicators for the selected security sector actors confirmed, a deci-
sion on the measurement procedure had to be made. After various procedures 
had been discussed, we opted for a SSR scale with (1) as the lowest and (5) as 
the highest grade, a model similar to the annual World Freedom Index64 applied 
by the American organisation Freedom House. It was defined that the lowest 
grade would indicate the complete absence of SSR, that is, the security sector in 
a given country was unreformed. Conversely, the highest grade meant that the 
64 For more details visit: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15
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second generation of SSR was accomplished successfully, and that the reformed 
sector was now democratically governed. We opted for this model because it 
requires fewer indicators whose accomplishments is based on the analysis of 
both quantitative and qualitative data.
This assessment model was adapted to every actor. We measured their re-
spective levels of reform first, and then the trends in the whole security sector. 
In the final stage of measurement, the researchers had to transform the earlier 
collected data and grades given against each criterion into a final (cumulative) 
grade for the reform in relation to each dimension and for each actor. In the next 
stage, the researchers added up all grades and then divided the total number 
with the number of dimensions. In this way, the average grade was created for 
the level of reform progress for each actor. Following the same principle, the 
researcher then calculated the average grade of SSR progress for each group of 
actors.
This means that the Reform Index of each actor was derived from the grades 
given on the basis of a set of indicators for each sub-criterion first, and then for 
the criteria. For example, on the basis of the analysis of indicators of female rep-
resentation in the police, it was estimated which grade, from (1) (the worst sce-
nario) to (5) (the best scenario), would accurately depict the representation of 
women in Serbian police. Then, the average grade for each criterion was calcu-
lated, based on the average value of the given grades according to each sub-cri-
terion. For example, in order to grade the police against the representativeness 
criterion, the grades for the representation of women and representation of the 
minorities were added up first, and then the sum was divided by two. Following 
the same procedure, the Reform Index was calculated for each individual di-
mension. This means that it was obtained from the average of the grades of the 
level of reform, which had been given previously for every criterion within cer-
tain dimension. For example, the grade for democratic management of statuto-
ry actors that use force, is in fact, the mean value of all grades given according to 
the following criteria: (1) the representation of women and ethnic minorities (2) 
transparency (3) participation of the citizens and their organisations in policy-
making, implementation and evaluation of   policy (4) democratic civil control 
and public control and oversight and (5) rule of law. Along the same lines, the 
grade given to the effectiveness dimension was calculated on a basis of mean 
value of the grades given for the management of (1) human and (2) material re-
sources. Accordingly, the grade for effectiveness dimension is the mean value of 
the grades given by the criteria of (1) legitimacy, (2) integratedness and (3) the 
ratio between aims, resources and outcomes. The Reform Index of each actor 
was also obtained by calculating the average grade, which, in turn, was calcu-
lated from the grades given to this Index for each of the three dimensions. The 
military Reform Index, for example, was calculated on a basis of the mean value 
of the grades given to the dimensions of democratic governance, efficiency and 
effectiveness.
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In order to avoid mistakes, the possibility was given to allocate a half grade 
(0.5) for each of the values from 1-5. The researchers were also obligated to sub-
mit a brief rationale in written form for the grade given according to each crite-
rion, explaining in more detail why the grade had been allocated. This explana-
tion was to further clarify how the inherited situation had affected the progress 
and what indicators, international standards and practices had been used in 
formulating the grades. Roughly, the grades 1 -3 were usually given based on 
the indicators of existence or lack of formal rules (rules-based indicators) for the 
actions of particular actors. On the other hand, grades 4-5 implied that the ac-
tors were in the second generation of reforms, they were using newly-adopted 
regulations in practice and that there were positive changes in the public per-
ception of security sector and/or its actors.  Under that, it meant that in practice, 
the newly adopted norms are in use, and that there are positive changes in the 
public perception of security, and/or security sector and its actors, as well as the 
proof that the organisational culture and the system of governance were based 
on new (democratic) values. These indicators are called the outcome-based in-
dicators.
After assessing individual actors, average grades were calculated for the 
groups of actors. However, the plan to calculate the Reform Index of the whole 
SSR was abandoned. In the course of the research it became evident that to 
simply add up the grades of each of the groups of actors and then divide them 
by the number of groups would be not only incorrect in terms of methodology, 
but also impossible. The security sector is not just a total sum of four groups of 
actors. Furthermore, each group is comprised of different individual actors. In 
the end, separate reform indexes were calculated only for (1) statutory actors 
that use force, (2) non-statutory actors that use force and (3) statutory and non-
statutory actors that are empowered to control and monitor the actions of the 
actors that use force. Despite the fact that the attempt at devising a unique In-
dex based on the quantitative indicators of the SSR has failed so far, the applied 
assessment method has provided some valuable insights: 
1) The main trends in the SSR can be identified and it is possible, at least in 
principle, to rank the key actors according to the level of their reform. For 
example, the comparative analysis of the groups of actors’ indexes has re-
vealed that the work of the majority of the actors still lack transparency and 
that the financial trends and budget allocating are hidden (unknown). The 
absence of a systematic and meaningful parliamentary control and control 
and oversight over the governmental power-holders in the Serbian security 
sector is also evident.
2) It is also possible to identify the actors whose reform is least known of or 
those with, according to the available data, the slowest pace of the reform. 
In the case of Serbia, such actors are the intelligence agencies and private 
security sector.
3) The holistic approach to the reform and the measuring of the SSR can be 
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justified and confirmed by applying several identical criteria on all actors, 
such as transparency, democratic civil control and public control and over-
sight and integratedness.
4. Applicability of the measuring tools and 
the lessons learned
In this phase of the research, our measuring tool, compared to the indicators 
that are used to assess the work practice, is largely based on formal norms (E.g., 
the existence of laws and bylaws). Most of the indicators are the so-called “proc-
ess” indicators (indicating whether certain standards have been adopted), but 
they do not indicate the outcome of the change. This shortcoming of our tool 
can result in proposing solutions which would consequently lead to the over-
regulation of the security sector. Being aware of this problem, we believe it is 
important to explain how these indicators have been selected. The selection 
was pre-determined by the key research question; has the first generation of 
the SSR reforms been completed and are the established norms necessary for 
the subordination to the democratic civilian authorities?
More often than not, the grades indicate the level of transparency in the 
work of the actors and the effectiveness of their public relations departments. 
In other words, the institutions which granted the researchers access to the re-
quired data had an opportunity to make the potential progress in their reform 
known to the public and therefore assessed more objectively. On the other 
hand, non-transparent institutions were risking that even the changes they had 
actually made would pass unnoticed by the general public and that they would 
receive lower grades due to the lack of available data. For example, the Ministry 
of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, the intelligence agencies, the judiciary 
and prisons all failed to provide the lists of their employees, nor did they provide 
any data on human resources management. The researchers tried to overcome 
this problem by collecting data from secondary sources and by triangulation 
with media sources. Consequently, the grades for these actors were formulated 
only after all available data had been collected.  
Despite the shortcomings, the Research team firmly believes that the given 
Index can be very useful for determining and measuring whether the first gen-
eration of SSR in a given country, in this case Serbia, has been completed. In 
other words, if all constitutional and legal regulations which guarantee an ef-
fective subordination of primarily state apparatuses of power to democratically 
elected and legitimate civilian authorities have been put in place. 
It should also be mentioned that the final grades do not reveal anything 
about the intentions, even the best ones, of the actors in question. They do re-
flect, to an extent, the current state of affairs in a given area of practical policy. 
It seems that the applied grading system is not representative enough of 
the reform dynamics, i.e., the rate at which the public perception of security 
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threats changes. As the SSR is a “moving target”, when interpreting the numeri-
cal score one should bear in mind that the SSR progress was measured for the 
2006-2008 period.
5. The next phase of the research
The findings of this research will be additionally checked in the course of the 
next year. For that purpose, the Centre will try to present its findings to the public 
and to organise consultations with different groups from the security commu-
nity in Serbia, such as employees of the governmental institutions competent 
for the security, the authorities in charge of the sector governance and control 
over the work of its actors, as well as other civil society organisations. Consulta-
tions will be held also with owners and employees of private security compa-
nies. The researchers also expect that the presented analytical concept and the 
accompanying tools and procedures will be further tested and improved in the 
course of the comparative research of the SSR progress in the countries of the 
Western Balkans. This research is already under way. It should contribute to de-
termining the similarities and differences among the countries in question and 
result in preparing a set of recommendations that could be useful to both the 
governments in the region and international actors. Moreover, the research will 
be an opportunity for further standardisation of the tools and procedures for 
measuring the SSR progress. 
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Contexts of the 
Republic of Serbia’s 
Security Sector Reform
Miroslav Hadžić
It is a reasonable supposition that the research team of the Centre for Civil-
Military Relations (CCMR) has managed to develop and apply the initial, and 
yet defensible, procedure to map the security sector in Serbia and measure the 
achievements of its reform (SSR). Furthermore, the team has presumably, at least 
within the requirements of this project, removed and/or resolved some of the 
theoretical and methodological problems other researchers caution against.65 
It is expected that in doing so the team members have met some of the key re-
quirements indispensable for successful measuring.66 Particularly useful in that 
exercise were the proposed tools and the initial criteria for measuring the suc-
cess of the SSR.67 They were additionally urged in their efforts by the observa-
tion of one of the above-mentioned authors that, in order to measure the SSR 
progress and success, procedures and instruments adjusted to the specific fea-
tures of the country concerned should be developed. That is why only a series of 
case studies will tell us whether it is at all possible to make an ideal typical and 
efficient model to measure the success of the security sector reform. Observing 
the listed guidelines the team applied a procedure that would, in the final stage, 
permit the quantification of progress in Serbia’s SSR. Naturally, provided that 
there has been any. That should, subsequently, lead to the Security Sector Re-
form Index (SSRI). The validity of the whole procedure will, we hope, be judged 
by the professional and more general public on the basis of findings presented 
in the following chapters and contributions to this Yearbook. 
The following text will, therefore, proceed from the assumption that the 
65 Wilhelm N. German and Timothy Edmunds, eds., Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold 
War Europe – A Framework for Assessment (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003). 
66 Wilfried Bredow and Wilhelm N. German, “Assessing success and failure: Practical needs and 
theoretical answers,” in Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe – A Framework for 
Assessment, eds. Wilhelm N. German and Timothy Edmunds. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsges-
ellschaft, 2003).
67 Zoltan Martinusz, “Measuring success in security sector reform: A proposal to improve the 
toolbox and establish criteria,” in Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe – A 
Framework for Assessment, eds. Wilhelm N. German and Timothy Edmunds. (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003).
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above-mentioned procedure enables us to identify and measure the main 
achievements in Serbia’s SSR. We will thus take it that the data and findings ob-
tained have been properly quantified and translated into the Index. We, likewise, 
believe that the following descriptions of reform courses related to individual 
actors may add to our knowledge of the conditions of its implementation. Addi-
tional data thereon may be found in the general and separate chronologies – a 
specific product of the research – registering the main events in the reforms of 
key actors in the Serbian security sector in the 2000-2008 period. All that com-
bined should, on its part, facilitate the reading, interpretation and use of the 
Index.
However, one could rightly wonder whether the following reviews and de-
scriptions of main events give us a sufficiently real and complete picture of the 
social and political context wherein the reform was carried out. More impor-
tantly, do they tell us about the influence of the local context on the courses 
and results of the security sector reform in Serbia? In other words, have its char-
acteristics, all or any, presented an obstacle or incentive for the (greater) success 
of the reform, and if so, why? This gives rise to a dilemma as to the possibility for 
the key characteristics of the context to be precisely identified and measured, 
and then also numerically expressed. Assuming that the influence of the con-
text may be relatively accurately established, the problem is how to calculate 
and incorporate it into the SSRI.
It is, therefore, intention in this text to briefly consider only those character-
istics of the context that, in our view, elude accurate measurement and quanti-
fication, but are indispensable for the proper understanding of the SSR courses 
and results in Serbia. We do hope that this exercise will produce useful findings 
and methodological instructions that would facilitate the assessment of the SSR 
achievements in Serbia in real conditions. An objective so defined relieves us of 
the obligation to systematically cite all the empirical material required, all the 
more so as it will be presented in extenso in other Yearbook documents and the 
Project’s by-products. 
For our purposes, characteristics of the context shall denote a mixture of in-
terdependent but mediatory and interfiring political (and social) processes and 
events in Serbia, which directly or indirectly determined the pace and achieve-
ments of its security sector reform. We should also note that the SSR actors in 
Serbia worked in a given and mandated context. In other words, they could not 
choose the conditions for the start up of the reform, any more than they could 
subject these conditions to arbitrary or once-off change. That is why their ap-
proach to the SRR largely depended on the manner they used to interpret this 
particular circumstance and assess the prospects for the implementation of 
reforms both to themselves and the Serbian public. Ultimately, their discourse 
was, among other things, defined by the manner in which they (actors) pro-
jected and interpreted the contents and objectives of Serbia’s reform, as well as 
the type of means they chose for its implementation. 
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Our considerations will be grouped in three sections. The first will discuss to 
what extent the labels used in literature to designate various SSR contexts are in 
agreement with the reform environment in Serbia. The second will examine the 
relation between the process of securitisation, i.e. desecuritisation and the SSR 
in Serbia. All that should allow us to use the concluding section for a brief review 
of additional difficulties encountered in measuring the SSR in Serbia. 
(Dis)agreement between labels and reality
The concept of the SSR was politically formulated under conditions marked by 
a radical change of the world order in the late 1980s and early 1990s which, at 
that time, had its epicentre in Europe. In theoretical terms it was profiled within 
the main course of the academic debate on the transition, i.e. democratisation 
of Europe’s former socialist states. Both discourses, therefore, reflect the theo-
retical (and political) optimism contained in the (implicit) conviction that these 
states will sooner or later, with many or not so many difficulties, create a liberal-
democratic order.68 That is perhaps part of the reason for the obvious lack of 
interest in the security sector displayed by theoreticians of democratisation, or 
rather the reason for the fact that the SSR scholars have failed to examine the 
interdependence of the democratic changes and the security sector reform in 
any greater depth. That is why, in simplified terms, the former find the reform of 
this sector an expected (necessary) consequence of democratisation and mere-
ly one of the various forms of its materialisation. The latter, on the other hand, 
indirectly suggest that the security sector can be reformed despite the modest 
progress in the democratisation of a specific country.
Still, the impression is that the contents and profile of these debates were 
substantially conditioned by the needs of the incumbent Euro-Atlantic crea-
tors of the new security concept and architecture. They, therefore, bear a strong 
stamp of Eurocentric approach to transition. That is why the potential security 
risks of the initiated change were considered primarily from the point of view of 
their influence on the preservation and/or strengthening of security in the Euro-
Atlantic circle. This approach is doubtlessly rational, as those were the times of a 
security vacuum in Europe created after the fall of the Berlin wall. That prompted 
the researchers, as well as politicians, to look primarily for the methods of early 
detection and removal of security threats that could result from the uncontrolled 
disintegration of socialism and the breakdown of complex, but weak states (SFRY, 
USSR, CSSR). It was one of the main reasons for the subsequent speedy security 
integration of transition countries into NATO and the EU. In parallel, the SSR con-
cept was launched and its application was intended to help the transition coun-
68 Timothy Edmunds, “Adapting to Democracy: Reflections on “Transition” in Serbia and the 
Western Balkans,” Western Balkans Security Observer, no. 7–8 (October 2007– March 2008): 5-11.
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tries to attain self-sustainable security as soon as possible and thus stop being a 
challenge, or threat, to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. 
However, it soon turned out that NATO and EU enlargement policies not 
only suffer from arbitrariness, but also encourage mimicking and/or feigned 
democratisation of candidate countries in the period of their preparation for 
admission to these organisations. That is why it is possible that NATO has for a 
long time yet been joined by states with democratic deficits,69 and that the EU 
with increasing frequency admits into its ranks countries that have not radically 
reformed their security sectors.70 This, naturally, does not refute the fact that 
entry into NATO and/or the EU, on its part, stimulates and accelerates reforms 
in the newly admitted countries. It only stresses the significance of the interna-
tional context and the important, and quite often decisive, role of external ac-
tors in the democratisation and SSR of a country. The same also largely applies 
to Serbia.
However, we must emphasise that the influences of the external environ-
ment and foreign interventionists on the democratisation and the SSR in Serbia 
were multiply mediated. The direction, intensity, range and consequences of 
external influences, just as in other similar countries, have always depended on 
the changeable and controversial, and quite specific context in Serbia. The de-
gree and strength of these influences were no less dependent on the political 
and security dynamics and the dominant reform discourse in Serbia. Inciden-
tally, these reasons, combined with the difficulties to reliably establish the ef-
fects of foreign interference, compelled the research team in this case to leave 
out the measuring of influences of the international context and foreign actors 
on the SSR in Serbia.
It means that in this analysis the context in Serbia will be intentionally ex-
empt from its wider environment. We shall, namely, start from the assumption 
that it (the context) was primarily formed by the dictate of socio-economic and 
political processes in Serbia, and under the influence of internal and relatively 
autonomous causes and actors. We shall also have in mind that the context in 
Serbia was, indeed, also formed and changed under the influence of its wider 
environment. This relation of interdependence can be presented in the form 
of concentric circles with the Serbian context at the centre. Already in the next 
circle it is a constituent part, as well as a product of the context formed in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY, 1992-2003), i.e. the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro (SCG) (2003–2006). In a yet wider circle the Serbian context, 
now mediated by the characteristics of the FRY/SCG context, participates in the 
69 The first precedent was the admission of Greece and Turkey (1952), followed by Spain and 
Portugal, while the entry of Bulgaria and Romania is a proper introduction for the impending 
admission of Albania and Croatia. 
70 Thus, for instance, Slovenia had no difficulties due to the absence of a radical reform of its 
security services, just as the high level of (systemic) corruption did nothing to hamper Romania 
and Bulgaria. 
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formation of the sub-regional context of the Western Balkans (Southeast Eu-
rope) to become, in turn, one of the parts of its reality, just as the latter has been 
formed within the Euro-Atlantic context and under its influence, and conversely 
contributed to its change.
Analytical requirements have driven the researchers to specify and classify 
the models of contexts wherein the SSR is taking place.71 That gave rise to gen-
eral criteria and aggregate indicators used to recognise and distinguish - and for 
methodological reasons also separate - three different contexts of the SSR: de-
velopmental, post-authoritarian and post-conflict. There is no doubt that each 
of these may be used to analyse the case of Serbia. We, however, believe that 
any one of them, used by itself, is insufficient to clearly outline and explain the 
characteristics of the context for the unfolding of the SSR in Serbia. Naturally, 
that is not so because of certain inherent – cultural, historical, economic, social, 
political or security – specifics of Serbia, but because it had, and still has, numer-
ous parallel and intertwined characteristics and influences attributable to each 
of the three contexts.
That is also suggested by the following table which displays only some of 
the main features distinguishing the SSR context in Central European countries 
from that created in the Western Balkans, including Serbia after the end of the 
Yugoslav wars. 
From the methodological point of view the least disputable are the mod-
el of the developmental context and the reasons for the SSR derived from it 
and based on socioeconomic benefits this undertaking may bring to a specific 
country. Equally doubtless is the fact that the Euro-Atlantic donor community 
was the main relay for the SSR export to numerous underdeveloped countries. 
It is also beyond dispute that by imposing conditions for their assistance the 
donors sought to force the authorities in these countries to undertake the SSR.72 
However, there does not seem to be sufficient proof that the donors have fre-
quently succeeded in their intention. It would be even more difficult to prove 
that the imposition of the concept led to effective reforms of local security sec-
tors. External pressure could, at best - as e.g. in the case of Western Balkan coun-
tries - prompt the domicile regimes’ faster adoption of the reform phraseology 
and partial reorganisation of the sector in line with their own needs. But, the 
donors could not induce the local power holders to willingly give up the in-
herited mechanisms of party and/or personal control over the security sector 
and its actors. In other words, they could not prevent them in their intention to 
occasionally (ab)use the state apparatuses of power, and especially the secret 
services, for their daily and narrow political ends.
71 Heiner Hanggi, “Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction,” in Reform and 
Reconstruction of the Security Sector, eds. Alan Brayden and Heiner Hanggi. (Munster: Lite Verlag, 
2004).
72 Hanggi, 11–12.
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Central European countries
1989 onwards
Western Balkans – Serbia
1991 onwards
1. Voluntary escape from socialism
Escape from socialism and transition 
into war 
2. Majority consensus in favour of transition
Absence of consensus – internally 
divided and conflicting societies
3. Willingness to bear the costs and pay the price of transition
Refusal to bear the costs and pay the 
price of war
4.
Transfer of part of the 
communist nomenklatura into 
new - political and economic 
- elites
Nationalist transfer and ideological 
adjustment of the old nomenklatura 
in order to remain in power
5.
Overthrowing and 
disempowering of the old 
security nomenklatura 
Survival in power and war-time 
alliances of the old security 
nomenklatura with the new political 
elites and organized crime 
6. Plural (re)distribution of authority and power
Prolonged survival and renewal of 
party state
7. Decreasing internal security risks of transition
Growing internal security risks of 
transition
8. Effective civilian control over state apparatuses of power
Personal and party control over state 
apparatuses of power
9.
Abolishment of client status 
for the apparatuses of state 
coercion
Preservation of client status for state 
apparatuses of coercion 
10.
Holistic approach to the 
security sector and reform of 
state apparatuses of power
Partializing of the security sector and 
reorganization of state apparatuses 
of power 
11.
Voluntary acceptance and 
fulfilment of conditions for 
entry to NATO and EU 
Evasion of fulfilment of key 
conditions for entry into NATO (PfP) 
and the EU
Table 13: Main characteristics of Central European and Western Balkan contexts
Judging by all indicators Serbia fits into the model of the SSR developmental 
context,73 in the first place because it is an insufficiently developed country. Per-
haps it could be more accurately qualified as a country checked in its develop-
ment by the Yugoslav wars and authoritarian nature of the former regime.74 That 
is why the foremost issue on its agenda after the removal of Slobodan Milošević 
from power, was recovery, rather than development. Due to modest internal 
resources, Serbia’s recovery and future development crucially depended on the 
external economic and financial assistance, as well as on the pace and effects of 
privatisation. But, contrary to the model, after the change in power Serbia did 
73 Hanggi, 10.
74 Will Bartlett, “Economic Transition in Serbia Since 2000: Trends and Prospects”, Western Balkans 
Security Observer, no. 7-8 (October 2007, March 2008): 30-38. 
109
not see a more substantial spillover of developement funds into the security 
sector. Moreover, the priority given to the country’s recovery and development 
resulted in a downward trend of investments into the apparatuses of state pow-
er. That is evidenced by the fact that in the past period (2000-2008) the Serbian 
authorities did not demonstrate any serious intention to create a special state 
fund for the reform of this sector, or at least its largest and most expensive ele-
ments, such as the military and the police.75 
Furthermore, the local power holders have not so far managed, or were re-
luctant, to recognise and appreciate the link between the SSR and Serbia’s social 
development, just as they failed to grasp the possible economic and develop-
mental benefits deriving from the faster achievement of a sustainable, national 
and individual security. In the same manner, there is no proof that by granting 
or promising assistance the donor community has actually managed to encour-
age, and let alone force, the authorities in Serbia to carry out a faster and more 
successful reform of the inherited security sector. This fact is not refuted by the, 
reorganisation of the military and the Defence Ministry, e.g., gradual decrease 
in the military budget, the partial and deferred demilitarisation of the police, or 
the substantial reduction in the number of employees in the state apparatuses 
of power, even more so because the authorities in Serbia were compelled to 
make these moves due to the limited resources of the destroyed and plundered 
society and an exhausted and inefficient economy. In view of that, Serbia had to 
use the major part of the budget and state investments to deal with the social 
and economic consequences of the Yugoslav wars and Milošević’s rule. That is 
where we should look for some of the reasons why the new authorities have 
never treated the SSR as one of the key preconditions for the democratisation 
of Serbia, i.e. an important lever for its faster development. That is, among other 
things, evidenced by the evasion to establish the price of Serbia’s security, or to 
calculate and present to the public the social, economic and security costs, as 
well as benefits, of its potential entry into NATO and/or the EU. In that vein, the 
last government of Vojislav Koštunica avoided to inform the National Assembly 
and the public about the meaning, results and price of Serbia’s proclaimed mili-
tary neutrality. 
There is yet another important reason why the SSR in Serbia cannot be 
properly examined if viewed only in the developmental context. It derives from 
the fact that this, in all truth construed model, does not include the unknown 
security factors and risks of transition in Serbia. This strengthens our belief that 
this approach was, for the most part, derived from the experience of Central 
European countries, where, after the breakdown of socialism, the majority of 
citizens, political and security elites reached a high degree of agreement about 
the future development strategy and thereby also the need to carry out the 
75 True, a decree was passed establishing a fund for the reform of the FRY military, which, how-
ever, did not become operational. 
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SSR. An agreement of this kind still does not exist in Serbia. That, on its part, 
facilitates political and ideological manipulations with the economic and social 
and, as we shall see later, also security cost of transition which, in periods of 
aggravating internal crises, made it easy to turn its losers into opponents of Ser-
bian democratisation. That is why the analysis of the SSR, if performed only in 
the developmental context, fails to provide the explanation why, e.g. the slow-
downs in economic and social development of Serbia, coupled with political 
resistance to its transition, cyclically threatened to grow into internal conflicts. 
Or, in other words, why it fails to explain the permanent danger of electoral or 
extra-institutional plugging of democratisation in Serbia, and potentially also of 
retrograde involution of its order.
Some of the above-mentioned deficiencies may be remedied if the Serbian 
SSR is considered in the post-authoritarian context. But before that, it would be 
in order to remove the possible ambiguities in the meaning of this syntagma. 
That is still more necessary because the prefix “post” may be interpreted in at 
least two ways. Understood literally, it suggests that we are talking about a so-
ciety wherein the authoritarian order was irrevocably dismantled and that, con-
sequently, the non-democratic ways of acquiring and distributing authority and 
power have been eliminated along with the old technologies of rule. Namely, it 
suggests that sufficient assumptions have been created for the establishment 
of a democratic order in line with the customs of a modern society. This may 
then lead us to conclude that in a society of that kind a SSR has already been 
successfully carried out, or is being implemented with the full support of the 
public and its political and security elites. If so, the “post-authoritarian context” 
in such countries is disappearing, and the analysis based on it is no longer ef-
fectual.
But, in a more narrow meaning, the prefix “post” indicates the countries 
where, starting with an once-off act (elections, putsch, mass rebellion of the 
population, foreign intervention), the authoritarian ruler and his right-hand 
men were deposed, and where the military, police and secret services, as well as 
the majority of their members, at least nominally, submitted to the new authori-
ty. In that case this label tells us that the change in power created only the initial, 
and necessary, conditions for the (pro)democratic consolidation of the society. 
It also tells us that this consolidation is not guaranteed in advance, and that a 
simultaneous, risky and long process of removing the authoritarian order, i.e. 
embedding of a democratic order, is yet forthcoming. This means that in these 
countries a liberal-democratic reform, and the inherent SSR, may be and are 
the strategic priority and objective of the new government and its voters, but 
not necessarily the priority of other political actors and the entire society. That 
is why the project of a democratic reform often, as e.g. in Serbia, becomes (or 
remains) only one of the competing options on the local political market. This 
outcome is made all the easier because the new government has to present, 
deliver and collect from the citizens (voters) the high costs of transition. This 
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may cause a substantial drop in the public support to the reform and its ac-
tors. On the other hand, the new holders of power may thus be encouraged to 
increase and amass their control invoking faster implementation of reforms or 
the fight against its opponents (opposition). In line with that, they may display 
a growing inclination to adopt and use the authoritarian and populist models 
of rule, applied by their predecessors. This course of events may be expected to 
substantially diminish the prospects for a democratically orientated reform of 
the security sector, and especially for a radical reform of the state apparatuses 
of force. Or, to put it differently, it may be expected that the interest of the rul-
ing elites in the SSR will decrease the very moment they succeed in placing the 
state apparatuses of force, even if only nominally, under their political control.
Serbia doubtlessly fits into the so outlined post-authoritarian setting. An 
environment of that kind makes the limited reform results of overthrowing 
Milošević and the conceptual-strategic deficiencies of his successors (demo-
cratic opposition – DOS) still more obvious, all the more because the absence 
of a radical split with the old regime incited mutation and facilitated the mask-
ing of authoritarian patterns of rule in Serbia. Owing to that, the war-time re-
distribution of social wealth and power remained essentially intact. The new 
government promptly adopted the reform rhetoric, but did not entirely give 
up the old technology of rule. The Serbian political scene was pluralised, but is 
still dominated by parties established according to the “fuehrer” principle.76 The 
division of power is constitutionally guaranteed and systemically carried out, 
but the practice reveals the domination of the executive branch, feudalised to 
the measure of forced out coalitions. The control package of power remained 
in the hands of leaders and top ranks of parties and/or coalitions, so that the 
cabinet and the parliament primarily serve for subsequent legalisation and le-
gitimisation of decisions taken outside the system. It is true that independent 
institutions for the control and oversight of the system and government have 
been established (commissioner for information, ombudsman, state auditor) 
but their work is in different ways obstructed, primarily by power holders. State 
apparatuses of fprce have been placed under the political control of the cur-
rent authorities, but not under the democratic civilian control of the parliament, 
the judiciary and the public. Lustration went missing, and the secret files kept 
on citizens are still in the hands of only partly reformed security services.77 Still 
worse, Serbian society is in many ways once again powerfully ideologised and 
politicised. Politics has once more encompassed the entire life in Serbia and for 
a long time yet prevented the autonomy of social spheres. At the same time, 
the search for the new collective identity develops within the coordinates of 
76 Vladimir Goati, Političke partije i partijski sistemi (Podgorica: Fakultet političkih nauka, Univer-
zitet Crne Gore, 2008), 168-76.
77 Bogoljub Milosavljević, “Reforma policije i službi bezbednosti u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori: ostvareni 
rezultati i izneverena očekivanja,” in Smisao reforme sektora bezbednosti, eds. Miroslav Hadžić, 
Milorad Timotić i Bogoljub Milosavljević. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2004).
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a mythologised national past, accompanied by creeping desecularisation, i.e. 
clericalisation of state and society.78
That is why we are convinced that the true proportions of the influence 
of developmental difficulties and authoritarian heritage on the course and 
achievements of the SSR in Serbia may be established only if considered in 
a post-conflict context. Before we do that, we shall briefly examine the main 
meaning of this label. Introduction of the prefix “post” clearly conveys that we 
are speaking of a country where a conflict and violence have just been discon-
tinued or terminated. That could mean that the initial assumptions have been 
created for that country’s pacification, i.e. normalisation and stabilisation, and 
then also development; and within that also for the gradual removal of the main 
causes of the conflict, as well as the mitigation and redressing of its most dif-
ficult consequences. It is reasonable to expect that the conflicting parties and 
possible mediators have started to develop and introduce procedures for the 
prevention and/or early checking of future conflicts. All that should, at least in 
principle, favour a faster democratic transformation of the country concerned.
However, even in cases where it is so, the post-conflict context is not en-
tirely devoid of the potential for the renewal of the old conflict, or its situational 
reorientation outward/inward, i.e. towards a new adversary. In such conditions 
the prospects for the implementation of pro-democratic reforms and the SSR 
largely depend on the causes, nature and consequences of the conflict in the 
given country. However, they are still more dependent on the interpretation of 
that conflict and its outcome by the internal political actors. There is also no 
doubt that the post-conflict context in a country which has only just emerged 
from an international conflict (war) will be vastly different from that created in 
a state where an internal strife has just been ended. That is why these countries 
are unevenly susceptible to the reforms. In both cases the peace and/or conflict 
potential of the context additionally depend on the manner in which the con-
flict was terminated. That is why the context in a country where peace came in 
consequence of a compromise of the conflicting parties will have different char-
acteristics from that in another country where peace emerged from the defeat 
of one of the participants, or yet another where peace was externally imposed 
by a political and/or military intervention.
But, in each of these scenarios, the first necessary step is the transition of 
the country (society) from the state of war into that of peace. However, it is un-
likely that this job may be successfully, or willingly, done by the protagonists of 
the recent, especially internal, conflicts. That is why prompt replacement of the 
warlords and their security elites becomes inevitable. Still, that should be only 
the initial step in the radical reform of the inherited security sector and appa-
ratuses of force. As a principle, that equally applies to both the victorious and 
78 Filip Ejdus, “Security, Culture and Identity in Serbia,” Western Balkans Security Observer, no. 7-8 
(October 2007, March 2008): 39-64. 
113
the defeated sides, although for different reasons. In the case of the former, to 
prevent the translation of the (unlimited) power acquired in a war into political 
power once the war has ended. In the second, in order to diminish the danger of 
redirecting the conflict inwards and of politically abusing defeat for the survival 
in power of the warlords and their executive agents. This assumption is proved 
correct by the war experience of Western Balkan countries. Namely, it was not 
before the main engineers of war, e.g. in Serbia and Croatia (Slobodan Milošević 
and Franjo Tuđman) left power in 2000, that the danger of the renewal of inter-
state conflicts, i.e. their transformation into internal conflicts was diminished. 
That, naturally, did not remove the need for the reform of the inherited security 
forces and formations. Quite the contrary, this reform became urgent just as 
the prospects for its success were, at least nominally, increased. That, in the first 
place, required the replacement of the central corps of military, police and se-
cret service power holders. The examples of Serbia and Croatia, naturally from 
different reasons, showed that this is not a simple matter. A part of the explana-
tion should, in our view, be sought in the different characteristics and uneven 
effects of the post-conflict context in each of the above-mentioned countries.
Some could, of course, deny the existence of the post-conflict context in 
Serbia, invoking the fact that Serbia has never declared war on its western 
neighbours (former republics of the SFRY) and officially did not participate in 
the Yugoslav wars. Others could claim that a context of that kind emerged in 
Serbia only following NATO aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) and the resulting exemption of Kosovo and Metohija from the jurisdiction 
of Serbia (May-June 1999).
If, for formal reasons, we conditionally accept the first claim, that will not 
remove the fact that numerous Serbian citizens, willy-nilly, participated in the 
wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) – initially as soldiers of 
the Yugoslav People’s Army and then as combatants for the armies of Republika 
Srpska Krajina (RSK) or Republika Srpska (RS) and the FRY, as well as members 
of numerous paramilitary formations. That is, among other things, evidenced by 
the sentences returned so far by the Hague Tribunal condemning civilian and 
military commanders of western Serbian armies, as well as a smaller number 
of their subordinates, for crimes committed during the wars in Croatia and BiH. 
To this we should add the sentences of courts in Serbia, BiH and Croatia pro-
nounced on the leaders and members of various paramilitary units fighting 
under Serbian flags. Let us recall that the ongoing trials in the Hague charge 
Milosevic’s closest associates not only with military and logistic support to the 
military of the RSK and RS during the wars in Croatia and BiH, but also with 
crimes their subordinates reportedly committed against the Albanians in Kos-
ovo and Metohija during 1998 and 1999. In the period from 1991 until 1999 the 
state of Serbia and its inhabitants actually lived not only in a war environment, 
but in a state of war, even if unproclaimed. However, far more important for 
the topic addressed here is the fact that throughout that period and even to 
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this date, Serbia and its population have suffered the disastrous social, political, 
demographic, cultural and security, consequences of their (non) participation in 
the above mentioned wars.
The second, essentially reductionist, argument is equally disputable, in the 
first place because it seeks to interpret NATO invasion of Kosovo and Metohija 
separately from the courses and consequences of the previous spillover of the 
Yugoslav Wars. Moreover, it wishes to exclude any responsibility of Slobodan 
Milošević and his regime for the wars on the territories of the former Yugoslavia 
and then also for the previous conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija and military-
police repression, which ultimately not only encouraged and legitimised mass 
armed rebellion of the Albanians, but also served as a cause and excuse for 
NATO bombing.79 That is why the already existing post-conflict context in Serbia 
after the withdrawal of the FRY army and the police from Kosovo (11 June 1999) 
only obtained additional characteristics and meanings. Above all, it became 
obvious that, notwithstanding Milošević’s proclamation of victory over NATO, 
Serbia suffered a military and political defeat in KiM. At that time all negative 
consequences of the previous Yugoslav wars converged in the political, social 
economic and security spheres of Serbia and there, among other things, height-
ened the old and established new political and ideological divisions. Under the 
powerful influence of these consequences and the growing dissatisfaction of 
the majority of the population it did not take long before Milosevic’s regime was 
deposed (5 October 2000).
However, it turned out that the enthronement of the new, self-defined as 
democratic, power only partly reduced, rather than removed all dangers for the 
outbreak of conflicts in Serbia. That was, among other things, due to the fact that 
the leaders of the DOS coalition, with their dissentions and conflicting interests, 
already on 6 October started to multiply and enlarge the conflict potentials of 
the inherited context. The lines of the existing and subsequent divisions and 
conflicts within the new authorities, as well as among citizens (voters) derived 
from two main sources and their numerous tributaries. At the manifest level, 
there was a political and ideological conflict concerning the pace, contents, 
scope, methods and objectives of the initiated and intended change. Some, 
led by the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the then FRY president Vojislav 
Koštunica, allegedly sought to change the old order, while preserving its con-
stitutional and systemic foundations in the name of legalism.80 In that they en-
joyed strong support of parties from the former regime – Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Others, headed by the Democratic 
Party (DS) and the then Serbian prime minister Zoran Đinđić sought faster re-
79 Miroslav Hadžić, Bezbednosni dometi NATO intervencije na Kosovu (Beograd: Centar za antiratnu 
akciju – Politički tim, 2000).
80 Đokica Jovanović, “Legalitet ili diskretna odbrana nacionalizma,” in Revolucija i poredak, eds. 
Ivana Spasić i Milan Subotić. (Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 2001).
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forms and were inclined towards fast, and if necessary so-called revolutionary 
methods, to dismantle the old regime and remove its remaining proponents. 
The ensuing events will show that the ongoing conflicts about the reform 
concealed diametrically opposed visions of the future image and set up of Ser-
bia. That also created conflicts about who should lead Serbia, how and why. 
Some sought to usher Serbia into NATO and the EU as soon as possible, while 
others wanted to irrevocably tie it to the Russian Federation. Sharp disagree-
ments also emerged in the interpretation of the Serbian present. That was fol-
lowed by mutually opposed readings and use of the country’s recent and an-
cient past for the purposes of daily politics. Along these lines the difficulties Ser-
bia was facing were assigned to culprits from diverse parts and different times.81 
Under the pressure of the reality of crisis the emphasis on the Yugoslav wars and 
Serbia’s role in them was soon transferred to the obvious consequences. At the 
same time, the point of political polarisation and crystallisation was displaced 
from the internal (social-economic) to the international sphere. Its very centre 
was immediately taken by the conflict concerning the implementation and 
fulfilment of Serbia’s (FRY) obligations towards the Hague Tribunal, remaining 
there to this date. It was, in effect, only another name for the disputes concern-
ing Serbia’s role in the Yugoslav Wars. Vojislav Koštunica and his minions denied 
that Serbia had any responsibility for the destruction of Yugoslavia in the war, 
assigning equal blame to all actors of that time – former republics, nations and 
their leaders. In line with that, despite the FRY obligations undertook already by 
Slobodan Milošević, they first refused and then long delayed to extradite the 
accused of war crimes to the Hague Tribunal. True, that did not prevent them to 
patent and partially successfully apply the model of the so-called voluntary sur-
render of indictees from Serbia during the terms of office of two governments 
they headed (2003-2008). By contrast, Zoran Đinđić’s government, after a brief 
hesitation and avoiding the debate on Serbia’s contribution to the Yugoslav 
Wars, invoked the previously undertaken international obligations and decided 
to extradite some of the accused by the Hague, including Slobodan Milošević 
(June 2001). 
Due to large differences and intense conflicts within the DOS, the reform 
discourse soon lost its primacy, and the Serbian public was again engrossed 
in major national and state topics. That was accompanied by parallel changes 
in the political map of Serbia, so that with the introduction of new lines of in-
ternal divisions and conflicts the relation towards the old regime soon ceased 
to be the central political watershed. The divisions primarily derived from an 
all-out and accelerated political search for the new – national and state - iden-
tity, but they were also the consequence of that quest. One side gathered the 
(self-proclaimed) holders of (fore)knowledge of the given and unchangeable 
81 Jovan Bajford, Teorija zavere, Srbija poritv “novog svetskog poretka” (Beograd: Beogradski centar 
za ljudska prava, 2006).
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substance of the Serbian national identity, and believed that if it was to remain 
intact, Serbia and the Serbs should return to their roots in the teachings of St. 
Sava and their traditional values. In that effort they assigned themselves the role 
of principal interpreters and measurers of the national orthodoxy of others. The 
other side gathered all those who, however inarticulately, wanted to bridge the 
gap between modernity and tradition in Serbia and leave the national identity, 
even if unintendedly, open to (re)formation in line with the standards of the 
new times and its (Serbian) contemporaries. Thus the political elites again man-
aged to divert the attention of the Serbian population from the difficulties of 
transition and to engage them in ontological inquiries of their self. Before them, 
Milošević, at least occasionally and partly, also managed to transfer the dissat-
isfaction of his subjects is Serbia and Serbs outside the republic, motivated by 
the breakdown of socialism and the second Yugoslav state into the fear from 
Others, and then engaged them in a (non-proclaimed) war for the final settling 
of historical accounts.82 
Bearing in mind that a (new) war against the external others was then pro-
hibited, the Serbs, directed by their elites to find another leader in their midst, 
once again plunged into an internal political and ideological showdown. This 
course of events was facilitated by the fact that due to the externally imposed 
peace, the forces and energies of war and destruction generated in Serbia dur-
ing the 1990s were then turned inwards. Owing to that, the old, only now re-
shaped, and newly created obstacles to the successful implementation of the 
social and security sector reform converged, joined and became crystallised in 
post-Milošević’s Serbia. Their growth was decisively assisted by the – political, 
ideological and interest – coupling of part of the new ruling elites disinclined 
towards reforms (to put it mildly), with war time elites, criminal groups and hid-
den parts of the state apparatuses of power. That outcome was further favoured 
by the hesitation of the so-called reform wing of the DOS concerning the scope 
and purpose of change in security services, the military and the police.83 In that 
sense, the assassination of prime minister Đinđić (12 March 2003) clearly sig-
82 Nebojša Popov, ed., Srpska strana rata, Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju, vol. I and II, 2nd. 
ed. (Beograd: Samizdat FREEB92, 2002).
83 That is clearly proved by the fact that within a span of several days during July 2002, their MPs, 
first in the FRY parliament and then in the National Assembly of Serbia, adopted two completely 
differently approaches and formulated laws on security services. The war regulating the status of 
federal services included the necessary instruments and procedures for a democratic and above 
all parliamentary control and oversight of their work. By contrast, the law on the newly formed 
Security Information Agency (SIA) included no such procedures. The first case reflected the wish 
to place under control the military services, experienced as a major threat after the preceding 
arrest of the republic prime minister Perišić. The second case reveals the wish to subordinate BIA 
to the prime minister of that time (for more see Bogoljub Milosavljević, “Reforma policije i službi 
bezbednosti u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori: ostvareni rezultati i izneverena očekivanja,” in Smisao reforme 
sektora bezbednosti, eds. Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timotić i Bogoljub Milosavljević. (Beograd: 
Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2004).
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nalled the readiness of war-time elites and their, new and old, political repre-
sentatives to spare no means for the preservation of their war gains. In other 
words, that was the sign of their determination to prevent the political and 
judicial establishment and sanctioning of their responsibility for the war and 
decline of Serbia, at all cost. That is why a series of military police incidents in 
2001 and 2002, which culminated in the assassination of prime minister Đinđić, 
also show that the new authorities did not have efficient control over the ap-
paratuses of state force. Furthermore, it became clear that the hidden parts of 
the military, police and secret services had sided with the reform’s opponents 
and were prepared to place their forces at the disposal of the political restorers 
of the old regime.
In view of all that the (pro)democratic transformation of the post-conflict 
and post-authoritarian Serbia was throughout this period faced with new and 
additional security threats. Only this time they had internal origins. They were, 
among other things, the final product of the DOS’ evasion to clearly present the 
Serbian public with its war balance sheet and face it with the resulting defeat, 
or, in other words, with the meanwhile increased cost of transition and the time 
squeeze for its implementation in Serbia. That is why in a situation marked by a 
periodically intensified social crisis it was not only possible to politically block 
the reforms, but also to actually contemplate the restoration of the old order. 
Owing to that, the dilemma whether the reform in Serbia has finally reached 
the point of no return into a non-democratic order, has not been fully resolved 
to this date.
Courses of securitisation and desecuritisation 
in Serbia 
We should therefore ask ourselves why despite the peaceful replacement of the 
old regime a danger from the outbreak of internal conflicts persistently existed 
and occasionally even grew in Serbia. In other words, why the new government, 
as well as its opponents, went on presenting their differences concerning the 
course, purpose and price of transition as decisive for the survival of the Serbian 
nation and state.  
Partial responses to these questions may be obtained if we analyse the con-
text in Serbia using the concept of securitisation, conceived by the authors of 
the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies.84 But before that, they - for 
analytical purposes - defined the existence of five security sectors – military, 
political, economic, societal and ecological – and thereby expanded the scope 
and meaning of the concept of security. Having done that, they analysed each 
84 Ralf Emmers, “Securitization,” in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2007), 109–25.
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of these sectors using their own concept of securitisation.85 Within that exercise 
they established that the collective (national) identity was the main referencial 
object in the societal security sector. The national state, in that interpretation, 
appears as the meeting and interferential point (space) of collective identity 
and security.86 These authors believe that what lies at the base of their security 
mutuality is the problem of survival of both entities.
That is why Waever finds security a self-referencial practice. Or, rather, an ac-
tivity which, owing to the prevailing public discourse and the inherited political 
constellation gives certain events or processes a primarily security connotation. 
In line with that, he continues, security studies seek to examine the reasons and 
procedures which make a certain issue (event, process) a security issue.87
That is why the concept of securitisation is based on the understanding of 
security as a speech-act. Accordingly, to put it simply, Buzan and colleagues de-
scribe security as a specific procedure for the linguistic interpretation and for-
mulation of an issue (event, process) in a given social (political) context. Security 
discourse, in their view, rests on the (political) dramatisation of that issue, i.e., 
event or process. This effect is attained by presenting and interpreting the is-
sues, processes or events to the public as existential threats for the survival of 
their nation and/or state. Since a threat of this kind needs to be removed at once, 
the establishment (reestablishment) of security of the given state and/or nation 
is (ought to be) given absolute (political) priority. In that name, then, the pro-
ponents of power ask the public support for the use of special (extraordinary) 
powers and measures, i.e. acceptance of (a temporary) suspension and/or viola-
tion of the existing (constitutional legal and political) norms and procedures. 
In other words, bearing in mind that the survival of the nation and state is the 
supreme objective which justifies the use of all available means and methods, 
the public is requested to agree with the displacement of the resolution of the 
securitised issue from the political – constitutional and institutional – sphere. 
They furthermore say that if the public accepts and supports this request, one 
could conclude that the problem (event, process) concerned has been success-
fully securitised.88 
Analogously, desecuritisation could be briefly described as a procedure of 
the linguistic (discursive) reinterpretation of an issue (process, event). In the 
course of this procedure the issue at hand is divested of the previously assigned 
security meanings and is therefore no longer presented and interpreted as a 
85 Barry Buzan and others, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Reinner Pub-
lishers, 1998), 119–20.
86 Ole Waever, “European Security Identities,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, no. 1 
(March 1996): 104.
87 Waever, 104.
88 Barry Buzan and others, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Reinner Pub-
lishers, 1998).
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threat for the survival of a nation and its state. Once that happens, the issue 
concerned re-enters the regular political flows and its resolution is undertaken 
only with political means and institutionalised procedures.
In order to successfully use the concept of (de)securitisation to improve the 
understanding of the features specific for the Serbian context, a previous quan-
titative and qualitative analysis would be required to look into the dominant 
discourses in the period observed (2000–2008). The same exercise should be 
used to learn about the main securitising actors and the types of social capi-
tal at their disposal.89 The findings so obtained should enable us to identify the 
central topics (events, processes) of the previous or ongoing (de) securitisation 
procedures. At the same time, it would certainly be necessary to specifically ex-
amine whether the reform of the Serbian security sector or its individual actors 
was - and if so why, when, in what way and for how long a time - a subject of 
(de)securitisation, and with what consequences. After that, we should examine 
whether there have been any securitising processes in Serbia that ended with 
the agreement of the domestic public for the use of extraordinary measures 
and procedures. If, on the other hand, the agreement went missing, the reason 
for the failure of the specific securitisation would need to be established. Or, in 
cases of successful securitisation, we should find out whether the special meas-
ures had been abolished and if so when and why, and also what was the course 
the desecuritisation processes thereafter. Only after all these findings have been 
obtained sufficient conditions would be created for a more detailed examina-
tion of the type and degree of interconnection of the (de)securitisation process 
and the SSR in Serbia.
Bearing in mind that research of this kind has not been undertaken in Serbia 
so far, our insight into the courses of (de)securitisation will of necessity be hy-
pothetical. That is precisely why we will, in this paper only attempt to outline its 
internal dynamics and indicate some of its possible consequences. We are will-
ing to take this risk since we are convinced that even preliminary insights that 
have to be empirically checked and verified, or refuted, may throw additional 
light on the context wherein the Serbian SSR was pursued.
We will argue that securitisation was the component, important and accom-
panying part, as well as the final product of key political processes unfolding in 
Serbia since the mid-1980s. To that extent securitisation represented a form of 
their linguistic appointment and externalisation, as well as their sharpening and 
realisation. It, therefore, necessarily originated from the continuous and power-
ful internal and extreme politicisation of Serbia and the Serbian nations’ survival 
and, in return, became the cause for an additional dramatisation of politics. No 
89 We must, at this point, recall the warning of Buzan and colleagues that the power for the per-
formance of securitisation is asymmetrically distributed among actors, and that only those who 
can translate their speech act into action, may efficiently define security threats and alternative 
strategies for reaching security. See Barry Buzan and others, Security: A New Framework for Analy-
sis (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998).
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less can it be understood as a simultaneous discursive reaction to the system-
atic external securitisation of Serbia presenting it, ever since the early 1990s, 
as the main threat to the security of its closest neighbours and other ethnic 
communities, and the main culprit for the Yugoslav wars. The overall and last-
ing politicisation of Serbian survival tended to lead towards internal securitisa-
tion, which encouraged its actors to persist in repeated and new request to the 
public, and demonstrate willingness to leave the sphere of (regulated) politics 
resorting to special measures.
The causes and motives for securitisation in Serbia originated from different 
sources, which is why it assumed diverse forms. Its pace was uneven, and so as 
was its intensity. Consequently, its success was also changing. The narrow and 
wide contexts in which it was created and acted upon also demonstrated faster 
or slower changes. That is why the courses of securitisation in Serbia can only be 
properly grasped if understood as a part of interconnected processes of securi-
tisation first in the SFRY and then also in the sub-region of the Western Balkans. 
When the Yugoslav war was joined by foreign interventionists, the number of 
securitising actors increased and the scope of securitisation was expanded. The 
same, naturally, applies to the processes of sporadic and/or gradual, i.e. tempo-
rary, desecuritisation of certain issues appearing in mutual relations between 
nations and countries of this region.
Furthermore, during the above-mentioned period and following the pace of 
change in power, the securitising and functional actors changed and replaced 
one another,90 but partial changes were also noted in relation to the public, i.e. 
its susceptibility to securitisation. In the same vein the list of special measures 
for the application of which the agreement of the domestic public was sought, 
remained mainly imprecise and changeable, and not infrequently impossible to 
finalise. Despite all the changes, securitisation, in our view has been a constant, 
but also a determinant of the political and security dynamics in Serbia for the 
past twenty years. In that respect we could say that Serbia and its population 
have throughout this time been exposed to securitisation. To the same extent 
they simultaneously and continuously felt the adverse consequences of securi-
tisation which then became new reasons for its occasional, more or less success-
ful, renewal and intensification. That is, among other things, indicated by the 
fact that powerful securitisation in Serbia was initiated in relation to the events 
in Kosovo and Metohija in the mid-1980s only to see the same topic at its focus 
90 According to Buzan et. al. securitising actors are all those who through their speech-act name 
the main object of protection, and the existential threat for its survival as the basis to request 
the use of special measures. The above-mentioned authors assign this power to political leaders, 
state bureaucracy (including the military, police and secret service), as well as to the govern-
ment, lobbyist and pressure groups (Barry Buzan and others, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998), 40. Functional actors, for them, include all 
those who substantially influence the dynamics of the security sector, i.e. those who could influ-
ence the taking of security decisions and expect some benefits from securitization (Buzan, 36). 
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in 2008, after the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo’s independence.
That is why we may claim that securitisation in Serbia during the past 20 
years developed in waves. It assumed diverse form and unfolded in several par-
allel, as well as crossing directions, passing through rises and falls. However, an 
occasional change of the referenc object or oscillations in its intensity were not 
necessarily an introduction to the desecuritisation of, to all appearances, merely 
temporarily abandoned or postponed topics.91 
The first and decisive wave of securitisation in Serbia came in the late 1980s. 
It was inseparably linked with the mutual securitisation processes of the repub-
lics and national actors in the Yugoslav circle. The initial assumptions for interac-
tive securitisation were created by the politically dramatised crisis of socialism. 
The crisis brought to the surface the fundamental Yugoslavia’s deficiencies and 
controversies and their combined securitisation soon became the key precondi-
tion for its political and then violent disintegration. The gradual abandonment 
and then rejection, of the socialist idea and order irrevocably deprived the sec-
ond Yugoslav state of its legitimacy. The ensuing disputes concerning the form 
of the future political community (confederation vs. modern federation) were 
soon transformed into national conflicts and animosities. For that purpose a 
new and different past was produced on daily basis to become the main proof 
that it would be not only impossible, but also damaging, i.e. dangerous, to re-
main in any kind of a Yugoslav community. Thus the way of exiting Yugoslavia 
soon became the central point of disputes, and therefore also of mutual secu-
ritisation. Bearing in mind that national-republic elites were unwilling and/or 
incapable of reaching an agreement on its abolishment, that resulted in uni-
lateral withdrawals which than became the cause for the violent re-tailoring of 
Yugoslavia.
The public scene in Serbia was, at that time, dominated by two, initially 
mutually conflicting, discourses, whose protagonists belonged to different po-
litical options and cultures. The proponents of the first discourse – the ruling 
political elite gathered around Slobodan Milošević, and the academics, poets, 
media men and generals riding on his coattails – long used the communist and 
ideological key to explain the crisis of socialism and Yugoslavia. They presented 
themselves as defenders of both. Moreover, even after the war had started and 
they were forced to openly legitimise themselves as the only authorised protec-
tors of the Serbian nation – eliciting powerful support of the Orthodox clergy 
and the opposition of the day – they were not prepared to abandon “Yugosla-
via” as a project, naturally one designed according to their understanding of 
the Serbian national and state interests. That is why it was possible for Slobo-
dan Milošević to guard Yugoslavia and keep it alive all that time, invoking the 
91 A warning of a danger from renewed extreme politicization, and potentially also securitisation 
of Serbian-Croatian relations, may be seen in the reactions of the public in Belgrade and Zagreb 
to the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Hague to declare its jurisdiction in the 
case of Croatia vs. Serbia, wherein the accused party is charged with genocide. 
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struggle for the protection of allegedly Serbian interests, and for Serbia to finally 
(2006) obtain state independence against its will, i.e. by a plebiscitary decision 
of Montenegrin voters. 
In parallel with Slobodan Milošević the scene was entered by diverse pro-
ponents and engineers of another and different discourse. Depending on their 
ideological orientations, they presented the crisis of socialism either as an op-
portunity to restore the Serbian monarchy and its 19th century tradition, or a 
chance for a democratic renewal of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Despite the differ-
ences existing between the power and the opposition during the 1980s and 
1990s – with the exception of few advocates of the liberal-democratic and civic 
option – both discourses rested on a series of common postulates and were 
built around similar narrative courses and constructs. Furthermore, the power 
and the opposition continuously competed for primacy in construing the rea-
sons for war and armed action to save the Serbian nation.
That is why, despite situational variations, securitisation had a firm and un-
changeable thematic core. Its centre was continuously taken by the problem 
of survival of Serbs and Serbia, i.e. the fear that the unilateral abolishment of 
Yugoslavia and the emerging of new states – reportedly designed and spon-
sored by foreign interventionists – would fatally endanger the Serbian national 
and biological substrate. The domination of the conspiracy-based and essen-
tially self-amnestying92 interpretation of the causes and reasons for the violent 
destruction of Yugoslavia inevitably lead to self-victimisation.93 Consequently, 
Serbs and Serbia were – in the first place to themselves - presented as the in-
nocent victims of an (international) anti-Serbian conspiracy. 
Out of this core emerged three mutually connected and unchangeable lines 
of securitisation in Serbia. Along the first line, the Serbian actors permanently 
securitised the international community and its main exponents (USA, NATO, 
Germany, etc.). The list of the latter was naturally changeable and situationally 
conditioned, and occasionally included the Vatican, Austria, Great Britain etc., 
as required. The second line led to the securitisation of the Yugoslav partners 
and rivals (nations and republics) at the time, and resulted in their presentation, 
first as adversaries in the political and national spheres and then also in war. The 
third line had to do with the internal Serbian securitisation of its own based on 
a binary and Manichaean construction of “true Serbian patriots” and “traitors of 
Serbdom”.
On top of all that, the Serbian (self )securitisation was from the very begin-
ning geographically, as well as thematically, decentralised and pluralised. The 
circle of leading securitising actors outright included the leaders of political and 
national movements (parties) of Serbs outside Serbia, and especially those in 
92 Miroslav Hadžić, Sudbina partijske vojske (Beograd, Samizdat FreeB92, 2001), 9–32.
93 Vlasta Jalušič, “Rod i viktimizacija nacije,” in Nasilno rasturanje Jugoslavije, ur. Miroslav Hadžić. 
(Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2004), 145–66. 
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Croatia94 and BiH. They thematically expanded and strengthened securitisation 
by reviving the Serbian traumas from World War II. They justified their securitis-
ing acts by the fact that they were faced with the renewal and fast growing ex-
treme Croatian and Bosniak nationalism of Serbophobe provenance. Their thus 
emitted concern for the fate of the Serbian nation became still more convincing 
after the electoral victory of Franjo Tuđman and The Croatian Democratic Union 
(HDZ) i.e., Alija Izetbegović and his Party for Democratic Action (SDA) in Croatia 
and BiH respectively.
The first wave of securitisation, with the full cooperation of actors from the 
Yugoslav republics and nations at that time, ended in June 1991 when their 
populations entered a mutual war. It encompassed all members of the Serbian 
ethnic community in Yugoslavia, as well as all inhabitants of Serbia at that time. 
Then came the second, multilayered and multidirectional wave of securitisation 
which lasted from the outbreak of the Yugoslav war until the overthrow of Slo-
bodan Milošević.
In the Serbian circle, the dominant discourse was formed in line with the 
dynamics of the war, and the initial successes, as well as subsequent defeats of 
the Serbian militaries and paramilitaries. It was equally conditioned by the pace 
and scope, as well as consequences of the direct third-party interventions in the 
Yugoslav wars, i.e. the pace, scope and consequences of the external imposition 
of peace solutions.95 Consequently, during this period, the Serbian actors were 
forced to change the referenc objects and emphasis in the process of securi-
tisation. Thus, for instance, the central referenc object until the signing of the 
Dayton Agreements (1995) was derived from the direct war danger for Serbs 
outside Serbia and their state-like creations – RSK and RS. After Dayton came 
the renewal, and soon predominance, of the Kosovo securitising cycle, center-
ing on not only the political, but also physical survival of the Serbian state and 
its inhabitants. In parallel, and in line with the war costs and losses, as well as 
preparations for war in Kosovo and Metohija, Milošević’s regime increased the 
securitisation of its survival in power. In order to achieve that it, once again, as-
signed the opposition the status of the internal and national enemy and – in the 
form of proposed legislation on terrorism, university and the press – turned to 
the public with requests for the use of special measures against the opposition. 
After the forced withdrawal of Serbian armed formations from Kosovo and Me-
tohija, Slobodan Milošević, until his removal from power, had only the opposi-
tion left to securitise. And vice versa.
Despite the war context and warmongering propaganda, as well as the 
Caesaristic involution of Milošević’s order, the second wave of securitisation in 
94 For more on the courses of securitization of the Serbs in Croatia see a study by Ozren Žunec, 
Goli život: socijetalne dimenzije pobune Srba u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Demetra, 2007).
95 Haakan Wiberg, “Third Party Intervention in Yugoslavia: Problems and Lessons,” in Organized 
Anarchy in Europe, eds. Jaap de Wilde and Haakan Wiberg. (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 
1996), 203–26.
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Serbia was not successful. That was due to the fact that the domestic public, or 
at least the major part, did not endorse the special measures which the regime 
never introduced, however paradoxical this may seem. That is why we could 
sooner say that we saw in Serbia in the 1990s only the materialisation and the 
final consequences of the successfully belligerently finalised first wave of secu-
ritisation. That is, among other things, supported by the fact that from the very 
beginning Slobodan Milošević resolutely, although at no time publicly and ex-
plicitly, refused the requests of leaders in the Western Serbian lands to be joined 
to Serbia. He equally persistently avoided to officially usher Serbia (FRY) into the 
Yugoslav war. In addition, despite the mass persecution and exodus of Serbs 
from Croatia, Serbia (FRY) did not wish (dare?) to make a military response to 
the final operations of the Croatian armed forces (“Flash” and “Storm”). To all this 
we should add the failure of several mobilisations in Serbia and the continuing 
increase of desertions, so that the regime had to fill the ranks of western Serbian 
armies by force. The resistance of a part of Serbia’s population to securitisation 
is additionally revealed by the fact that despite the proclamation of the state of 
war after the start up of NATO aggression on the FRY (Serbia) and the reality that 
Serbia then, for the first time, had a clear, proclaimed and justified war objective, 
mobilisation was evaded by about 27,000 military conscripts. This list should 
be completed with the observation that the rapid growth of the internal – civic 
and political – resistance prevented Slobodan Milošević to openly establish a 
dictatorship in Serbia at the close of 1999. 
After the electoral breakdown of Milošević’s regime, the third wave of secu-
ritisation unfolded in a substantially changed context and with variable inten-
sity. One could even say that it was actually the case only of cyclical and abortive 
attempts to renew securitisation. This conclusion, it seems, cannot be disputed 
even by the introduction of the state of emergency following the assassination 
of prime minister Zoran Đinđić, because it was an ad hoc decision of the incum-
bent government, which not only legalised operation “Sabre” but also initiated 
securitisation of organised crime in Serbia, oscillating as it was.
That is why securitisation in time became/remained only one of several po-
tential denouements of the powerful and continuing politicisation of Serbia on 
the inside, all the more because it kept losing strength due to the parallel start 
up of desecuritisation processes. Thus, for instance, the relation between the 
power and opposition in Serbia was gradually desecuritised. That is undeniably 
proved by multiple peaceful changes of parties in power – although for the time 
being only those from the original nest of the DOS – as well as overall acceptance 
and respect of the existing electoral rules and procedures. That is evidenced by 
the Socialist Party of Serbia’s recent coalition with the Democratic Party, allow-
ing the Democrats to form the government. In all truth, election campaigns in 
Serbia have been charged with mutually securitising moves and meanings, but 
have not been accompanied by requests for the use of special measures.
Similarly, in step with Serbia’s return to international organisation, and in 
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view of its strategic option to join the Euro-Atlantic community, the Serbian au-
thorities started gradual desecuritisation of the key international actors (USA, 
NATO, EU), and then also of their closest neighbours. Naturally, this has not com-
pletely removed the attempts for their renewed securitisation during the, truely 
feigned, negotiations on the status of Kosovo, i.e. after the above-mentioned 
international actors appeared as the champions of international recognition for 
this self-proclaimed state.
Furthermore, we could also say that in Serbia the topic of Kosovo has, in the 
meantime, actually lost its securitising charge of previous times. That happened 
despite the powerful securitising moves of the then prime minister Vojislav 
Koštunica and his allies – the largest opposition parties (SRS, SPS) and ultra-
rightist and nationalist movements. He, namely, first tried to securitise the par-
astatal terror of the Kosovo Albanians over the Serbs in March 2004, and then 
also the self-proclamation of the independent state of Kosovo in February 2008. 
Let us note that in the meantime he also –unsuccessfully – tried to securitise 
the plebiscitarily-achieved independence of Montenegro. This thesis is sup-
ported by the fact that in none of the above mentioned occasions did Vojislav 
Koštunica officially request the introduction or application of any special meas-
ures. One could rather say that it was only an attempt to take advantage of the 
Kosovo theme and use the securitising form of the extreme politicisation and 
danger for Serbia and Serbs for the showdown with internal political opponents 
and the strengthening of his own power.
During the above mentioned two decades, the vortex of the Serbian secu-
ritisation necessarily caught its security sector. Namely, it first enveloped the 
state, and after the outbreak of the Yugoslav war, also the non-state power hold-
ers: the military, police, secret services, paramilitary and parapolice forces, as 
well as private and party armed formations. One of them, e.g. the Yugoslav Peo-
ple’s Army appeared independently as a securitising as well as functional actor 
at the end of the Yugoslav political crisis. After that, from the outbreak of the war 
until its disappearance (1992) it lost all political influence and then professional 
autonomy.96 Some, for instance the secret services, were the key moderators of 
violence and thereby functional actors which had sufficient hidden power to 
influence the security dynamics in Serbia and the war dynamics throughout Yu-
goslavia.97 All other formations were mere instruments in realising the supreme 
political will of Milošević’s regime. It is therefore hardly surprising that during 
the 1990s the regime gave the police the role of the internal military, i.e. the role 
of its main protector, and militarised it for that purpose. Furthermore, the main 
task of all paraformations was to use ethnically motivated terror to instigate, 
spread and transfer the war to all the regions outside Serbia inhabited by Serbs. 
96 Miroslav Hadžić, The Yugoslav People’s Agony (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2002).
97 Miroslav Hadžić, “Moderatori nasilja – skrivena strana yu-rata,” in Nasilno rasturanje Jugoslavije, 
ed. Miroslav Hadžić. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2004), 133–44.
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To that extent their activity may be understood as a form of violent materiali-
sation of the main securitising course, as well as a form of a self-renewing and 
frightening securitisation on the local (micro) level.
That is why it was impossible to expect any reform of this sector and/or its 
actors for the duration of Milošević’s regime. Moreover, they were irrevocably 
harnessed to the war and political needs of the autocratic regime and accord-
ingly formed, or reorganised, as required. Therefore, the reform of this sector, and 
above all the reform of state apparatuses of power, became fundamentally pos-
sible only after the ascent of the DOS coalition. However, this possibility, as sub-
sequent events proved, remained largely unutilised. That outcome was strongly 
favoured by the previously outlined third wave of internal securitisation. 
Namely, due to the protracted public production of fear the reform of the 
security sector itself soon became securitised in Serbia. Its opponents present-
ed any deeper attempt at reorganisation (e.g. in the military), or Serbia’s orienta-
tion towards security integration into NATO and/or the EU, as a deliberate move 
to weaken its defence abilities and a step towards an irretrievable loss of state 
sovereignty and national identity. The securitisation of the SSR, on its part, gave 
rise to several types of consequences which immediately became obstacles for 
its successful implementation. While politically using their ongoing securitis-
ing acts, the holders of power acquired, among other things, an alibi for their 
postponement of a radical SSR, i.e. an excuse for the establishment of party or 
personal control over the state apparatuses of force. Following the course of 
securitisation they simultaneously renewed and imposed a state-centric ap-
proach to security and so equipped restored the monopoly of political elites in 
defining and reaching the national security. By keeping it again in the domain 
of high policy, namely within their own competence, they additionally tabooed 
it. They, therefore, did not even try to legally regulate the domain of the state 
and military secrets, thus leaving room for their discretionary interpretation and 
use. By doing that they have again displaced the security of the state and nation 
out of the public sphere, and prevented its critical review. At the same time they 
sidetracked the problem of citizens’ (in)security, and in functional and political 
terms, subordinated it to the security of the nation (collectivity) and state. That, 
on its part, helped them to remove the pressures of the part of the public which 
expected and/or demanded a radical SSR. To make things worse, they simulta-
neously relieved themselves of the obligation to deal with the inherited war-
related baggage of the Serbian armed formations, and establish and sanction 
their performance in the war. This naturally yielded direct benefits for the local 
security elites. They were, first, allowed to remain in power after Milošević’s de-
feat, and were then tacitly relieved of the responsibility for the Yugoslav war and 
decades long terror over the Serbian citizens. Owing to that, Milošević’s military 
and police generals, as well as leaders of secret services, i.e. their successors, 
retained executive control over the course and pace of the SSR, and especially 
over the changes in the state apparatuses of power. 
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Additional measuring difficulties
One could, therefore, rightly wonder whether the new authorities have already 
missed the opportunity to irreversibly embed the democratic order in Serbia. A 
positive answer triggers additional questions as to where, when and how that 
opportunity was let slip. But before these responses are provided, it would be 
necessary to establish where, how and why the reform in Serbia got stuck. Fig-
uratively speaking, it would be necessary to find the transition “plugs”, which 
made Serbia’s hovering “somewhere between” for too long a time.98 To make 
that possible we need to know why some changes in Serbia did take place, and 
how.99 It would then be easier to explain how some of the announced, i.e. nec-
essary, changes went missing. Only when additional research has addressed 
these unknown quantities will it be possible to interpret the modest SSR results 
in Serbia with a higher degree of reliability. That would, on its part, increase 
the prospects for greater reliability in measuring the influence of the domestic 
context and the prolonged securitisation on the courses and achievements, i.e. 
deficiencies in the reform of this sector and the state apparatuses of force. That 
would require the examination, and then also the removal, of some additional 
difficulties that may appear in measuring and evaluating the hitherto results of 
the SSR in Serbia.
The events after the deposing of the former regime warn that the achieve-
ments in the reform of the security sector in Serbia largely depended on the way 
in which the domestic elites and proponents of power understood and inter-
preted the contents and objectives of this undertaking. That is why we should 
ascertain why the DOS leaders overlooked the glaring warning that in a post-
authoritarian and post-war - and internally deeply divided - Serbia it was impos-
sible to create even the initial assumptions for the establishment of a demo-
cratic order without a simultaneous and radical reform of the entire security 
sector. Or rather, we should find out why their approach to the SSR remained 
reductionistic throughout this time.100 They, making the first step, reduced this 
undertaking to limited and dosed changes in the military, the police and secret 
services. Moreover, they not only omitted to promptly disempower Milošević’s 
agents of force and violence, but actually expected them to be the main propo-
98 Dušan Pavlović and Slobodan Antonić, Konsolidacija demokratskih ustanova u Srbiji posle 2000. 
godine (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2007).
99 This is all the more urgent, bearing in mind the theses about the decisive role of foreign states 
and their services along with their “domestic mercenaries” in overthrowing Slobodan Milošević 
have been rife in the Serbian public for quite some time already. There are also other theses 
with the same meaning, to the effect that the electoral overturn became possible only when the 
top ranks of secret services and their criminalised followers denounced Slobodan Milošević to 
preserve their own interests.
100 Miroslav Hadžić, “Dometi reforme sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji,” in Reforma sektora bezbedno-
sti u Srbiji, ur. Mirolav Hadžić. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2007), 13–18.
128
nents of change. Therefore, the new power holders in the next step reduced the 
reform to reorganisation, presenting the changes in the numerical composition, 
internal organisation and formation of these apparatuses as the main and only 
content of the reform.
That left the - state and non-state - holders of security authorities in Ser-
bia out of sight of the general and professional public. That is why the pow-
ers granted to tax and customs authorities to apply special measures for se-
cret control and oversight of citizens, traditionally within the competence of 
security services, went unnoticed. Furthermore, these new holders of (secret or 
hidden) power over the citizens and society remained beyond the reach of par-
liamentary control and public control and oversight.101 In the same way, despite 
the enormous increase in the number of private companies offering security 
services, the scope of their activities and their competencies have not yet been 
regulated by a special law.102 
Still worse, the reform of the security sector in Serbia was (is) most often ap-
proached in a piecemeal fashion. That is, among other things, evidenced by the 
way in which the current holders of power have regulated the security sector in 
the Serbian Constitution.103 They have, namely, once again missed the opportu-
nity to use this act in order to, for starters, define and regulate a single security 
sector and system. Moreover, the constitution makers omitted (avoided?) to in-
stitute the National Security Strategy and form the National Security Council. 
It is therefore small wonder that Serbia still does not have its National Security 
Strategy. Furthermore, the Serbian Armed Forces still rely on the defence strat-
egy inherited from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and continue to 
make do without a Military Doctrine.
At the same time, the Constitution has placed only the military under demo-
cratic civilian control, while the police, secret services and other parapolice forc-
es still remain beyond its reach. On top of that, proper constitutional, legal and 
institutional frameworks and procedures for cooperation within the security 
sector do not exist. Not surprisingly changes in each of the above-mentioned 
apparatuses are isolated and develop independently from one another. For ex-
ample, there is no proof of even an indirect conceptual, strategic or operational 
connection between the changes taking place in secret services, the police and 
the military. That is why operational cooperation among actors in the security 
sector, and especially those who use power, directly depends on the good will 
of their leading professionals and the current personnel (party) composition of 
101 Miroslav Hadžić i Predrag Petrović, eds., Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih ovlašćen-
ja (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008).
102 Sonja Stojanović, ed., Privatne bezbednosne kompanije u Srbiji – prijatelj ili pretnja? (Beograd: 
Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008).
103 Bogoljub Milosavljević, “Ustavno pravni status policije i drugih snaga bezbednosti u Srbiji po-
sle donošenja Ustava 2006. godine,” in Zbornik predavanja sa IX Škole reforme sektora bezbednosti, 
ed. Pavle Janković. (Beograd, ISAC Fond, 2007).
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the cabinet and relevant ministries. All this is, still, the expected result in the ab-
sence of a state strategy and plan to implement the reform of the armed forces, 
i.e. the security sector. To make things worse, the competent bodies have thus 
far failed to present the public with any kind of government calculation related 
to the price of intended reform. Still less is known about the possible sources of 
the required funds. 
Taking all this into account, the question is whether it is at all possible to 
holistically measure the security sector reform in a country wherein the related 
concept has never been officially adopted and applied, i.e. a country where an 
all-comprising security sector has not yet been functionally and institutionally 
established.
We should also bear in mind that the SSR concept reached first the aca-
demic and then the political circle in Serbia, from the Anglo-Saxon part of the 
donor community through international NGOs, such as the Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. That is why the reception of the SSR 
concept, and especially its application, largely depended on the political dy-
namics in Serbia and the state of its (bilateral, multilateral) relations with the 
concept’s exporters. Furthermore, the domestic public does not have access to 
data on the forms, amounts and effects of the state and non-state, material and 
non-material assistance thus far provided to Serbia by foreign actors (individual 
states, international governmental and/or non-governmental organisations) in 
the reform of its security sector. There is no knowledge either about the donors’ 
view of the ways their assistance was used, and who benefited from it. Still less 
is known what the beneficiaries in Serbia – state institutions and bodies, and 
civil society actors – think about the received assistance, i.e. their use of it and 
its effects.
Moreover, any attempt to measure the results of the SSR in Serbia faces 
several more methodological and cognitive obstacles. They naturally include 
those that may arise in the collection and processing of the available empirical 
material. It is an open question whether that material is sufficient to reliably 
(e)valuate the courses and achievements of the above mentioned reform. The 
available material, for the time being, comprises detailed findings of analysing 
the application of the SSR concept in the transition of non-democratic (illiberal) 
orders in Croatia, i.e. Serbia.104 In addition, most of the key changes carried out 
in some state apparatuses of force in Serbia in the past few years have also been 
inventoried. But, these data come from secondary sources which do not provide 
a sufficiently trustworthy image of the SSR courses and problems in Serbia. 
The next problem arises in determining the time-point when the register-
ing and then also measuring of the reform’s results should start, because due to 
the recently ended wars the transition calendar counting the time as of the fall 
104 Timothy Edmunds, Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies – Croatia, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).
130
of the Berlin Wall (1989) does not apply to Serbia, or for that matter other Yu-
goslav states, except Slovenia. Therefore, the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević 
(October 2000) is most often taken as the starting point of pro-democratic 
changes in Serbia.105 It would be equally possible to start the reform chronol-
ogy in Serbia from the date of its state independence (May 2006), forced by the 
acts of Montenegro. That is because the prolonged survival of the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (1992-2003), i.e. the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
(2003–2006) inevitably influenced the pace and achievements of Serbia’s secu-
rity sector reform, at least because of the fact that in this period the military and 
the defence were, at any rate nominally, within the competence of the federal 
state. Furthermore, we should also bear in mind the parallel existence of three 
relatively separate security systems – one each in the two member states and 
the Union – which, far from being interconnected and coordinated, were actu-
ally mutually competitive. And in the case of Montenegro, the other two were 
also treated as potentially hostile.
We could, then, say that Serbia obtained the necessary conditions to create 
its security sector and efficiently manage its reform, only after it had renewed 
its statehood and adopted a new Constitution (2006). Consequently, the post-
Milošević period which Serbia spent in the union with Montenegro could be 
defined as a stage of reform incubation and accumulation, when most of its 
state apparatuses of force were only reorganised, as well as a period wherein 
it lost the momentum, or dissipated and dispersed the reform energy derived 
from the replacement of the old regime. One could therefore rightly wonder 
if the reform of this sector has passed the critical point, primarily because the 
democratic order in Serbia has not been firmly embedded yet, which leaves the 
possibility for internal political (involutive) about-turn.
The next step faces us with the problem of choosing (defining) a bench-
mark to measure the achievements of the security sector reform in Serbia. At 
first sight it may seem that it could be solved by comparing the Serbian reform 
with the achievements of the same processes in Central European, i.e. other 
Western Balkan countries. However, both choices are deficient for several im-
portant reasons. In the first case, the fundamental similarities between Serbia 
and former real-socialist countries lost their importance, i.e. were no longer 
comparable after the violent dissolution of the second Yugoslav state. The war, 
namely, prevented and for a long time postponed the exit of its constituent 
members (newly created states) from socialism (authoritarianism). Moreover, 
the non-democratic order in Serbia not only used these circumstances to secure 
itself a new (ethno-religious) legitimacy, but also started to assume totalitarian 
(Caesaristic) features.
At this point it would be possible to identify additional similarities between 
105 Ivana Spasić and Milan Subotić, Revolucija i poredak (Beograd: Institit za filozofiju i društvenu 
teoriju, 2001).
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the war-created orders in Serbia and those in other states emerged from the 
second Yugoslavia. That particularly applies to Croatia during the rule of Franjo 
Tuđman (1991–2000). In view of all that, it seems that it would be justifiable 
to comparatively measure and evaluate only the achievements in the security 
sector reforms of Western Balkan countries, primarily Serbia and Croatia. That, 
however, gives rise to a new set of intractable problems.
Namely, the immediate question is if, and to what extent, the achievements 
of the security sector reforms in the above-mentioned countries were condi-
tioned by the results of the Yugoslav war, or rather the question of how to estab-
lish and measure the possible influence of the war heritage on the SSR? 
Despite the differences between the local actors concerning the causes of 
the war, and despite the fact that it was stopped (prohibited) only by means of 
foreign intervention, there is no doubt that some came out of it victorious, while 
others were defeated. It would be reasonable to expect that reform is easier to 
pursue in a winning than in a defeated country. Naturally, providing that they 
have started a democratic transition of their societies and states. However, it 
would be possible to offer fundamental reasons in favour of the opposite claim. 
We should recall that the military and other apparatuses of force along with the 
victory in a war also acquire substantial political power, which they are reluctant 
to relinquish after the end of the conflict.106 If in the process they also acquire 
the status of state creators, as is for instance in the case of Croatia,107 they can 
only be expected to demonstrate increasing resistance to any change, especial-
ly if it can endanger their acquired power and privileged position in the society 
and state. The case of Serbia, on the other hand, warns that a military, especially 
non-recognised, defeat, does not necessarily lead to the reduction or abolish-
ment of the power acquired in the war by the military-police and secret service 
elites. On the contrary, their resistance to reforms may even grow.108 
There is no doubt, e.g., that Croatia came out of the war victorious. That is 
why it not only became an internationally recognised and sovereign state in the 
inherited borders, but also provided a lasting solution to the Croatian national 
issue. This cannot be denied even by the fact that Croatia attained its objec-
tives, among other things, but the mass banishment of the Serbs in operations 
“Flash” and “Storm”, i.e. that it was directly involved in the war in BiH. Victory, 
however, did not spare Croatia the trials and difficulties of transferring its state 
and society from a state of war into the one of peace. It is therefore small won-
der that the reform of its security sector gained momentum only after the death 
of Franjo Tuđman and the replacement of his regime at the elections. However, 
it would be reasonable to assume that the victory facilitated the agreement of 
106 Semjuel P. Hantington, Vojnik i država (Beograd: CSES, Diplomatska akademija, 2004).
107 Ozren Žunec, Rat i društvo, Ogledi iz sociologije vojske i rata (Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 
Hrvatsko sociološko društvo, 1998).
108 Miroslav Hadžić, The Yugoslav People’s Agony (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2002).
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the domestic citizens and elites concerning the pace and objectives of reforms 
in Croatia. In the same way it (the victory) actually served as the crucial proof 
for Croatia to subsequently deny any responsibility for the outbreak of the Yu-
goslav war. With the firm option to enter NATO and the EU the local elites (inad-
vertently) gave the reform of the Croatian security sector a different meaning. 
By placing the emphasis on the fulfilment of conditions for, even if only formal, 
attainment of Euro-Atlantic standards, they relieved this reform undertaking of 
the inherent political charge, which inevitably appears whenever the nomen-
klatura’s control of the state apparatuses of power acquired in a war is to be 
reduced and/or limited. 
A proper answer to the above-mentioned question is much more difficult 
to find in the case of Serbia. It is so because the claim that Serbia (FRY) did not 
officially participate in the Yugoslav war seeks to render this question point-
less. It, moreover, tries to avoid any serious talk of its role in the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia. The fact that during the 1990s Serbia did not officially declare a 
war on anyone does not change the reality that the war was ended with the his-
torical defeat of Serbian political elites.  It is also doubtless that the elites have 
delivered the disastrous consequences of their defeat to all other members of 
the Serbian nation and citizens of the Serbian state. That is why the political life 
in Serbia, and more, is based on a paradox. Power-greedy elites and their devo-
tees among the citizens (voters) resolutely reject any thought of Serbia’s defeat, 
but for all their efforts cannot avoid its consequences. That is why it appears 
that the defeat, whether publicly acknowledged or not, represents the nodal 
point of the Serbian transition vortex. And since it is unrecognised, its place is 
again filled with delusions about a world-wide anti-Serbian conspiracy, which 
is then used to hatch and generate ideological and emotional resistance to the 
modernisation and democratisation of Serbia. They, naturally, conceal wholly 
measurable economic and political (party) interests of their leading spokesmen. 
Consequently, evidence substantiating the thesis that the pace and achieve-
ments of transition in Serbia, and therefore also of its security sector reform, 
have to this date been defined by the unrecognised (hidden) defeat, may be 
obtained only indirectly. In other words, it may be reached through the research 
of the numerous forms of the political and public escape from the need to face 
the defeat, and the examination of methods for its persistent concealment and 
renaming.
This process should also revise a set of dominant reasons invoked in the ex-
planation and/or justification of the difficult course and feeble results of the SSR 
in Serbia. Most of them would immediately lose the enchanting attributes of 
simplicity, self-explanatoriness and universal applicability. A typical example is 
the explanation that the main causes for the postponed and/or blocked reform, 
not only of Serbia’s security sector, derive from the lack of political will of those 
who have governed it since October 2000. 
But, it is not at all easy to define the meaning and contents of the “lack of 
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political will” as a qualifier. To this we should add the difficulty of establishing 
its indicators, i.e. difficulties in measuring its scope and intensity. Only after that 
will it be possible to look for the sources and ways for its creation and renewal. 
It seems, therefore, that this should be preceded by a serious debate on the 
relation between the desirable, the possible and the so far accomplished in the 
attempted democratic transition of Serbia. Failing that, we would be facing a 
danger to arbitrarily and on the basis of our personal preferences, single out 
specific manifestations of the current lack of political will among those who 
govern Serbia today. This danger may initially be avoided with the analysis of 
the security sector reform status, assigned to it by the ruling political parties in 
their visions of the Serbian democratic transformation.
A cursory look at the dominant discourse indicates the political division in 
the two processes. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to convince us that 
the power holders in Serbia understand their fundamental interconnection and 
interdependence. Hardly surprising, the pro-democratic reforms of the society 
and security sector in Serbia are, so to say, unfolding separately from one anoth-
er. That can also be explained by the fact that a state-centric way of understand-
ing security still prevails in Serbia. This situation is favoured by the internal and 
international controversies concerning the present and future status of Kosovo 
and Metohija. For the purpose of our deliberation, it is important to note that 
not only the power, but also the opposition in Serbia have intensively securi-
tized this topic, and thus produced intractable obstacles to further reforms of 
the security sector and the entire society. It is, therefore, not easy to understand 
why the proponents of power are avoiding and deferring the definition and 
proclamation of their own security policy and strategy. One could, for instance, 
doubt that they have used this manoeuvre to leave themselves enough room 
to change Serbia’s foreign-policy and security orientation in line with their daily 
needs and interest.
Also missing is reliable knowledge on the proportions and effects of the 
possible, and entirely expectable, resistance to reforms in the state apparatuses 
of force. That is also suggested by the fact that sporadic personnel changes in 
the military, police and secret services have never been explained by the need 
to speed up the SSR, but came in consequence of electoral change of govern-
ing parties. It is still more difficult to find out whether, and to what extent, the 
security elites are committed to the reform, i.e. to establish the beginning and 
end of their verbal mimicry and pretense of change. 
Not surprisingly, parts of the public, and especially the media, predomi-
nantly believe that the main responsibility for the slow reform of e.g. the mili-
tary, police and secret services rests with the generals, i.e. directors of security 
agencies. They lose sight of the fact that these people ultimately only execute 
the political will and decisions of civilian holders of power. That, naturally, does 
not cancel the fact that the generals and directors with the power they posses 
can indeed obstruct the reform. We, however, wish to say that the state appa-
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ratuses of force cannot reform themselves, even if they wanted. In order to do 
their job properly they have to obtain clear and precise instructions and orders 
from the civilian authorities. That, on the other hand, obliges these authorities 
to create all the necessary conditions and assumptions for the successful reform 
or the armed forces. Therefore, the key responsibility for the course and results 
of the security sector reform in Serbia rests with parliamentary political parties 
and their representatives who hold the key state functions. Only then should 
the leaders of each of the armed forces’ components be added to list of the re-
sponsible. Because, even if the generals or directors do fail, that should not hap-
pen to those in whom the citizens have vested the right to manage the security 
sector, i.e. exercise command over the holders of state power on their behalf 
and in their best interest. 
PART ThREE
 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN 
ThE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
Chapter I
STATUTORY ACTORS ThAT USE FORCE
Military
Đorđe Popović
The Serbian Armed Forces (VS) were formed in 2006 in the wake of numer-
ous changes in the political and military configuration on the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia, most recently following the disintegration of the State Un-
ion of Serbia and Montenegro. This development was, however, merely the last 
stage of a much longer and complex process. It started at the beginning of the 
Yugoslav wars in the 1990s when the Yugoslav Armed Forces (VJ, 1992–2003) 
emerged from the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA, 1941–1992). The VJ was sub-
sequently renamed the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (VSCG) in line 
with changes in the political union. The latter, however, remained operational 
for only three years (2003 – 2006). 
Consequently, the Serbian Armed Forces inherited all the major social and 
professional traits of its predecessors. Reform has been substantially condi-
tioned by the nature and content of this legacy as well as problems with demo-
cratic consolidation following the toppling of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 
October 2000. Thus, the reforms in the Serbian military carried out over the past 
two years should be analysed and understood as a continuation of the chang-
es initiated or (un)accomplished by the SMAF. By the same token, the present 
slowdown in the pace of reforms in the armed forces can largely be explained 
by first analysing the role of those in power in Serbia, the FRY and the State Un-
ion of Serbia and Montenegro after the year 2000. The changes in the military 
over the past eight years were strongly influenced by the political turmoil in Ser-
bia, the post-conflict and post-authoritarian context in which the armed forces 
developed, and the lingering union with Montenegro. As a result it is hardly sur-
prising that the approach of the ruling elites to the reform of the armed forces 
was driven by everyday political needs and interests. In addition, reform was 
for a long time slowed down by the absence of clear constitutional and legal 
provisions properly regulating its status, missions and tasks. Furthermore, the 
civilian chain of command over the military was not precisely defined, and the 
armed forces were, in effect, beyond the reach of democratic civilian control. 
These summary findings will be explained and substantiated in greater detail in 
the first part of this paper and will enable us to identify and evaluate the results 
of the Serbian Armed Forces reforms from 2006 until the present date.
The Legacy of the Serbian Armed Forces 
The reforms of the VS were influenced both by the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s 
(although Serbia did not officially participate in the conflicts) and the post-au-
thoritarian environment. However there has been no attempt to analyse the 
true impact of these legacies.
Despite the fact that the Yugoslav People’s Army was the largest armed 
force in South East Europe (SEE)109 and the armed pillar of the Yugoslav society, 
in early 1991 it was about to oversee the disintegration of the country it was 
supposed to defend. Worse still, the highest military ranks played prominent 
roles in this process. The Serbian government colluded with leading generals to 
misuse the armed forces, pushing them into a conflict that actually destroyed 
the very purpose of their existence. It is therefore unsurprising that the army 
finally turned its arms against the citizens it should have defended,110 and em-
barked on a war that was doomed from the start. 
Once the Yugoslav state disintegrated, the Yugoslav People’s Army de facto 
became the Serbian military, and was split into three parts, namely the armed 
forces of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska Krajina (Serbian military in Croatia) and 
Republika Srpska (Serbian military in Bosnia). This reorganisation was not ac-
companied by necessary reform. The leadership of the Serbian Armed Forces re-
placed the communist ideology with a nationalistic one and placed themselves 
under the informal command of Slobodan Milošević, who, through his generals, 
controlled the military.111 
However, Milošević’s reliance on the military was not total. Although he 
controlled the top military ranks, he could not be certain of the loyalty of the 
lower officer corps. He therefore decided to form an armed force whose alle-
giance to him would be unswerving, consequently militarising the police and 
secret services, both by the introduction of military ranks and equipment and 
by their training. Some units in the police and security services were soon better 
equipped and trained than those of the military.112
In 1997 Slobodan Milošević became president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) and assumed formal command of the military. In 1999, NATO’s 
109 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in the 1990-1991 period the Yu-
goslav People’s Army numbered 180,000 men in total, 101,400 of whom were recruits. Its arsenal 
included 1,850 tanks; over 2,000 various artillery pieces; 4 frigates; 15 rocket, 14 torpedo and 30 
patrol boats; 25 coastal batteries; 455 combat and training aircraft; 198 helicopters... For more 
information, see The Military Balance 1990-1991 (London: IISS, 1991).
110 For more on the war role of the JNA, see: Miroslav Hadžić, Sudbina partijske vojske [The Fate of 
the Party’s Army] (Beograd: Samizdat B92, 2001).
111 Ljubodrag Stojadinović, Reforma vojske i ideologija [Military reform and ideology](Beograd: 
Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2004).
112 Filip Švarm, „Jedinica: neispričana priča o Crvenim beretkama,“ {Unit: Untold story of the Red 
Berets] B92, http://www.b92.net/specijal/jedinica (accessed on July 18, 2008).
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three-month bombing campaign resulted in defeat for the regime, and al-
though Milošević attempted to portray Serbia as the victor, it was clear that 
Serbian forces has been defeated and had to leave Kosovo, while NATO troops 
entered that territory, where they  remain to this date.
On 5 October 2000 the military leadership defied orders and decided not to 
intervene or use force against the protesters. By refusing to prop up the already 
collapsed system, the generals hoped that the new authorities might let keep 
them their positions after the democratic change. This tactic was partially suc-
cessful, notably in the case of the Chief of the General Staff Nebojša Pavković, 
who managed to remain in office for two more years.
The new democratic authorities were unprepared to handle the security 
sector, including the military as its largest component part. The new govern-
ment failed to make the reform of this sector its priority, and even the state-
ments of the new decision-makers offered no more than platitudes about the 
country’s requirements for a smaller, better-equipped, modern and more effi-
cient armed force. The government did not have a ready set of long and short-
term measures for thorough reform.113 
Constitutional Position
A key precondition for the reform of the military is a clear constitutional frame-
work that defines the position of the military, and also provides a link to the 
political system that controls it.
The missions and tasks of the military are usually prescribed by a constitu-
tion, and subsequently elaborated and defined in greater detail by the laws on 
defence and the armed forces. The 1992 Constitution of the FRY stipulated that 
the Yugoslav Armed Forces defended the sovereignty, territory, independence 
and constitutional order.114 After the creation of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro this moderately clear wording of the Constitution115 was replaced 
with a fairly broad and vague provision in the Constitutional Charter imparting 
that the armed forces of the State Union had the task to defend the country in 
accordance with the Charter and principles of international law regulating the 
use of force.116 This formulation was transferred to the new 2006 Constitution 
113 Miroslav Hadžić, The Fate of the Party’s Army, op. cit.,  pp. 211–214.
114 Ustav Savezne Republike Jugoslavije [Constitution of the FRY], Art. 133, Službeni list SRJ, No. 
1/92.
115 Protection of the constitutional order is a phrase taken over from the Constitution of the 
SFRY, which has never been sufficiently precisely formulated and often enabled abuse of the 
military for political purposes.
116 Ustavna povelja Državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora [Constitutional Charter of the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro], Art.. 55, Službeni list Srbije i Crne Gore, No. 1/2003).
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of the Republic of Serbia.117 However, a few months prior to the adoption of 
the Constitution the Ministry of Defence (MOD) endorsed a Strategic Defence 
Review, wherein the missions and tasks of the VS were precisely defined, sub-
stantially improving regulation. The VS missions are: (1) to defend Serbia from 
military challenges, risks and security threats by deterring armed threats, and 
defending its territory and air space; (2) to participate in peace-building and 
peace-keeping in the region and the world, by taking part in international mili-
tary cooperation, peace operations and the collective defence system, and (3) 
to provide support to civilian authorities in their response to non-military secu-
rity threats, specifically in fighting terrorism and organised crime and dealing 
with natural disasters, industrial and other catastrophes.118 
The constitution is the most important of several legal provisions regulating 
the military. Other laws on defence and the armed forces were adopted in 1994 
under Milošević and were valid until the end of 2007. In addition to the fact that 
these laws failed to meet the basic principles of democratic civilian control of 
the military and were long outdated, the Yugoslav Armed Forces had been func-
tioning outside the legal frameworks since their formation of the 1992. Until 
quite recently, the political decision-makers sought to remedy the obvious fail-
ings of these legal solutions by adopting a series of ordinances, instead of new 
and modern laws. This is best illustrated by the introduction of civilian military 
service for conscientious objectors, approved by the 2003 Council of Ministers’ 
ordinance, although this provision did not figure either in the Constitutional 
Charter or the laws on defence and the armed forces. 
New laws on defence and the armed forces had been anticipated for a 
long time. The laws dating from the 1990s prevented further military reforms, 
as best illustrated by Serbia’s accession to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
programme. The existing legal regulations did not anticipate a possibility for 
security integrations, let alone accession to NATO programmes. The new laws, 
more appropriately described as amendments to the passed-down legislation, 
are nevertheless a closer fit to the current realities facing the military and, at 
least, present no obstacles for further reforms. 
Democratic Civilian Control
Well-established democratic civilian control over the state apparatus of power, 
and thereby over the military, is one of the most important preconditions for 
the success of security sector reforms. In recent times, we have often seen situ-
ations where political elites sought to place the military under their control and 
117 Ustav Republike Srbije [Constitution of the Republic of Serbia], Art. 139, Službeni glasnik RS, 
No. 98/06.
118 Vojska Srbije [Serbian Armed Forces], http://www.vojska.mod.gov.yu.
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thus abuse it. In other cases, the military have interfered in everyday politics 
and tried to impose itself as the dominant power in the state. Prevention of any 
interference of this kind requires legal implementation of a democratic civilian 
control of the military.
Before the changes of 5 October 2000 democratic control of the military did 
not exist in any form. Control was indeed civilian, but directed by the regime. 
Democratic civilian control was introduced for the first time by the Constitu-
tional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003.119 How-
ever, although the Charter stipulated that the Armed Forces of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro were subject to civilian control, it failed to specify the instruments or 
mechanisms for its implementation. At the same time, legislation passed during 
the Milošević era was still in effect, effectively meaning that democratic civilian 
control existed only in words and not in practice.
The same situation existed at the time of adoption of the new Serbian Con-
stitution in 2006. The provisions for civilian control of the military that were in-
corporated in the Constitutional Charter were literally transplanted into the new 
constitution. More precise regulation only appeared with the new Law on the 
Serbian Armed Forces adopted in late 2007. The law stipulated that democratic 
civilian control is the responsibility of parliament, the ombudsperson, other rel-
evant state bodies and citizens. This solution resulted from pressure placed on 
the law-makers by civil society, a sign that this type of control will increasingly 
feature as part of civil society’s (if not the state’s) agenda, especially given that 
tax payers have the right to know how their money is spent. 
Within the context of democratic civilian control, the chains of both civil-
ian and military command must be precisely defined. The FRY constitution, for 
instance, stated that the military was under the command of the state presi-
dent, during peacetime as well as during times of war, in accordance with the 
decisions of the Supreme Defence Council.120 The Constitutional Charter, on the 
other hand, vested the supreme military command in a collective body – the 
Supreme Defence Council.121 A major problem however was the lack of account-
ability of the president and the Supreme Defence Council. The new Serbian con-
stitution confers the exclusive command over the military to the President of 
the Republic.122 This solution largely simplifies the chain of command, but still 
emits accountability of the president in terms of his military command role.
One outcome of military reform in Serbia and the institution of democratic 
civilian control is the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of De-
fence (MoD). Until 2004, when the decision was brought in by the Supreme 
Defence Council, the MoD had been completely excluded from the chain of 
119 Constitutional Charter, Art. 54.
120 Constitution of the FRY, Art.135.
121 Constitutional Charter, Art. 56.
122 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 112.
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command and was solely concerned with administrative matters related to the 
military. The chief of the General Staff consequently was an important position 
since actual command over the military was in his hands.
Reform vs. Reorganisation
Discussion of reform in the military often details examples of reorganisational 
achievements, although this is only a part of the whole process. The most visible 
change is that the General Staff now includes the Joint Operations Command. 
The projected structure of the Serbian Armed Forces up to the year 2015 com-
prises 15 per cent officers, 25 per cent non-commissioned officers, 45 per cent 
soldiers and 15 per cent civilians. Furthermore, the military budget has been set 
at 2.4 per cent of GDP. The Serbian Armed Forces are to be organised at three 
levels: strategic, operational and tactical. The strategic level includes the Gen-
eral Staff and Joint Operations Command; the operational level for the organi-
sation of the army, air force and anti-aircraft defence; and the tactical level for 
brigade commands.123
However, there are other, more important elements of the military reform 
that have not yet been fully applied. In addition to democratic civilian control, 
one of the declared objectives of reform is gradual professionalisation of the 
armed forces. The 2006 Strategic Defence Review refers to a downsizing of the 
armed forces to 21,000 professional members. At the same time, the number 
of troops will be gradually decreased, obsolete equipment and arms will be 
reduced or replaced, and the armed forces will be brought in line with NATO 
standards. The anticipated number of soldiers in peacetime will range from 0.2 
to 0.4 per cent of the total population (and three-times this amount in times of 
war).124 
The absence of a National Security Strategy (as well as a Defence Strategy) 
is perhaps the single most important failing of Serbian military reform. These 
documents would provide a framework and pave the way for security sector re-
forms in line with the country’s foreign policy orientation. To date, we have seen 
only National Security Strategy drafts produced by advisors to president Boris 
Tadić and the former prime minister Vojislav Koštunica.125 It is yet to be seen 
whether either of the two proposals will be adopted, or whether new drafts will 
be presented for public consulation.
123 Strategijski pregled odbrane [Strategic Defence Review], Ministarstvo odbrane Republike 
Srbije, Beograd, June 2006.
124 Strategic Defence Review.
125 “Nacrt strategije bezbednosti,“ [Security Strategy Draft] B92,  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/
index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=11&nav_id=215021&nav_category=11 (accessed on July 
18, 2008).
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PACE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORMS126
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representativeness of women
Gender equality has been incorporated into the Serbian Constitution. It pro-
hibits discrimination on any grounds127 and stipulates that all citizens may hold 
public offices128 and have access to all jobs under equal conditions.129 The Law 
on the Serbian Armed Forces also stresses that its provisions equally apply to 
both genders.130 Regrettably, there are no systemic measures designed specifi-
cally to encourage gender equality in the Serbian armed forces and defence 
system. 
Women account for 18.5 per cent of the total number of employees in the 
Serbian MoD and armed forces. Of this figure, 17.5 per cent are civilian employ-
ees. Only 0.6 per cent of women wear uniforms. Professional female military per-
sonnel number only 171: 15 officers, 29 NCOs and 127 professional soldiers.131 
The small number of women is due to the (recently repealed) provision in the 
Law on the Yugoslav Armed Forces which stipulated that professional soldiers 
must have completed military service.132 This obstacle was removed in the Law 
on the Serbian Armed Forces.133  Men and women now have equal conditions for 
admission to the professional military service, the same dress code and equal 
pay. Nevertheless, women are most often found in the administrative sector 
of the MoD and the armed forces, and very few occupy high grade positions. 
Thus, the administrative sector of the defence system employees 23.4 per cent 
women, and the operations sector 17.7 per cent. Of that number, 22.17 per cent 
are executors and only 3.09 per cent executives.134
126 Data necessary for the evaluation of the pace and achievements of the Serbian Armed Forces 
reform have been obtained from the Serbian MoD, with the help of Vidak Anđelić.
127 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 21.
128 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art.  53.
129 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art . 60.
130 Law on Serbian Armed Forces, Art. 11.
131 Dopis Ministarstva odbrane Republike Srbije, Sektor za ljudske resurse, Uprava za kadrove [Let-
ter of the Serbian MoD Human Resources Sector, Cadre Dept.], int. no. 5734-1, 28. 05. 2008.
132 Zakon o Vojsci Jugoslavije [Law on the Yugoslav Armed Forces], Art. 21, Službeni list SRJ, Nos. 
43/94, 28/96, 44/99, 74/99, 3/2002 i 37/2002 - dr. zakon i Službeni list SCG, No. 7/2005.
133 Law on the Serbian Armed Forces, Art.39.
134 Letter of the Serbian MoD Human Resources Sector, int. no. 5734-1, 28. 05. 2008.
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In 2006 the MoD and OSCE mission in Serbia organised an international 
conference ‘Women in the Army’. A year later, for the first time in the history of 
military schools, the MoD invited women to apply for admission into the Mili-
tary Academy. During the academic year 2007/2008, the Military Academy ad-
mitted 30 women as regular students.135 Although such efforts represent some 
progress, gender equality in the defence system has not yet reached a satisfac-
tory level.
grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
Representativeness of ethnic minorities
The Serbian constitution guarantees equality of all citizens, regardless of their 
ethnicity. This means that the criteria for admission and advancement in the 
service apply equally to all members of the Serbian Armed Forces, regardless of 
their ethnic origin. However, there are no other norms or facilities that would ad-
ditionally encourage and affirm proportional representation of ethnic minority 
members in the military and defence system. The fact that 91.21 per cent of all 
Serbian Armed Forces members are declared as Serbs supports this statement 
and points to the need to adopt special systemic measures aimed at achieving 
proportional representation of ethnic minority members in the defence system 
in foreseeable future.136
grade: 2 (two)
TRANSPERENCY
general transparency
The MoD’s obligation to provide free access to information is regulated by the 
Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance. The defence minister 
has specifically designated staff members within the MoD’s Department of Le-
gal Affairs to respond to requests for free access to information of public inter-
135 “Školovanje devojaka,” [Education of Girls] Vojna Akademija, http://www.va.mod.gov.yu/cms/
view.php?id=1831 (accessed on July 24, 2008).
136 Letter of the Serbian MoD Human Resources Sector, int. no. 5734-1, 28. 05. 2008.
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est.137 Moreover, the Ministry has also drawn up an Information Bulletin which 
is available on its website.138 Various data are classified, kept and archived ac-
cording to regulations governing office work in the armed forces. The proce-
dure for acquisition of information of public importance has been regulated by 
the above law.139
Within the Ministry of Defence data is classified according to its importance 
for the country’s defence.140 For this purpose the relevant rules defined for the 
Yugoslav Armed Forces141 also apply. These bylaws have become fairly obsolete. 
That is why a new piece of legislation is required to regulate the matter of clas-
sification, as well as declassification of data which is equally applicable to all 
state bodies.
Finally, when members of the public make an inquiry, relevant staff within 
the MoD are obliged to inform them about their respective rights and obliga-
tions, as well as the means of exercising these rights and obligations. This infor-
mation should include sphere of its activity, the state body supervising its work 
and possibilities to contact this body. Furthermore, the MoD must notify mem-
bers of the public about other data essential for the transparency of its work and 
relations with external parties.142
The Annual Report presented by the Commissioner for Information of Pub-
lic Importance in 2007 includes a review of requests for data of public impor-
tance submitted to the MoD. Of a total of 23 requests, 16 were admitted in part 
137 “Postupak po Zahtevima za slobodan pristup informacijama od javnog značaja,“ [Procedure 
for the Processing of Requests for Free Access to Information of Public Importance]  Ministarstvo 
Odbrane Republike Srbije, http://www.mod.gov.yu/cir/aktuelno/informator/8.php (accessed on 
Sep. 4, 2008).
138 „Informator o radu Ministarstva odbrane,“ [MoD Information Bulletin] Ministarstvo odbrane 
Republike Srbije, http://www.mod.gov.yu/cir/aktuelno/informator/inf_index.php (accessed on 
July 25, 2008).
139 Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacijama od javnog značaja [Law on Free Access to Informa-
tion of Public Importance], Art. 15, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 120/04.
140 Uredba o kriterijumima za utvrđivanje podataka značajnih za odbranu zemlje koji se moraju 
čuvati kao državna ili službena tajna i o utvrđivanju zadataka i poslova od posebnog značaja za 
odbranu zemlje koje treba štititi primenom posebnih mera bezbednosti [Ordinance Defining the 
Criteria for Identification of Data of Importance for the Country’s Defence That Must Be Kept as 
State or Official Secret and Identification of Tasks and Activities That are Particularly Significant 
for Defence and Need to Be Protected by Special Security Measures]. Službeni list SRJ, No. 54/94.
141 Pravilnik o kriterijumima za utvrđivanje podataka o Vojsci Jugoslavije koji predstavljaju vojnu 
tajnu, stepen vojne tajne i mere za njihovu zaštitu [Rules on the Criteria for Identification of Data 
on the Yugoslav Armed Forces Considered as Military Secret, the Degree of Their Confidentiality 
and Measures for Their Protection], Službeni vojni list, No. 22/01.
142 Zakon o državnoj upravi [Law on State Administration], Art. 79, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 79/05, 
101/07.
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or in full, two were dismissed, and five denied.143
grade: 3 (three)
Financial Transparency
The 2008 budget allocates 65,069,033,000 RSD for defence. This equals 10.2 per 
cent of the total budget, or 2.4 per cent of projected GDP. The budget also an-
ticipates the MoD’s own income of 944,028,000 RSD as well as receipts from the 
sale of military property amounting to 833,904,000 RSD.144 However, the budget 
gives imprecise information on where the money is spent, preventing proper 
insight into the Ministry’s allocation of funds. Although there exists a need for a 
certain level of secrecy in defence spending, data on certain allocations should 
be presented with greater transparency. 
One positive development has been the repaying of debts inherited by the 
MoD. The clearing of this debt certainly improves the Ministry’s financial situa-
tion especially considering that debt interest payments in 2007 amounted to 
500 million RSD.145 However, there is no publicly available information on where 
the funds for debt repayment have come from.
Although financial operations are legally regulated, proper control does not 
exist. Procedures for public acquisitions are regulated at several levels. The pro-
curement of movables and services is regulated within the MoD’s Procurement 
Department.146 
Procurement procedures for resources in the Serbian Armed Forces are pre-
scribed by the Law on public procurement.147 Procurement competences in the 
MoD are not defined according to value, but rather to the types of assets and 
services, and are vested in the relevant organisational units.148 Public procure-
143 MoD Information Bulletin, http://www.mod.gov.yu/cir/aktuelno/informator/inf_index.php 
(accessed on Jul 25, 2008).
144 Zakon o budžetu Republike Srbije za 2008. godinu [Law on the Budget of the Republic of Serbia 
for 2008], Službeni glasnik RS, No. 123/07.
145 „Prvih sto dana Minstarstva odbrane,“ [MoD’s first 100 days] Dragan Šutanovc’s interview to the  
RTS, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/1/Србија/22941/Првих+100+дана+Министарства
+одбране.html (accessed on Nov. 4, 2008).
146 Odluka o ovlašćenjima za raspolaganje novčanim sredstvima, nabavku pokretnih stvari i usluga 
i raspolaganje pokretnim stvarima u MO i VSCG [Decision on the Competences for the Disposal 
of Monetary Funds, Procurement of Movables and Services and the Disposal of Movables in the 
MoD and the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro]. Službeni vojni list, br. 21/05.
147 Zakon o javnim nabavkama Republike Srbije [Public Procurement Law of the RS], Službeni 
glasnik RS, br. 39/02, 43/03, 55/04, 101/05.
148 Decision on the Competences for the Disposal of Monetary Funds, Procurement of Movables and 
Services and the Disposal of Movables in the MoD and the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro.
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ments of small value are a special case in this respect,149 and may be regulated 
by internal acts of the procuring agency.150 The MoD regulates this procedure 
by special rules.151
The Law on public procurement does not apply to armaments and other 
confidential acquisitions (as defined by special regulations).152 Acquisitions of 
armaments and military equipment follow a procedure regulated by the Ordi-
nance on Special Purpose Movables. Procurement of these assets is subject to 
the defence minister’s decision and the relevant procedures are carried out by a 
commission comprising at least five members, formed by the head of the MoD 
Procurement Department. Confidential procurements are arranged in direct ne-
gotiations.153 The regrettable absence of any control over confidential procure-
ments has given rise to several corruption scandals in military circles.154
The negotiation procedure for the provision of services required by the Ser-
bian Armed Forces is the same as that for material resources and is regulated by 
the Law on public procurement. Exceptions are confidential services which are 
subject to the Rules on planning and material-financial operations in the MoD and 
the Yugoslav Armed Forces, i.e. public tendering.155
The main problem related to public procurements in the MoD is the absence 
of regular and precise public reporting on expenditure. Furthermore, reports 
on the control and oversight and control of the MoD’s financial operations by 
competent state bodies are not publicly available. That should primarily be the 
task for the State Audit Institution authorised to oversee the use of all budget-
ary funds by the Serbian constitution.156 Unfortunately, after nearly three years 
of existence, the institution is still not in a position to provide systematic control 
and oversight of budgetary expenditures of all state bodies, including the MoD.
grade: 2,5 (two and a half) 
149 Public procurements of small value are those estimated at 270,000 and 2,700,000 dinars, Law 
on the RS Budget for 2008, Art. 19.
150 Public Procurement Law of the RS,  Art. 124.
151 Pravilnik o javnim nabavkama male vrednosti [Rules on Public Procurements of Small Value], 
Službeni vojni list, No. 29/07.
152 Public Procurement Law of the RS, Art. 2
153 Uredba o pokretnim stvarima za posebne namene [Ordinance on Special Purpose Movables], 
Službeni list SCG, No. 28/05.
154 Such were e.g. Mile Dragić and Satelie scandals, whose actors are on trial for abuse of office 
and conclusion of contracts damaging for the military budget.
155 Pravilnik o planiranju i materijalnom i finansijskom poslovanju u Saveznom ministarstvu za 
odbranu i Vojsci Jugoslavije, Službeni vojni list, No. 18/97, 22/98, 17/01, 22/02.
156 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art.  92.
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PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORgANISATIONS
Participation in policy-making (strategic and legal 
framework)
The Law on state administration prescribes that all state bodies, are obliged to 
use the media to inform the public about their work.157 Furthermore, the MoD 
is required to organise a public debate when drafting a law that substantially 
alters the Serbian defence and military legal regime, or regulates matters of 
special interest to the public.158 As such, the MoD posted drafts of the Law on 
defence and the Law on the Serbian Armed Forces on its website. However, since 
the drafts became available in August, at the height of the holiday season, it left 
only two months for public debate. Nevertheless, the draft legislation gained a 
lot of public interest as a novelty and, hopefully, represents a positive precedent 
for other state bodies within the security sector. The draft of the Law on defence 
on the MoD’s website registered 75,000 hits.159 
Public consulation in security and defence policy-making in Serbia is con-
sidered unimportant. This can be illustrated by the MoD’s decision to organise a 
two-week public debate on the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy 
of the Republic of Serbia between 14 - 30 December 2008 (although it must also 
be noted that the MoD agreed to the request of a group of civil society organisa-
tions to prolong the debate until 31 January 2009). Although the organisation 
of public debates on draft strategies and legislative proposals represents a posi-
tive precedent in the state security sector, it is obvious that there is not enough 
time to react, which makes the exercise largely pointless. 
grade: 3 (three)
Participation in policy implementation and evaluation
(rating)
In March 2008 the defence minister endorsed the Guidelines for the Communica-
tion Strategy of the MoD and the Serbian Armed Forces, drafted by the Ministry’s 
Public Relations Department. This document offers a vision for military reforms 
157  The Law on State Administration Art. 76.
158  The Law on State Administration Art. 77.
159 “Obaveze Ministarstva odbrane iz delokruga javnog informisanja,” [MoD public information 
obligations] Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, 
http://www.mod.gov.yu/cir/aktuelno/informator/10.php (accessed on July 25, 2008).
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until the year 2015 and guidelines for the Ministry’s external and internal com-
munications. The document is aimed at improving public understanding and 
generating support for the implementation of reforms. The Ministry’s strategy 
defines the media, citizens, professional public and the young and local com-
munities as its main external target groups. With this document, the MoD has 
stressed its intention to establish a transparent and proactive communication 
with the public. The strategy is binding on all employees of the defence system 
and is formalised in annual communications action plans.160
The Ministry has paid particular attention to its relations with civil society 
organisations, academics and independent experts. This cooperation was par-
ticularly intensive in the period preceding the adoption of the new defence and 
military legislation in the autumn of 2007. A number of suggestions made dur-
ing the public debate were subsequently incorporated in the final versions of 
the laws.161 
Cooperation related to the draft of the Defence Strategy in the spring of 
2007 was somewhat less successful. A draft version developed by the Ministry 
was sent to professional academic institutions and civil society organisations. 
Subsequently, comments and suggestions to the proposed text were given at a 
round table meeting. However, after this meeting further cooperation with civil 
society experts was discontinued. 
The MoD does not have a special public information section. As part of ef-
forts to improve co-operation with citizens and in line with the armed forces’ 
mission to support civilian authorities in their response to non-military security 
threats,162 the General Staff has formed its Civil-Military Co-operation Unit (J-
9).163 In view of the specific security situation in south Serbia, the emphasis has 
been placed on the promotion of civil-military co-operation in the Ground Se-
curity Zone by the opening of an Office for Civil Military Co-operation in Vranje.
grade: 3 (three)
160 Smernice za strategiju komunikacije Ministarstva odbrane i Vojske Srbije, Ministarstvo odbrane 
Republike Srbije, Beograd, 2008.
161 For more, see: Popović Đorđe, ‘Komentar nacrta Zakona o Odbrani i Vojsci Srbije’, [Comments 
on drafts of defence and Serbian armed forces laws] Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana, br. 7–8 (ok-
tobar 2007–mart 2008): 120-131.
162 Strategijski pregled odbrane [Strategic Defence Review], Ministarstvo odbrane Republike 
Srbije, Beograd, June 2006.
163 See the MoD oranisational scheme, http://www.mod.gov.yu/cir/organizacija/index_cir.php 
(accessed on July 26, 2008).
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ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-
IAN CONTROL AND PUBLIC CONTROL 
AND OVERSIghT
Control by the Executive
The initial formal conditions for the control of the executive over the Serbian 
Armed Forces have been fulfilled. However, the degree of actual implementa-
tion could not be established in the course of this research. The Serbian presi-
dent and government, (in the form of the MoD) represent the executive bodies 
vested with the control over the Serbian military. In addition to having com-
mand of the military during war and peace time,164 the president appoints the 
chief of the General Staff, in consultation with the defence minister (although 
this consultation is not obligatory).165 In this way the president exercises control 
over the highest operational command and administrative body of the Armed 
Forces. However, the Law on the Serbian Armed Forces does not contain any pro-
visions specifying to whom (and when) the president is accountable in his com-
mand of the military. Furthermore, the president is not obliged to confer with 
the defence minister or the parliamentary committee for defence when ap-
pointing or replacing the military chief of staff. The removal of General Zdravko 
Ponoš from the position of chief of staff illustrates presidential control over the 
armed forces. President Tadić replaced general Ponoš after making public the 
details of his conflict with the defence minister.166 On that occasion he stated a 
series of accusations against minister Šutanovac, claiming that Serbia did not 
have a defence policy, that the military reform had reached a standstill and that 
the budgetary funds were being used for other purposes.167 
The Law on the Serbian Armed Forces allows the president, the defence min-
ister and the chief of the General Staff to grant extraordinary promotions to pro-
fessional military staff, which is one of the ways for the executive control over 
the military.168 Unfortunately, the law fails to define the procedures and criteria 
for such extraordinary promotions.
164 Law on Serbian Armed Forces, Art. 17.
165 Law on Serbian Armed Forces, Art.
166 “Predsednik Srbije razrešio Zdravka Ponoša sa mesta načelnika Generalštaba,“ [Serbian presi-
dent relievesn Z.P. as Chief of General Staff] Saopštenje sa veb-strane predsednika Republike Srbije, 
http://www.predsednik.yu/mwc/default.asp?c=301500&g=20081230124247&lng=cir&hs1=0  
(accessed on  Jan. 23, 2009).
167 “Politika odbrane zemlje ne postoji,“ [Country’s defence policy non-existent] general Zdravka 
Ponoš’s interview to the daily „Politika“, 24. 12. 2008, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Politi-
ka-odbrane-zemlje-ne-postoji.lt.html  (accessed on Dec. 31, 2008).
168 Law on Serbian Armed Forces, Art. 61.
151
The government controls the military through the development and im-
plementation of defence policy, and also by proposing and enforcing laws and 
other defence-related decisions.169 The government also appoints the defence 
minister, as well as the assistants and state secretaries who implement presi-
dential, governmental and parliamentary acts. Furthermore, the government, 
acting on the advice of the defence minister, evaluates the work of military staff, 
and makes decisions on promotion and establishes incentives for professional 
advancement.170 The absence of a clearly defined procedure and criteria, how-
ever, once again provides the possibility for arbitrary evaluation.
The MoD exercises additional control over the defence system through the 
Defence Inspectorate. This body carries out inspection work related to the en-
forcement of all defence-related laws, regulations and plans produced by state 
and military bodies.171 The Law on defence obliges the Defence Inspectorate to 
regularly inform the president and the defence minister on its findings.172 How-
ever, it is not known whether this actually occurs and to what extent. Further-
more, the public does not have an insight into reports of this kind, or for that 
matter, into the work of the Defence Inspectorate.
grade: 3.5 (three and a half)
Parliamentary Control and Control and oversight
Parliamentary control and control and oversight of the Serbian Armed Forces 
is carried out by the Defence and Security Committee. The committee oversees 
the constitutionality and legality of the defence system, its compliance with the 
basic strategic documents and the use of budgetary resources. Parliament also 
decides on the allocation of funds for defence and oversees the work of the 
military intelligence services.173 However, the Committee rarely exercises its au-
thorities. During 2007, the work of the Defence and Security Committee was 
reduced to the review of new defence and military laws.174 Reports on the work 
of the committee reveal that there was no debate on the functioning of the 
defence system, nor on the use of budgetary funds. During the past three years, 
the committee has not scrutinised a single military armament procurement de-
169 Zakon o odbrani [Defence Law], Art. 12, Službeni glasnik RS, No.. 116/07.
170 Law on the  Serbian Armed Forces, Art. 65.
171 Defence Law, Art. 16.
172 Defence Law, Art.. 18.
173 Defence Law, Art.. 9.
174 Izveštaj o radu odbora Narodne skupštine u 2007. godine [Report on the work of National As-
sembly Committees in 2007], Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, Beograd, februar 2008.
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cision.175 During this same period no commission or committee of inquiry was 
formed and not one MP asked a defence-related question.176 Committee mem-
bers have made no field visits to a defence system institution.177 This lack of scru-
tiny strongly suggests that parliamentary control and control and oversight of 
the defence system has not been fully implemented.
A specific problem is the lack of professional staff on the Defence and Se-
curity Committee. The Committee has only one employee, assisted by two staff 
members (only one of which has extensive experience) from the Parliamentary 
Department for Defence and National Affairs.178
In order to promote cooperation with parliament, in April 2006, the MoD set 
up a Parliamentary Liaison Group within the Defence Policy Sector.179 Although 
commendable, there is still no evidence to suggest whether this measure has 
intensified cooperation between the two institutions. 
grade: 2 (two) 
Judicial Control
There are two elements to judicial control of the Serbian Armed Forces. On one 
hand the Constitutional Court judges the constitutionality and legality of work 
of the defence bodies, and on the other hand, there are courts of general juris-
diction. The 2003 the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro anticipated the transfer of military courts’ jurisdiction to mem-
ber republics. This was not done until the adoption of the Law on the Transfer 
of Jurisdiction of Military Courts, Military Prosecution and Attorneys in 2004. For 
military cases the law prescribes the jurisdiction of special military chambers 
formed in relevant district courts.180
As with parliamentary control, formal conditions for judicial control of the 
armed forces are in place. However, in reality the courts are inefficient and 
overburdened with cases. A particular problem exists in cases where military 
employees have brought proceedings against the MoD in order to affirm their 
rights and obligations. Such disputes were previously transferred from the mili-
175 Dopis Narodne Skupštine Republike Srbije [Letter of the Serbian National Assembly], 30. 7. 
2008.
176 Letter of the Serbian National Assembly.
177 Letter of the Serbian National Assembly.
178 Letter of the Serbian National Assembly.
179 Dopis Ministarstva odbrane Republike Srbije, Sektora za politiku odbrane Uprave za strategijsko 
planiranje [Letter of the Serbian MoD Defence Policy Sector, Strategic Planning Dept.].
180 Zakon o preuzimanju nadležnosti vojnih sudova, vojnog tužilaštva i vojnog pravobranilaštva, čl. 
3 i 4, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 137/04.
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tary courts to the Supreme Military Court and the Court of the State Union, and 
following the disintegration of the State Union, to the Administrative Depart-
ment of the Supreme Court of Serbia. During 2007, this Department had the to-
tal of 26,069 cases, of which only 9,657 (or 41,61 per cent) were solved.181 These 
figures show that the backlog of cases facing the court is a major problem, es-
pecially since it affects efficiency and also the position of numerous individuals 
in the defence system.
grade: 2 (two)
Public control and oversight
Public control and oversight of the armed forces is carried out by various in-
dependent institutions, such as Auditors Ombudsperson, civil society organi-
sations, the media, acadeMoI, and the general public. The Law on the Serbian 
Armed Forces confers this control and oversight of the military to Ombudsper-
son and the public.182 Despite substantial progress in improving public control 
and oversight of the Serbian military, the current situation is not entirely satis-
factory.
Independent institutions involved in control and oversight are primarily 
concerned with the enforcement of laws, as well as implementation of strategic 
documents regulating the defence system. These institutions also participate in 
defence and security policy-making and monitor the defence system. Unfortu-
nately, very few independent institutions and civil society organisations have 
the capacities for public control and oversight of the defence system.  
grade: 3 (three)
RULE OF FAW
Legal State
The 2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia does not regulate the security 
sector as a whole, but only one of its elements – the Serbian Armed Forces. How-
ever, the section of the constitution dealing with the military contains three ar-
181 Izveštaj o radu Vrhovnog suda Srbije sa prikazom rada sudova opšte nadležnosti za 2007. godinu 
[Report on the work of the Supreme Court of Serbia including a review of courts of general 
jurisdiction in 2007], Vrhovni sud Srbije, 2007.
182 The Law on Serbian Armed Forces, Art. 29.
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ticles which: define the competences of the SAF; prescribe that they cannot be 
used outside the territory of Serbia without parliamentary approval, and; place 
the military under democratic civilian control.183 The Constitution does not men-
tion the existence of a single security system. Attempts to regulate this system 
were made by the adoption of the Law on the basic organisation of security and 
intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia.184 Although this Law defines intel-
ligence services as part of a single security-intelligence system, its composition 
and role are still not clear. Those who wrote the constitution should explain why 
it only speficies the Armed Forces, rather than all elements of the security sector, 
and why it only envisages civilian control over the military.
The constitution, furthermore, does not anticipate a National Security Strat-
egy. This strategy is instead included in the Law on Defence.185 The Law on the 
Serbian Armed Forces has also failed to account for the existence of this strate-
gic document. This shows a clear discord between the most important defence 
system laws and the constitution. Moreover, there is a discrepancy between 
the Law on defence and the Law on the Serbian Armed Forces, since the former 
describes presidential command of the armed forces,186 while the latter more 
precisely specifies command over the armed forces in war and peacetime.187 In 
order to avoid ambiguity it would be desirable to have the same specificity in 
both pieces of legislation.
Until the adoption of the new defence and armed forces laws in 2007, by-
laws were apparently the main instruments used to regulate the defence sys-
tem. Political decision-makers seemed more inclined to pass ordinances than 
to adopt new and modern legislation. The most conspicuous example is the 
Ordinance on military duty which introduced civilian military service and consci-
entious objection, contrary to the existing legislation.188 The discord between 
the laws and bylaws was removed by the Law on defence which prescribes that 
all regulations implementing the old 1994 law that do not contravene the new 
law remain in force, pending the adoption of new implementing regulations.189
It is clear that the legal regulation of the defence system is not complete. 
As a result the defence system and the Serbian Armed Forces together func-
tion as a separate entity. Moreover, the discord between the legal acts regulat-
183 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 139, 140, 141.
184 Zakon o osnovama uređenja službi bezbednosti Republike Srbije [Law on the Basic Organisation 
of Security and Intelligence System of the Republic of Serbia], Art. l. 1, Službeni glasnik RS, Nor. 
116/07.
185 Defence Law, Art., 7.
186 Defence Law, Art.. 11.
187 Law on the Serbian Armed Forces, Art.17.
188 Uredba o vršenju vojne obaveze [Ordinance on Military Duty], Art. 26, Službeni list SRJ, No. 
36/94, 7/98 and Službeni list SCG, No. 37/03, 4/05.
189 Defence Law, Art.. 118.
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ing defence matters, although substantially reduced, has not been completely 
eliminated.
grade: 3 (three)
Protection of human Rights
There is no special constitutional and legal protection of the human rights of 
Serbian Armed Forces members. The constitution prescribes that every person 
is entitled to protection if his/her human rights have been violated or denied, 
including the right to remedy any resulting consequences.190
Data on the violation of legal norms, including those related to human 
rights, are kept by the Military Disciplinary Court. Any such violations are report-
ed to the president of the republic and the defence minister on annual basis. 
Unfortunately, these reports are not available to the public, and it is not possible 
to any assessment of the extent of violations of legal norms in the defence sys-
tem. Moreover, we cannot establish the degree of observance of human rights 
of this system’s members or citizens who, for whatever reason, come in contact 
with the MoD. 
grade 3: (three)
EFFICIENCY
human Resources
The present organisational structure of the MoD was, to a large extent, already 
in place by May 2005.191 Even at the time of its establishment, this structure had 
a number of deficiencies, particularly a surfeit of organisational units, and an 
excessive number of employees in the Ministry and its subordinated structures. 
In addition, the organisation of military health services, logistics and education 
is ill-matched to the needs of the system and poorly adjusted to the economic 
resources available in the country. As a result there are plans to wean a number 
of military institutions from the defence budget. Finally, the defence sector does 
not make sufficient use of information technology.192 
A new and more functional organisational structure was established in the 
190 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 22.
191 Letter of the Serbian MoD Defence Policy Sector, Strategic Planning Dept.
192 Strategic Defence Review.
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Ministry in 2007. The number of employees was reduced and the number of 
military and civilian employees balanced. In addition, the functions of civilian 
defence have been integrated as were also military, work and material obliga-
tions.193 However, the process of demilitarisation in the Ministry was stopped, 
which explains why most of the administrative and senior positions below the 
level of the state secretary and assistant minister are presently occupied by 
high-ranking officers. This was highlighted by a statement made by the former 
chief of General Staff General Zdravko Ponoš, who claimed that the General 
Staff has 192 colonels, compared with 476 in the Ministry, and 28 and 15 gener-
als respectively.194
During the past few years, the professional staff in the Serbian Armed Forces 
has been reduced. At present, the forces number 28,000.195 The number of pro-
fessional members of the armed forces is to be reduced to 21,000 by 2010.196 
This reduction was calculated on the basis of precisely defined criteria at each 
level (rank). The cadre has been divided into the promising, semi-promising 
(those who may reach the promising level with additional education) and un-
promising (those who will be let go).197 Data on the structure of qualifications 
of MoD personnel reveals that 47.07 per cent of uniformed and 18.42 per cent 
civilian employees have higher education.198 Of all staff, 13.77 per cent have ad-
ministrative jobs and 86.23 per cent operative jobs.199
In early 2006, the Military Academy signed an agreement with the University 
of Belgrade to award Academy graduates in 2010 with diplomas from Belgrade 
University. The Military Academy has developed a programme of English lan-
guage teaching containing all the principle of the NATO STANAG. In addition, it 
has started an ECDL programme for computer skills development, whose grad-
uates receive European IT-certifications of different levels.200 There is no doubt 
that all these measures have been introduced to make the officers calling more 
attractive to the young in Serbia and to increase their interest for enrolment in 
the Military Academy. However, there is no way of telling whether the Ministry 
and the Military Academy have properly reckoned with the fact that the above-
193 Letter of the Serbian MoD Defence Policy Sector, Strategic Planning Dept..
194 “Country’s Defence Policy Non-Existent”, op. cit.
195 Jeftić Zoran, „Razvoj organizacije Ministarstva odbrane i reforma Vojske Srbije,“ [Develop-
ment of MoD Organisation and Serbian Military Reform] in Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji, 
dostignuća i perspektive, ed. Miroslav Hadžić. (Beograd: Centar za Civilno-vojne Odnose, 2007), 
23-28.
196 Strategic Defence Review.
197 Jeftić, op.cit.
198 Letter of the Serbian MoD, Defence Policy Sector, Human Resources Sector, Cadre Dept., 28.05. 
2008.
199 Letter of the Serbian MoD.
200 Jeftić, op. cit. pp. 23-28.
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mentioned measures, especially the Belgrade University diploma, may result in 
a sudden and uncontrolled outflow of young  Serbian officers.
grade: 3 (three)
Material Resources
The military health services system is also undergoing a reform. The idea was to 
preserve part of the military health services and at the same time incorporate 
them into the civilian healthcare system.201 In line with this idea, the Military 
Medical Academy has already opened its doors to civilians.
One of the major problems facing the MoD is the issue of military pensions. 
There are close to 50,000 military pensioners compared with just under 17,000 
active officers and NCOs. In view of these numbers, it is not surprising that per-
sonnel expenses account for about 80 per cent of the military budget.202 The 
remaining 20 per cent are insufficient to meet the other needs of the defence 
system. This problem will be resolved by transferring military pensions to the 
republic budget, or rather by integrating civilian and military pension funds.
Military efficiency is very difficult to evaluate in peace-time conditions. 
There is no doubt that a lot has been done to improve high military education 
and downsize the forces. However, large problems caused by the lack of finance 
are still outstanding. The armament and equipment of the Serbian Armed Forc-
es are fairly obsolete and are not efficient for the fulfilment of duties and tasks. 
grade: 2,5 (two and a half)
EFFECTIVENESS
Integratedness of the defence system
Despite the fact that the defence system has been established, Serbia does not 
have a single and complete security system. The Law on defence lacks a provision 
defining the defence system as part of a wider system of national security. There 
is also an absence of unified system of organising the preparations for defence, 
or for implementing measures related to the work of citizens, state bodies and 
economic entities, and other legal persons, enabling the use of Serbian armed 
201 Jeftić, op. cit., pp. 23-28.
202 Jeftić, op. cit., pp. 23-28.
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and other defence forces in times of war and emergencies.203 Moreover, in the 
absence of a long-term development plan for the defence system, it cannot be 
claimed that an organised approach to the management of this system exists.
An important deficiency is that the Serbian constitution does not anticipate 
the existence of a security system for the Republic of Serbia. The Law on the 
basic organisation of a security and intelligence system provided for the estab-
lishment of the National Security Council in 2007. The Council’s competences 
are mostly limited to co-operation and co-ordination between elements of the 
security sector. The defence minister, chief of the General Staff and directors 
of military intelligence services, among others, participate in the work of the 
Council.204 The Council should gather representatives of most important parts 
of the security sector and co-ordinate their work. However, stress in the Coun-
cil’s operations has been placed on intelligence services revealing that the law-
makers have not given due attention to the establishment of a comprehensive 
security system.
Moreover, after public conflict between the defence minister and the chief 
of General Staff in December 2008, it became clear that the status and relations 
between the MoD and the General Staff need to be systemically and normative-
ly regulated. Judging by public statements by parties in this conflict, it is clear 
that substantial conceptual differences exist in the work of these two bodies 
that should, each in its own sphere, exercise the management and command 
of the military. This also suggests the existence of different interpretations and 
practices with respect to the principles and degree of subordination as well as 
mutual competences. 
grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
Ratio between aims, resources and outcomes
Strategic objectives of the defence system reform prescribed by the MoD in-
clude the following: (1) the building of an efficient and economically sustain-
able defence system; (2) the building of a modern, professional and efficient 
military and (3) the establishment of democratic civilian control over the armed 
and other defence forces.205
The Strategic Defence Review stipulates the factors with the largest influ-
ence on the attainment of the prescribed objectives: (1) security challenges, 
risks and threats: (2) processes in the Republic of Serbia and resolution of the 
status of Kosovo: (3) incorporation in Euro-Atlantic security integrations: (4) eco-
203 Defence Law, Art. 4.
204 Law on the basic organisation of security and intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia.
205 Letter of the Serbian MoD Defence Policy Sector, Strategic Planning Dept.
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nomic and demographic possibilities of the Republic of Serbia: (5) existing level 
of doctrinal, normative and organisational development of the Serbian defence 
system and armed forces; and (6) foreign experience and international stand-
ards.206 
The success of military reform is assessed by observing three spheres: stra-
tegic-doctrinal, legal-normative and organisational-functional.207 It is clear that 
the greatest progress has so far been attained in the third, organisational-func-
tional sphere. The projected military organisation has been achieved and the 
legal normative objectives have, to a large extent, been fulfilled with the adop-
tion of the new defence and armed forces laws. The reform in the first, strategic-
doctrinal sphere has remained incomplete. Serbia still does not have the basic 
documents such as the National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, Long-Term 
Development Plan of the Defence System, Strategic Defence Review and the 
Serbian Armed Forces Doctrine. Only when these documents are adopted will 
we be able to speak of the professionalisation and modernisation of the Serbian 
Armed Forces and the solution of social problems, or the establishment of a 
new system of values. 
Of the proclaimed aims of the Serbian Armed Forces, those of an organisa-
tional-functional nature have been attained along with many of the legal-nor-
mative kind. However, the strategic-doctrinal objectives have not been attained 
at all. The absence of a political consensus at the highest decision-making level 
concerning the directions of the reforms has, to a great extent, affected the abil-
ity to fulfil the proclaimed aims. The realisation of objectives in particular is in-
fluenced by the lack of financial assets.
grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
Legitimacy
Public opinion on changes in the Serbian Armed Forces are divided. Serbian 
society has always tended to have a high level of trust in the military. However, 
public opinion surveys carried out by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in 
2003-2005, reveal a downward trend in this trust.208 In particular, there was a 
sudden drop in 2004 following the murder of two members of the guards’ bri-
gade at the Karaš secret military facility.209 Trust in the military was based on 
206 Strategic Defence Review.
207 Strategic Defence Review.
208 Miroslav Hadžić, ‘Poverenje građana Srbije u vojsku’ {Serbian citizens’ trust in the army] in 
Javnost i vojska, eds. Miroslav Hadžić i Milorad Timotić. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odno-
se, 2006), 84.
209 Hadžić, ibid., p. 99.
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its role as the main guarantor of security and peace, as protector of national 
interests and because of the perception that the military represented a sort of 
‘school of life’. On the other hand, the main reasons for distrust are due to poorly 
trained and equipped employees, resistance to reform and the continued exist-
ence of officers supportive of the former regime with its ranks.210 
According to the research of the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy 
carried out in June 2007, 43 per cent of Serbian citizens responded that they 
had trust in the Serbian Armed Forces.211 A year later, in September 2008, this 
had increased to 48 per cent.212 These research findings suggest that the Serbian 
Armed Forces have a relatively high popularity and enjoy the trust of almost half 
the population.
grade: 3 (three)
210 Hadžić, ibid., pp. 100–101.
211 Istraživanje javnog mnjenja Srbije, rano leto 2007. godine [Serbian public opinion survey, 2007] 
(Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 2007) 
212 Resurs 2008 (Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 2008) 
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Police
                         
Sonja Stojanović
The police in Serbia has come a long way since 2001 and new democratic foun-
dations have been laid upon which the police can fulfil their duty to serve the 
country’s citizens. There have been four crucial changes. First, there is greater 
co-operation with the international community. Second, has been the ‘return 
of brainpower instead of force.’ In other words there is more capacity within 
the criminal investigation police compared to the Milošević period. Third, po-
lice identity has been re-defined from that of an instrument of coercion to one 
which serves the public. Finally, there is a legal and strategic framework for reg-
ulating police work. However, the key question remains whether these reforms 
are enough to ensure that the police no longer hinder broader processes of 
democratisation. Judged by the above changes, it can be said that the ‘first gen-
eration’ of reforms (according to the model developed by the British political 
scientist Tim Edmunds) has been successfully completed. Such reforms include 
the establishment of the mechanisms for civilian control and the adoption of a 
basic legal framework. The Serbian police have entered the second phase – the 
consolidation of reforms - whereby formal reforms are internalised by the sys-
tem. The second generation of reforms aims at “consolidation of the previous 
reforms and the effective and efficient operation of the institutions and proce-
dures at the sustainable cost for the state and the society” (Edmunds 2003: 16). 
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to reduce structural factors that allow for the 
polarisation of policing, while simultaneously increasing efficiency through the 
improvement of human resources and financial management in line with main-
stream reforms in the rest of the public administration. It is also crucial to adopt, 
as soon as possible, a mid-term MoI Development Strategy which would clarify 
priorities of reform for the next three to five years. In addition, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the commitment to further democratisation of policing by imple-
menting internal control and oversight, introducing community policing and 
internationalising a democratic police culture in the new police education and 
training systems. Finally, it is important that the Serbian police service continues 
to open up, both internally through more intense co-operation with other state 
authorities and civil society organisations, and internationally by intensifying its 
work towards EU integration.
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PACE OF REFORM AND ITS AChIEVEMENTS
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representativeness of women 
20011 2006 2008
Out of 35,000 
employees in the MoI
(21,000 uniformed)
Out of 33,284 employees 
with the status of 
uniformed authorised 
police personnel and 
authorised police 
personnel 
The MoI did not 
respond to this 
question
29 women
2,683 women have the 
status of uniformed 
authorised police 
personnel and authorised 
police personnel. Of this 
number 124 are part of 
the command staff
2,909 women 
have the status of 
uniformed authorised 
police personnel 
and authorised 
police personnel. Of 
this number 78 are 
managers within the 
operational police 
force
Table 14: Representativeness of women in the operational police force 
Since 2000 considerable progress has been made in the representation of 
women in the operational section of police service. This is one of the most vis-
ible reform processes that has increased public trust in the police. This reform 
was initiated upon the recommendations of international organisations, prima-
rily the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CoE).213 The government has also dem-
onstrated its support for the implemention of reform, with a visible change in 
how the public view the police; no longer as a threat to their own safety. This 
213 Richard Monk, Study on policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: OSCE Mission 
in FRY, 2001) and John Slater, Report on the assessment of the human rights, ethics and policing 
standards in the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro (Strasbourg: Council of Europe – Committee 
of Experts on Police Ethics and Problems of Policing, 2001)
is further underscored by public perception surveys which indicate that the in-
crease in women in the police is supported by 68.8 per cent of the population. 
One of the goals of the Ministry of Interior’s police training and education re-
form was a target of 30 per cent female police officers.214 This indicator is in line 
with the recommendations of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action A/
CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995).215    
Chart 3: Public perception survey on female police officers216
The first step towards the 30 per cent target was to recruit women for ba-
sic police training, i.e. the Police Officers’ Course. During 2002 and 2003 three 
courses were organised exclusively for women. These courses lasted for four 
214 Marina Blagojević, ‘Iskustva policije Srbije u osposobljavanju žena za poslove u oblasti bez-
bednosti’ in Žene u vojsci – zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije. (Beograd: Ministarstvo 
odbrane RS i Misija OEBS u Srbiji, 2007). 155 i Snežana Novović and Dijana Petrović, Žene u policiji 
(Beograd: MUP, VŠUP, 2006), 39.
215 Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action A/
CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995).
216 Public perception of the police in Serbia (Partner Marketing Research Agency, 2002), 80. Survey 
on how the public perceived the police was conducted for the OSCE Mission in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in co-operation with the Working Group of the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Serbia between 29 November and 12 December 2002. 
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months) compared to the six-month courses attended by male recruits).217 The 
female police officers’ courses were conducted in line with the existing cur-
riculum, but without the field training.218 The exception was the border police 
course, where men and women attended the same programme.219 A 2004 OSCE 
Report, which analysed the achievements of the police since 2000, indicated 
that separate training organised for men and women was one of the flaws of 
the system.220 The main objection was that men and women officers should be 
doing the same police work, and therefore the curricula should not differ. This 
recommendation was adopted in 2004 and since then the basic police training 
courses have been organised jointly for men and women.
The next positive step occurred in 2002 when the 10 per cent quota for en-
rolment of women to the Police College was abolished. All women who passed 
the entrance exams qualified for enrolment under the same conditions as male 
applicants. The enrolment criteria were the same for both genders, apart from 
those that referred to the check of the basic motoric status, which was based on 
different predispositions of women and men. In the same year, nine years after 
it was established in 1993, the Police Academy allowed women to enrol for the 
first time, although the maximum proportion of women was set at 20 per cent. 
Generation Total number of enrolled students
Number of 
enrolled 
women
Since establishment in 1993 till 2002 1,170 0
2002/2003 125 34 (27%)
2003/2004 130 30 (23%)
2004/2005 125 35 (28%)
2005/2006 130 28 (27%)
Total until 2006 1680 127 (13,22%)
Table 15: Number of women enrolled at the Police Academy before its transforma-
tion into the Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies 
217 Proposed response to the CCMR enquiry – indicators for the Security Sector Reform Index in Ser-
bia, MoI, General Police Directorate, Directorate for Analytics, November 2008, p.2
218 Marina Blagojević, ‘Iskustva policije Srbije u osposobljavanju žena za poslove u oblasti bez-
bednosti’ in Žene u vojsci – zbornik radova sa međunarodne konferencije. (Beograd: Ministarstvo 
odbrane RS i Misija OEBS u Srbiji, 2007). 156
219 Novović, Petrović, “Žene u policiji”, 41
220 Mark Downes, Police reform in Serbia – towards the creation of a modern and accountable 
police service (Belgrade: OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, Law Enforcement Department, 
2004), p. 33.
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The greatest progress in institutionalising the recruitment of women into 
the police service was made when the new model of basic police training was 
adopted in the Strategy of development of police training and education system221 
in December 2005. The strategy stated that instead of a six-month course, all 
future employees of the Ministry of Interior would have to go through a stand-
ardised 18-month training (12 months in the Basic Police Training Centre – BPTC 
- in Sremska Kamenica and another six months of field training). The new model 
of basic police training envisaged that female participants could be women 
aged 19 to 25. During the promotion of the new training, significant efforts 
were made to encourage the recruitment of women and to have as many fe-
male applicants as possible. The results of these efforts were clear; out of 3850 
candidates who applied in 2007 for the first class of trainees in the BPTC, 1015 
were women (26 per cent). Out of 129 selected trainees in the first class, 32 were 
women (24.8 per cent). In the second class, which enrolled in 2008, there were 
30 women (25 per cent) out of 120 trainees.
Apart from efforts to increase the representation of women in the police, 
which should be commended, we also need to draw attention to certain weak-
nesses. There is still a quota for number of women into the basic police training 
(up to 30 female trainees) as well as in undergraduate studies at the Academy 
of Criminalistic and Police Studies (funded from the state budget).222 The Acad-
emy was established in 2006 following a merger of the Police College and the 
Police Academy into a single institution of higher education offering three-year 
vocational and four-year academic studies. Out of 70 students, 15 places are al-
located for women (21 per cent), and in vocational studies this number is 15 out 
of 50 (30 per cent).223 These limitations do not apply to undergraduate studies if 
tuition fees are paid by the students themselves, nor do they apply to graduate 
and masters courses. Since the establishment of the Academy of Criminalistic 
and Police Studies in 2006 until the beginning of the academic year 2008/2009, 
the total number of budget and self-funded students was 300, of which 30 were 
women (10 per cent).224 The Ministry of Interior approved these enrolment quo-
tas. These figures indicate that not all levels of police education are equally acces-
sible to male and female candidates, which would be in line with the principle of 
equal opportunities. By limiting the number of female candidates, women are 
indirectly limited in employment and promotion opportunities in police jobs. 
Considering a high level of interest among women for a police career, and the 
221 Available at: http://prezentacije.mup.sr.gov.yu/upravazaobrazovanje/strategija/Strategija%20
razvoja%20sistema%20obuke%20i%20obrazovanja_221205-.htm 
222 Proposed response to the CCMR enquiry – indicators for the Security Sector Reform Index in Ser-
bia, MoI, General Police Directorate, Directorate for Analytics, November 2008, p. 1–2
223 Proposed response to the CCMR enquiry – indicators for the Security Sector Reform Index in Ser-
bia, MoI, General Police Directorate, Directorate for Analytics, November 2008, p. 1
224 Danijela Spasić, “Žene u sistemu policijskog obrazovanja stanje i perspektiva ženskih ljudskih 
prava”, Temida (Septembre 2008): 51. 
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fact that the number of women who pass the entrance exam is higher than the 
number admitted, we recommend that the limits on women should be abol-
ished and that they should be allowed to compete with their male colleagues 
for the budget-funded places based on their achievements. In order to remedy 
the unequal representation of women in the police,225 the active promotion of 
recruitment of women should continue, including a minimum quota of women 
in all forms of training and education.
A second limitation is the fact that working conditions and promotion cri-
teria are not adjusted to the full integration of women into the police service 
and are not in line with international standards. Despite efforts since 5 October 
2000 to increase the representation of women in the operational police force, 
most women employed in the MoI are outside of the operational police work. In 
autumn 2008 the MoI employed 8,913 women. Out of this number 2909 wom-
en were authorised uniformed police personnel and authorised police person-
nel (the operational police service), which represents 32.6 per cent of the total 
number of female employees in the MoI. The remaining two-thirds are mostly 
engaged in administrative and education jobs. There are 298 women in man-
agement positions, 78 of which are in the operational police service.226 Despite 
requests for information, the MoI did not submit data on the number of em-
ployees nor on its staff structure, so the precise current percentage of women 
in the MoI is unknown, neither in relation to the total number of employees 
nor in relation to the entire operational and management staff. Assuming that 
the number of employees has not changed substantially since the last available 
public data227 from 2005 and that there are approximately 44,000 staff mem-
bers in the MoI, only 4.94 per cent are women. If we assume that the number 
of occupied positions in the operational force of the MoI has not changed since 
2005 (33,284), we can conclude that 2909 women make up 11.44 per cent of 
the operational staff of the MoI. If the total number of employees in the MoI 
and the number of occupied positions with the status of authorised uniformed 
police personnel and authorised police personnel did in fact change, then the 
representation of women in the total number of staff and operational staff is 
even lower.                              
225 According to the 2002 Census, there are 3,852,071 women in Serbia (51.3 per cent) and 
3,645,930 men (48.7 per cent).  
226 Proposed response of the MoI, p. 1
227 Report on the activities of the MoI of the Republic of Serbia during the period between November 
2004 and April 2005, p. 28
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Chart 4: Representativeness of women in the MoI
Women are almost invisible in management positions, especially in the op-
erational force of the MoI. According to data from August 2005, cited by Novović 
and Petrović,228 there were only 164 female managers within the ministry. At 
the end of 2008 there were 298 women in management positions of which 78 
were in the operational force.229 This point to the fact that there are significantly 
more female managers in administrative jobs than in the operational police 
force. Given the very short period of time in which the number of uniformed 
female officers has increased, the small number of women in the command staff 
is not entirely surprising. It is, however, discouraging that of all the women who 
graduated from the former Police College and gained employment with the 
MoI, significantly more are working in non-police jobs compared to their male 
colleagues who graduated from the same college.230 
Status
Classified 
number 
of 
positions
Occupied 
number 
of 
positions
Number 
of women 
relative 
to 
occupied 
positions
Percentage 
of women 
relative to 
occupied 
positions
Number 
of 
managers
Number 
of female 
managers
Police 
officer 41,000 27,997 1847 6.60 %
Authorised 
police 
personnel
7401 5287 836 15.81 %
Total 48,401 33,284 2683 8.06 % 1378 176
Table 16: Women in the MoI as of March 2006231
This situation can be blamed on inadequate management of human re-
228 Novović, Petrović, “Žene u policiji”, 43.
229 Proposed response of the MoI, 1.
230 Novović, Petrović, “Žene u policiji”, 93.
231 Adapted based on the table from Novović, Petrović, 43.
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sources. Apart from measures to increase the number of female recruits, active 
measures for keeping women in police jobs should be established, including 
measures that would encourage their promotion based on merit. It is necessary 
to examine whether the current system of salaries, incentives and pension in-
surance favours male over female officers in certain positions. If this is the case, 
it is necessary to revise the job descriptions and skills needed to perform these 
jobs and to value competences such as problem solving, ability to work with 
local communities and co-operation with other state bodies just as equally as 
police work with the use of force. This would ensure that, when promotions de-
cisions are made, positions which are more frequently occupied by female po-
lice officers (e.g. juvenile delinquency, sex crime, work with children, domestic 
and gender-based violence) are not informally valued as less important than 
other police jobs. To achieve this, it is necessary to have a transparent system of 
human resources management that values competences and initiative. This is 
currently not the case in the MoI. The section on human resources management 
system deals with this in detail. 
Average grade: 3 (three)
Representativeness of ethnic minorities
Insufficient representativeness of ethnic minorities in the police is one of the 
main consequences of the post-conflict context of security sector reform. Due 
to police actions during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during 
the 1990s, and also due to discriminatory and oppressive actions towards so-
called ‘disloyal minorities’ (mostly Albanians and Bosniaks232), the police lost le-
gitimacy in minority communities. As a result large numbers of people from 
ethnic minorities left the police. Their positions were often filled by the Serbian 
police officers, themselves refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Ko-
sovo.233 These officers were often traumatised and unprepared for policing in 
multi-ethnic communities. Restoring the trust in unbiased policing is a precon-
dition for attracting individuals from ethnic minorities to the police. In order to 
overcome the lack of trust in police, it is necessary to process all cases of police 
torture against members of ethnic minorities.234 This is particularly important 
for regional police districts in Sandzak and the three municipalities in south Ser-
232 According to the Sandzak Committee for Human Rights, between 1991 and 1995 the police 
questioned 15,000 people in this region.
233 Draft of Final report on the first phase of the project police and minorities and socially vulnerable 
groups (British Council and OSCE Mission in Serbia), 11.
234 For more information on the cases of violation of human rights for ethnic minorities mem-
bers, see reports of the Humanitarian Law Centre and Sandzak Committee for Human Rights.
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bia where instances of systematic torture of ethnic minorities took place during 
the 1990s.
Chart 5: Opinions on the police of high school pupils of different ethnicities235
One turning point that could lead to a new policy towards ethnic minorities 
is a peace agreement that ended the armed conflict with the Preševo, Medveđa 
and Bujanovac Liberation Army (PMBLA), which lasted from the end of 2000 
until mid-2001. The establishment of the Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE) 
was part of a peace agreement named after Nebojša Čović (deputy prime min-
ister in the Serbian government at the time). In line with the Čović agreement, 
intensive training and background checks were initiated for former members 
of the PMBLA (as well as others from these three municipalities) who were in-
terested in joining the police. With the assistance of OSCE instructors, intensive 
three-month police courses236 were held in Mitrovo Polje. Within a short period 
of time there was a significant increase in the number of Albanian police offic-
ers. This led to increased trust in local police. A UNDP survey found that the po-
lice was named the most representative state authority, after a decade of being 
seen exclusively as an oppressive authority. Nevertheless, after initial successes 
local representatives of the Albanian minority complained of inadequate en-
gagement and poor promotion of members of the Multi-Ethnic Police Element. 
Instead of daily policing work in police stations, they were placed in modular 
buildings in remote and scarcely populated places. When it became clear that 
235 We obtained the results of this survey, conducted at the sample of 1686 senior pupils of 
four-year secondary schools, during the interview with Biljana Puškar, Director of the Basic Police 
Training Centre in Sremska Kamenica, on 1 August 2008. The survey was conducted in second-
ary schools in Belgrade, Niš, Novi Sad, Vranje, Subotica, Šabac, Užice, Sremska Mitrovica, Vršac, 
Kanjiža, Bački Petrovac, Bačka Topola, Preševo, Bujanovac, Novi Pazar, Zaječar and Kragujevac.     
236 MEPE training lasted only half the time of the regular six-month police courses. 
the initial intensive training would not be enough, the Ministry conducted ad-
ditional training between 2002 and 2006. This was done at the request of the 
Working Group for south Serbia, which comprised representatives from local 
authorities, the local police, the Ministry and the OSCE.237 These reforms led to 
the representation of ethnic minorities to largely reflect the structure of the 
population.    
        
                         
Table 17: Representativeness of ethnic minorities in police service in three munici-
palities in south Serbia238
In areas with large ethnic minority populations (apart from the three mu-
nicipalities in south Serbia) ethnic minorities are not adequately represented 
in the majority of regional police districts. The situation is similar for the repre-
sentation of women. Based on the last available data on ethnic structure of the 
MoI from 2004, ethnic minorities are almost invisible in command positions in 
the operational police force.239 The MoI states that the main problem is a lack of 
interest among ethnic minorities for police work. This is illustrated by the results 
of a survey of secondary school pupils interest in police careers.240 The survey 
found that 63.4 per cent of secondary school pupils of Albanian ethnicity, 54.5 
per cent of Bosniaks and 53.4 per cent of Hungarians were not interested in 
working in the police.       
237 Thorsten Stodiek, The OSCE and the creation of multi-ethnic police forces in the Balkans (Ham-
burg: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2006), 43.
238 South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons 2004b, 
Public Perception of Small Arms and Security in South Serbia, Belgrade. str. 11 
239 The MoI did not respond to our question on number of employees who are members of 
ethnic minorities.
240 Survey at the sample of 1,686 secondary school pupils. 
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Chart 6: Interest of secondary school pupils in police careers
In spring 2006 the Ministry of Interior, together with the OSCE Mission and 
the British Council, held eleven round tables with minority, socially vulnerable 
and marginalised groups.241 These discussions helped to identify obstacles to 
cooperation between the police and ethnic minority communities. Hungar-
ian participants cited low salaries and the low social standing of police officers, 
whereas Albanian and Bosniak participants pointed to cases of discrimination 
at training facilities located far away from where they live. Another problem is 
inadequate knowledge of the Serbian language. This was also highlighted in 
2007 during an enrolment campaign for basic police training, when many ap-
plicants of ethnic minority origin had difficulties in taking the psychological 
tests in the Serbian language. As a result the tests were later translated with 
the assistance of the OSCE Mission. Specific Serbian language classes were also 
organised for Roma applicants. During the promotion campaign, cooperation 
with Ethnic Minority Councils was established for the first time in order to en-
courage members of ethnic minorities to apply. Promotional brochures, posters 
and radio adverts were produced in minority languages. Such practices should 
be continued. In addition, the Ministry should explore the possibility of promot-
241 Draft of Final report on the first phase of the project police and minorities and socially vulnerable 
groups (British Council and OSCE Mission in Serbia).
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ing police officers who speak the language of the minority living in the given 
area, when deciding between two candidates of the same ranking. This meas-
ure would both encourage police officers of Serbian ethnicity to learn minority 
languages and encourage members of ethnic minorities to apply for police jobs.
Despite these efforts, some ethnic communities such as Roma and Croatians, 
are still invisible in the police,. Roma in particular are one of the least represented 
minorities in society. It is particularly important that the entire state administra-
tion becomes involved in integrating the Roma population. Specific measures 
need to be developed in cooperation with the social security and education 
system to increase the number of Roma who graduate from secondary schools, 
including measures which would encourage them to apply for police jobs.                 
2001 20062 
Out of total 45,149 employees of the 
MoI
2008
Data not available
118 
Albanians
296 Albanians
(0.66% of police staff compared to 
0.82% in the general population)
Data not available
496 
Hungarians
487 Hungarians
(1.08% of police staff compared to 
3.91% in the general population)
Data not available
380 
Bosniaks
453 Bosniacs
(1% of police staff compared to 2.1% in 
the general population)
Data not available
40 Roma
(0.09% of police staff compared to 
1.44% in the general population)
Data not available
Table 18: Representation of some ethnic minorities in the MoI
The Ministry of Interior should set as one of its long-term reform goals a 
structure in the police service that reflects the general population, both at the 
local level, particularly in ethnically diverse communities, and at the national lev-
el. Particular attention should be given to the promotion of ethnic minority rep-
resentation in the operational police force and in management positions. In this 
vein, novelties in the work with the media and with the local communities should 
be introduced. This primarily refers to institutional cooperation with Ethnic Mi-
nority Councils, local self-government and civil society organisations. Such co-
operation should contribute to the promotion of the police in ethnically diverse 
communities, starting from primary school age. Budgetary resources should be 
allocated for the publishing of police application calls in minority languages and 
in ethnic minority-language media. Managers from ethnic minorities in the MoI 
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should also be involved in campaigns. To promote ethnic minority employment 
in the MoI, there needs to be access to education without fear of discrimination 
from peers or colleagues at the Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies, as 
well as during professional development courses conducted away from where 
they live. Supervisors should be responsible for creating safe and neutral learn-
ing and work environments. They should ensure that all staff members are treat-
ed equally based on merit and that all forms of discrimination are dealt with. 
      
Average grade: 3 (three)
TRANSPARENCY
general transparency
During the observed period, the Ministry of Interior made considerable but in-
sufficient progress in increasing its public transparency. Important changes were 
introduced by the 2004 Law on free access to information of public importance. The 
MoI started to publish a regular Information Booklet and disseminate informa-
tion of public importance. However, the public still consider that the MoI is insuf-
ficiently transparent. This has also been highlighted in reports by the Commis-
sioner for Information of Public Importance. The MoI stands out from the other 
authorities at the national level in the number of rejected requests for access to 
information, and also for not acting upon 14 enforceable decisions of the Com-
missioner.242 The main obstacles in achieving an appropriate level of transparency 
are legal factors, a lack of resources and the legacy of its organisational culture. 
Year Number of requests
Positively 
resolved Percentage Rejected Percentage
2006 401 337 84.03 % 40 9.97%
2007 558 433 77.59 % 96 16.7 %
Total 959 770 80.29% 136 14.18%
Table 19: Responses by the MoI to requests for free access to information in 
2006 and 2007243
242 Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, Report on implementation of the Law on 
free access to information of public importance in 2008 (Belgrade, March 2009), 11.
243 Based on the response submitted in: Proposed response to the CCMR enquiry – indicators for 
the security sector reform index in Serbia, MoI, General Police Directorate, Directorate for Analytics, 
November 2008, p. 8.
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The legal framework is the first obstacle to greater transparency. For in-
stance, the Law on police qualifies free access to information of public interest 
by specifying ‘justified interest’ (Article 5). This contravenes standards of free ac-
cess to information of public importance set forth in the Recommendation of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe no.2002, Art. 5. Similar laws in 
consolidated democracies do not require citizens to prove their interest before 
they can receive information. Further, there is no legislation on confidentiality 
or classification of data. This increases the probability that requests for infor-
mation will be rejected. Information requests can therefore be denied because 
of confidentiality, even when it is unclear which criteria were applied to clas-
sify the information as such. This is particularly important since data confiden-
tiality is one of the most common reasons stated by the MoI when rejecting 
access to information, according to Commissioner reports. The Commissioner 
further states that this explanation was used for information referring to illegal 
or criminal activities (for instance, the ‘Road Mafia’ case).244 For this reason the 
provision of ‘justified interest’ in the Law on police should be replaced by provi-
sions that refer to the Law on free access to information of public importance. It is 
also necessary to enact the Law on classification of data, which would regulate 
the concepts of state, military and official secrets in line with modern European 
standards.
The Law on free access to information of public importance specifies three 
types of obligations for public authorities (state bodies). First, they must publish 
an Information Booklet (article 39). Second, they are required to organise staff 
training on information requests (article 42). Third, they must submit a report to 
the Commissioner (article 43). In the past the MoI has fulfilled these obligations 
to varying degrees. The Information Booklet of the Ministry of Interior is avail-
able on its website, but it is not regularly updated and it contains only a small 
portion of information prescribed by the Instruction for development of the In-
formation Booklet of public authority bodies.245 The Information Booklet provides 
names and telephone numbers of MoI officials responsible for free access to 
information.246 It also outlines information on the organisation of the MoI (at 
the headquarters and in territorial organisation), including the competences of 
Ministry bodies. The document does not contain information on the types of 
services provided by the MoI, procedures of exercising rights, nor information 
244 Proposed response to CCMR questions, 20.
245 Instruction for Development of Information Booklet of Public Authority Bodies, the Official Ga-
zette of the Republic of Serbia, no.57/05, 5 July 2005
246 Apart from names, there are no mailing or e-mail addresses, even though it is expected that 
the request should be submitted in writing.
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on the enforcement of the most relevant laws.247 Similarly, there is no informa-
tion on budgetary allocations, as prescribed by the Instruction for development 
of information booklet as mandatory.248 The Information Booklet should be 
amended to include information on public contact points within the MoI, so 
that, for instance, civil society organisations, local governments or companies 
interested in cooperation know who they can contact.
The MoI was specifically criticised in reports on the implementation of the 
Law on free access to information of public importance in 2006 and 2008 because 
of the Information Booklet’s limited contents and irregular updating of informa-
tion.249 After Transparency Serbia analysed 80 Information Booklets by public 
authorities at the national and provincial level, it gave the lowest assessment 
to the quality of information published by the MoI.250 Regular updating of the 
contents of the Information Booklet requires systematic monitoring of the MoI’s 
work. This would allow managers to identify weaknesses and enable the public 
and the media to have immediate interaction with the Ministry. That is why the 
Instruction for development of information booklets requires public authorities to 
update the contents of booklets at least once a month,251 something that the 
MoI is not doing. The MoI also fails to fulfil its obligation, as required by article 
196 of the Law on police, to publish at least twice a year a list of laws enforced by 
the police, including explanations of the most important changes in legislation. 
A list of laws and by-laws, which exists as a separate page on the MoI’s website, 
contains the legislation which is no longer in effect,252 but there are no explana-
tions about the most important legislative changes.
Another obstacle is a lack of capacity. Staff dealing with public enquiries 
often do so alongside regular daily work. There is also not enough training and 
insufficient IT and analytical capacities to support the efficient provision of in-
formation. After initial criticism of inefficient handling of information requests, 
since 2006 the MoI has been constantly increasing the number of responsible 
247 At the website of the Ministry of Interior there is the Frequently Asked Questions page (http://
www.mup.sr.gov.yu/domino/mup.nsf/pitanja), which provides mostly technical advice, such as 
how to obtain your personal documents. At the web pages of the Uniformed Police Directorate 
and of the Sector for Rescue and Protection, which are much more difficult to find due to chaotic 
organisation of the MoI website, there is advice referring to the citizens’ rights and obligations of 
police officers. 
248 Ibid.
249 Report on implementation of the Law on free access to information of public importance in 2006, 
31 and Report on implementation of the Law on free access to information of public importance in 
2008, 30
250 The MoI was given 1.78 on a 1 – 5 scale, as stated in the Report on implementation of the Law 
on free access to information of public importance in 2008, 30
251 Ibid.
252 For example, the list includes the Code of Ethics from 2003, even though the new one was 
enacted in 2006. 
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staff. There are currently 106 staff members in charge of these tasks in the MoI.253 
They perform these duties alongside their regular daily work. Because of heavy 
workloads they are sometimes unable to respond to requests within the time-
frame prescribed by the law. Article 42 of the Law on free access to information 
of public importance requires training for all MoI staff members in the previsions 
of this law.254 The most recent training was held in June 2006 for MoI employ-
ees responsible for sharing information of public importance. Consequently, 
the MoI’s Directorate for Police Education, Training, Professional Development 
and Science should include the contents of the Law on free access to informa-
tion of public importance in its annual Professional Development Programme, 
and should also develop a specific training programme for relevant staff mem-
bers. Finally, in order to ensure efficient provision of information, responsibility 
should be delegated to regional police districts so that they can respond to cer-
tain requests without prior verification from MoI headquarters. In order to have 
a functioning system, it is necessary to improve the analytical capacities outside 
MoI headquarters and to introduce e-government which would enable faster 
access and exchange of documents over the internet.
The lack of political will and resistance within the MoI to publishing informa-
tion on its plans, goals and results represent further obstacles to transparency. 
Since mid-2005 the MoI’s Activity Report is no longer available on its website. 
This report is submitted at least once a year to the Parliamentary Security and 
Defence Committee. Furthermore, the MoI did not respond to several questions 
submitted in writing by the authors of this paper. No further explanation was 
provided. The most important question concerns the number of employees in 
the MoI, including classified positions. It is also necessary to publish standards 
on public information so that it is clear which information is accessible. In dem-
ocratic countries all information referring to the goals and methods of police 
work is available as long as it does not compromise police investigations, does 
not jeopardise the presumption of innocence and does not affect public secu-
rity. In order to ensure timely and efficient informing of the public, it is necessary 
to improve cooperation between the police and the media. Public education on 
important security issues should also be raised. For this reason the ‘Instruction 
for cooperation with the media’ should be improved, spokespersons should be 
appointed and trained in all regional police districts and media relations train-
ing should be mandatory in police management courses.      
Average grade: 2 (two)
253 Proposed response to CCMR questions, 7.
254 This training was one recommendation in the GRECO Report on Serbia (Council of Europe’s 
Group of States Against Corruption) from 9 October 2006 
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Financial transparency 
It is clear that during the last eight years the MoI has been unprepared to pub-
lish information on its financial, human and other resources, despite obligations 
outlined in the Instruction for development of the information booklet of public 
authority bodies.255 Publication of this information is particularly important con-
sidering that the Ministry of Interior has one of largest budgets of any govern-
ment department. It receives approximately seven per cent of the budget (two 
per cent of GDP).256 It is particularly important to publish (either within the Infor-
mation Booklet or in separate reports) information on additional funding sourc-
es through the provision of MoI services (article 182 of the Law on police),257 in-
cluding information on extra-budgetary resources used to improve the work of 
the police, obtained through aid or donations from non-governmental or other 
legal entities (article 18 of the Law on police). This information should be up-
dated at least once a year on the webpage of the MoI, so that all the interested 
members of the public can monitor any conflict of interest in the Ministry of 
Interior’s work.    
The MoI’s budget in 2007 equals two per cent of projected GDP
The 2007 budget earmarked RSD 41,454,312,000 for the MoI. This equals 
seven per cent of the total budget, or two per cent of projected GDP. The 
budget also envisages revenue generated by the ministry itself of RSD 
4,067,785,000.258 The MoI receives RSD 7,500,000 from non-governmental 
organisations and individuals, as well as the unallocated surplus of rev-
enue from previous years of RSD 22,437,922.
The economic budget classification should be replaced by a functional 
classification as soon as possible, in order to present clearly the appropriation 
of budgetary resources. Whereas the economic classification only lists various 
types of expenditures in very broad terms (e.g. staff costs, travel expenditures 
and materials), the functional budget classification specifies the purpose of ex-
penditures (e.g. maintenance of public peace and order, and criminal investiga-
tions). The current budget methodology is not precise enough and it does not 
allow for proper insight into the way the Ministry allocates financial resources. 
Although part of the budget must remain confidential because of specificities 
255 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 57/05, 5 July 2005
256 Proposed response to CCMR questions, 10
257 Rulebook on types of service which the MoI can provide to obtain additional means, the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 64/2006, 71/2007 and 14/2008
258 Law on the budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2007, the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, no.123/07.
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of the system, the rest of the budget should be presented in a transparent way. 
The public is unfamiliar with the allocation of budget resources since the MoI 
has never published a report. Such a report should be presented according to 
form number five (regulated by the Law on budgetary system) and submitted 
to the Treasury. In addition, the government’s final account statement from 
2002 was never published. When the author of this paper asked about the use 
of grants to civil society organisations (budget classification 481), the MoI re-
sponded that it had no resources allocated to classification 481,259 although the 
2007 budget specifies RSD 3,500,000 for this purpose. However, responding to 
questions posed by the Centre for the development of the non-profit sector,260 
the MoI admitted that in 2007 this amount was allocated to CSOs but that there 
was no use of this money.
This problem is more apparent when it comes to public procurement, 
since the MoI is one of the largest state bodies. The MoI is also partially exempt 
from the public procurement system Directive on funds for special purposes,261 
in line with the Law on public procurement. The Minister of Interior decides on 
the funds for ‘special purposes’ which are confidential (weapons, ammunition, 
means for counter explosive protection, equipment used for encryption, detec-
tors, etc.). Nevertheless, big corruption scandals, such as the case of low-quality 
uniforms in 2008, which cost the police tens of millions of dinars,262 show there 
is the need for additional verification and implementation of the Law on public 
procurement.
A Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is required as soon as possible to monitor 
the MoI. Its staff should be trained to oversee procurement for ‘special purposes’, 
which is excluded from the regular public procurement system (article 183 of 
the Law on police). They should also be trained to oversee payments allocated to 
special operational needs (article 184 of the Law on police), additional revenues 
from the provision of MoI services (article 182 of the Law on police), including 
extra-budgetary resources intended for the improvement of police work in the 
form of aid or donations coming from the non-governmental or other legal en-
tities (article 19 of the Law on police).                              
Average grade: 2 (two)
259 Proposed response to CCMR questions, 10.
260 Transparency Serbia. Budget classification 481 (2003 – 2007), proposed Serbian budget for 2008 
and for the future http://www.transparetnost.org.rs  
261 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 29/2005
262 Tamara Marković-Subota, ‘Zbog nabavke nekvalitetnih uniformi uhapšeni samo referenti”’, 
Blic, 15 December, 2008, http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=70055
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PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORgANISATIONS
Participation of citizens and civil society organisations 
in policy making
During the early transition period civil society (apart from human rights organi-
sations) lacked sufficient understanding of how the police functions. Knowl-
edge is needed in order to provide efficient monitoring of the MoI and to facili-
tate reform of the state security sector. This lack of expertise within civil society 
and the media, combined with politically-motived appointments in the police, 
undermine thorough scrutiny. It also allows the police to act as the driver of re-
form. All laws submitted for adoption, as well as priority areas for obtaining do-
nor financial assistances, have been proposed by the police service itself. Rare 
proposals of laws and strategies,263 drafted by civil society organisations have 
been mostly ignored during the development of the legislation.  
Insufficient transparency, the lack of clear priorities and a centralised deci-
sion making process are the main obstacles to public and civil society participa-
tion in the creation of the MoI policy. The MoI should upload drafts of new laws 
and strategies onto its website more often, and it should use public events to 
invite all interested citizens and organisations to give comments (as was the 
case with the proposed Law on road traffic safety). As well as representatives 
from acadeMoI and civil society organisations, other interested citizens should 
have the possibility to express their opinion, even if this is by e-mail. This has not 
been the case so far, since public debates are open only for select organisations. 
Public perception survey conducted at the end of 2008 under the sponsorship 
of the OSCE Mission asked about public perception of the police. The results 
showed that 74 per cent of respondents did not see any possibility for influenc-
ing the development of police priorities in their own communities.264    
263 These are the examples of alternative draft laws and policies we have learned about during 
interviews with representatives of the MoI and civil society organisations in August 2008. The 
best known examples of draft laws that were never adopted are the Law on police, developed 
by LEX (2004), three alternative drafts of a law on private security companies developed by the 
experts of CCMR, LEX and the Association of Private Security Companies, as well as the draft 
National Strategy Against Organised Crime, developed by the working group led by the Centre 
for Security Studies. The exception to this rule is the proposal for amendments in the Criminal 
Act, in the part where it regulates the issues of domestic violence and human trafficking, where 
women’s organisations participated as equal partners in legislation development.   
264 Strategic Marketing Research (November 2008), Public Perception Survey on Police Reforms 
(for the OSCE Mission in Serbia). Available at http://www.mup.gov.rs 
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Chart 7: How the members of the public perceive the possibility of influencing the 
police priorities in their communities 
The MoI should establish a process for holding regular consultations with ci-
vilian society organisations at the national and local level. Also, it should inform 
all interested citizens about the possibilities for participation in such events. 
Besides regular monitoring of public perception, it should also open channels 
for immediate consultations, such as designated telephone lines and e-mail ad-
dresses. This could be followed by the establishment of a standing consultation 
body comprising representatives of civil society and acadeMoI. During inter-
views conducted in August 2008 as part of the project ‘Increased citizens par-
ticipation in security policy’, the MoI stated it was not sufficiently informed on 
civil society expertise. It also noted that the prevailing centralised management 
style discouraged the fostering of partnerships with civil society organisations.  
Partnerships with CSOs could be used to improve MoI capacities and would 
enable it to fulfil obligations in the process of Serbia’s accession to the EU. The 
MoI management should consider the establishment of a standing consultation 
body consisting of representatives from civil society and acadeMoI with exper-
tise in police reform and EU integration. Such a body would have an advisory 
role in policy and law making, and also in the process of programming of the 
pre-accession assistance available in the IPA funds. This is crucial for Serbia’s pro-
gression towards the EU. Furthermore, in order to improve the MoI’s readiness 
to harmonise its laws and polices with those of the EU, civilian academic and re-
search institutions should be involved in the development of comparative stud-
ies on solutions implemented by other countries. These are reasons why the 
use of grants for civil society organisations (budget classification 481) should 
be used to commission alternative policies proposals and analysis from CSOs. 
Average grade: 2 (two)
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Participation of citizens and civil society organisations 
in policy implementation and evaluation
 
Police relations towards civil society organisations have improved since the 
1990s when they were treated as ‘enemies of the regime’ and as ‘foreign mer-
cenaries’. The Law on police provides for police cooperation with citizens, infor-
mal and organised groups and local government,265 and the novelty is that in 
the second instance proceedings upon complaints against police, the citizens 
are involved through their representatives who are selected to be members of 
the Committee for complaints against police officers. In practice, most progress 
has been made with the organisations that deal with protection of children and 
women rights.266 Cooperation is less intense and less frequent when it comes 
to technical expertise organisations (independent research centres conducting 
analysis on police reform), as well as organisations that regularly monitor the 
police in relation to human rights. The least cooperation occurs with represen-
tation organisations that promote the interests of minority, socially vulnerable 
and marginalised groups.  However, there have been some positive steps with 
LGBT rights organisations through a programme of prevention of hate crimes 
and through community policing programmes. Civil society representatives be-
lieve that the police should act proactively and in more transparent manner so 
as to become closer to the citizens. MoI employees believe that the overly cen-
tralised decision-making and the prevailing organisational culture do not en-
able them to foster partnerships with the members of the public.267 The greatest 
progress in cooperation with citizens and local level associations was made in 
municipalities where the concept of safe communities has been implemented, 
and through ‘Community Policing Programmes’.268 
265 Law on police, Articles 6, 17, 144, 180 and 188, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 
no. 101/05
266 Želimir Kešetović, Final report on the first phase of the project ‘Police and minorities and socially 
vulnerable groups’ (Belgrade, London: OSCE Mission in Serbia, British Council, 2006), 5
267 These conclusions have been drawn up based on interviews conducted with MoI managers 
and representatives from CSOs in August 2008, as part of the project Increased citizens participa-
tion in security policy.    
268 Pilot Community Policing Programmes has been implemented in the municipalities of Bačka 
Palanka, Kragujevac, Novi Bečej, Novi Sad, Požega, Vrnjačka Banja, Zvezdara, Požega, Bujanova, 
Preševo and Medveđa, and as part of the UN Habitat programme ‘Safe Community’ in a number 
of municipalities co-operation between the police, the local authorities and the public has been 
intensified (e.g. Valjevo, Niš).
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Chart 8: Assessment of cooperation with citizens at the national level269
It is necessary, as soon as possible, to adopt the National Community Polic-
ing Plan. The police should also harmonise its organisational structure and set 
aside funds necessary for this implementation. The MoI is obliged to do so in 
line with the National Strategy of the Republic of Serbia for Serbia and Mon-
tenegro’s EU Accession from 2005. The plan should incorporate lessons learned 
from experiences of implementing Community Policing Programmes piloted 
in ten municipalities in Serbia, as well as the experiences of other municipali-
ties in which similar initiatives have been launched. As part of this initiative, the 
police should be adequately adjusted to work with other public authorities, 
local government and the public. Through its Department for Preventive and 
Community Policing within the Uniformed Police Directorate, the MoI should 
support the institutionalisation of co-operation with local communities. This is 
best achieved through regular meetings of citizens’ advisory groups at the lo-
cal community level, but also through cooperation with local authorities and 
CSOs within inter-agency bodies established in some municipalities in Serbia 
(e.g. municipal safety councils and committees, municipal committees for the 
prevention of addiction, school safety councils, etc.).270 Establishment of such 
bodies should be encouraged all over Serbia. And teams in all regional police 
districts should be established and trained to participate. Decentralisation of 
decision-making is a requirement. Authority on issues related to police work in 
269 Strategic Marketing Research (November 2008), Public Perception Survey on Police Reforms 
(for the OSCE Mission in Serbia). Available at http://www.mup.gov.rs
270 In a presentation organised by the OSCE in Ečka on 29 February, a representative of the MoI 
said that there are currently around 100 different inter-agency bodies whose aim it is to deal 
safety issues at the municipality level.  
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local communities should be transferred to municipal and regional police bod-
ies. Such a change is a necessary precondition for the establishment of efficient 
cooperation between regional police district managers and representatives of 
local authorities and civil society organisations.
Other possibilities for public involvement also exist. The MoI should facilitate 
and encourage CSO visits to detention units. It should support the commissions 
which are questioning the use of coercion and it should foster partnerships for 
victim protection (for instance victims of human trafficking and domestic vi-
olence and asylum seekers). It should conduct activities and campaigns with 
CSOs and informal groups, including minorities, marginalised and socially vul-
nerable groups. Trainings and campaigns should be organised to inform CSOs 
about police work so they can establish adequate partnerships with the police 
to resolve safety problems and provide control and oversight. 
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC CIVIL 
CONTROL AND PUBLIC Control and 
oversight
Control by the Executive
The 2005 Law on police271 introduced de jure categorisation of police into profes-
sional and operational components (Police Directorate, Protection and Rescue 
Service), separate from the development and supervision roles of the MoI. This 
categorisation should reduce political interference in the operational manage-
ment of the police. A deeper analysis of the law implies that jurisdiction over 
the majority of decision-making processes remains in the hands of the minis-
ter.272 For instance only the minister can nominate and remove from duty heads 
of the regional police directorates although these directorates are, according 
to existing chains of command, directly accountable to the director general of 
the police. Also, the minister has many discretionary rights, such as the use of 
specialised units.  The minister can also choose to exclude the MoI from public 
procurement procedures or decisions as regards data from the internal control 
investigations. 
Police decision-making processes on all levels are affected by government 
271 Law on police, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 101/05.
272 As many as 44 articles of this law refer to various competences of the minister of interior, 
whereas only eight of them regulate the exclusive competences of the police director general.  
interference. This is echoed in public perception surveys showing that 74 per 
cent of citizens believe that politicians influence police work and that the police 
is only an instrument for protecting the government and political interests.273 In 
order to reduce politicisation and at the same time enable efficient functioning 
of the MoI, the Sector for Internal Control should effectively supervise the legal-
ity of all work conducted by MoI employees.
Chart 9: Political influence on the operational police work and appointments of 
MoI managers
Chart 10: In whose interest do the police in Serbia work?
273 Strategic Marketing Research (November 2008), Public Perception Survey on Police Reforms 
(for the OSCE Mission in Serbia). Available at http://www.mup.gov.rs  
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The competences of the director general of the police should be increased 
in order to reduce the possibility of politicisation and to ensure operational in-
dependence of police from the Ministry. For this reason the Law on police should 
be amended to enable the director general and not the minister to appoint 
and dismiss heads of regional police districts (article 24). The MoI’s discretion-
ary powers should also be reviewed. Articles 177, 178 and 175 of the Law on 
police should be changed to ensure independence. Control of the head of the 
Internal Affairs Sector (article 177) should be the responsibility of government 
and parliamentary committee instead of the minister. Furthermore, the minister 
should only delegate tasks of individual police control to those police officers 
from the Internal Affairs Sector (article 175), or restrict access to documents, 
premises or certain data vital required by the sector (article 175). The sector’s 
regional internal affairs centres should be provided with more staff and better 
equipment to enable the efficient work of this unit outside Belgrade. The sec-
tor’s activities should be increased, especially when it comes to investigations of 
police corruption, and it should be allowed to ‘test’ the potential for police offic-
ers towards corruption. At the same time it is essential to create mechanisms for 
protecting police officers from malicious and false accusations. 
Average grade: 3 (three)
Parliamentary control and control and oversight       
Parliamentary supervision and control is the weakest link in the process of po-
lice democratisation, primarily due to a lack of will from political parties and MPs 
to actively participate in parliamentary control and oversight. The Ministry of 
Interior submits annual reports on its activities and the national security situa-
tion to parliament, as stipulated by the Law on police (article 9). Information on 
cases of unjustified or unlawful coercion (violations of human rights) are also 
included in the report and made publicly available. Article 179 specifically states 
that the Internal Affairs Sector can submit a report following a request by the 
parliamentary working body in charge of security and police work (the Security 
and Defence Committee of the National Assembly). The law also envisages the 
possibility of submitting this and other reports more frequently, according to 
requests by parliament and the Security and Defence Committee. Local authori-
ties can receive similar reports on request by the Security Committee of the As-
sembly of Autonomous Province (Article 17). 
Between 5 October 2000 and end of 2008 the Security and Defence Com-
mittee held 20 sessions in which it discussed aspects of the MoI’s work or pro-
posed legislation. Based on the analysis of the agendas we can conclude that 
the MoI’s Activity Report was the most frequent topic (ten times), followed by 
reports on the results of the ‘Sabre’ police action and respect of human rights 
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during this action (five times). Security situation reports were discussed twice. A 
report on inter-ethnic relations in Vojvodina, a report on the arrest of Radovan 
Karadzic, a report on the burning of secret service files after October 2000 and 
a report on the proposed Law on travel documents were discussed once respec-
tively. The majority of the proposed laws from the MoI were debated in plenary 
and extraordinary sessions, without debate in the Security and Defence Com-
mittee and without the involvement of external experts in these discussions. 
Reports on police activities and the security situation in Serbia are discussed 
once or twice a year but they do not touch certain topics and do not go deep-
ly into the strategies initiated by the police. The last MoI report was submit-
ted to the Committee in October 2007. This illustrates that the Law on police 
is inadequate, since it does not oblige the Ministry to submit the report to the 
Committee unless requested by members of the Committee. It also indicates 
that Committee members are not active enough. The only police-related topics 
discussed in Committee sessions concerned the politicised investigation of the 
police in operation ‘Sabre’, police actions towards the Hungarian ethnic minor-
ity following allegations of ethnically motivated incidents in Vojvodina, and the 
circumstances of Radovan Karadzic’s arrest. Neither parliament nor the Security 
and Defence Committee have ever used the possibility (as stipulated by parlia-
mentary Rules of Procedure) to discuss control and oversight over the use of 
resources and the procurement of weapons, or to request a special report from 
the Internal Affairs Sector. Similarly they have never sought to inform the public 
on important issues concerning the police and the MoI.
Parliamentary control and control and oversight must be used to depo-
liticise the police. MPs, and particularly the Security and Defence Committee, 
should undertake initiatives to oversee the MoI’s work. This is why it is essential 
to develop a plan of activities for the Committee which would include discus-
sions on proposed laws, as well as topics such as financial management in the 
MoI, police actions towards minorities, and marginalised and socially vulnerable 
groups. The Committee should meet frequently in order to thoroughly analyse 
proposed laws and overview MoI policies. Parliament should consider introduc-
ing regular Committee sessions so that it can prepare timely reactions to differ-
ent political situations.
The sessions of the Security and Defence Committee should be public, to 
give the public a better understanding of the issues and better insight into the 
Committee’s work. The minutes of these sessions and discussed documents 
should be published (unless they are classified as confidential). The Committee 
should also respond to public and media questions. For this reason the Com-
mittee should publish information on its future sessions and create mailing lists 
to disseminate information to the media, CSOs and other interested parties. A 
mechanism should be created to enable the Committee to request information 
from the government and to efficiently respond to the questions of the wider 
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public. This would improve the public image of MPs and parliament. This is also 
a cost-efficient way of improving public opinion on parliament and the police.   
Average grade: 2 (two)  
Judicial control                  
Judicial control over the police and the Ministry is entirely grounded on the con-
trol of the legality of specific evidence procedures. It decides on the legality of 
administrative decisions, on criminal liability of police officers, and in award-
ing damages to citizens. Judicial consent in writing is required for the use of 
specific evidence procedures such as; secret audio and video surveillance; ren-
dering false services and making false legal business deals; the engagement 
of covert investigators; and the controlled provision and computerised search 
of personal and other data which is primarily regulated by the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code.274 Although information on the number of approved measures 
for secret intelligence collection are not available to public, representatives of 
the judiciary underline that due to organised crime, issuing licences for use of 
specific evidence procedures are more frequent in Serbia rather than in other 
countries.275 Due to inadequate capacity, during the period of observation, the 
judiciary was not able to keep and destroy gathered data, and it was left instead 
in the Ministry’s possession. 
The judiciary uses forms of control sporadically, although the situation is 
much better than before 2000. The training and professional development cur-
ricula for prosecutors and judges should be directed at improving knowledge 
of control over security sector actors. In particular, reports from the courts and 
public prosecution offices should provide information on specific types of con-
trol over police work, including information that indicates difficulties encoun-
tered while executing this control. This information should be made available 
to the public. 
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
274 Bogoljub Milosavljević, ‘Ovlašćenja policije i drugih državnih organa za tajno prikupljanje 
podataka’, in Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih ovlašćenja, Eds. Miroslav Hadžić and 
Predrag Petrović. (Belgrade, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 59–76. 
275 Dragan Jovanović, “Posebna prava i ovlašćenja koje primenjuje policija”, in Demokratski 
nadzor nad primenom posebnih ovlašćenja, Eds. Miroslav Hadžić and Predrag Petrović. (Belgrade, 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 85–97. 
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Public control and oversight      
During the period of observation, legislation defining external control and 
oversight over police work was adopted. The following institutions were also 
established; the Commissioner for Free Access to Information and Protection 
of Personal Data, the Protector of citizens, the State Audit Institution, and the 
Commission for Preventing Conflict of Interest in Performance of Public Func-
tions. To date, only the Commissioner for Free Access to Information of Public 
Importance and the Ombudsman have exercised control and oversight over 
the MoI. Their recommendations and conclusions were broadly received by the 
public. However, they were not fully implemented due to a lack of enforcement 
capabilities. It is expected that through amendments to relevant legislation 
the conditions for efficient work will be created in the near future and that the 
above institutions will have adequate resources and working conditions. The 
control that these institutions exercise should be particularly strengthened in 
the areas of personal data protection and financial management in the MoI.
Average grade: 3 (three)
RULE OF LAW
State of Law (Rechtsstaat)
Detailed analysis of the legal framework of police organisation and work is giv-
en in the chapter by Bogoljub Milosavljević in this publication.276 As the chapter 
indicates, most of the laws and by-laws which regulate police work are not har-
monised with the 2006 Serbian Constitution, and many of them date back to 
the period before the beginning of reforms in 2001. In order to fully implement 
police reform it is essential to harmonise the legal framework with the consti-
tution and ratified international agreements (formal legislative harmonisation), 
as well as with the goals of police reform and commitments stemming from 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (articles 80–87), including regional 
cooperation commitments (substantial harmonisation). To achieve this in the 
most efficient way, the government should adopt a plan to harmonise legisla-
tion relevant for the MoI. One idea that should receive particular attention is 
taking some administrative responsibilities from the MoI and giving them to 
other ministries and public authority bodies.     
Average grade: 3 (three)
276 Bogoljub Milosavljević, ‘Legal Framework of Police Work’.
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Protection of human rights
Protection of human rights of citizens and employees in the MoI has improved 
significantly since 2000 when human rights were systematically violated. The 
legal preconditions for the protection of human rights were established by the 
Law on police, the Code of police ethics and other by-laws. They are, to the great 
extent, harmonised with international standards of protection of human rights, 
apart from areas which regulate access to information of public importance, 
secrecy of data and protection of personal data. As part of a thorough revi-
sion of laws and by-laws which regulate the police, particular attention should 
be given to human rights. There should be verification of the extent to which 
the legislation is harmonised with international regulations which Serbia has 
signed. It is essential to fully implement the recommendations and conclusions 
of reports by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the UN 
Committee against Torture. The government should provide resources to im-
prove the situation in detention units and in interrogation rooms. As Bogoljub 
Milosavljević points out in his paper, during the revision process, particular at-
tention should be paid to internal police enactments (internal instructions and 
directives). These regulations are adopted by the Minister of Interior and are not 
published. The majority are classified documents. Since they frequently affect 
police officers’ work directly, it is very important to have some form of control 
over content. Therefore external actors should have access to these documents 
so that they can judge if they are harmonised with the goals of police reform, 
and with the constitution and the law.
Protections of human rights, non-discriminatory policing and relevant 
documents have been introduced into basic police training and annual profes-
sional development programmes for of all MoI staff. However, only a few hours 
are designated for these topics. The greatest progress, in particular concerning 
excessive use of force, was accomplished with the establishment of the Inter-
nal Control Sector and the publication of the procedures for filing complaints 
against the police. The Law on police calls for the MoI to submit a report once a 
year containing information on the number of cases in which the use of coercive 
means was unjustified or unlawful, and that it should be available to the public. 
In the last two years, since the management of Internal Affairs was dismissed, 
information on the number of complaints against the police and cases where 
force is used have rarely been published and they are more difficult to find on 
the MoI website. The least progress was achieved in the protection of collective 
rights, for instance in the official use of minority languages, as well as in privacy 
rights. Some of the documents on citizens’ rights, such as the Code of police eth-
ics, the brochure on filing complaints (or commendations) against the police and 
application calls for basic police training, have been translated into the minority 
languages. Still, the police buys technical equipment adjusted only to the Cyrillic 
alphabet, and in many places documents are not issued in minority languages.   
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Chart 11: Non-discriminatory policing277
Moreover, international and local civil society organisations draw attention 
to cases of brutality as well as to inappropriate conditions in detention units.278 
The Report of the delegation of the European Committee for the prevention of tor-
ture stated that the delegation was aware of cases of verbal and physical har-
assment, especially during suspect interrogation. In some police stations base-
ball bats and metal bars were also found in prominent places.279 The Belgrade 
Centre for Human Rights states in its report on human rights in Serbia that the 
police often accuses victims it has tortured of obstructing police work (counter-
accusations). As a result, parallel cases sometimes take place in the courts.280 
Cases against police officers very rarely result in a conviction, and if a verdict 
is reached, in most cases it is not enforced. In the larger cities there has been a 
clear improvement in respect to human rights, but in smaller communities the 
police is still untouchable.
In spite of the introduction of many new formal standards, the legacy of 
reactive and oppressive standards of conduct is likely to last for some time be-
cause of informal socialisation in police culture. Changes, such as those in the 
concept of police training and the introduction of democratic police ethics and 
277 Strategic Marketing Research (November 2008), Public Perception Survey on Police Reforms 
(for the OSCE Mission in Serbia). Available at http://www.mup.gov.rs  
278 See: Ana Jerosimić, Ed., Ljudska prava u Srbiji u 2007. godini (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights, 2007). 
279 Report to the Government of Serbia on the visit to Serbia carried out by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 19 to 29 
November 2007, 14.
280 See: Ana Jerosimić, Ed., Ljudska prava u Srbiji u 2007. godini (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights, 2007).
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standards, will take time to implement. It is even more important for manage-
ment to continuously implement new values. In practice this may require a gen-
erational change of personnel in management structures. Apart from improv-
ing protection of citizens’ rights, it is vital to improve protection of social and 
economic rights of MoI employees and to create mechanisms for the protection 
of police officers against malicious accusations.         
Average grade: 3 (three)
EFFICIENCY
One of the weakest points in police reform is the excessively centralised, po-
liticised, uneconomical and obsolete management style, which contasts with 
modern principles of material and human resource management in public ad-
ministration. Considering the funds used by the MoI, (and compared to other 
state institutions), police reform should prioritise a holistic efficiency review of 
resources (for instance, maintaining a huge number of personnel for support 
services such as the Directorate for Lodging and Catering) and introduce a sys-
tem of material and human resource management. 
human resources
A priority of the police reform should be the professional development of the 
HR Directorate to conduct the selection, promotion and career development 
of all police officers and supporting staff. This requires a complete change in 
mode of operation of the HR Directorate, the development of new procedures, 
additional training of employees and the hiring of HR experts. Then, in line with 
the strategic plan, a holistic analysis and the review of personnel is needed. As 
Table 20 shows, the number of classified and occupied positions in the MoI has 
varied significantly during the past few years. Reports submitted by the MoI to 
parliament show stable trends with regard to the lack of interest in police ca-
reers in Belgrade, Pozarevac and some towns in Vojvodina, but also the lack of 
engineers, law graduates, psychologists and other professions. This is why it is 
worth offering scholarships to undergraduate and graduate students of various 
profiles, as this would help fill some of the specialists vacancies needed by the 
police. A system of accelerated promotion for talented individuals should also 
be introduced, and also the possibility of allowing individuals to conduct their 
military service in the police. On the other hand, some of the organisational 
units of the MoI, such as the Directorate for Catering and Accommodation, are 
over-staffed. Some of regional police districts have achieved equal or better re-
sults with a smaller number of staff then other districts with more staff mem-
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bers (when comparing municipalities of similar size and levels of policing). The 
review of human resources could help to remedy these imbalances and define 
the educational profiles required for specific positions, including the identifi-
cation of redundant jobs. The review should lead to changes in how jobs are 
classified. The conclusions should be used to develop appropriate social pro-
grammea and financial resources to reduce employee numbers. Furthermore, 
an independent review should be conducted on salary structures in the MoI 
and new salary grades established. 
Provisions within the Law on Police which are not in line with modern ca-
reer development principles should be reconsidered. Currently, the primary 
precondition for promotion is number of years in service.281 All management 
and command positions should be filled through an open competitive process, 
and not through appointments and lobbying. Promotion should be based on 
merit and should be conditioned by successful completion of management 
courses. Different training packages should be developed for lower, mid and 
senior management levels. Furthermore, in order to achieve similar levels of 
knowledge and skills across the MoI, it is crucial to standardise specialised train-
ing for employees in different lines of work. The mechanisms of efficient co-
ordination and standardisation of specialised training should be put in place 
by the Directorate for police education, training, professional development and 
science. This Directorate would co-operate closely with other organisational 
units and the Directorate for Human Resources. Standardisation of specialised 
training should contribute to cost-effective implementation and, at the same 
time, leave sufficient capacity for specialised topics required by staff from differ-
ent organisational units of the MoI.         
Average grade: 2 (two)
Material resources
During the observed period, considerable funds from the state budget, the Na-
tional Investment Plan, as well as donations from international partners were 
spent on modern equipment. Forensics, serious crime, organised crime teams, 
as well as communications and IT systems have benefitted to a certain extent. 
With the assistance of international organisations and partners, regional foren-
sics centres were established in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Nis, including DNA and 
biological expertise laboratories. New equipment for issuing personal identifi-
cation documents was obtained, including an automated fingerprint identifica-
281 The Law on police envisages promotion without competition if the incumbent had posi-
tive performance appraisal over the past two years, which means pass grade 2 (satisfactory), 3 
(good), 4 (very good) or 5  (excellent).
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tion system (AFIS) and a face identification system (FIS), and also equipment 
for the development of a digital radio network in line with TETRA standards. 
Given technical and technological developments and the fact that criminals 
have more and more sophisticated technologies, the MoI needs to invest in new 
and existing equipment. It is assumed that the largest investment in the next 
few years will be in the border police, in order to meet the requirements of the 
Schengen Agreement. The first step is a review and assessment of new needs.
Experts and other state bodies should participate in analysing the costs of 
modernisation (IT, communication and other equipment). This analysis should 
indicate the mid-term and long-term consequences of procurement of particular 
equipment, help avoid over-reliance on one manufacturer and ensure compati-
bility with other communication and IT systems in public administration in Serbia.
The development of functional crime intelligence analytics in the police 
should be of primary importance and should be available to all operational 
units. This change would facilitate intelligence-led policing. A comprehensive 
critical review should be conducted in line with predefined efficiency criteria, 
focusing on methods of gathering, storing and retrieving information on the 
current and future costs of this investment.       
Average grade: 3 (three)
EFFECTIVENESS
Integratedness of System
There are many areas where the MoI’s jurisdiction overlaps with other security 
sector bodies. This includes the response to emergency situations and the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime. Adoption of a National Security Strategy 
and Constitutional amendments should clarify the jurisdiction (role) of various 
state bodies in the implementation of security policy. The strategy of the MoI 
should be harmonised with the National Security Strategy as well as other stra-
tegic government documents, such is the Strategy for Accession of Serbia and 
Montenegro to the EU. 
The current management system needs to change in order to improve co-
operation with other state bodies. This system is characterised by centralised 
decision-making and micro-management processes (interference in day-to-day 
management). Most police services have a clear hierarchical structure. However 
if the vertical lines of responsibility are highlighted (with a small number of de-
cision-makers on the top) the development of the horizontal lines of communi-
cation and coordination of different MoI units would be prevented. The mecha-
nisms for horizontal cooperation within the MoI need to be strengthened, cou-
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pled with improved internal information flow systems, as well as through more 
significant de-concentration282 of decision-making. Changes in management 
sytle are preconditions for improving communication and coordination of MoI 
units with other state authorities. Representatives from other ministries com-
mended the MoI for being more open for cooperation compared to the 1990s. At 
the same time, they criticised the Ministry for failing to initiate partnerships with 
other bodies in the state administration as well as with civil society organisations. 
Over the next few years, the MoI management needs to support the es-
tablishment of mechanisms for horizontal cooperation with other state bodies 
on the development of joint policy and legislative proposals, as well as mecha-
nisms of operational cooperation (in particular with those bodies that are not 
part of the National Security Council). 
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
Legitimacy
The police reforms instituted to date have contributed to an increase in public 
trust in the police. However, distrust still prevails. According to the survey con-
ducted by Strategic Marketing at the end of 2008, 28 per cent of citizens have 
a positive opinion about the police, compared to 30 per cent with a negative 
one. This places the police among the most trusted institutions, though against 
a general context of poor trust in institutions.283 Public opinion of the police is 
more positive than for the MoI: 23 per cent of citizens have a positive opinion, 
while 32 per cent have a negative one. Approximately half of citizens consider 
the police to be estranged from them, while the other half considers that they 
are close to the citizens (Chart 10). According to what the public associates with 
the police and police officers, it is clear that there are more positive and neutral 
than negative associations. As mentioned, the vast majority of citizens still be-
lieve the police is politicised, serving government and political interests rather 
than those of the public. The Serbian government needs to ensure police neu-
trality and to promote the police as a public service. For this to happen, certain 
procedures within the MoI need to change, such as the attitude of political lead-
282 De-concentration is a process managed by central government, or in this case the Ministry 
HQ. Certain decision making competencies are delegated to lower levels of management within 
the hierarchy of the MoI, e.g. to the managers/heads of police districts. De-concentration entails 
keeping the hierarchy of decision-making and accountability at the Ministry HQ, while at the 
same time it allows a larger number of day-to-day decisions to be made at the lower level of 
management, in consultation with the public. Unlike de-concentration, decentralisation entails 
the transfer of competencies to directly elected bodies or individuals, e.g. to Municipal Councils 
or the heads of police districts that would be directly elected, such as sheriffs in the USA. 
283 Only the church, army and education system have higher percentages of trust than distrust.
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ership in public appearances. There needs to be regular monitoring public opin-
ion concerning the politicisation of the police. Certain civil society groups, in 
particular, young urban society and members of certain national minorities, do 
not have sufficient trust in the police due to past discriminatory treatments and 
inadequate communication systems. The Ministry of Interior should develop 
creative methods to increase trust among groups with the least trust in police 
work. It should develop campaigns aimed at these target groups and cooperate 
with CSOs, as well as with the education system and local communities. 
Chart 12: Trust in police from 2000 to 2008284
Chart  13: How close / estanged are the police from the public
284 The chart shows the results of a survey conducted by the Centre for Political Studies and 
Public Opinion Research of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade (http://www.idn.org.yu). 
Survey conducted in 2008 was done by Strategic Marketing and was commissioned by the OSCE 
Mission to Serbia.
197Chart 14: Perception of police and MoI in relation to other institutions
Average grade: 3 (three)
Table 21: First associations regarding the police
198
Chart 15: Perception of police officers
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Ratio between Aims, Resources and Outcomes 
Based on analysis of public opinion published at the end of 2008, citizens 
believe that the police are the most efficient means of maintaining public peace 
and order, and the least efficient in combating organised crime and resolving 
cases of journalists’ murders. The charts illustrate public opinion about current 
and desired priorities for police reform. They indicate that citizens would like 
the police to invest more resources in combating corruption, maintaining pub-
lic peace and order at the local level, in depoliticisation and the setting up of a 
control system within the police. 
The main obstacle to greater efficiency in the MoI is a lack of consensus on 
key police reform priorities, as well as a lack of clarification of priorities in the 
strategic plan of the MoI. It is necessary to adopt a mid-term MoI strategy that 
clarifies reform priorities for a three to five year period. The MoI strategy should 
be harmonised with the MoI’s annual plan, as well as with other strategies under 
the jurisdiction of the MoI and the state budget. When developing a strategy, it 
is important to define measurable success indicators that can be used for moni-
toring progress. Similiarly there needs to be agreement about the frequency 
Chart 16: How do citizens evaluate police efficiency?
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of publishing key indicators of success. Areas in need of particular attention 
should be highlighted. Training should be provided to enable staff employed 
in the Bureau for Strategic Planning in the Minister’s Cabinet, as well as sen-
ior analysts working in the police districts, to participate in strategic planning 
and updating of documents. Strategic planning skills need to be incorporated 
in management training courses. More efficient police performance can be en-
couraged through the development of analytical capacities in all organisational 
units, and especially in the Analytics Directorate within the General Police Di-
rectorate, as well as the capacities for the criminal operational analytics. This 
can ensure more proactive and knowledge-based policing. The possibility of 
transferring administrative work (such as issuing IDs and personal documents) 
to the Ministry for Public Administration and Local Self-Government should be 
considered, as this would decrease the scope of non-police work of the MoI.
A strengthening of the capacities of the Bureau for Strategic Planning in the 
Minister’s Cabinet or the establishment of a separate unit for evaluation of ef-
ficiency within the MoI is a prerequisite for regular control and oversight of the 
work of the MoI and police organisational units. At present, (in principle) it is the 
role of managers of different units and of the Analytics Directorate to prepares 
different statistical analysis of how the various organisational units perform in 
combating different forms of crime. An control and oversight unit is also need-
ed in order to identify performance productivity problems, to analyse and con-
trol work processes and to ensure the enhancement of systems and methods of 
performance organisation. This unit would be in charge of periodical perform-
ance assessments, particularly in terms of efficiency, cost effectiveness and op-
timal organisation of work. Such data can highlight instances of poor efficiency 
and dysfunctionality, thus enabling damage control and prevention of waste 
of resources. The MoI and police activity reports submitted to the state control 
and oversight bodies should include data that enables a reliable assessment of 
efficiency and effectiveness.
Average grade: 2 (two)
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Graph 3: What should be the priorities of police reform? 
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2.1 Legal framework of 
police work
Bogoljub Milosavljević
The organisation and remit of the police are regulated by a number of laws 
and by-laws. Only a portion of these regulations have been enacted since 2001 
(when police reform in Serbia began), and out of those only a few are harmo-
nised with the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia adopted in 2006 
(hereinafter: the Constitution). The majority of the remaining regulations date 
from before 2001 and they are still not harmonised with the Constitution and 
with the aims of police reform.
This chapter gives a brief overview of the legal and political context of police 
reform (I). It then provides a brief overview of regulations relating to the organi-
sation and remit of the police (II). It also indicates the regulations through which 
the legal facet of policing extends to other areas such as services (III). Finally, the 
chapter highlights the main challenges facing police reform in Serbia (IV).
I. Legal and Political Context
The reform of legislation relating to the organisation and remit of the police has 
developed within a wider legal and political context consisting of: 1. the Con-
stitution; 2. Ratified international agreements, including the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (chapter VII: Justice, freedom and security), as well as 
the other international legal and political documents dealing with standards of 
human rights in policing, and; 3. The government’s strategic directions in police 
reform. Although the government did not adopt a separate strategy for police 
reform, there is a number of strategic government documents relating to police 
reform (such as the National strategy against money laundering and financing of 
terrorism and the Regulatory reform strategy of the republic of Serbia for the period 
2008-2011).
II. A brief overview of regulations related to 
organisation and remit of the police
Regulations on the organisation and remit of the police can be divided into the 
following groups: 1. Regulations on police organisation; 2. Internal affairs regu-
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lations which are directly enforced by the police or which are overseen by the 
police; 3. Regulations on certain powers, tasks and methods of police work, and; 
4. Regulations that stipulate the control of police work and the conditions for 
the transparency of its work. 
(1) Regulations on police organisation
1.1. The Law on police (2005) is supported by sixteen by-laws (adopted in 
2006 and 2007). There are six other by-laws adopted on the basis of the previous 
Law on internal affairs. These six by-laws should be harmonised with the Law on 
police. Furthermore, the Law on police should be formally harmonised with the 
Constitution.
1.2. The remit of the Ministry of Interior is regulated by the Law on ministries 
(2008), and civil servant regulations apply to the police in a subsidiary manner 
(i.e. they apply to issues not regulated by the Law on police). For issues that are 
not regulated by the Law on civil servants, provisions of the Labour Law apply. 
Since the police is a public administration body, the Law on public administra-
tion (as well as other regulations related to public administration bodies and 
their obligations towards the government) apply. The Law on general adminis-
trative procedure applies to its administrative procedures (apart from in certain 
administrative areas which are regulated by separate procedure regulations).
1.3. The police has its own internal regulations which stipulate issues impor-
tant for police work (internal instructions and guidelines). These regulations are 
endorsed by the Minister of Interior and are not published. Most of them are 
classified documents. Since they often directly influence police performance, it 
is very important that there is some kind of control of their content. However, 
these regulations usually escape the usual mechanisms of external control and 
oversight. Hence, without external insight into their contents, it is impossible to 
evaluate the level of harmonisation with the aims of police reform or with the 
Constitution and the law.
(2) Internal affairs regulations which are directly enforced by the police 
or which are overseen by the police
This group covers a substantial number of regulations which are enforced 
or whose enforcement is being overseen by an internal affairs authority, i.e. 
within the scope of the Ministry of Interior’s work. One part of this group of 
regulations (especially those of an administrative nature) could be enforced by 
other administrative bodies. This was one idea considered during the process 
of conceptualising police reform. However, no significant developments in this 
regard have occurred to date and almost all the regulations that determine the 
competencies of internal affairs authorities are listed below. The list comprises 
19 laws and 55 by-laws:
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 2.1. Law on public peace and order (1992, with amendments)
 2.2. Law on public assembly (1992, with amendments)
 2.3. Law on prevention of violence and hooliganism at sports events 
(2003, with amendments)
 2.3. Law on basic organisation of road traffic safety (1988, with amend-
ments) and ten by-laws; Law on road traffic safety (1974, with amendments) and 
eight by-laws
 2.4. Law on protection of state borders (2008) and four by-laws
 2.5. Law on foreigners (2008) and two by-laws; Law on asylum (2007) 
and five by-laws
 2.6. Law on firearms and ammunition (1992, with amendments) and 
three by-laws
 2.7. Law on transport of explosive materials (1985, with amendments); 
Law on transport of hazardous materials (1990, with amendments) and four 
by-laws; Law on explosive materials, inflammable liquids and gases (1977, with 
amendments) and one by-law.
 2.8. Law on fire protection (1988, with amendments) and eight by-laws
 2.9. Law on citizenship of the Republic of Serbia (2004, with amend-
ments) and three by-laws
 2.10. Law on permanent and temporary residence of citizens (1971, 
with amendments) and one by-law
 2.11. Law on introduction of unique identity number of a citizen (1976) 
and two by-laws; Law on unique identity number of a citizen (1978, with amend-
ments) and one by-law
 2.12. Law on identity cards (2006) and two by-laws
 2.13. Law on travel documents (2007) and two by-laws 
As can be seen from the above list, 14 out of the 19 laws date from before 
the adoption of the Constitution, meaning that they need to be harmonised 
with the Constitution. Some of the laws date back to the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (when competencies 
were divided between republic and federation levels). These laws are often used 
to highlight the failure to create a suitable framework for efficient police per-
formance or successful fulfilment of security interests (especially in areas such 
as road traffic safety, public peace and order, firearms and ammunition, as well 
as fire protection). There are issues that are not yet encompassed by this group 
of laws, such as the private security sector.
 
(3) Regulations on specific police powers, tasks and methods of work 
3.1. Specific police powers, tasks and methods of work are covered by the 
Criminal procedure code (2001 and 2006) and the Law on misdemeanours (1989 
and 2005). The former regulates the powers of the police in pre-investigative 
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procedures, such as information gathering, arrest and detention of suspects, es-
tablishing individuals’ identity, securing evidence, temporary seizure of objects, 
searches of property and  individuals, suspect interviews and data gathering 
through special investigative measures (e.g. wiretapping), as well as obligations 
of the police towards the prosecution and judicial authorities. The Law on misde-
meanours regulates the powers of the police related to the filing of misdemean-
our charges and evidence gathering. It covers initial misdemeanour proceed-
ings and the issuing the mandatory fines, as well as the obligations of the police 
towards the misdemeanour procedure authorities.     
3.2. There are a number of special laws which regulate police powers, tasks 
and methods of work, including how the police is organised to conduct spe-
cial tasks, such as organised crime (the Law on organisation and competencies of 
public authorities in the suppression of organised crime, 2002, with amendments), 
cyber-crime (the Law on organisation and competencies of public authorities for 
fight against cyber-crime, 2005) and war crimes (the Law on organisation and 
competencies of public authorities in war crimes procedures, 2003, with amend-
ments). Furthermore, the Law on the protection programme for participants in 
criminal proceedings (2005) and the Law on seizure of proceeds of crime (2008) 
establish and define the roles of special organisational units within the Ministry 
of Interior. 
3.3. The Ministry of Interior (the police) has specific duties when implement-
ing ratified international agreements which refer to cross-border organised 
crime and terrorism. The Ministry is the focal point for many established forms 
of international cooperation such as visas, border control, asylum and migra-
tion, prevention and control of illegal migration, suppression of money launder-
ing and financing of terrorism, suppression of illicit drugs, as well as the fight 
against organised crime and terrorism. Some of these are not yet regulated by 
national legislation, which is one of the preconditions for Serbia’s membership 
of the ‘white’ Schengen List.   
(4) Regulations on external control of the police and conditions for 
transparency
 
4.1. External control of the police is covered by the Rules of procedure of par-
liament, the Law on government and the rules of procedure of the government, as 
well as the Law on the protection of citizens (2005, with amendments). Similarly, 
control of police work is covered by procedure laws which enable the prosecu-
tion and the courts to conduct the ex ante control. There are also regulations 
that allow for legal means and procedures within ex post control of police work 
(appeals procedures, court protection and compensation of damages before 
the regular courts, as well as the constitutional appeal before the Constitutional 
Court)  
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4.2. The regulations that ensure conditions for transparency in the police 
are the same as those which refer to the entire public administration and other 
public authority bodies; the Law on free access to information of public impor-
tance (2004, with amendments), the Law on prevention of conflict of interest in 
the discharge of public office (2004), the Law on protection of personal data (2008), 
the Law on the supreme audit institution, and the Law on public procurement (the 
latter governs the extent to which police procurements are not exempt from 
general public procurement regimes).    
III. Regulations covering the policing of other 
areas, such as services
Reform of police legislation is objectively more important than reform of the 
police itself. The application of laws (and in some cases by-laws) which deter-
mine police competences and the regime of policing, extend to other parts of 
the state apparatus. In such cases, by improving the quality of police legislation 
there will be wider impact on the legal framework for other state bodies and 
services to which the legal regime of policing affairs applies. This relates to the 
following bodies and services:
1.1. The Law on the Armed Forces of Serbia (2007) prescribes that authorised 
Military Police personnel have commitments and competencies stipulated by 
the law regulating criminal procedures towards employees of the Ministry of 
Defence and members of the Armed Forces of Serbia, and within the criminal 
investigation activities, the law regulating police work, as well as the regulations 
based on that law.
1.2. The Law on security intelligence agency (2002) stipulates the manner in 
which regulations relating to competencies, as well as regulations on rights, re-
sponsibilities and obligations of police officers are applied to members of the 
agency. 
1.3. The Law on intelligence services of the FRY (2002), which applies to two 
military services (the Military Security Agency and the Military Intelligence 
Agency), also stipulates that in pre-investigative proceedings these services 
have police competences (those of the internal affairs bodies). 
1.4. The Customs Law prescribes that authorised customs officers have the 
right to carry firearms and ammunition, as well as the right to use arms under 
the same conditions and in the same manner prescribed for authorised police 
officers. The Law on tax procedure and tax administration (2002, with amend-
ments) prescribes that the Tax Police has authority to act as an internal affairs 
body in pre-investigative proceedings in order to tackle tax-related crime and 
tax offenders. 
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1.5. Although judicial and prison administration competencies are regulat-
ed by separate laws (the Law on organisation of courts and the Law on execution 
of penitentiary sanctions), regulations that relate to means of coercion are similar 
to those used by the police. 
IV. Challenges
Changes in the legal framework of the police have been implemented only 
partly, and the greatest progress has been made with the new Law on police, 
as well as with the the Law on protection of state borders, Law on foreigners, Law 
on asylum and Law on travel documents. However, the legal framework of the 
police reform needs further harmonisation. This should be based on two funda-
mental conditions. First, harmonisation with the Constitution and ratified inter-
national agreements (formal and legal harmonisation). Second, harmonisation 
with wider aims of police reform, obligations stemming from the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (Articles 80 – 87), as well as obligations undertaken 
within the framework of regional cooperation (material harmonisation). Both 
conditions could be fulfilled simultaneously. A plan should be developed by the 
Ministry of Interior and adopted by the government. The Ministry of Interior 
should receive expert assistance in preparation of new legislation. Particular at-
tention should be given to moving some administrative tasks from the Ministry 
of Interior  to other ministries or administrative bodies.  
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3. Security-Intelligence 
Services in the 
Republic of Serbia
Bogoljub Milosavljević 
and Predrag Petrović
The Security-intelligence services (hence the intelligence services) are among 
the most important executive actors in any national security systems. In this 
chapter the term intelligence services denotes only specialised civilian and mili-
tary organisations with security-intelligence functions, established within the 
state apparatus and operating under government control. Intelligence serv-
ices should, first of all, provide state bodies with timely, relevant and precise 
information. They should protect the constitutional order and national interests 
against penetration by foreign intelligence services and activities of organised 
criminal and terrorist groups. They are authorised to collect information from 
public sources, and can use secret methods, techniques and means.285 
There are three organisations in Serbia with these responsibilities; the Secu-
rity-Information Agency (SIA), the Military Security Agency (MSA) and the Mili-
tary Intelligence Agency (MoI). The SIA is directly subordinated to the govern-
ment and has the status of a special republic organisation, while both the MSA 
and MoI are organisational units (administrative bodies) within the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) subordinated to the defence minister, and thus also to the gov-
ernment.
The functions of the intelligence services are specified by positive legal 
regulations286 and include the usual intelligence activities: 1. The collection and 
analysis of data relevant for national security, defence and protection of eco-
285 Reconciling the secrecy needs of intelligence services with the fundamental tenets of democ-
racy is an important question. In order words, how can this secrecy be reconciled with transpar-
ency of state institutions. Bogoljub Milosavljević has thus labelled intelligence services as “social 
dynamite in democratic society.” See ‘Reforme obaveštajno-bezbednosnih službi: slučaj Srbije,” 
[Reforms of Security-Intelligence Services: The Case of Serbia] in Prva škola reforme sektora 
bezbednosti: zbornik predavanja, ed. Pavle Janković. (Beograd: Centar za proučavanje odbrane i 
bezbednosti, G17 Institut, 2003), 95.
286 See: Zakon o osnovama uređenja službi bezbednosti Republike Srbije [Law on the basic organi-
sation of the security and intelligence system of the RS], Službeni glasnik RS, No. 116/07; Zakon 
o Bezbednosno-informativnoj agenciji [Law on the Security Intelligence Agency], Službeni glasnik 
RS, No. 42/02; Zakon o službama bezbednosti Savezne Republike Jugoslavije [Law on the security 
services of the FRY], Službeni list SRJ, No. 37/02 and Službeni list SCG, No. 17/04. 
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nomic, foreign policy and other interests of the country, and: 2. Submission of 
this information to political decision-makers, law-enforcement and other com-
petent state bodies. In addition, the SIA and MSA also have specific security tasks 
aimed at uncovering, preventing and documenting threats to the constitutional 
order, national security and democratic values in society. This primarily refers 
to terrorist activities and armed rebellions, forms of organised crime, criminal 
offences against the constitutional order and state security, crimes against hu-
manity and other goods protected by international law and crimes against the 
Serbian Armed Forces. The SIA and MSA also engage in counter-intelligence to 
uncover (and prevent) the activities of foreign intelligence services and protect 
domestic institutions. None of the intelligence services has legal powers to plan 
or carry out secret operations abroad, for the purpose of achieving Serbia’s for-
eign-policy objectives or protecting the country’s national interests. Likewise, 
they have no control over domestic political and ideological dissent, although 
under the communist regime and during the 1990s the intelligence services 
had the hallmarks of a political police.
There are strong links between the intelligence services and other executive 
actors, especially the military and the police. Close and efficient cooperation is 
a precondition for the successful functioning of security-intelligence systems in 
all countries. The security competences of intelligence service may overlap with 
those of the police and military security bodies. There have been several cases 
over the past few years of conflicts of jurisdiction between the intelligence serv-
ices and the police. In these cases, the intelligence services assumed a leading 
role, or rather, succeeded in imposing their objectives over and above those of 
routine police-security operations. Since the police operations are undertaken 
for the purpose of law enforcement, these cases suggest that law enforcement 
was subordinated to higher national security interests which were unknown to 
the public. This damages (already weak) public trust in the rule of law and blurs 
the lines of responsibility of security sector actors. 
In addition, until mid-2006, the military and civilian intelligence services 
were seemingly in competition with one another in the fulfilment of their roles. 
This was due to the absence of a state mechanism to coordinate operations, as 
well as the fact that military intelligence services acted as bodies of the FRY/
SaM, in contrast to civilian services organised at the republican level.  
Intelligence services in Serbia originate from similar institutions created 
immediately after the end of the Second World War in socialist Yugoslavia (the 
SFRY, or ‘the second Yugoslavia’, 1945-1992). Their organisational and func-
tional continuity was preserved during the existence of the joint state of Ser-
bia and Montenegro (FRY and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, or 
the so-called third Yugoslavia, 1992-2006). This project analyses whether this 
continuity has been retained and the position and role of Serbia’s intelligence 
services today. In this respect, we note the general public impression in Serbia 
that against the background of its historical position and role within Yugoslav 
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society as a whole, the intelligence services still represent an extremely power-
ful and influential actor in the entire security sector, but one which is the least 
controlled.287 Namely, the decades-long survival of authoritarian regimes on Yu-
goslav territory resulted in the submission of the state and national interests in 
favour of those of the ruling group. Therefore, the main task of the intelligence 
services was to protect the interests of those in power. They persecuted political 
dissenters and critics of the regime, functioning primarily as a political police. 
The intelligence services retained that role until the democratic changes in Oc-
tober 2000. Text box 2 describes the legacy that confronted reformers of the 
security services, as well as accomplished results. It also proposes measures for 
the further improvement.
 Origins of the Serbian Security Services 
The origins of the present day intelligence services in Serbia go back to 
the Kingdom of Serbia and its Department for Confidential Police Work 
(secret police), which was formed on 17. October 1899. That date is cel-
ebrated as SIA’s day since 2001. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia had a Military 
Intelligence Service, Counter-Intelligence Service and a Cipher De-
partment within the Army and Naval Ministry, along with a Directorate 
for National Security within the Ministry of the Interior. The Directorate 
had a political department (charged with suppressing the activities of the 
regime’s political opponents), a counter-intelligence department and a 
special security department (for registering individuals important for na-
tional security).
In 1942 the Partisans formed the Second (Intelligence) Section at the 
Supreme Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army, with ‘intelligence 
commissioners’ as staff within operational units. The first institutions 
with the markings of an intelligence-security service was established 
on 13 May 1944 under the name of the Office for Protection of People 
(OZNA). This day was celebrated as the ‘Day of Security’, (day of the secu-
rity services and police) until 2001. The The State Security Department 
(UDBA) was formed in 1946 from parts of the OZNA, the Radio Centre 
and the Cipher Group of the Ministry of National Defence. The State Se-
curity Administration was a federal institution, with appropriate bodies in 
republic ministries (secretariats) of internal affairs, directing the work of 
district departments. After the Brioni Party Plenum in 1966, the UDBA was 
transformed into the State Security Service (SDB), a federal institution 
attached to the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, which coordinated 
the work of security services within republic secretariats for internal af-
287 This moment kept resurfacing after 2000, whenever a new government was formed, espe-
cially in the form of a protracted ‘bargaining’ of coalition partners about the person at the head 
the Security-Intelligence Agency. 
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fairs.288 Independence of the republic services from the federal SDB was fi-
nally accomplished by the SFRY Constitution adopted in 1974. The federal 
SDB ceased to exist in early 1992.
The Military Intelligence Service emerged out of the Second (intel-
ligence) section of the Supreme Headquarters of the People’s Liberation 
Army and functioned under the name of the Second Administration of 
the Yugoslav Army General Staff, and later the Yugoslav People’s Army. 
For a time, it was called Intelligence Administration. In 2002 it was first 
renamed the Military Intelligence Service by the Law on the FRY Security 
Services, and in 2003 it became the Military Intelligence Agency (MoI).
The second military security service – the MSA - was formed in 1946 
from parts of OZNA. It was known as the Counter-Intelligence Service of 
the Yugoslav Army. In 1955 it was renamed the Security Administration, 
known as the XII Administration of the Yugoslav Army General Staff. Fol-
lowing the adoption of the Law on the FRY Security Services (2002) it was 
reorganised and renamed initially as the Military Security Service and 
then in November 2003, as the Military Security Agency.
Outline of the inherited situation
The political regime determined the role and tasks of the intelligence services 
in the SFRY. The undisputed rule of the Communist party ensured that the main 
interest of the national security system was the protection of party’s monopoly 
of power. As an important prop for the regime, the intelligence services had a 
privileged status. Individuals loyal to the party elite held leading positions both 
in the intelligence services and in a series of large, mostly trade, enterprises set 
up to provide substantial funds for the financing of these services’ operations. 
They were accountable only to the ruling elite. As a secret police, they protected 
the regime from its dissenting citizens. Although a complete study of their op-
erations has not yet been carried out, it is assumed that they compiled about 
400,000 files of political dissenters in Serbia alone.289 They also used violence 
against their own citizens and are suspected of murdering 200 emigrants.290
In common with similar authoritarian regimes, the Intelligence services had 
288 For more on the history of security-intelligence services in Serbia see the SIA web page, ‘His-
tory – Background of Inteligence-Security Systems in the Territory of Serbia’, http://www.bia.gov.
rs/istorijat.htm.
289 Quoted in, Bogoljub Milosavljević, ‘Reforms of Security-Intelligence Services: The Case of 
Serbia’, 97.
290 Ozren Žunec, ‘Democratic Control and oversight and Control Over Intelligence and Security 
Agencies’, in Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and 
Perspectives, eds. J. A. Trapins and Ph. H. Fluri. (Geneva/Belgrade: DCAF, 2003), 382.
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wide and insufficiently defined lawful powers. No legal regulations referring to 
civilian or military service were passed between 1945 and July 2002. Following 
the death of President Tito, and under pressure of the liberal wing of the party, 
the Law on the basis of the State Security System was adopted in 1984. However, 
it “addressed only commonplace (unimportant) issues, leaving the executive 
authorities and leaders of powerful services to pass their internal secret instruc-
tions regulating the entire habitual legal matter (establishment, functions, au-
thorities, organisation, operation and accountability of services).”291 Throughout 
this period the most important regulations governing the operation of these 
services were the ‘Work rules of the State Security Service’, a classified docu-
ment, passed by the minister (federal secretary) for internal affairs.292
The disintegration of the SFRY brought few changes, except that the federal 
state security service ceased to exist in 1992, and was formally disbanded in 
July 2002. Both Serbia and Montenegro had state security departments within 
their interior ministries. The newly formed state of the FRY took over two mili-
tary services from the SFRY (VOS and KOS) and two smaller services attached to 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (SID and SB). The Law on the basis of the security 
system remained in force until 2002. Although it was the only legal document, 
it had no real function in the legal system. The competences, seat and scope 
of work, as well as methods of RDB operations were still defined by secret acts, 
which is a paradox, since “a legal state cannot have secret regulations, or rather 
regulations of that kind are not part of the legal order of the state and cannot 
be binding on citizens (…) and sanctions for violations of these regulations can-
not be pronounced by the courts of law, but only by disciplinary bodies of their 
makers.”293 Moreover, the use of special investigative techniques and methods 
infringing on the constitutionally-guaranteed rights and freedoms of citizens 
(e.g. wiretapping and opening of letters) did not require court approval. The 
same applies to military intelligence services.294 This is why the security serv-
ices in the newly created FRY continued to operate without an efficient legal 
291 Milosavljević, ‘Reforms of Security-Intelligence Services: The case of Serbia’, 98.
292 The last SFRY rules of that kind were adopted in 1990. As usual, they were published in a 
secret (confidential) official gazette (Sl. list SFRJ – Poverljivo glasilo, No. 18/90). The fact that it 
was unavailable to citizens denied legality to all acts published therein. For more, see Bogoljub 
Milosavljević, ‘Ovlašćenja policije i drugih državnih organa za tajno prikupljanje podataka: 
domaći propisi i evropski standardi’, [Secret data collection powers of the police and other state 
bodies: Domestic regulations and European standards] in Demokratski nadzor nad primenom 
posebnih ovlašćenja, ur. Miroslav Hadžić i Predrag Petrović. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne 
odnose, 2008), 69–70.)
293 Bogoljub Milosavljević i Aleskandar Resanović, Državno nasilje nad građanima u 
Jugoslaviji[State Violence over Citizens in Yugoslavia] (Beograd: Centar za antiratnu akciju, 2001), 
70.
294 Zvonko Horvat, ’Reforma vojnih službi bezbednosti’, [Reform of Military Intelligence Services] 
in Zbornik predavanja sa IX Škole reforme sektora bezbednosti, ed. Pavle Janković. (Beograd: ISAC 
Fund, 2007).
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framework and democratic civilian control, even though the 1992 constitution 
proclaimed a democratic multi-party parliamentary republic, based on the prin-
ciples of the rule of law and observance of citizens’ rights and freedoms,. 
The violent disintegration of the SFRY, together with the Milošević regime 
(‘electoral authoritarianism’295), contributed to the criminalisation and militarisa-
tion of the society and state. In particular, Serbia’s role in the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina prompted the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on the FRY. 
These circumstances allowed crime to become a functional part of state and 
society, as well as in neighbouring Romania and Bulgaria.296 A dense network 
of illegal supply channels formed in response to the sanctions, turning the FRY 
into a grey (and black) economy (share of GDP as high as 50 per cent in 1994).297 
Thus, a ‘grey state’ emerged to perform all the functions which the official state 
could not. The intelligence services were an important actor in the organisation 
of these networks and operations, primarily those related to energy supplies.298 
The war also contributed to the militarisation of intelligence services. 
Namely, in 1996 a Special Operations Unit (SOU) was formed, as part of the 
Serbian Interior Ministry’s RDB until January 2002 (and then as a special Inte-
rior Ministry unit until its disbanding on 25 March 1993). The Unit’s members 
were mostly veterans of different paramilitary forces who fought on the Serbian 
side in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role this unit had in the war, 
and therefore also the involvement of the RDB in the wars on the territories 
of the former Yugoslavia, has not been clarified to date. However, there is no 
doubt that through paramilitary units, the intelligence services acted secretly 
in the Yugoslav wars. Their involvement did not present a problem “since they 
acquired the power and know-how for violent ‘crisis management’ already in 
the second Yugoslavia, using a strategy of special war, focused on the so-called 
internal enemy, devised specifically for that purpose”.299 The Milošević regime 
used both paramilitary and para-police units, to spread its power in society and 
reinforce the authoritarian base of its rule, facilitated “by the interest-based alli-
295 Dušan Pavlović, ’Srbija za vreme i nakon Miloševića’, [Serbia during and after Milošević], 
Sociološki pregled, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, (2005): 183–196.
296 For more, see: Jens Stilhoff Sorensen, ‘War as social transformation: Wealth, class, power and 
an illiberal economy in Serbia’, Civil Wars, Volume 6, Issue 4 (2003): 55–82; Misha Glenny, ‘Krimi-
nalci kao ključni ekonomski igrači’ [Criminals as key economic players], B92, http://www.b92.net/
info/intervju/index.php?nav_id=304428 (accessed on 23 January 2009).
297 For the difference between grey and black economy and the role they had in Serbia during 
1990s, see: Jens Stilhoff Sorensen, o. c.
298 The 660 kg of heroin uncovered in March 2001 in a safe leased by the RDB from the Commer-
cial Bank confirms the criminal legacy of security services. 
299 Miroslav Hadžić, ‘Moderatori nasilja – skrivena strana yu-rata’, [Moderators of Violence – The 
hidden side of the Yu-War] in Nasilno rasturanje Jugoslavije: uzroci, dinamika i posledice, ed. Miro-
slav Hadžić. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2006), 199.
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ance of political, military-police and criminal elites, cemented during the war.”300 
A particularly difficult aspect of the Serbian security services’ (primarily the 
Serbian RDB’s) legacy, was their open support for the Milošević regime during 
the 1990s. They defended a regime that had lost substantial public support, 
especially after the mid-1990s. The RDB and the police persecuted opposition 
leaders, suppressed peaceful demonstrations and beat hundreds of citizens 
who took to the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian towns. 
The consequences of the SOU’s transformation into an autocratic tool of 
the Milošević regime had still more drastic consequences. Its members, acting 
independently or together with organised criminal gangs committed many 
crimes.301 The Unit’s commander, Milorad ‘Legija’ Ulemek, some of its officers 
and members, and even the then RDB head Radomir Marković, were various-
ly sentenced by the courts for several political assassinations. The were found 
quilty of the abduction and murder of the former Serbian Presidency head Ivan 
Stambolić in August 2000, the murder of four high officials of the opposition-
al Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) on the Ibar highway in October 1999302 
and the attempted assassination of the SRM leader Vuk Drašković in Budva in 
June 2000. The trial for the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija in April 1999, owner of 
the paper Nedeljni Telegraf, is still ongoing.303 Despite suspicions that Milošević 
ordered these crimes, it has not been proven in court. Still, the sentences show 
how the political leadership of the state transformed the security services from 
protectors of the national interest and promoters of the security of society and 
the state, into tools to deal with political dissenters.
Democratic changes and politicisation of reforms
After the changes of October 2000, Serbia made initial steps away from au-
thoritarianism and patriarchal political culture. It also started reforms of the 
quasi-market economic system (essentially a command economy) and started 
300 Mirolsav Hadžić, „Različitost prividno istog,” [Difference of the apparently same] Centar za 
civilno-vojne odnose, http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/rec59.htm (accessed on Jan. 27, 2009).
301 For more information on the creation of JSO, as well as on ties between the leaders and indi-
vidual members of this unit with organised crime and their involvement in the organisation and 
perpetration of a number of crimes, see: Filip Švarm, ‘Jedinica’ [The Unit], B92, http://www.b92.
net/specijal/jedinica/ (accessed on Dec. 12, 2008).
302 Vuk Drašković, SOU leader said the sentencing for the Ibar highway crime was historic, 
as the first prison sentence for a head of a secret police since 1945. ‘Maksimalne kazne za 
Ibarsku’ [Maximum sentences for Ibar highway], B92, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.
php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=19&nav_id=304459 (accessed on Dec. 14, 2008)
303 The degree of violence Slobodan Milošević used against his own citizens, critics and oppo-
nents of his rule grew in parallel with the loss of his popular political support. 
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the transition towards liberal-democracy. One of the urgent tasks of the new 
democratic authorities was reform of the security sector, and in particular of 
the intelligence services. They were rightly considered by victorious DOS coali-
tion and the democratic public to be an open threat to the democratisation of 
society. This was seen as a source of fear and mistrust in the security sector by 
the majority of citizens. 
This is why new authorities proclaimed reform of state institutions in the 
Contract with the people (DOS election platform). This reform promised to give 
competent parliamentary committees access to all secret police files within a 
period of 100 days and to form an independent expert commission to examine 
and publish all relevant documents, audio and video records related to Serbia 
and Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policy in the 1987-2000 period, kept se-
cret by the former authorities. Other extremely important tasks were to define 
national interests, to prepare and adopt key documents in the security sphere 
(a national security strategy, defence strategy and doctrine), and to adopt new 
laws governing the operation and organisation of the security-intelligence sys-
tem and lustration.
However, the initial political will for reform soon abated. A series of factors 
delayed the implementation of serious reform measures for a year and a half. 
Security sector reforms typically faced resistance from within the security struc-
tures themselves, political forces from the former regime, and from sections of 
the public who considered national security to be an unquestionable category 
of power. 
On the one hand, after the October changes, the DOS coalition was in a 
position to start reforms in the military intelligence services (at the FRY level). 
To do this it needed the support of the Montenegrin political elite. However, the 
government in Montenegro was more concerned with securing independence 
for Montenegro than with improving the FRY institutions. A transitory govern-
ment in Serbia operated until the parliamentary elections of 23 December that 
year and the constitution of the national parliament and government until in 
January of the following year. At that time the government did not have ca-
pacity for reform. On the basis of an agreement with FRY President Koštunica, 
Milošević-appointee Radomir Marković remained at the head of the RDB for the 
next four months, which gave RDB leaders time to destroy part of the service’s 
files, and consolidate their positions with the new political decision-makers in 
Serbia. The DOS coalition, on its part, failed to make use of that time to prepare 
appropriate personnel and plans for the reform of intelligence services, or for 
that matter for the reform of the military and the police. Instead, the parties of 
the DOS coalition manifested increasing disagreed on the course and pace of 
reforms in society and state, and generated inter-party scandals involving the 
intelligence services. 
At the same time the unfavourable security situation in the Ground Safe-
ty Zone towards Kosovo and in southern Serbia weakened the initial resolve 
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for fast and thorough reforms of intelligence services. The grave situation was 
used by the services, other security forces and the highest authorities to argue 
against any measures for substantial security sector reform. The same argument 
was employed to postpone the opening of files for political or ideological mo-
tives (ostensibly not to endanger the network of collaborators and thus affect 
their efficiency), and to justify resistance to the lustration of members of the 
service who violated human rights. Another factor which, although of different 
nature, had similar effects on the postponement and slow down of intelligence 
services reforms, was the legacy of the war and the resulting deep divisions in 
Serbian society on the issue of cooperation with the Hague tribunal and extradi-
tion of thosee accused for war crimes.
The following paragraphs cite examples of the effects of certain factors 
on the politicisation and delay in intelligence services reform. All these events 
highlight that the absence of a political consensus among the key political ac-
tors was the main obstacle for reform. In this context it is possible to understand 
why, despite Goran Petrović’s (first RDB head appointed by the Serbian Govern-
ment on 27 January 2001) statement that the situation in the RDB was “in the 
mildest terms disastrous”304 between 2001 and the first half of 2002, none of the 
badly needed reforms (except minor personnel changes) was enacted.
Inadequate attempts to open services’ secret files are a good illustration of 
the inconsistency of reform and the Serbian government’s unreadiness. Under 
public pressure to finally make good on its pre-election promises, the govern-
ment passed an Ordinance declassifying Serbian citizens’ files kept by the State Se-
curity Service.305 Soon after the government changed the title of this document 
to Ordinance allowing insight into certain files on Serbian citizens kept by the State 
Security Service.306 The ordinance obliged the RDB to identify only citizens with 
files categorised as ‘internal enemies’. Therefore, this list does not include oth-
ers classified as ‘cominformists’, ’civil right wing’, ‘liberals’, ‘anarcho-liberals’, ‘op-
position leaders’ and ‘supporters of change’. As such the “Ordinance gave the 
citizens incomplete insight into the SDB files.”307 The opening of secret services’ 
files should have marked the end of the non-democratic era and the reason for 
the partial declassification of files demonstrates that “this period (1945-2000) 
304 ‘Interview with Goran Petrović,’ Nedeljni telegraf, Aug. 1, 2001).
305 Uredba o stavljanju na uvid određenih dosijea vođenih o građanima Republike Srbije u službi 
državne bezbednosti, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 30/01.
306 Uredba o stavljanju na uvid određenih dosijea vođenih o građanima Republike Srbije u službi 
državne bezbednosti, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 31/01.
307 Jovica Trkulja, ‘Pravno savladavanje autoritarne prošlosti’, [Legal overcoming of authoritarian 
past] Hereticus, 2003-1, http://www.hereticus.org/arhiva/2003-1/pravno-savladavanje-autori-
tarne-proslosti.html/2. 
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was neither dictatorial nor undemocratic for many within the DOS.”308  The Ordi-
nance also contravened the Constitution, and was, in 2003, proclaimed uncon-
stitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
Similar inconsistencies manifested themselves in late 2003, with the adop-
tion of the long-awaited Law on the responsibility for violation of human rights 
(lustration).309 Although Serbia is the only country in the region that has a law 
regulating this matter, the lustration has never been carried out, in the absence 
of the required parliamentary majority to select members of the lustration com-
mission and provide other conditions for its work. Implementation of the law 
also required insight into intelligence services’ files.
In addition members of the intelligences services were implicated in several 
affairs that have far graver consequences in terms of the politicisation of reform. 
For instance the ‘Gavrilović affair’ (the assassination of a high-ranking RDB mem-
ber Momir Gavrilović), the ‘Perišić affair’ (the arrest of the former chief of General 
Staff, then vice-president of the Serbian government Momčilo Perišić) and the 
‘Pavković affair’ (an attempt to use Special Yugoslav Armed Forces Units for a 
raid on the Serbian Government Communications Bureau in June 2001, alleg-
edly for wiretapping). In all these affairs the two key DOS coalition parties, the 
Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), accused each other 
of abusing the intelligence services for their narrow party interests.
The third example was a rebellion by the Special Operations Unit, whose 
members, armed and in full gear, blocked the traffic communications in Kula 
and the highway near the ‘Sava’ Conference Centre in Belgrade, demanding the 
replacement of police minister Dušan Mihajlović and the RDB leaders. They also 
publicly demonstrated against the arrest and extradition of the ICTY indict-
ees. In a whole series of inter-party conflicts within the DOS, the FRY President 
Koštunica defined that event as no more than a “protest of workers”; people 
who instead of wearing workers’ overalls wore uniforms and carried arms.
However, the situation was very serious. The rebels managed to force the 
removal of the RDB head Goran Petrović and his deputy Zoran Mijatović. In 
response to the situation the government established a State Security Council. 
Its president was the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić,310 and the Council 
was in charge of monitoring RDB operations pending the establishment of par-
308 ‘Uvid u dosijea SDB regulisati zakonom’, [Insight into SDB files requires legal regulation] 
Danas, Jul 5-6, 2003. For more on the need to open the secret files and the related dilemmas and 
problems, see Boguljub Milosavljević and Đorđe Pavićević, Tajni dosijei: otvaranje dosijea službi 
državne bezbednosti [Secret Files: Opening of State Security Service Files] (Beograd: Centar za 
antiratnu akciju, 2001).
309 Zakon o odgovornosti za kršenje ljudskih prava, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 58/03 and 61/03.
310 Defense & Security, Issue No. 043, January 24, 2002.
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liamentary control.311 The government, furthermore, verified an act312 separat-
ing the SOU from the RDB under which the SOU became a unit of the interior 
ministry. The government thus sought to establish control over the SOU. At the 
same time, an attempt by President Koštunica to establish a National Security 
Council at the federal level failed in the face of opposition from members within 
Serbian government who considered the president unauthorised to establish a 
such body.313 
Despite the highly politicised reforms and the sharp political conflict be-
tween the two ruling political parties, two laws were adopted in July 2002, one 
of which regulated the operations of civilian and military services on the federal 
level, while the other transformed the Serbian RDB into a Security Intelligence 
Agency. However, the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić 
in March 2003 showed that organisational changes and the creation of a legal 
framework were insufficient. The assassination was carried out by a group con-
sisting of SOU members, the organised criminal group known as the ‘Zemun 
clan’, and a number of members from the SIA. The first priority was to remove 
all involved in serious violations of human rights or linked with criminal groups 
from the service; to replace the cadre and undertake a series of other reforms 
that will enable the services to function in a way suiting a democratic society. 
In a word, it was clear that proper reforms had been lacking and that a genuine 
change was needed.
Almost two years after the democratic change, in early June 2002, the Law 
on the FRY Security Services was adopted. The speed in preparing this legislation 
was due to the ‘Perišić affair’ which had revealed the absence of civilian control 
of military intelligence services and the armed forces. The law regulated the po-
sitions, functions, authorities and control of intelligence services at the federal 
level. The Military Security Service and Military Intelligence Service,314 as well as 
the Security Service and Service for Research and Documentation were attached 
to the Foreign Ministry. For the first time, the military intelligence services were 
defined by one law and bound to obtain court approval for the use of special 
procedures and methods temporarily limiting constitutional and legally guar-
anteed human rights and freedoms. In addition, the military police was sepa-
rated from the military intelligence services, with the “result […] that the service 
that uses secret methods for the collection of data does not have the military 
311 This body was dissolved after the formation of Vojislav Koštunica’s government in spring 
2004.
312 Pravilnik o unutrašnjoj organizaciji i sistematizaciji radnih mesta u Jedinici za specijalne op-
eracije Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova [Rules on internal Organisation and job classification in 
the Special Operations Unit of the Interior Ministry] (DT 01 No. 255/2002, 15. 1. 2002).
313 Dejan Anastasijević, „Savet za avet,” [Advice for a ghost] Vreme, No. 758, Jan. 19, 2006.
314 These services were subsequently renamed MSA and MoI.
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police as its executive body, which is one of the democratic standards.”315 
This law established a mechanism for democratic civilian control. Military 
services were subordinated to the defence minister and the federal govern-
ment – an important step leading towards the institution of civilian control over 
military services previously subordinated to the chief of the General Staff or unit 
commanders on lower levels. The law anticipated parliamentary mechanisms 
for monitoring the services. A parliamentary Commission for the Control of the 
FRY Intelligence Services was set up, but this did not function due to numerous 
difficulties in the work of the federal parliament. The law regulated the position, 
functions, powers, control and control and oversight of the intelligence services 
in a clear, meaningful and comprehensive manner. The committee, however, 
was only critical of the decision to enable the MSA to retain police powers. Fol-
lowing the disintegration of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the law 
was incorporated into the legal system of Serbia and still forms the crucial legal 
framework for the operation of military intelligence services.
The above-mentioned law was, merely two weeks later, followed by the 
adoption of the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency in the Serbian parlia-
ment. This legislation separates the RDB from the Ministry of Interior and trans-
forms it into a Security Intelligence Agency (SIA), directly subordinated to the 
Serbian government. In terms of its functions, this is a ‘mixed type’ service, since 
it simultaneously has intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks, and functions 
as a security service (for the protection of the constitutionally established or-
der). However, although it welcomed the long-awaited law, the public sharply 
criticised both the law as a whole and some of its provisions. The following are 
only the most important examples.
In the first place, the law has only 28 articles316 that incompletely and im-
precisely regulate the subject matter. The intelligence and counter-intelligence 
components have not been clearly divided, and the same goes for the security 
service functions.317 Furthermore, in contrast to the Law on the FRY Security Serv-
ices, this legal act does not precisely list and define the methods of the agency’s 
work. It says that, acting within its jurisdiction, the agency applies “appropri-
ate operational methods, measures and acts and uses appropriate operational-
technical means”,318 but without specifying the methods, measures, acts and 
means. In consequence, the control of procedures and methods for a temporary 
suspension of certain human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitu-
315 Quoted in Zvonko Horvat, “Reform of Military Intelligence Services”, 128.
316 By comparison, the Law on the Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia (2006) has 
126 articles which comprehensively and in detail regulate all issues related to the operations of 
security services.
317 Mladen Bajagić, ‘Reforma službi bezbednosti’, [Reform of Security Services] u Druga škola 
reforme sektora bezbednosti: zbornik predavanja, ur. Pavle. Janković. (Beograd: CEPROB, G17 
Institut, 2003), 215.
318 Zakon o Bezbednosnoj-informativnoj agenciji, čl. 9, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 42/02.
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tion and law (art. 13) has not been sufficiently elaborated.319 Another provision 
in dispute states that agency members with (fairly broadly defined) specific jobs 
have traditional police powers.
Finally, control of the SIA is not substantially defined and is reduced to the 
agency’s obligation to submit semi-annual reports to parliament and govern-
ment, and to observe the government’s general views and guidelines; “a stand-
ard obligation of all republic administrative bodies and organisations.”320
An overview of these two laws (adopted almost at the same time) inevita-
bly leads to the question why one meets the essential standards of democratic 
control over the secret services, and the other does not. One could assume that 
the decisive factor was political. Namely, that members of the ruling elite who 
feared becoming the target of the security services decided to adopt modern 
legislation (the Law on the FRY Security Services) regulating the work of security 
services in the military and the foreign ministry. However, the same political 
elite also adopted the law on the SIA, which does not meet modern standards of 
regulation of the security intelligence services. This could be due to the fact that 
the political elite controlled the operations of the civilian intelligence service at 
the republic level and did not wish to legally diminish the power of that service, 
thereby weakening its own grip on power.
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned laws represent some progress. The se-
curity services, although not thoroughly reformed, have, for the first time been 
placed in a legal framework with defined tasks and powers. Moreover, the pro-
cedure for the use of their special authorities for the collection of data is subject 
to the control of competent courts, and parliament is given the possibility of 
monitoring their work. On the other hand, the laws that are still in force need 
to be adjusted to meet the highest standards. Furthermore, a National Security 
Strategy which would define the main challenges, risks and security threats to 
Serbia and the manner of the relevant security intelligence system’s response, 
is still missing.
With the dissolution of the union with Montenegro and the new Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Serbia, it was expected that legislation would follow to 
comprehensively regulate the entire security-intelligence system. Instead, the 
Law on the basic organisation of the security and intelligence system of the RS, hast-
ily adopted towards the end of 2007, addressed only the control and oversight 
and coordination of intelligence services. Their tasks and authorities, as well as 
other issues essential for the operation of intelligence services will be regulated 
subsequently by separate laws on civilian and military services. The adoption of 
these laws has been anticipated but without any specific deadline.
319 For more information see Bogoljub Milosavljević, ‘Reforms of Security Intelligence Services: 
The Case of Serbia’, 102.
320 Milosavljević, 103.
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In addition to the National Security Council, an important novelty intro-
duced by this law is a broader and more precise definition of the supervisory 
role given to the competent parliamentary defence and security committee. The 
committee, among other things, has the power to monitor the legality of use 
of special procedures and measures for the secret collection of data and direct 
control over the security services. Furthermore, service directors are obliged to 
allow committee members access to the service premises, to allow them insight 
into their documentation, to provide them with the data and information on 
their work, and to respond to their questions.
PACE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORM
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representativeness in the intelligence services is, on the normative level, pro-
vided by constitutional and legal provisions that guarantee the equality of all 
citizens, prohibit discrimination and envisage measures for the attainment of 
full equality (so-called positive discrimination). Thus article 15 of the 2006 Ser-
bian Constitution stipulates that the state guarantees the equality of men and 
women and develops a policy of equal opportunities, while article 21 proclaims 
the principle of equality of all before the Constitution and law and prohibits 
direct or indirect discrimination on any grounds, and especially on the basis of 
race, gender, national affiliation, social origins, birth, religion, political or other 
opinion, property status, culture, language, age, and mental or physical disabil-
ity. Article 53 safeguards citizens’ rights to assume public services and offices 
under equal conditions, and article 60 affirms citizens’ rights to work, their free 
choice of occupation and availability of all work places under equal conditions, 
as well as other labour rights, including a special protection of women, the 
young and the disabled. A special section of the Constitution (articles 75-81) 
guarantees the rights of national minority members and stipulates that specific 
regulations and provisional measures undertaken by Serbia in order to achieve 
full equality of national minority and majority members do not constitute dis-
crimination, and that any employment in the state bodies and services must 
take into account the ethnic composition of the population and appropriate 
representation of national minority members.
The above mentioned constitutional principles have been elaborated some-
what by the legislation on state administration. Thus the Law on civil servants321 
prohibits the favouring or discrimination of civil servants in their rights and ob-
321 Zakon o državnim službenicima, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 79/05, 81/05 – corr., 83/05 - corr. and 
64/07.
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ligations and prescribes availability of all civil service jobs to applicants under 
equal conditions (art. 7 and 9). In addition, articles 18-23 of the Labour law322 
also prohibit discrimination on any grounds and specify the actions deemed 
discriminatory under the law.
However, the above-mentioned constitutional principles and legal provi-
sions are relatively general which means that they do not represent an efficient 
legal framework for the prevention of discrimination. Further, constitutional and 
legal provisions have not been established in the by-laws of individual adminis-
trative bodies, including the intelligence services. An awareness of comparative 
experiences of modern European legislations, has given rise to a proposal for 
the adoption of a separate law to regulate the problem of discrimination. The 
adoption of political documents fighting discrimination and the establishment 
of specialised state bodies to monitor their enforcement and improvement of 
situation in this particular sphere is equally important. 
Information could not be obtained on internal regulations and other meas-
ures ensuring and encouraging employment of women and minority members, 
nor information on gender and the ethnic structure of employees. The only 
piece of information which is useful is a call for employment applications from 
two years ago, in which the SIA seeks to encourage ethnic minority members 
to join the agency. Furthermore, the intelligence services also failed to provide 
information on the proportional representation of women and national minori-
ties’ members in leading positions. 
grade: 2 (two)
TRANSPARENCY
general Transparency
Secrecy is one of the main principles of the intelligence services. However, since 
they are concerned with the security of the democratic order wherein transpar-
ency of state institutions is a central principle, a certain degree of operational 
transparency is also expected. A proper balance of transparency and secrecy is 
not easy to define. Every country has a specific relation between these two prin-
ciples depending on specific security challenges, risks and threats. Nevertheless, 
some generally acknowledged standards do exist and have to be met by all de-
mocracies. Accordingly, given their role and importance for the society as a whole, 
intelligence services are obliged to ensure that the principle of transparency and 
to enable free access to information of public importance in their possession.
322 Zakon o radu, Službeni glasnik RS, Nos. 70/01 and 73/01.
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Over 30 countries have constitutional guarantees for freedom of access to 
information of public importance held by state bodies, while over 50 countries 
regulate this right by laws.323 In Serbia, this right was initially regulated by the 
Law on free access to information of public importance324 passed in 2004, follow-
ing demands from civil society organisations and the media in their four-year 
dialogue with state institutions. Two years later, Serbia obtained a new constitu-
tion. Article 51 of the constitution guarantees the right of access to information 
held by state bodies and organisations vested with public powers, in accord-
ance with the law. Article 15 of the Law on the basic organisation of intelligence 
services likewise prescribes the services’ obligation to inform the public on the 
performance of their tasks, in accordance with law.
However, despite the fact that access to information of public importance is 
both a constitutional and legal obligation, major problems still exist in practice. 
Non-accountability by state bodies, especially those in the security sector, to the 
public was a habit acquired over several decades, This is clearly in conflict with 
new demands and will take time to change. It is therefore not surprising that 
the ‘Report of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance’325 names 
the SIA as the most extreme example of failure to act on the Commissioner’s 
decisions (six in 2006) and notes that “it is not only the case of violation of the 
right of access to information held by the authorities, but of a complete non-
implementation of the Law on free access to information of public importance.”326 
In one case, the SIA also failed to act on a court decision relating to the provision 
of data on the number of persons wiretapped during 2005. The SIA claimed that 
information was a state secret. In addition, the SIA did not submit an annual 
report on the implementation of the law to the Commissioner and also omitted 
to create and publish an Information Booklet. It is probable that during this pe-
riod, similar problems existed in the implementation of this law by the military 
intelligence services (to which this particular legislation did not apply prior to 
the dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro).
The lack of adequate transparency in the intelligence services can be illus-
trated by other examples. For instance, the intelligence services often withhold 
information from the media or decline to respond to MPs questions, citing rea-
323 The principles of transparency and accessibility of information have, in addition to states, 
also been embraced by international organisations, as best illustrated by the example of the 
European Union. For more information, see Jadranka Jelinčić, Vodič kroz Zakon o slobodnom 
pristupu informacijama [Guide through the Law on Free Access to Information] (Beograd: Fond 
za otvoreno društvo, 2005).
324 Zakon o slobodnom pristupu informacija od javnog značja, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 120/04 and 
54/07.
325 Poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja, Izveštaj o sprovođenju Zakona o slobodnom pristu-
pu informacijama od javnog značaja u 2006. godini [Report on implementation of the Law on Free 
Acces to Information of Public Importance] (Beograd, mart 2007. godine)
326 Report.  
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sons of state secrecy. On the whole, the intelligence services and the bodies to 
whom they report fail to inform the public on the performance of their duties. 
This is also partly due to the absence of a law clearly and precisely defining levels 
of confidentiality for documents, procedures for their classification and declas-
sification, issuing of certificates for access to classified data, and sanctions for 
disclosing secrets. On the other hand, positive steps include an improvement 
in communication with civil society organisations and participation in various 
conferences and round tables where representatives from these services have 
discussed problems related to organisation, operation and reforms. 
grade: 2 (two)
Financial Transparency
For all countries transparency of the budget for security intelligence services is 
a sensitive issue, especially in respect to the specific structure of financial assets 
and their use for different purposes. The total amount of budgetary funds (ap-
propriations) for individual intelligence services is made known to the public 
through the Law on the budget adopted by parliament annually. However, more 
detailed financial data are available only to members of parliamentary commit-
tees concerned with security, budget and finances, while confidential data of 
intelligence services’ budgets is available only to the independent State Audit 
Institution. Data confidentiality is also protected by the auditor’s reports, which 
assess the legality and appropriate use of funds. The reports also describe possi-
ble irregularities without revealing any data that could jeopardise the methods 
and objectives of covert operations. In some countries (such as Germany) the 
accounts and financial management of intelligence services are audited by a 
special unit of the state audit institution.327
Serbia has only recently made initial steps towards increased financial trans-
parency of intelligence services. Only after the SIA became a separate organisa-
tion was the public allowed to see the amount of state appropriations. In 2005, a 
Law on the State Audit Institution328 was adopted. This institution was granted the 
rank of a constitutional body by new Constitution (art. 96). However, the law’s 
implementation has been postponed. Although the law was passed in 2005, 
members of the State Audit Institution’s Council were elected only in Septem-
ber 2007, one year after the deadline specified by the law expired. By the end of 
327 For more information see: Hans Born and Jan Li, Postizanje odgovornosti u obaveštajnoj 
delatnosti: pravni standardi i najbolji načini nadzora obaveštajnih službi [Making intelligence ac-
countable: Legal standards and best practices for control and oversight of intelligence agencies] 
(Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF, 2005).
328 Zakon o Državnoj revizorskoj instituciji, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 101/05.
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2007, the State Audit Institution was still without premises and equipment, and 
the Council, as its president notes, still “meets in one of the two conference halls 
of the Serbian parliament, depending on their vacancy.”329
Financial transparency of the intelligence services has received no support 
from parliamentary committees for security and defence and financing. They 
have not informed the public whether the security services have used budget-
ary funds legally and meaningfully. Considering that the security services are 
exempt from procedures prescribed by the Public procurement law, parliamen-
tary committees and state auditors should be obliged to control expenditures 
and duly notify the public. Without this scrutiny, the financing of intelligence 
services will remain clouded in mystery.
Therefore, in terms of financial transparency of the intelligence services, 
only the initial and mostly normative steps have so far been taken. 
grade: 2 (two)
PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORgANISATIONS
Article 53 of the 2006 Constitution guarantees citizens’ right to participate in the 
management of public affairs, while the Law on state administration adopted 
in 2005330 obliges state administrative bodies to organise public debate when 
drafting a law “that substantially changes the legal regime in a specific area, or 
regulates issues of special interest to the public” (article 77). In addition, arti-
cle 21 of the Law on the basic organisation of the security and intelligence system 
of the RS requires the security services to inform the public about their work 
through the bodies they report to, It also gives them a possibility of directly 
informing the public “on certain security phenomena and events.”
Despite the existence of a legal framework, citizens’ participation in policy 
making is very low, for a number of reasons. First, the intelligence services in 
Serbia are still considered omnipotent and untouchable. It is a widespread per-
ception that everything they do is secret and that demonstrating any interest 
in their work might be dangerous. This explains why citizens are basically un-
informed about the intelligence services and are therefore unprepared to par-
ticipate in security policy-making. The intelligence services themselves make 
no effort to change this situation. The political elite have also failed to motivate 
329 Aleksandar Milošević, ‘Za državnog revizora prepolovljen budžet’ {Halved budget for state 
auditor], Glas javnosti, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu/clanak/glas-javnos-
ti-12-12-2007/za-drzavnog-revizora-prepolovljen-budzet (accessed on 12 November 2008).
330 Zakon o državnoj upravi, Službeni glasnik RS, Nos. 79/05 and 101/07.
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the public to participate. Moreover, in the absence of a political consensus, the 
elite has proved incapable of adopting a clear and complete strategy of Security 
Services reform. This explains why all new laws governing these services have 
been ‘rushed through, without giving sufficient time for a deeper analysis and 
public debate. Thus, for instance, the Law on the basic organisation of the security 
and intelligence system was adopted by parliament within a month of the gov-
ernment’s submission of the draft, despite the fact that its preparation should 
have taken over a year.331 Furthermore, the government has proved disinclined 
to accept suggestions offered by experts during the preparatory stage (or in re-
lation to amendments), as illustrated by the Law on SIA. Finally, very few Serbian 
academic institutions and civil society organisations systematically address is-
sues related to intelligence services (and the security sector as a whole).
The situation is the same, if not worse, with respect to public and civil so-
ciety organisations’ participation in policy implementation and evaluation. The 
main obstacle to this participation is the above-mentioned withholding of data 
on the work of the intelligence services. The only positive step in this respect 
is an increase in cooperation with acadeMoI and civil society organisations at 
international conferences and round tables. However, these are all ad hoc activi-
ties.
The organisational structure of intelligence services does not include a 
public relations department. Furthermore, military intelligence services do not 
even have an webpage to inform the public on their activities, whereas the SIA 
website has the total of 13 news items covering the period from 2005 until mid-
2008. Non-existent or scant information, however, allows for speculation. This is 
why it is extremely important for these services to have a communications strat-
egy with the public. This is all the more important given that it is in the agency’s 
own interest to “shed the burdening legacy and restore the citizens’ trust” as 
noted by Rade Bulatović, SIA director from 2004 until July 2008.332 
grade: 2 (two)
331 By comparison, public debate in the UK on the Serious Anti Organised Crime Agency lasted 
over a year. For more information see Glen Segell, ‘Reform and Transformation: The UK’s Serious 
Organised Crime Agency’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Volume 20, 
Issue 2 (2007): 217–239; Clive Harfield, ‘SOCA-A paradigm shift in British policing’, British Journal 
of Criminology, No. 46 (2006): 743–761.
332 Bojan Tončić, ‘Ratko Mladić je boravio u Srbiji do 2005’, [R.M. stayed in Serbia until 2005] inter-
view with Rade Bulatović, Danas, 31 August 2007, http://www.danas.co.yu/20070831/terazije1.
html.
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ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC 
CIVILIAN CONTROL AND PUBLIC 
CONTROL AND OVERSIghT
One of the most important reforms is the creation of a legal framework for the 
work of intelligence services and the establishment of the mechanism of demo-
cratic civilian control and control and oversight, achieved in the 2002-2007 pe-
riod. This was achieved by the adoption of the Law on the FRY Security Services. 
They were thus subordinated to democratically elected civilian authorities and 
parliamentary control, vested in the federal parliament’s Commission for Control 
and oversight of Security Services. This was, although less successfully, followed 
by the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency, which regulated control over 
the agency. Finally, following the inauguration of the new constitution, which 
gives parliamentary control and oversight of intelligence services the rank of 
a constitutional category, the Law on the basic organisation of the Security and 
Intelligence System of the RS was passed. It includes fairly precise and compre-
hensive provisions regulating parliamentary control and control and oversight 
of intelligence services as well as the position and role of the National Security 
Council. In addition, article 3 of this law prescribes that the work of intelligence 
services is, in addition to democratic civilian control of parliament and National 
Security Council, also subjected to the control of the president of the republic, 
the government and other state bodies as well as the public ‘in accordance with 
law’. However, the role of these other bodies and the public is not elaborated. 
Legislation on individual intelligence services should be harmonised with this 
law as soon as possible, including specifications of obligations of the services’ 
leaders towards supervisory bodies. 
Control by the Executive
The executive’s role in the control of the intelligence services in Serbia has de-
veloped by means of several mechanisms. First, the government has broad 
functional, organisational and personnel powers. These include guidance and 
adjustment of their work, endorsement of acts on their internal organisation 
and job classification, as well as appointment and relief of their directors and 
leading personnel. As part of the Ministry of Defence, military intelligence serv-
ices are under the Ministry’s direct control and oversight. Intelligence services 
are obliged to submit annual plans and reports to the government, including 
data on the enforcement of laws and other government acts and conclusions, 
as well as data on any measures undertaken in the sphere of their activity. 
The president of Serbia’s control, although unspecified by the law, is related 
to his position of the head of state and his powers in the sphere of security and 
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defence.
The National Security Council has an important role in channelling and co-
ordinating the intelligence services and overseeing their work. The Council con-
siders intelligence security evaluations and determines the priorities of national 
interests. The Council also monitors the implementation of its conclusions, gives 
opinions on the proposed annual and medium-term plans for the intelligence 
services and offers its views to the government concerning the budget. It also 
monitors the use of the budget and advises on the appointments and replace-
ment of directors.
The existence of a mechanism ensuring political neutrality of intelligence 
services’ operations is particularly important for executive control. The Law on 
the basic organisation of the services prescribes that members of the intelligence 
services cannot be members of political parties and are obliged to act in ac-
cordance with the principle of legality and the rules of professional and political 
neutrality (art. 2, paras 2 and 3). The Law on state administration also obliges 
state bodies to observe the principles of professionalism, impartiality and po-
litical neutrality (art. 8), while the Law on civil servants prescribes their duty to 
act in accordance with the constitution, law and other regulations, as well as 
professional rules, impartiality and political neutrality. They are, while on duty, 
prohibited to express and advocate their political views (the principle of legal-
ity, impartiality and political neutrality, art. 5). Recurrence of these principles 
in the above-mentioned laws is entirely justified since depoliticisation of the 
intelligence services is a serious problem. Furthermore, one should not under-
estimate the potential for governments to use the intelligence services to serve 
their own interests. There are also other control and oversight mechanisms de-
signed to prevent this possibility. 
grade: 3 (three)
Parliamentary Control and Control and oversight
Article 99, para 1(6) of the Serbian Constitution establishes the right of parlia-
ment to oversee the work of the intelligence services. As in other democratic 
states, the central role in this control and oversight is given to a special body 
– the parliamentary Defence and Security Committee. The role of this Commit-
tee is stipulated in article 16 of the Law on the basic organisation of the security 
and intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia. The Committee oversees the 
constitutionality and legality of the security services and their compliance with 
Serbia’s National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and security intelligence 
policy. It oversees observance of neutrality in the service, legality of use of spe-
cial procedures and measures for the secret collection of data, and legality of 
use of budgetary and other assets. The Committee is also authorised to review 
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and adopt reports on the intelligence services, consider proposed laws, regula-
tions and general enactments, and initiate and submit legal proposals. Further-
more, the Committee considers public proposals, petitions and submissions 
addressed to parliament. It proposes measures in response to these submis-
sions. The Committee is authorised to rule on the illegalities and irregularities 
in the work of the services, draw conclusions and inform parliament. Finally, the 
Committee has the right to control the intelligence services’ operations. Intelli-
gence service directors are obliged to give Committee members access to their 
premises, insight into documentation and to provide information on their work. 
There is little doubt that the powers of the Committee provide possibili-
ties for proper parliamentary control and oversight. However, it is not clear how 
this control and oversight will function in future. The Committee lacks experi-
ence and its work covers the whole security sector. It requires a large number of 
members with specific professional knowledge and a strong dedication to their 
work. Parliamentary control has so far been less than satisfactory, since its work 
has almost exclusively dealt with the SIA’s semi-annual reports. However, since 
parliamentary control and oversight was only introduced in mid-2002 it may 
require time for the Committee to develop and improve its capacity. 
grade: 2 (two)
Judicial Control
Judicial control of the intelligence services is primarily focused on the legality 
of measures for secret collection of data which requires written court approval. 
Although data on the approvals for secret data collection are not publicly avail-
able (as already mentioned), we could assume that there are no major problems 
in judicial control, since the competent courts make no special references to this 
particular matter in their reports .
The courts also decide on the legality of administrative acts, possible crimi-
nal responsibility of service members and compensation of damages inflicted 
on citizens in administrative disputes. Control in administrative proceedings is 
sporadic, since the intelligence services rarely adopt administrative acts, while 
there is no judicial control of the services’ administrative actions. During the 
period observed, the courts ruled in several cases on criminal responsibility of 
service members and responsibility for damage resulting from their work. Al-
though the number of such cases is small, they nontheless represent important 
successes for the judiciary (compared with the situation before 2000) and it is 
expected that the number will increase, depending on the pace and success of 
reform of the judiciary. 
grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
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Public control and oversight
Public control and oversight of the intelligence services is poorly regulated by 
the Law on basic organisation of the services. Article 21 of this law obliges the 
intelligence services to inform the public on their work through the bodies they 
report to and in a manner that does not endanger the rights of citizens, na-
tional security and other interests of the country. They may also directly inform 
the public on certain security phenomena and events. As already mentioned, 
there are practically no results for the time being and it is therefore impossible 
to speak of visible public control and oversight.
Independent institutions that play a role in controlling the intelligence 
services (including the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, 
Ombudsperson and State Audit Institution) have only recently engaged in this 
control and oversight. From the start, they have had to overcome a series of dif-
ficulties and in a brief period only the Commissioner for Information of Public 
Importance has actually demonstrated a capacity for the control and oversight. 
The other two institutions are expected to do so shortly, in view of the impor-
tance of their role.
Important normative efforts have been made to create the conditions and 
for democratic civilian control and control and oversight, but the actual control 
and control and oversight have not yet yielded substantial results.
 grade: 2 (two)
RULE OF LAW
In its definition of the Republic of Serbia (art. 1), the 2006 Constitution stresses 
the principle of rule of law as one of the state’s fundamental values. The Con-
stitution goes on to define a whole series of specific principles, including the 
subordination of power to the Constitution and law, legality of administration, 
equality of all before the law, division of power, independence of the judiciary 
and court protection of human rights and freedoms. All state administration 
bodies and the intelligence services are bound by law to observe the principles 
of the rule of law. The Law on the basic organisation of the services stipulates that 
they should “act pursuant to and in accordance with the Constitution, law, and 
other regulations and general enactments, national security and defence strate-
gies and the established security-intelligence policy of the Republic of Serbia” 
(art.2, para 1). Further, the competent parliamentary committee “oversees the 
constitutionality and legality of intelligence services’ operations” (art. 16, para 
2 (1)). In the similar vein, article 3, para 1 of the Law on Security Services of the 
FRY prescribed that the security services “perform their tasks pursuant to and 
in accordance with the Constitution and law”, and in article 4, para 1, that they 
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“perform their duties in line with the principles of constitutionality and legality, 
respect of human rights and freedoms, professionalism and proportional use of 
power.”
However, in reality, full observance of the rule of law by the intelligence 
services is a difficult task, not only in transition countries, but also in developed 
democracies. The central problem is the services’ use of special measures and 
powers for secret data collection which could violate the public’s right to pri-
vacy.
Until the early 1990s in Yugoslavia, the use of special measures and powers 
for secret data collection was based on classified by-laws. Serbia provided for the 
possibility of bypassing the principle of inviolability of letters and other means 
of communication with a decision taken by the president of the Supreme Court 
of Serbia in the Law on internal affairs adopted in 1991. This decision attracted 
much criticism,333 and this issue was subsequently regulated by the 2001 Law 
on criminal proceedings,334 as well as the laws on the SIA and the FRY security 
services passed in 2002. The main shortcoming of these laws was the fact that 
they were not mutually harmonised, either in terminology or in substance. Civil 
society has been particularly critical of the Law on the SIA. The law specifies that 
the decision to bypass the principle of inviolability of letters and other means of 
communication can be taken by the president of the Supreme Court of Serbia 
upon a request from the agency’s director (art. 14). That “in effects, amounts to 
the restoration of the decision contained in article 13 of the republic Law on 
internal affairs, which has been widely challenged and contested as contrary 
to the FRY Constitution.”335 This provision is also contrary to article 232 of the 
Law on criminal proceedings which stipulates that the use of secret surveillance 
and recording measures requires the approval of an investigating judge. Intel-
ligence services may also use this legal channel to obtain the required approval 
which additionally complicates control of their work.
A major deficiency of the laws on SIA and criminal proceedings is the ab-
sence of an obligation by the intelligence services’ to inform individuals who 
have been subject to the above-mentioned measures. This contravenes article 
42 of the Constitution, which stipulates that “everyone shall have the right to 
be informed about personal data collected about him, in accordance with the 
law, and the right to court protection in case of their abuse.” Incidentally, a 1999 
recommendation of the Council of Europe states that the intelligence services 
must observe the European Convention of Human Rights, which in article 8 pre-
scribes that a citizen is entitled to be informed on a special measures applied 
333 For more information, see: Bogoljub Milosavljević, ‘Secret data collection authorities of the 
police and other state bodies: Domestic regulations and European standards’, 69-70.
334 The new Law on criminal proceedings was adopted by parliament in 2006, but its implementa-
tion was postponed until 31 December 2008.
335 Bogloljub Milosavljević, ‘Reforms of Security Intelligence Services: The case of Serbia,’ 102.
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on him, and the results of its application.336 The Law on the FRY Security Services 
alone includes provisions obliging the MSA to inform citizens who makes writ-
ten requests whether they have been subject to secret data collection measures 
and to let them see the compiled documents (art. 34). However, to the best of 
our knowledge, this obligation has not been observed.
Although the legal regulation of special measures for the secret collection 
of data represents a major step forward, it is still not satisfactory. It is undesir-
able to have several legal regimes for the use of special measures, since this 
affects the public’s legal security, and inevitably makes control and oversight of 
these measures more difficult. This problem must be overcome by the adoption 
of comprehensive, meaningful and precise legislation, in accordance with the 
Constitution. It is also necessary to adopt new legislation governing the protec-
tion of personal data, bearing in mind that the current law was passed over ten 
years ago and does not meet standards established by the Constitution, nor 
those of the European Convention on Human rights.
grade: 2 (two)
EFFICIENCY
It is difficult to judge the efficiency of the intelligence services because of a lack 
of publicly available information. Public statements by the heads of the services 
are the only source of information. According to a statement by SIA director 
Rade Bulatović made in October 2006, the agency had undergone important 
personnel and organisational changes and done a lot to improve efficiency. 
He stated that: “In order to ensure the conditions for greater efficiency of its 
work, the internal organisation of the agency was changed and simplified to 
the extent possible.” In addition, “a large number of leading positions were re-
moved and the number of personnel increased, mostly in operations.”337 The SIA 
director also spoke of internal budgetary control. Between 2002 and mid-2007 
a third of the operational composition of the Agency was changed and the total 
336 For more information, see: Bogoljub Milosavljević, ‘Secret data collection authorities of the 
police and other state bodies: Domestic regulations and European standards’, 72.
337 Rade Bulatović, ‘Reforma sistema bezbednosti u Srbiji: dostignuća i perspektive’, [Reform 
of the Security System in Serbia: Achievements and Prospects] in Reforma sektora bezbednosti 
u Srbiji: dostignuća i perspektive, ur. Miroslav Hadžić. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 
2007), 77–78.
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number of its members reduced by 15 percent (only in its logistics section).338 
Of the total number of SIA employees (unknown) about 50 per cent have high-
er education and the average age is 37 years (or more precisely only a dozen 
or so of its members are over 50). But, the director also notes that the RDB, or 
SIA, experienced a large number of radical changes following the loss of a large 
number of personnel, and that the continuity of appropriate replenishments 
went missing; “This situation has been overcome in our regular activities, but 
complete stabilisation takes time.”339 Furthermore, the UN sanctions against the 
FRY affected the quality of the intelligence services’ equipment and technology. 
The “equipment used by SIA is old and far below operational standards of EU 
countries, as well as inefficient and unreliable and is, in that sense, an inferior 
solution for conducting criminal investigations.”340
The situation in the military intelligence services is similar. According to a 
statement of the MSA head Svetko Kovač in October 2006, the agency under-
went organisational changes and intensive preparations were under way for the 
difficult task of personnel reform. Thus 50 percent of the present MSA personnel 
were admitted after 2002. Further, during the 2001-2006 period about 360 of 
its employees, predominantly officers, were made redundant. The majority of 
MSA employees - 52 percent - are aged between 30 and 40, while 13 per cent 
are under 30. Nineteen per cent have attended various post-graduate studies, 
22 per cent have completed foreign language courses, of whom only eight per 
cent have second level certificates.341
Graph 4: professional qualifications of MSA members
338 Bojan Tončić, ‘Ratko Mladić je boravio u Srbiji do 2005’, intervju sa Radetom Bulatovićem, 
Danas, 31 August 31, 2007, http://www.danas.co.yu/20070831/terazije1.html
339 Tončić.
340 Dragan Jovanović, ‘Posebna prava i ovlašćenja koja primenjuje policija’, [Special rights and 
authorities of the police] u Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih ovlašćenja, urs. Miroslav 
Hadžić i Predrag Petrović. (Beograd: Centar za civilno vojne-odnose, 2008), 86.
341 Svetko Kovač, ’Reforma obaveštajno-bezbednosnih službi u Srbiji’, [Reform of Intelligence 
Security Services in Serbia] u Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: dostignuća i perspektive, ur. 
Miroslav Hadžić (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2007), 82.
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However, the data offered by the directors of the intelligence services are 
impossible to verify by independent sources. It is likely that the directors have 
sought to present their organisations to the public in the best possible light. 
On a number of occasions, some have declared that their services are “the best 
in the region.” While accepting that the information on the efficiency of intelli-
gence services is ‘sensitive’, the fact remains that no state body in charge of their 
control and oversight has so far informed the public on the efficiency of these 
services.
Efficiency evaluation must take into account the possibility that the above-
mentioned information may not be reliable and that the intelligence services as 
part of the state administration inevitably have the same characteristics, as well 
as the fact that transparency is substantially lower compared with other parts of 
the state administration, which is why their efficiency may realistically be more 
doubtful. In conclusion, there is not sufficient reliable data to evaluation this 
dimension.
grade: 2 (two)
EFFECTIVENESS
Integratedness 
Until recently, Serbia (and before that the FRY and the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro) did not have a single body for coordination and operational 
harmonisation of the intelligence services. This has strongly affected efforts for 
creating an integrated system. The adoption of the Law on the basic organisation 
of security and intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia in 2007 and the estab-
lishment of the National Security Council will hopefully resolve this problem. 
The law defines intelligence services as part of a single security intelligence sys-
tem in Serbia, and gives the National Security Council the duty to harmonise the 
work of intelligence services and their cooperation with the competent bodies 
for defence and internal affairs, as well as other state bodies, including coopera-
tion with security bodies and services of other states and international organi-
sations. The Council comprises the president of the republic, the prime minister, 
ministers for defence, internal affairs and justice, the chief of the General Staff 
of the Serbian Armed Forces and directors of intelligence services. Operational 
harmonisation of intelligence services is the duty of the Coordination Bureau, 
consisting of intelligence service directors and the secretary of the National Se-
curity Council.
grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
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Ratio between aims, resources and outcomes
Another precondition essential to evaluate the effectiveness of intelligence 
services - a National Security Strategy - has not been created as yet. Effective-
ness is usually understood to denote a balance between the aims, invested re-
sources and achieved results. It is thus reasonable to ask how to evaluate the 
intelligence services in the absence of the most essential parameters - defined 
security aims and resources. Moreover, the law stipulates that the security serv-
ices act “pursuant to and in accordance with the Constitution, laws, other regu-
lations and general enactments, National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy 
and the established security intelligence policy of the Republic of Serbia,” for 
which a National Security Strategy is a precondition. A strategy is also a pre-
condition for the control of intelligence services, since the competent parlia-
mentary committee has the power to “oversee the compliance of the services’ 
work with the National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and the security-
intelligence policy of the Republic of Serbia.” The National Security Strategy is 
also important as a precondition for the successful functioning of the National 
Security Council. Namely, this body should harmonise the work of intelligence 
services by reviewing intelligence security evaluations and adopting the rele-
vant conclusions, defining the priorities and ways of protection and channelling 
the pursuit of national interests attained through intelligence security activities. 
With this in mind, elaboration and adoption of the National Security Strate-
gy should be undertaken as soon as possible and this document should express 
a broad social consensus on security issues. It should be based on detailed re-
search and analysis carried out with the participation of state bodies, academic 
institutions and civil society organisations. In addition this document should 
precede strategic defence documents (the existing Defence Strategy and Stra-
tegic Defence Review were adopted in the joint state of Serbia and Montene-
gro). Finally, Serbia is the only SEE country which has not yet adopted a National 
Security Strategy. 
grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
Legitimacy
In addition to the above, we should add that publicly available data on the ef-
fectiveness of the intelligence services does not exist. The same is true for the 
data on public evaluation of their work.
grade: 2 (two)
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4. Institutions with policing 
competencies
Marko Savković
The Customs Administration (CA), the Administration for the Prevention of 
Money Laundering (APML) and the Tax Police can, unlike other bodies of the 
Serbian Ministry of Finance, use some of police powers when performing their 
duties. This makes them specific actors of the security sector. For this reason the 
first part of the chapter will present and analyse their competencies. After, their 
security capacities will be measured and assessed based on a uniform meth-
odology, and within the scope of analysis of reform trends and achievements 
within these bodies. 
Although the basic task of the CA is to enable the flow of goods and passen-
gers, employees of are also obliged to ensure “full efficiency and effectiveness of 
control, i.e. disclosing and combating customs and other infringements, in par-
ticular terrorism, organised crime and corruption.”342 The 2003 law incorporated 
the customs service into the group of state institutions engaged in combating 
crime. Its employees were given power to use firearms,343 as well as to perform 
vehicle stop and search344 within the entire customs area.345
The Law on tax procedure and tax administration stipulates the powers of 
the Tax Police, which are almost identical to those of the Crime Investigation 
Police during pre-investigation proceedings.346 The Tax Police thus has all the 
powers of the classic police, except those restricting freedom of movement. In 
order to disclose customs crime and the perpetrators, the Tax Police is author-
ised to “summon the citizens, collect necessary information from them, inspect 
the documents of state bodies, companies, businesses and other legal entities, 
conduct search of vehicles, passengers and luggage, conduct search of specific 
342 Dejan Carević, ’Reforma carinske službe u Srbiji’, in Reforma sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji: 
dostignuća i perspektive, Ed. Miroslav Hadžić. (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations 2007), 
p. 97.
343 Customs law, art. 276, para 6, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 73/2003 and 
61/05.
344 Customs law, art. 278.
345 Customs law, art. 6, “The customs area of Serbia includes the territory, the territorial waters 
and airs space above Serbia. The border of the customs area is identical to the state border of 
Serbia.”    
346 Law on tax procedure and tax administration, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 
80/2002, 84/2002, 23/2003, 70/2003, 55/2004, 61/2005, 85/2005, 62/2006 and 63/2006, Art. 135.
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facilities and premises of state bodies, companies, businesses and other legal 
entities, issue search order for wanted persons and objects.”347
Money laundering is a relatively new form of corporate crime. It is a spe-
cific criminal activity which results from previously committed criminal acts, but 
it is also a starting point for future crime.348 Money laundering is a means of 
turning illegally gained sums legal within national and international payment 
systems.349 As criminal syndicates’ ability to launder ‘dirty money’ grows, their 
overall power within society increases. If society is in transition, the increasing 
power of these syndicates becomes a potential threat for the success of reforms; 
“The criminal act of money laundering has a much wider negative impact on 
society as a whole, since its primary purpose is to disguise other serious forms 
of crime, particularly in their organised form, and to continue with the criminal 
activity without fear of being disclosed.”350 
The establishment of a separate Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was one 
of the most urgent tasks of reform in Serbia. On 27 September 2001 the fed-
eral parliament passed the Law on the prevention of money laundering,351 which 
established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as an independent commission 
for the prevention of money laundering at the federation level. The FIU was re-
named the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML) in 
April 2003, after parliament adopted the Law on ministries352 which, in line with 
the provisions of the Belgrade Agreement, transferred the fight against money 
laundering to the republican level.353
Organised crime syndicates are able to engage in unrestricted economic 
activities in the knowledge that state bodies with which they have established 
criminal ties will provide appropriate protection.354 Participation in the activi-
ties of organised crime syndicates, as well as responsibility for the financing of 
certain armed groups that committed war crimes at the territory of former Yu-
goslavia are consequences of the methods used by the Federal Customs Admin-
347 Boris Batarilo, ’Poreska policija’ in Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih mera i 
ovlašćenja, Ed.  Miroslav Hadžić and Predrag Petrović 2008 (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military 
Relations 2008), 99–100.
348 ‘Borba protiv pranja novca u Srbiji’, Puls (Magazine on corruption), May – June 2006, 26.
349 Mićo Bošković, ‘Oblici ispoljavanja organizovanog kriminaliteta u privredno-finansijskom 
poslovanju’, Bezbednost, no.  6 (2005): 915.
350 Milovan Milovanović, ’ranje novca: neka otvorena pitanja’ Revija za bezbednost, no. 5 (2008): 
32.
351 Law on agency for deposit insurance, rehabilitation, bankruptcy and liquidation of banks, the 
Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  no. 53/2001.
352 Law on ministries, the Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro, no. 35/2003.
353 ‘Mission of the APML’, website of the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering 
http://www.fcpml.org.yu/misija.htm (accessed on 23 Aug 2008).
354 Mićo Bošković, ‘Oblici ispoljavanja organizovanog kriminaliteta u privredno-finansijskom 
poslovanju’, Bezbednost, no. 6 (2005): 915.
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istration (FCA) during the 1990s.
In the first part of this chapter we present factors that determine the con-
text of the CA’s development, and describe the burden of its political and insti-
tutional heritage. We then consider the internal reform of institutions that have 
certain police competencies, with an overview of the public image they have 
in Serbia today. The second part of the chapter examines the achievements of 
reform of institutions with certain police powers in 2008.
The Centre for Civil-Military Relations sent requests for information to the 
CA, the APML and the Tax Police in June 2008, but only the CA responded. Con-
sequently we focus on the work of CA when examining representativeness and 
transparency, as well as criteria for control of special investigative measures and 
powers. 
         
   
Federal Customs Administration (FCA) heritage
 The international isolation in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia found 
itself after May 1992 had a negative impact on the work of the customs serv-
ice. Together with high inflation levels between 1995 and 2000, around 270,000 
people in Serbia lost their jobs. Under such circumstances the grey market blos-
somed. However, the price paid for reducing social tensions was that the flour-
ishing of illegal trade and corruption.355 
The FCA, headed by Mihalj Kertes, allowed individuals close to the Milo-
sevic’s regime to import illegally excise commodities with high profit margin 
(such as oil, tobacco, alcohol), as well as food and medicine. This led to the po-
liticisation and corruption of institutions such as police, customs, tax police and 
judiciary.
The Milosevic regime tolerated this new situation for two reasons. Firstly, 
money it gained from these activities could be used to finance strategically im-
portant companies and institutions.356 In this way resources were provided for 
the financing of armed groups in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.357 Sec-
ondly, it enabled the continuous funding of the Socialist Party of Serbia.358 
355 Jelena Unijat, ’Organizovani kriminal: slučaj Srbija’, Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana, no. 1 
(2006): 15.
356 ’Kertes: Branim se istinom’ Beta, 8 October  2007:
http://www.mail-archive.com/sim@antic.org/msg37495.html ¨(accessed on 17 June  2008)
357 Miloš Vasić, Jovan Dulović and Davor Konjikušić, ’Hapšenje direktora Savezne uprave carina: 
Čudesni svet Bracike Kertesa’ Vreme, section “Dosije Vremena”, http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_
html/520/12.html (accessed on 17 June 2008).
358 ‘Kertes: Politički montirano’, B92, 5 September 2007, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=09&dd=05&nav_category=120 (ac-
cessed on 17 June 2008).
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The overall disintegration of the system of values and international isolation 
were just two conditions for the creation of such a system. It was also necessary 
to appoint someone to head the Federal Customs Administration who the re-
gime could trust. That person was Mihalj Kertes, who was appointed director of 
the FCA on 4 May 1994.359 
According to an indictment issued in March 2007, Kertes, who was a in-
dicted of a crime syndicate led by Slobodan Milosevic, unlawfully transferred a 
portion of the FCA’s revenue to legal entities, political organisations and Serbia’s 
State Security Service. A portion of the foreign exchange resources was, without 
the National Bank of Serbia’s approval and upon the order of members of this 
syndicate, taken to Cyprus. The syndicate was charged with misappropriating at 
least 120 million German marks from the budget.360   
Following Mihalj Kertes’ orders, the FCA supplied the State Security Service 
with cars and other vehicles, thus providing logistic support to their activities 
aimed at intimidation of political opponents. In one such incident, four people 
were killed during the attempted assassination of Vuk Draskovic, president of 
the Serbian Renewal Movement in October 1999.
Although the former director of the FCA was first interviewed on 6 Decem-
ber 2000 (two months after the political changes), it took eight years to bring 
a sentence against him. The lack of political will to resolve this case was evi-
dent, since the process within the Special Department for Organised Crime of 
Belgrade District Court was stalled, during which time the statutory limitation 
ran out. Proceedings against Kertes and his accomplices were renewed several 
times, and the indictees were acquitted of any responsibility. Finally, Kertes was 
convicted and sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment for complicity in 
the aforementioned murder and attempted assassination of Vuk Draskovic.361 It 
was proven in court that the truck used during assassination attempt was pro-
vided upon Kertes’ order.362 Other court processes against Kertes on charges of 
abuse of office are still ongoing. 
359 ‘Mihalj Kertes (Ko se boji Srba još?)’, Glas javnosti, 20 May 2000,
 http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2000/05/21/srpski/P00052006.shtm (accessed on 17 
June 2008).
360 ‘Kertes: Politički montirano’, B92, 5 September 2007,
 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=09&dd=05&nav_category=120 (ac-
cessed on 17 June 2008).
361 ‘Maksimalne kazne za Ibarsku’, B92, 19 June 2008, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=19&nav_id=304459 (ac-
cessed on 20 June 2008).
362 Dragoljub Todorović, ‘Nema nikakve zbrke: povodom početka suđenja za zločin na Ibarskoj 
magistrali’, Glas javnosti, http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2001/10/16/pisma/srpski/pisma.
shtml [accessed on 20 June 2008]
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The beginnings of reform 
On 6 October 2000 the Federal Customs Administration was seized by a group 
of armed men led by Dusan Zabunovic, the owner of the company MPS. At first 
glance this was similar to a pattern where state institutions of strategic impor-
tance were being taken over following the fall of the regime. According to the 
B92 television programme ‘Insajder’, Zabunovic had tried to position himself as 
an leading figure of the smuggling trade in Serbia during early 1990s. The pro-
gramme claimed that his conflict with Kertes dated back to Kertes’ decision (fol-
lowing Marko Milosevic’s instructions) to destroy a new duty free shop which 
Zabunovic opened at the Presevo border crossing.363 
After 2000 institutions with certain police powers went through “the four 
Ds: decriminalisation, demilitarisation, depoliticisation and decentralisation.”364 
In this chapter the reform process in Serbia is examined as a two-track proc-
ess. Reform of customs services and the establishment of new institutions (the 
Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Tax Police) are 
examined.
Corruption challenge
Due to its powers, corruption is a greater problem for the Customs Adminis-
tration compared to other public administration bodies. During the last three 
years a great deal of public attention has been drawn to two large-scale police 
actions against crime syndicates linked to corruption in the customs service. In 
November 2006 the police initiated the action ‘Sword’ in several cities all over 
Serbia. During the action seventeen people – customs officers and small busi-
ness owners – were arrested, suspected of acting as a crime syndicate, offering 
and accepting bribe, abusing their office and engaging in smuggling over an 
extended period of time. 
In late May 2007, Slobodan Radovanovic, a Special Prosecutor for Organised 
Crime, brought an indictment against 28 individuals on charges of customs cor-
ruption, accepting bribes and abuse of office, as well as smuggling. This crime 
syndicate was active in exempting “certain beneficiaries of the alleged import” 
from customs monitoring and control, as well as enabling them to smuggle ex-
cise commodities and oil derivatives. The commercial goods in question were of 
substantial value and the imports came from China, Turkey, Bulgaria and Mac-
edonia. As Tomo Zoric, spokesperson of the Special Prosecutor’s Office said, “the 
363 ‘Kako je Marko švercovao cigarete’, B92, Insajder, 20 February 2006,
 http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?mm=02&nav_id=190194&yyyy=2006 [accessed 
on 20 June 2008].
364 Unijat, ’Organizovani kriminal: slučaj Srbija’, 14.
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state lost dozens of millions of euros in unpaid tax and customs duty.”365 Velibor 
Lukovic, a former head of the Section for Combating Smuggling and a coordina-
tor of the Customs Administration for the area south of Belgrade, was charged 
with organising this criminal syndicate. The syndicate was, in the meantime, re-
duced from 28 to ‘just’ eighteen members.366 
Renewal of international cooperation and the 
beginning of customs services reform
 In April 2001 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) became a member of the 
World Customs Organisation (WCO). Membership of this organisation was im-
portant for the Serbian customs service. Twelve international conventions and 
a number of recommendations were adopted under the auspices of the WCO. 
These conventions and recommendations were adopted in order to simplify 
and harmonise customs procedures, thus enhancing the movement of goods 
across the borders.367 
Since 1 January 2002, the FCA is no longer directly responsible to the FRY 
government. It is instead subject to the Federal Ministry of Finance.368 Three 
months later a new Director of the FCA, Vladan Begovic, announced the re-
organisation of the customs service, in cooperation with the European Union 
(EU). Begovic stated that the strategy was made in cooperation with the World 
Bank.369 Immediately after, the FRY joined the Trade and Transport Facilitation in 
South East Europe Programme (TTFSE), a regional project of customs adminis-
trations modernisation.370 
In May 2003 the CA become part of the network of Regional Intelligence 
Liaison Offices (RILOs), acting under the auspices of the World Customs Organi-
sation, gaining the right to join the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN), which 
facilitates the exchange of information and co-operation against smuggling. In 
2003 the new Customs law and Code of conduct for customs officers came into 
365 ‘Optužnica za carinsku mafiju’, B92, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.
php?yyyy=2007&mm=05&dd=28&nav_id=248670 [accessed on 24 December 2007]
366 “Počelo suđenje carinskoj mafiji” B92, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.
php?yyyy=2007&mm=12&dd=10&nav_id=275828 [accessed on 24 December 2007]
367 Website of the World Customs Organisation, http://www.wcoomd.org/home.htm
368 Website of the Customs Administration of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.fcs.yu
369 Website of the Information Directorate of the Council of Ministers of State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro, http://ssinf.sv.gov.yu/saveznavlada/print.php?idteksta=5
370 By joining the TTFSE, the state expressed its readiness to reduce costs and burdens at borders 
which are not customs related, and to reduce smuggling: Website of the Trade and Transport 
Facilitation in South East Europe Programme, http://www.ttfse.org
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effect,371 which specified rules of conduct for customs officers in relation to their 
colleagues, managers and members of the public during and outside of work 
hours.
Following 5 October 2000 the customs service faced problems resulting 
from poor relations within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. After Bel-
grade rejected a request not to re-appoint Mihalj Kertes FCA director, the Mon-
tenegrin authorities took control of the customs offices in Montenegro in 1998. 
After Kertes’ re-appointment Montenegro ceased paying customs revenues into 
the federal budget.372 This decision of Montenegrin authorities was politically 
motivated; Podgorica was no longer prepared to finance the politics dictated 
by Belgrade.
In its first regular report on progress towards EU accession drafted in April 
2002, the European Commission (EC) criticised the fact that the Republic of Ser-
bia and the Republic of Montenegro had separate customs administrations, two 
separate customs codes and two separate IT systems.  At the time it was EC 
policy to observe the FRY (and one year later Serbia and Montenegro) as a sin-
gle country, for the purposes of EU membership candidacy.
After the Belgrade Agreement was signed, the Serbian and Montenegrin 
Customs Administrations started regularisation of administrative customs, har-
monisation of documents required in customs procedure and a gradual reduc-
tion of customs tariff in Serbia and increase of tariffs in Montenegro. The lack of 
will to carry out the agreement led to another negative EC assessment.
Establishment of new state bodies with certain 
police powers
The first Law on the prevention of money laundering, which was adopted by the 
Federal Assembly on 27 September 2001, envisaged the establishment of a fed-
eral body responsible for the prevention of money laundering, whose organisa-
tion and scope of work would be established subsequently by the federal gov-
ernment.373 The definition included only “the placement of money374 acquired 
371 ‘Code of Conduct of Customs Officers’ Customs Administration,
 http://www.fcs.yu/srpski/o_nama/kodeks.htm [accessed on 24 December 2007]
372 Ratomir Petković, ‘Federacija samo na papiru: Srbija i Crna Gora nisu više u istoj državi?’, AIM 
Press, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/pubs/archive/data/199806/80622-019-pubs-beo.htm [ac-
cessed on 8 September 2008]
373 Law on prevention of money laundering, art. 11, the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, no. 53/2001.
374 In money laundering we can distinguish phases of placement, laying (or covering) and 
integration. According to Miroslava Milenović, ‘Pranje novca’ Puls (Magazine on Corruption), (July 
– August 2004): 1. 
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through illegal activities into the accounts of banks and other financial institu-
tions […] by national and foreign physical and legal persons with the aim of 
conducting a legal economic or financial activity.”375 Hiding the illegal origin of 
money or property, including the following two phases of money laundering – 
“laying” and “integration” – were not considered an integral part of the crime.376 
Soon after the Law on tax procedure and tax administration was enacted, the 
Tax Police was established within the security sector; “The amendments of the 
Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration changed the concept of the Tax 
Police powers, so that it […] became independent in conducting and applying 
the authorities it had.”377
The powers of this institution (which are also called police competencies) 
are under the control of Public Prosecutor’s Office. Coercive measures – search 
or investigative – cannot be applied by the Tax Police alone, but in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Interior (MoI). According to the law, cooperation between 
the MoI and the Tax Police is based on special agreement. After the law came 
into effect, this agreement was signed by the Minister of Finance and the Min-
ister of Interior. It clearly defined the forms and methods of co-operation be-
tween the Tax Police and the Ministry of Interior.378 
After the nature of the union of Serbia and Montenegro changed, the fight 
against money laundering was transferred from the federal level to the level of 
member states. The Federal Commission for the Prevention of Money Launder-
ing was replaced by the Administration for the Prevention of Money Launder-
ing. The new Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering was passed by the 
Serbian parliament on 28 November 2005.379 
On 25 September 2008 the Serbian government adopted the National Strat-
egy against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.380 However, this law 
(which is a response to international obligations) had still not been enacted at 
the time of writing (September 2008).   
                               
375 ‘Borba protiv pranja novca u Srbiji’: 29.
376 Ibid.
377 Miodrag Vuković, ’Uloga poreske policije u reformi sektora bezbednosti’, in Reforma sektora 
bezbednosti u Srbiji: dostignuća i perspektive, Ed. Miroslav Hadžić. (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Mili-
tary Relations 2007), 118.
378 Vuković, 119.
379 The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 107/2005, 117/2005, 62/2006.
380 ‘Notice’ Website of the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering, http://www.apml.
org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=6&Itemid=6&lang=rs
&limitstart=4 (accessed on 11 Nov 2008).
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REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representativeness of women
Article 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia prohibits any discrimina-
tion, direct or indirect, on the grounds of gender.381
Article 18 of the Labour law introduces even more comprehensive prohibi-
tion.382 Unlike the Constitution, this law defines the concept of direct and indi-
rect discrimination. Whereas direct discrimination is “any action […] that puts 
an employee or a person seeking an employment into unfavourable position in 
relation to others in the same or similar situation”, “indirect discrimination […] 
exists when an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice puts […] into 
unfavourable position in relation to the others who are seeking employment 
[…] due to certain attribute, status, position or belief.”383 
Article 9 of the Law on civil servants stipulates that, in recruitment decisions, 
a candidate’s professional qualifications, knowledge and skills are the decisive 
criteria.384 A civil servant’s promotion will depend on whether he or she has 
these qualities or not. This is reaffirmed by article 11, which stipulates equal op-
portunities for all employees.385 
Article 318 of the Customs law prescribes the conditions for recruitment of 
customs officers. Gender is not a condition. The criteria for recruitment, apart 
from formal requirements,386 are the type and degree of professional qualifica-
tion. Article 322 of the law refers to the requirements for promotion and stipu-
lates that the only condition for promotion appraisal of professional capabili-
ties.387 
According to information received by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations 
from the Bureau of the Director of the Customs Administration on 25 June 2008, 
candidates are recuited regardless of their gender, race or ethnicity. It was fur-
381 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 18, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
no. 98/2006.
382 Labour law, art. 18, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 24/2005, 61/2005.
383 Labour law, art. 19.
384 Law on civil servants, Art. 9, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 79/2005, 81/2005 
and 83/2005.
385 Law on civil servants, Art. 11.
386 “That [the person] is a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro, that he/she has not been sentenced 
to a minimum three months of imprisonment, that he/she has not been convicted of fraud, 
violence or drugs and that he/she fulfils special health and psychological and physical require-
ments for specific tasks, that his/her employment in a body of public authority has not been 
terminated due to disciplinary measures.”   
Customs law, art. 318, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 73/2003, 61/2005. 
387 Customs law, art. 322.
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ther stated that job requirements are never defined on the grounds of gender. 
In line with the positive legislation, “training […] professional development op-
portunities are organised in line with the needs of the customs service and gen-
der is never a condition for professional advancement.”388
It was also stated that in public calls for applications for hiring 55 officers in 
2006, 30 women and 25 men were eventually employed. This can be illustrated 
by the vacancy notice for the position of head of Customs Office in Kraljevo 
published in March 2008 on the ‘Infostud’ web page. This vacancy notice did not 
list gender as a precondition for employment.389
Out of the total number of employees, women represent 40.25 per cent. 
This high percentage of female employees is a result of the fact that they per-
form administrative tasks (70 per cent of the employees), while the percentage 
of those engaged in operational tasks is significantly lower (37.2 per cent). This 
percentage ratio indicates that the division of ‘male’ and ‘female’ jobs is less 
obvious in the CA, but that administrative jobs are more often performed by 
women than men.
The CA does not recruit and promote candidates according to gender and 
the participation of women in the total number of employees is above the na-
tional level for public administration.390 However, there is a lack of measures that 
would promote gender equality, which could eventually increase the number of 
women employed in operational positions. 
Average grade: 3 (three)
Representativeness of ethnic minorities
The provisions of the Constitution, the Law on civil servants and the Labour law 
(which were cited in the section on gender equality) refer to the representative-
ness of ethnic minorities as well. In the Customs law, in the abovementioned 
articles 318 and 322, ethnicity is not listed as a precondition for recruitment or 
promotion.
Nevertheless, as stated in the information received from the Customs Ad-
ministration, this institution tries to ensure proportional representation of eth-
388 Response of the Bureau of the Director of Customs Administration to the enquiry of the Cen-
tre for Civil-Military Relations from 23 May 2008, sent in print on 25 June 2008.
389 ‘Konkurs za radno mesto: upravnik carinarnice’, website Poslovi Infostud.com, http://poslovi.
infostud.com/oglasi/dbk.php?posaoID=31351 (accessed on 3 Nov 2008).
390 Participation of women in state administration and social insurance services, according to 
the Republic Bureau for Statistics is 38.5 per cent. The Republic Bureau for Statistics, ‘Workforce 
Survey for April 2008’ Press release, no. 373 (2008): 9-10,
http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd/dokumenti/saopstenja/RS10/rs10102008.pdf
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nic minorities, especially in units located in areas where ethnic communities 
live. The note claims that one of the job requirements in these units is language 
knowledge of a given ethic minority.
The authorities are guided by regulations when recruiting and promoting 
candidates, and not by ethnicity. Positive discrimination measures, which are 
applied in vacancy notices for positions in those units where ethnic minorities 
live, is commensurate with the principle of efficiency. However, the vacancy no-
tices are not sufficiently visible.
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half)                                    
TRANSPARENCY
general transparency
The Law on free access to information of public importance establishes the right 
of citizens, the media and other entities to free access to information held by 
public authority bodies. This law also establishes the institution of a Commis-
sioner for Information of Public Importance. The Commissioner is independent 
in exercising his or her authority, and their main function is to ensure the effec-
tive implementation of this right. Article 52 of the Constitution guarantees this 
right.
However, in his work, the Commissioner faces inadequate legal framework. 
The right to free access to information is limited by: 1. A formulation by which 
access is allowed only to certain interested parties or based on requests in 
which there is a “justified” or “founded” interest for access to information; 2. A 
formulation by which access is limited data confidentiality, and; 3. A formulation 
by which some information is simply exempt.391 Enforcement of the Law on free 
access to information of public importance is hindered by a lack of complemen-
tary regulations, such as a law on classification of information and a law on per-
sonal data protection. These laws would simplify “the deliberation of the order 
of precedence between the public’s right to know and the data confidentiality 
requirements.”392
In response to the Centre for Civil-Military Relations’ enquiry, the Customs 
Administration stated that it responded to all nine requests for access to infor-
mation received during 2007. Five of these requests were approved, three were 
391 Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, Report on implementation of the law on 
free access to information of public importance in 2007 (Belgrade, March 2008), 17.
392 Report on the implementation of the Law on free access to information of public importance in 
2007, 18.
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denied and one was only partially approved. 
Article 39 of the Law on free access to information of public importance stipu-
lates the obligation of the public authority bodies to publish an Information 
Booklet containing basic information on their work. The Information Booklet, 
which should be published at least once a year, should contain basic informa-
tion on the institution’s activities. The Commissioner issued the Instruction in 
July 2005, in which he recommended the publishing of the Information Booklet 
in electronic form on their websites.393
The Information Booklet would enable members of the public and the me-
dia to access important information on these bodies, staff capacities, organi-
sation, authorities, use of budget resources and the type of information held. 
The institution itself would benefit from the drafting of an Information Booklet, 
since staff members would have the opportunity to assess their organisation 
and established procedures and make any necessary improvements.394
The Information Booklet included in this research was published by the Cus-
toms Administration in June 2008. The following sections of the Information 
Booklet are relevant for the evaluation of general transparency; “data on the 
type of information that the CA holds,” “data on the type of information to which 
the CA allows access” and “the CA data that are important for the public.”
The executives of the CA have established the practice of publishing pub-
lic requests for access to information of public importance in the Information 
Booklet. In the June 2008 issue all five approved requests in 2007 were pub-
lished.395 
When the data that the CA can hold is concerned, the authors of the Infor-
mation Booklet refer us to article 312 of the Customs law. This article stipulates 
that when customs officer is acquainted with confidential information while 
performing their duty (unless the information is defined as public), they must 
not pass the information to unauthorised persons or use it for personal gain. It is 
worth mentioning that the request for confidentiality of information is defined 
by this article as permanent.396
A portion of data that the CA holds is published in the periodicals following 
the work of this institution (Statistical Bulletin and Customs Officer). The other 
portion refers to customs regulations, explained in the publications Passenger 
Flows and Customs Guide. The public relations service is an integral part of the 
CA. It is responsible for presenting information to the public through press re-
393 Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, Instruction for development of the Infor-
mation Booklet of the public authority bodies, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 
57/2005.
394 Instruction for development of the Information Booklet of the public authority bodies, 26.
395 ‘Information Booklet on the Customs Administration’, Customs Administration (June 2008): 3, 
http://www.fcs.yu/srpski/right/Informator.pdf
396 Customs law, Art. 312.
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leases, and the webpage www.fcs.yu, from where the Information Booklet can 
be downloaded.
The CA provides access to “all information that are available, and which have 
been obtained during the activities or in relation to the activities of the CA.”397 
The data, the document containing the data or a copy of this document, shall 
be made available to those seeking the information, except where there are 
grounds to not allow or to limit freedom of access.398    
The webpage of the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering 
displays questions regarding the Law on the prevention of money laundering. 
This has been done to remove any doubts regarding the information required 
related to financial transactions. The list of ‘frequently asked questions’ is up-
dated on regular basis.399
By publishing the requests for access to information in the Customs Admin-
istration’s Information Booklet, the CA has demonstrated its determination to 
apply the the Law on free access to information of public importance. The execu-
tives of the Administration for Prevention of Money Laundering have acted in a 
similar fashion. The only problem remaining is a lack of standardisation.
Average grade: 3 (three)
Financial transparency
The 2008 budget earmarked RSD 5,512.5 million for the CA. Budget revenues 
make up RSD 4,437.3 million of this sum and CA revenues of budget benefici-
aries RSD 1,075.2 million. Donations from international organisations’ amount 
to only RSD 4.5 million.400 The CA resources increased by one third compared 
to 2007 (RSD 3,696.6 million).401 The amount approved for 2008 is significantly 
397 Information Booklet on the Customs Administration, 43.
398 Information Booklet on the Customs Administration, 44. Conditions for limiting or denying 
free access exist where there is the possibility of jeopardising the values of life, health, safety, 
judiciary, defence, national and public security, economic wellbeing of the country and secret: 
Law on free access to information of public importance, Art. 9, the Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Serbia, no. 120/2004.
399 ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ website of the Administration for the Prevention of Money 
Laundering, http://www.apml.org.rs/index.php?view=category&cid=6%3A---&option=com_
quickfaq&Itemid=5&lang=rs (accessed on 5 November 2008).
400 Law on the budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2008, the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, no. 123/07.
401 ‘Information Booklet of the Customs Administration’ Customs Administration (June 2008): 24, 
http://www.fcs.yu/srpski/right/Informator.pdf.
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lower than the budget proposed by the CA of RSD 5,610 million.402 
According to data available in the CA’s Information Booklet, the unallo-
cated surplus of revenue from previous years was spent on “rewards, bonuses 
and other necessary expenditures”; “contract services”; “regular repair work and 
maintenance”; “materials”; and “machines and equipment”. The use of these re-
sources for these purposes was approved by the Ministry of Finance. The ap-
proved resources were spent, except those allocated to contract services. Out of 
the approved RSD 78.5 million, only 36 million was spent.403 In 2008 the largest 
portion of contract services will also be financed from the CA’s own revenues, at 
a ratio of 5:1.404 Considering that the salaries and related dues for those engaged 
in “special tasks – projects” (in diplomatic and consular offices and international 
missions) are already included under economic classifications 411 and 412 of 
the CA’s budget (employees’ salaries and allowances, social insurance), it is im-
portant to clarify what is implied under the category of “contract services.”
Projected resources of the CA for 2008 indicate that the bulk will be spent 
on employees’ salaries and social insurance (RSD 2,080 million, or 37 per cent of 
the budget). It is telling that there is no economic classification referring to in-
vestments. There are, however, items such as “regular costs”, “regular repair work 
and maintenance” and “materials” to which RSD 835.6 million have been allo-
cated. As already stated, in 2008 “contract services” will be mostly funded from 
the CA’s own revenues (RSD 186 million). Although this is only three per cent of 
the CA budget, for reason of financial transparency it is necessary to clarify how 
these resources will be spent.
The 2008 budget stipulates that, according to the Law on public procure-
ment, “a low value contract” is considered to be a contract where the estimated 
value is between RSD 270,000 and 2,700,000.405 In practice this means that the 
law does not apply to contracts valued annually below RSD 270,000, and that 
contracts between RSD 270,000 and 2,700,000 are subject to procedures envis-
aged for low value contracts.
Article 124 of the Law on public procurement406 obliges the client (buyer) to 
adopt regulations laid down by the Rulebook on low value contracts. According 
to the response received from the CA, “the contracts that fall under the thresh-
old value set within a budget year, and to which the clients are not obliged to 
apply the provisions of the law, make up for less then one per cent of the total 
402 Information Booklet of the Customs Administration, 27.
403 Information Booklet of the Customs Administration, 25.
404 Information Booklet of the Customs Administration, 26.
405 Law on the budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2008, Art.20, the Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Serbia, no. 123/07.
406 Law on public procurement of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 124, the Official Gazette of the Repub-
lic of Serbia, no. 39/02, 43/03, 55/04, 101/05.
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value of procurements within the CA.”407 It is assumed that the CA, due to a low 
number of such contracts, has not adopted a specific Rulebook.
The Information Booklet does not explain which organisational unit of the 
CA is responsible for the implementation of public procurement procedures. 
It is unclear whether responsibility is divided between organisational unit for 
whose needs tenders are made, or whether there is a single unit responsible for 
the CA.
Given that customs officers have the power to bear and use firearms,408 the 
issue of future procurement of weapons arises. According to article 2 paragraph 
4 of the Law on public procurement, the procurement of weapons is considered 
confidential and is regulated by a specific set of rules. The Law on weapons and 
military equipment manufacturing and trade regulates this matter in an unsatis-
factory way.409
The bulk of the budget approved for the current year is spent by the CA on 
salaries and social insurance. The explanation of the economic budget classifi-
cation “contract services” is missing. The public procurement procedure is being 
followed, but there is the lack of an appropriate legal framework to regulate 
the procurement and control of weapons. There is no information concerning 
which CA unit is responsible for the implementation of the public procurement 
procedure. While reviewing the budget it was impossible to determine the re-
sources appropriated for the execution of special evidence gathering measures. 
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half)       
                        
    
PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORgANISATIONS
Participation in policy making 
According to available information, the participation of citizens and civil society 
organisations in policy making is negligible.
Average grade: 1 (one)
407 Response of the Bureau of the Director of Customs Administration to the enquiry made by 
the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. 
408 Customs law, Art. 276, para 6.
409 Preconditions that the client must fulfil in order for trade to be successful are reduced to only 
one article in the law (Art. 26): Law on arms and military equipment manufacturing and trade, the 
Official Gazette of the FRY, no. 41/96, the Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro, no. 07/05, 
the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 85/05.
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Participation in policy implementation and evaluation
The CA has concluded memoranda of understanding with a number of compa-
nies to establish a framework for intensive co-operation against customs viola-
tions. These memoranda are aimed at the prevention of drugs smuggling, vio-
lation of intellectual property rights and all acts that jeopardise the safe trade 
in goods. Complementary instructions define the rights and responsibilities of 
the signatories, and the forms of cooperation. The instructions define methods 
of provision of information that are helpful for the CA in disclosing and investi-
gating attempted frauds.410 A designated information line of the CA was estab-
lished and citizens can use it to report cases of customs violations. At the web-
page of the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering there is the 
section in which ‘frequently asked questions’ are listed, along with responses. 
This section is updated regularly.
At the conferences ‘Reform of Security Sector in Serbia: Achievements and 
prospects’, held in October 2006 and ‘Democratic control and oversight over the 
use of special investigative measures and powers’, organised by the Centre for 
Civil-Military Relations in November 2007, representatives of the CA, the Admin-
istration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Tax Police presented 
trends and achievements of reforms.
The basic preconditions for the participation of citizens in policy implemen-
tation and evaluation are fulfilled. However, there is no formalised cooperation 
between citizens and CSOs and institutions with police powers. 
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half) 
                 
ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC CIVIL 
CONTROL AND PUBLIC CONTROL
AND OVERSIghT
Control of use of certain police powers
CA exercises control over CA work. As a public administration body, the CA en-
forces laws and other regulations and enactments of parliament and the gov-
ernment, by undertaking administrative activities and executive tasks. How-
410 National Programme for Integration: a work-in-progress version, Government of the Republic of 
Serbia (2008): 594: http://web.uzzpro.gov.rs/kzpeu/dokumenti/npi/npi_radna_verzija_maj2008.
pdf
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ever, the CA does not have legislative competences.411 Immediate control and 
oversight of the CA is also done by the Administrative Inspectorate.412 
The director of the CA is appointed by the government upon recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Finance.413 The CA’s director is subordinate to the Minister 
of Finance. Upon the director’s recommendation the Minister approves inter-
nal post classification within the CA, decides on rights and responsibilities of 
the CA’s employees and establishes the number of posts, their descriptions and 
structure. Finally, the Minister rules on employees’ complaints concerning em-
ployment rights and responsibilities.414 
The director’s primary task is to ensure “coordination and a unified imple-
mentation of the regulation from within the CA’s scope of work within the entire 
customs area.”415 Furthermore, the director is authorised to suspend and demote 
a customs officer, to dismiss him/her or to rehabilitate an officer who has been 
demoted.416 The director can approve financial incentives to those who help to 
resolve customs violations and offences.417 Upon the report of a line supervisor, 
the director can initiate an investigation on inappropriate conduct or violation 
of duty.418 Finally, in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, the Director 
is obliged to inform the responsible Public Prosecutor on the criminal offence 
prosecuted ex officio.419   
The Internal Control Department has existed as an independent organisa-
tional unit within the CA, since September 2003. The Internal Control Depart-
ment’s primary task is to define the measures of protecting and securing con-
fidential materials. It also investigates and prepares reports on investigations 
concerning unprofessional conduct or corruption. The Internal Control Depart-
ment obtains court warrants necessary for gathering criminal evidence and co-
operates with other state bodies, international organisations, as well as educa-
tional, cultural or scientific research institutions.420   
The CA believes that one priority of modernisation is an increase in the re-
sources available to the Internal Control Directorate. This primarily means that 
the number of posts in the department should be increased and the office 
411 Law on public administration, Art. 14, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 
79/2005.
412 Law on public administration, Art. 45.
413 Customs law, art. 255, para 1.
414 Customs law, art. 256 and 258.
415 Customs law, art. 255, para 2.
416 Customs law, Art. 265.
417 Customs law, Art. 266.
418 Customs law, Art. 267.
419 Customs law, Art. 275.
420 Information Booklet on the Customs Administration, 14.
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space enlarged.421 
All the formal preconditions to enable the executive branch of power to 
control the CA are in place. However, based on existing legislation, it is not pos-
sible to establish how the executive state bodies actually oversee the use of 
certain police powers.
Average grade: 2.5 (two and a half)
Parliamentary control of use of certain police powers
Parliament oversees the work of the CA. However, reports from the sessions 
of the parliamentary Finance Committee show that between 18 January 2005, 
when the 24th session of this Committee was held under Vojislav Kostunica’s 
government, until the last session held around the time of publication of this 
research (5 September 2008), there were no discussions on the work of the CA, 
Tax Police nor the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering.
Given that the Ministry of Finance drafted the new Customs law (and ac-
companying by-laws), due to be adopted by the end of 2008, a discussion by 
this Committee could be expected. Serbia has been through two election cycles 
in the past two years, followed by months of negotiations on forming the gov-
ernment. This has impacted on the work of parliament. Parliament engaged in 
frenzied legislative activity in order to complete the legal framework defined by 
the Constitutional law, but also by the expectations set forth by the European 
Commission. As a result the Finance Committee spent most of its time debating 
draft laws and appointments in the newly established state bodies, such as the 
Supreme Audit Institution.422
Reports from the sessions of the Security and Defence Committee in 2007 
and 2008, suggest that the Committee had no interest in working with state 
bodies which have police powers.
Average grade: 1 (one)
Judicial control of use of certain police powers
According to the Criminal Procedure Code, the Investigative Judge decides upon 
use of special investigative measures, based on the Public Prosecutor’s written 
421 Response of the Bureau of the director of CA to the enquiry made by CCMR.
422 ‘Committee activities and sessions’, Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.parla-
ment.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/aktivnosti/skupstinske_odbor_lista.asp?Id=42 (accessed on 5 Sep 
2008).
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justification or request. This request must contain evidence and information on 
the individual(s) accused of committing a crime. Furthermore, a request for the 
use of special investigative measures for combatting organised crime must be 
accompanied with a justification that the organised crime in question cannot 
be disclosed, proved or prevented in any other way.423 
When the Investigative Judge decides that the conditions for approval of 
the use of special investigative measures have been fulfilled, they issue a court 
order. Otherwise, they issue the ruling according to why the use of such meas-
ures is denied. The order can contain information on the person against whom 
the measure is to be used and an explanation of the type of crime, and also the 
method, scope, place and duration of measure, including the party responsible 
for its application. This must be accompanied by a justification for the use of 
such a measure.424
The Investigative Judge oversees the use of special investigative meas-
ures by requesting reports, even on a daily basis when organised crime is con-
cerned.425
When the special investigative measure is used, police authorities sub-
mit a special report to the Investigative Judge and to the Public Prosecutor. If 
these materials are not used as evidence in criminal proceedings, they are de-
stroyed under the supervision of the Investigative Judge. Official minutes are 
made. However, this information is considered an official secret.426 Based on 
the Criminal Procedure Code, within a Special Department for Organised Crime 
of Belgrade District Court, there are ‘registers’ upon which basic information is 
recorded on every case in which the use of special investigative measures is 
decided. This is where “the prosecutor’s request or proposal is submitted, with 
all the annexes and enactments related to the Investigative Judge’s control and 
oversight of measures used, police reports, official records on submitted materi-
als including the list of materials, official minutes on the destroyed materials or 
note that the materials are used in the criminal proceedings, a copy of notice 
sent to the persons to whom the destroyed information referred, etc.”427 
It was impossible to obtain information on the effectiveness of judicial con-
trol over use of special investigative measures.
Average grade: 1 (one)
423 Vučko Mirčić, ‘Uloga sudstva u primeni posebnih mera od strane različitih državnih ustanova’, 
in Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih mera i ovlašćenja, Eds. Miroslav Hadžić and Pre-
drag Petrović. (Belgrade, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 106.
424 Ibid.
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
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Public control and oversight of use of certain police 
powers 
Based on all the available information, we were unable to determine whether 
there were any examples of public control and oversight over the use of certain 
police powers.    
Average grade: 1 (one)                    
RULE OF LAW
Use of special investigative measures and powers 
during investigative procedures
“Special investigative measures”, as stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Code, 
are “secret auditory and optical forms of surveillance of a suspect”, “provision 
of simulated business services and brokerage of simulated business deals”, “in-
volvement of undercover agents”, “access to records on personal and other re-
lated data on a suspect” and “control of banking and financial transactions of a 
suspect.”428 
The CA indirectly gathers personal and other data from existing records. The 
authorised customs officer is not obliged to inform the person to whom the 
data relates if it prevents or hinders their work.429 
Within the CA’s Sector for Control of Customs Regulations there is an Op-
erational Centre whose task is to collect, process and forward intelligence. The 
intelligence is produced internal units of the CA and other state bodies, and 
can be collected through the ‘customs phone line’. The Operational Centre is in 
charge of verifying and processing information it receives, and for forwarding 
this information to the responsible internal unit of the CA. The information is 
classified and completely protected. If the intelligence indicates that there is a 
reasonable suspicion of crime, it is then forwarded to the responsible organisa-
tional units within the Ministry of Interior. However, the problem of destroying 
and archiving of the information obtained in this way is yet to be resolved. 
An authorised customs officer has the right and duty to carry firearms and 
ammunition under the conditions stipulated by the Minister of Finance, pre-
scribed by the Rulebook on weapons of authorised police personnel and em-
428 Momčilo Grubač, ‘Posebna ovlašćenja organa krivičnog gonjenja i ustavna prava i slobode 
građana’, in Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih mera i ovlašćenja, Eds. Miroslav Hadžić 
and Predrag Petrović. (Belgrade, Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 49–50.
429 Customs law, Art. 296, para 1.
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ployees engaged in specific duties within the Ministry of Interior.430
If there is reasonable suspicion that a tax-related criminal offence has been 
committed, the Tax Police can use coercion to arrest suspects. Officers have the 
right to search apartments, businesses and other premises, as well as persons 
and vehicles. Finally, all objects that can be used as evidence in a criminal case 
can be seized by the Tax Police.431 When arresting a suspect or seizing objects, 
the Tax Police coooperates with the Ministry of Interior.432
The Tax Police is not authorised to apply surveillance measures or to use 
telephone tapping, surveillance of other technical means of communication, 
nor optical surveillance.433 
Information concerning financial transactions or the identity of parties in-
volved which are relevant for the prevention of money laundering, are classified 
as official secrets. This information is recorded and exchanged in the three-way 
relationship consisting of an obligor,434 the customs authorities and the Admin-
istration for the Prevention of Money Laundering. The obligors first record the 
data to establish the identity of the client. The customs authorities record infor-
mation on cross-border transfers of cash, cheques, securities, precious metals 
or precious stones. The Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering 
records all cash transactions that exceed EUR 15,000 in RSD counter value. It 
also records all transfers of cash, cheques, securities, precious metals or precious 
stones across the state border if their value exceeds the prescribed limit. The 
Administration also registers all initiatives of the responsible authorities under-
taken for data verification so that the suspicion of money laundering can be 
investigated. Finally, every exchange of information (including that between 
competent national and foreign state bodies and international organisations) 
is recorded. The obligors, the customs authorities and the Administration for 
the Prevention of Money Laundering are responsible for archiving this informa-
tion for the minimum of five years after the transaction or transfer has been 
executed.
According to article 25 paragraph 3 of the law, personal data held by the ad-
430 Customs law, Art. 276, para 6.
431 Boris Batarilo, ‘Poreska policija’, p. 100.
432 Ibid.
433 Ibid.
434 “For the purpose of this Law, the obligors shall be banks and other financial organisations 
(savings institutions, savings and credit organisations and savings and credit cooperatives), 
bureaux de change, postal and telecommunication enterprises as well as other enterprises and 
c-ooperatives, insurance companies, investment funds and other institutions operating in the 
financial market, stock exchanges, broker-dealer associations, custody banks, banks authorized 
to trade in securities and other individuals/entities engaged in transactions involving securities, 
precious metals and precious stones, organizers of classical and special games of chance (casi-
nos, slot-machine clubs, betting places), as well as of other games of chance, pawnshops. (Law 
on the prevention of money laundering, Art. 4)
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ministration may be forwarded to the competent foreign authorities “provided 
that the country to which the data is forwarded has regulated protection of per-
sonal data and with confirmation that the country’s competent authorities will 
use the personal data solely with the aim of detecting and preventing money 
laundering.”
However, a clear provision on who controls the Administration for the Pre-
vention of Money Laundering when it is executing its authority to record per-
sonal data is missing from the law. This is a major flaw in the system.
The fact that there is no law on personal data protection is a major short-
coming and it has been only partially compensated by the procedure of collect-
ing, processing and forwarding information of the CA. It is also worrying that 
archiving and destroying of information has not been resolved. There is no pro-
vision that specifies which body controls the Administration for the Prevention 
of Money Laundering when it is recording the personal information. 
Average grade: 1.5 (one and a half)                     
EFFICIENCY
human and material resources
In practically all corruption surveys, the public declares the customs services 
the most corrupt state authority. However, in Transparency Serbia’s 2007 annual 
report, there is no information on corruption in the customs services. The CA 
was not included in the survey.435 Widespead corruption in the service is con-
firmed by the current director Predrag Petronijevic: “There is no question that 
the phenomenon of corruption is present in the customs service too. More than 
50 employees of the Customs Administration, currently under suspension, are 
investigated by the police and the judiciary. The investigation on some of them 
is conducted by the Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime of Belgrade District 
Court and they will probably be tried by the Court’s Special Department. The 
fact that more than two per cent of the total number of employees in a public 
authority body, which should be highly responsible, are being investigated in 
one way or another, is something that should get us all thinking and that calls 
for urgent reaction so that we can reduce the level of corruption to the lowest 
435 As said at the end of the presentation; “the number of current cases of bribery committed by 
citizens is certainly higher, because some issues and areas have not been included in the survey 
(e.g. customs services, bribing for employment, bribing the inspection authorities).” 
“Globalni barometar korupcije 2007”, Transparency Serbia and UNODC:
 http://www.transparentnost.org.yu/aktivnosti/antikorupc_sav/07122007.htm (accessed on 4 
September 2008).
258
possible level.”436 So far the only measure that has been used against suspects 
is suspension, but without hiring new officers to fill these vacant positions.437 
As possible solutions, Mr Petronijevic recommends staff rotations and sys-
tematic measures; “By introducing electronic customs processing of goods we 
will avoid direct physical contact of customs officers with importers or shipping 
companies, which is one of the key preconditions eliminating corruption. On 
the other hand, by strengthening some services within the CA, primarily inter-
nal control […] we will show clearly that the fight against corruption is one of 
our primary goals.”438 
Introduction of good governance into the CA is hindered by an inappropri-
ate staff structure. The director of the CA said in 2007 that out of 2465 permanent 
staff members around 47 per cent had secondary school education […]; “We 
will try to increase the number of university-educated employees through new 
job classification, which should be completed by the end of this year.”439 Director 
Petronijevic announced that they would be also working on specific training of 
staff, reconstruction of the CA’s Vocational Education Centre and modernisation 
of distance learning (or e-learning). The Customs CA also confirmed that they 
have an insufficient number of university-educated staff members.440    
Customs officer training in the CA’s Vocational Education Centre is conduct-
ed during the first six months of employment. The training consists of practi-
cal elements within customs offices and seminars. Theoretical training for those 
with secondary school education is organised separately from college or uni-
versity graduates. After training the officers take the professional competency 
exam. There are also specialised seminars organised for some categories of cus-
toms officers, where more focused specialised topics are taught.441 
The CA’s plans to upgrade staff competencies could be hampered by gov-
ernment’s announcement that it would take responsibility to find employment 
for workers forced to resign from the interim self-government institutions fol-
lowing Kosovo’s declaration of independence. According to Mirko Cvetkovic, 
Minister of Finance at the time, there was a request to hire a number of people 
into the CA and Tax Administration. These workers had to submit evidence on 
436 ’Promene iz temelja – Intervju sa Predragom Petronijevićem’, Ekonomist, 8 Oct 2007.
437 ‘Novi zakon o sprečavanju pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma u skupštinskoj proce-
duri u oktobru’, Government of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.
php?id=72722&q=carina (accessed on 26 Aug 2008).
438 ‘Novi zakon o sprečavanju pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma u skupštinskoj proceduri u 
oktobru’
439 ’Promene iz temelja – Intervju sa Predragom Petronijevićem’, Ekonomist, 8 Oct 2007.
440 Response of the Bureau of the director of Customs Administration to the enquiry made by 
the Centre for Civil-Military Relations.
441 Response of the Bureau of the director of the Customs Administration to the enquiry made 
by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations.
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their previous employment in Kosovo.442 
The improvement of the CA’s work has been significantly influenced by 
EU donations, implemented through the European Agency for Reconstruction 
(EAR). Together with the EC delegation, the EAR funded the construction of a 
new border crossing with Hungary – ‘Horgos’, the reconstruction of ‘Batrovci’ at 
the border with Croatia, and checkpoints ‘Presevo’ at the Macedonian border, as 
well as the reconstruction of ‘Dimitrovgrad’ railway station at the border cross-
ing with Bulgaria. Since October 2000, the EU has invested EUR 23 million in the 
reconstruction of border checkpoints.443 
The renovated Vocational Education Centre where customs officers are 
trained was opened on 10 September 2008. The EAR invested EUR 170,000 in 
its reconstruction. The training aids were modernised, and distance learning is 
finally available, facilitated by experts from the World Customs Organisation. 
Albert Camarata, a representative of the European Commission in Serbia, used 
that opportunity to praise the CA by saying that to a large extent the Serbian 
customs service had managed in practice to harmonise national laws with the 
EU acquis.444
Camarata’s positive assessment of the CA was validated in the last Progress 
Report of the European Commission, published in November 2008. The report 
highlighted the particular importance of specific organisational units within the 
CA responsible for tariffs and ex post audit. They also emphasised the impor-
tance of implementation of risk analysis leading to larger seizures of drugs and 
smuggled goods. Finally, the report states that “the implementation of the new 
Code of Conduct for Customs Officers helped disclosure of cases of abuse of of-
fice and the prosecution of these individuals before the court.”445
Addressing reporters at the opening of the renovated Education Centre, CA 
director Prederag Petronijevic said that the service “could now stand on its own 
two feet,” following the replacement of more than 60 management staff. He 
pointed out that the social phenomenon of corruption can not be rooted out, 
but it can be reduced to a level tolerable by society.446 
442 ‘Zapošljavanje radnika koji su ostali bez posla u institucijama Kosova i Metohije’, Government 
of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=86424&q=carina (ac-
cessed on 4 Sep tember 2008).
443 “Otvoren Centar za obuku carinika”, Delegation of the European Commission in Serbia, http://
www.europa.org.yu/code/navigate.php?Id=593 (accessed on 15 Sep 2008).
444 ‘Uprava carina otvorila školski centar’, Beta, 
http://www.beta-video.tv/?page=play&id=481&naslov=Uprava%20carine%20otvorila%20
%C5%A1kolski%20centar, (accessed on 10 September 2008) 
445 ‘Serbia 2008 Progress Report’ European Commission (2009): 34, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/ser-
bia_progress_report_en.pdf 
446 ‘Dan Uprave carina’, B92, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.
php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=25&nav_id=300360 (3 September 2008).
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After the CA was accepted into the World Customs Organisation, reform of 
staff education quickly developed. The scandals that marked 2006 and 2007 
only show how important it is for this process to be successfully completed. The 
transformation of the CA into a role model of “good governance” is impossible 
without cooperation with international organisations relevant for its work. Im-
plementation of the Integrated Border A Management Strategy will provide new 
incentives for ongoing reform. However, the personnel structure is still not fully 
commensurate with the CA’s needs. 
Average grade: 3 (three)       
EFFECTIVENESS
Integratedness
The Law on the basic organisation of security and intelligence system introduced 
the concept of a security intelligence system.447 However, apart from the Secu-
rity Intelligence Agency, which is a separate organisation and the Military Secu-
rity Agency and the Military Intelligence Agency which are administrative bod-
ies within the Ministry of Defence, the other institutions which make the rest of 
this system are not specified.
According to Dejan Carevic, representative of the CA, this institution uses 
an IT system that covers the whole country. It has over 2000 workstations used by 
2500 customs officers, and is connected to the network by 50 local servers which 
are in turn connected to the mainframe.448 The CA is engaged in crime preven-
tion which is why it has responsibility over goods, vehicles, passengers and docu-
ments. Finally, the CA integrates the planning, management, directing, gathering 
and distribution of information. This indicates that, apart from its fiscal and pro-
tective function, the CA has acquired security, IT and coordination functions. Mr 
Carevic, however, notes that the CA does not exercise its authorities in the same 
way as the Ministry of Interior or the Security Intelligence Agency. The CA fulfils 
its goals through timely distribution of information to the other services within 
the Serbian security system, but does not undertake the executive measures.449 
The CA and other institutions which have certain police powers are still not 
recognised by the public as actors in the Serbian security system. 
Average grade: 1.5 (one and a half) 
447 Law on the basic organisation of security and intelligence system, art. 3, the Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Srrbia, no. 116/07.
448 National Programme for Integration of the Republic of Serbia with the EU, 594.
449 Carević, ‘Reforma carinske službe u Srbiji’, 98.
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Ratio between aims, resources and outcomes
Serbia’s National programme for integration with the EU proclaims two short-term 
priorities. The first one is the enactment of the new Customs law, which should 
be adopted by the end of 2008. This law is fully aligned with EU customs legisla-
tion, apart from the section referring to specific provisions reserved only for the 
member states. The other priority is the adoption of a new Code of conduct for 
customs officers, which would regulate their conduct in a more detailed and 
specific way, and which would strengthen the integrity of the customs service 
and prevent corruption.450
There are two mid-term priorities. The first is the implementation of the 
project ‘Capacity building in the sector for implementation of the customs reg-
ulations within the Serbian CA in line with the EU best practices’, which will be 
implemented in phases until 2014. The project will be financed through the EU’s 
‘Instrument for pre-accession assistance’ (IPA). The second priority is the adop-
tion of the new Strategy of IT development of the customs services system, 
which should simplify existing procedures.451
Continuous implementation of the Integrated border management strategy 
is defined as a short-term, mid-term and long-term priority. According to the 
Strategy, the CA is one of four border services. The other three are the Ministry of 
Interior’s Border Police, the Veterinary Inspection and the Phytosanitary Inspec-
tion of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management. The inte-
grated work of these four services should create conditions for efficient system 
of border control and surveillance.452
Five years after the reform of the Customs Administration had been initi-
ated, Dragan Jerinic, who was director at the time, stated that the efficiency of 
this institution had increased significantly. Although there were three rationali-
sations (and reductions) of the personnel, the payment of customs duties has 
multiplied tenfold since 2000; “The level of disclosed cases is increasing eve-
ry year by 20 per cent. This means that in five years we [the CA] increased the 
number of disclosed cases by five times although we had reduced the number 
of staff.”453 
In the first half of 2007 the CA managed to collect 61 per cent of income pro-
jected by the budget plan.454 By 18 December 2007 it had collected RSD 54.35 
450 National Programme for Integration of the Republic of Serbia with the EU, 595.
451 National Programme for Integration of the Republic of Serbia with the EU, 595.
452 Strategy of the integrated border management in the Republic of Serbia, Government of the 
Republic of Serbia (15 September 2008); 13,  http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/upload/documents/
strategija_granice.pdf
453 ‘Za četiri meseca naplaćeno 60 milijardi dinara’ Danas, 4 May 2006.
454 ‘Novi zakon o sprečavanju pranja novca i finansiranja terorizma u skupštinskoj proce-
duri u oktobru’ Government of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.
php?id=72722&q=carina (accessed on 26 Aug 2008).
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billion in customs duties, exceeding the plan by one per cent. The total income, 
including VAT charged on imports, increased by 21.05 per cent compared to the 
same period in 2006. At the same time the number of misdemeanour procedure 
doubled compared to 2006.455
During this timeframe customs officers seized 226kg of heroin, 139kg of 
marijuana, 42kg of opium, 2.5kg of cocaine and approximately 58,000 ephe-
drine pills. According to the US Drugs Enforcement Agency, the seizure of 163kg 
of heroin at Gradina customs checkpoint in late October 2007 was the third 
largest seizure in Europe in the last five years.456 
The CA not been able to establish the exact value and amount of goods of 
Chinese origin. In order to reduce abuses, in October 2007, the CA changed the 
method in which they collected data on goods from Asia submitted for cus-
toms procedure. At the same time trainings were organised on implementing 
the CEFTA Agreement, so that customs officers are trained to deal with goods 
coming from signatory states.
Through the implementation of its new competences and of the Integrated 
Border Management Strategy, the CA is growing into a body that can execute its 
IT, coordination and security functions. However, the activities of the CA so far 
have been reduced to the collection of customs duties and the prevention of 
customs violations. 
Average grade: 3 (three)
Legitimacy 
Public opinion in Serbia perceives the customs service as highly corrupt. This 
perception originates from the 1990s. Corruption was fuelled by an inadequate 
legal system left over from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
which regulated the customs system and procedure. There were also unre-
solved border issues in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with former Yugoslav 
republics. In addition, the Milosevic regime had links to organised crime. Finally, 
the constant deterioration of customs officers’s living standards, as well as the 
existence of a large number of discretionary legal provisions, enabled the cus-
toms officers to conduct procedures as they pleased.457
455 Ibid.
456 ‘Uprava carina u 2007. ostvarila dobre rezultate u zapleni narkotika’, Government of the Repub-
lic of Serbia, http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=80415&q=carina (accessed on 26 Aug 
2008).
457 ‘Borba protiv korupcije’, Customs Administration:
 http://www.fcs.yu/srpski/right/borba_protiv_korupcije.htm (accessed on 15 Sep 2008).
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The Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Tax Po-
lice were not covered by public perception surveys.
By the end of 2006, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corrup-
tion (GRECO) had conducted a second round of evaluation of the system against 
corruption in member states. The first round focused on bodies in charge of the 
fight against corruption and immunity of officials. The second round targeted 
seizure of assets gained through corruption, as well as public administration 
and legal entities. In Serbia (a member of GRECO since 2003) there was an evalu-
ation for the first and the second round. The report, which included the analysis 
of the capacities of the CA and the APML, was adopted in June 2006. Since Oc-
tober 2006 the report has been made public.458
Several important recommendations from 2006 were introduced to the le-
gal system. The institution of the Ombudsman was established, the Council of 
the Supreme Audit Institution has been appointed, the legislative framework 
for use of special investigative techniques was adopted, and the system of wit-
ness protection became functioning. In line with recommendations, the Action 
plan for the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy was also adopted. 
However, it has yet to have “efficient implementation.”459
The GRECO Report from 2006 recommended Serbia to improve the imple-
mentation of the Law on public procurement, especially concerning the training 
of administrative staff involved in procurement processes. The report also rec-
ommended better cooperation between the Public Prosecutor and the police 
during investigations. It did not, however, specify the use of special investiga-
tive measures and powers.
Serbian authorities were given until the end of 2007 to submit a report on 
implementation of the recommendations. During the first half of 2008 GRECO 
experts assessed whether the report’s recommendations had been enacted. Ac-
cording to information available on the GRECO website, a new report on Serbia 
had not been adopted by September 2008, nor had it been made public.460
Corruption is still one of the obstacles to the reform of institutions which 
have certain police powers. General public perception of the CA is negative, 
while the public does not know enough about the Administration for the Pre-
vention of Money Laundering and the Tax Police. 
Average grade: 2 (two)
458 ‘Korupcija – najviša prepreka na putu ka EU’, Portal Argus,
http://www.korupcija.org/paragraf/7769.html  (accessed on 15 Sep 2008).
459 ‘Joint first and second evaluation report – Evaluation report on the Republic of Serbia’, GRECO 
– Group of states against corruption (2008): 5-6, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoEval1-2(2005)1rev_Ser-
bia_EN.pdf
460 The table with the overview of the report status is available at
 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/ReportsRound3_en.asp  
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1. Parliament
Filip Ejdus
The institutions of the parliament and parliamentarism do not have a deeply 
rooted tradition in modern Serbian history.461 Despite the fact that the first as-
semblies were held during the First and Second Serbian Uprisings (1804–1815), 
parliament became a legal institution in 1858 when the St. Andrew’s Day As-
sembly was convened.462 During the entire 20th century the institution of par-
liament was not sufficiently developed in Serbia. Though the 1903 constitution 
marked a departure from the principle of royal supremacy over parliament and 
Serbia became nominally a modern parliamentarian monarchy, the role of par-
liament was still more formal than real in Serbian political life.463 After World War 
I notional parliamentarism continued, since political parties, governments and 
the king (often even the conspiracy groups such as ‘Black Arm’), played more 
significant roles. World War II soon brought to power partisans and communists 
who abolished democracy and introduced a single-party system. This turned 
parliament into an institution that ritually voted for decisions already adopted 
by the Communist Party, and which completely degraded the institution of par-
liament for the next 45 years.
 With the introduction of a multi-party system in Serbia in 1990, the role 
of parliament improved. However, it was marginalised in the next ten years, 
mostly due to the cesaristic, and later sultanistic, nature of the Milosevic re-
gime.464 Members of parliament were dependent on political parties, the par-
liament on the government and ‘Rules of procedure’ were frequently violated 
461 Konstantin Nikiforov, ‘Parliamentarism in Serbia in XX century’ 20th century History, Vol. 23, no. 
1 (2005): 9-26. Website of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia,
 http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu 
462 In August 2008, then unknown texts related to the work of parliament in the 19th century 
were found in the archives. These included the minutes from the secret sitting held because of 
the Berlin Congress in 1878, and acts from the St.Andrew’s Day Assembly held in 1858.
463 It is worth mentioning that during this period the 1888 Constitution was passed, the most 
liberal constitution Serbia had ever had. Some authors call the 1903-1918 period a ‘golden age’ 
of Serbian parliamentarism. For more information, see Slavica Vuckovic, ‘Golden age – with 
epaulettes’, Republika, No. 263 (2001).
464 While a cesaristic regime has a degree of proto-democratic legitimacy, a sultanistic re-
gime is based on sheer force and coercion. Slobodan Antonić, ‘The nature of the regime in 
Serbia in the last years of Milosevic’s power’ Sociology, Vol.42, No. 4 (2000):44, and Slobodan 
Antonić,’Parliamentarism in Yugoslavia 1990-1996’, Law and Social Sciences Archive, Vol. 83, No. 2  
(1997): 177-198.
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in order to marginalise the opposition.465 That the Committee on Defence and 
Security held only eleven sittings (out of which almost a half were constitutive) 
between 1992-2001, illustrates parliament’s inactivity regarding democratic 
control of armed forces.466 Although Serbia has (at least in words) adopted de-
mocracy, since 5 October 2000 until the second parliament was elected in 2004, 
parliament continued to be burdened by problems similar to those encoun-
tered during the Milošević period and sometimes even more serious ones.467 
The security sector was faced with post-authoritarian legacies from Tito and 
Milosevic and with a post-conflict legacy of the 1990s. Paradoxically, between 
2000 and 2003, the institution of parliament was occasionally in a worse state 
than during Milosevic’s rule, due to a large number of reform measures which 
the government of the late Zoran Djindjic wanted to undertake and due to the 
need for the fast adoption of laws. This was particularly evident in the case of 
the unconstitutional termination of the terms of members of the Democratic 
Party of Serbia in 2002, as well as repeated vote-rigging (which was one of the 
reasons for the fall of government at the end of 2003).
The activities of the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security dur-
ing this period undoubtedly receives low appraisal as well. The parliament of 
FRY (from 2003 to 2006, the parliament of the State Union of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), which was nominally competent for the control and oversight of Ser-
bian Armed Forces, did not have clearly defined jurisdiction nor the political will 
to conduct effective control and oversight. For example, the SaM parliament 
was not competent to undertake budget control, since this was done by respec-
tive member-state parliaments, nor could it control the president of the FRY 
or the Supreme Defence Council. Similarly, it did not have jurisdiction over the 
election, promotion, appointment or dismissal of Yugoslav Armed Forces gen-
erals.468 In addition, parliament controlled only the military intelligence services 
(Military Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency) and services operat-
ing within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Service for Investigation and Docu-
mentation and Security Service) while civil security services (Security Informa-
tion Agency in Serbia and National Security Agency in Montenegro) were under 
the jurisdiction of republic parliaments. The Defence Committee of the federal 
parliament had a very limited scope of formal competencies, such as “to consid-
er bills, other regulations and general acts“ and ‘’to consider issues related to the 
control conducted by the Council of the work of the federal government and 
465 Dušan Pavlović and Slobodan Antonić, Consolidation of Democratic Institutions in Serbia after 
2000.  (Belgrade: The Official Gazette, 2007), 91.
466 According to Dragan Šutanovac, at the time the member of the Committee on Defence and 
Security. More in Duška Anastasijević, ‘A Panel – defence strategy in light of Euro-Atlantic inte-
grations’, Vreme, No. 811. July, 2006.
467 Pavlović and Antonić, Consolidation of Democratic Institutions in Serbia after 2000, 92.
468 Miroslav Hadžić, ‘New Constitutional Status of the Military, Vojno delo, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2003).
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other federal authorities and officials accountable to the federal parliament’’ 
(article 67).469 However, though the Defence Committee worked relatively well 
under the conditions, the absence of political will in Montenegro for the pres-
ervation of the joined state was the biggest obstacle to the functioning of the 
parliament of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro as a whole.
It was only during the second post-Milošević parliament (2004-2007) that 
the institution of parliament in Serbia began to consolidate.470 This was prima-
rily a consequence of the disintegration of the State Union of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro and the resulting transfer of the control and oversight over the military 
to the Serbian parliament (June 2006), the change of the ‘Rules of Procedure’ by 
which the competences of the Defence and Security Committee were extended 
(September 2006), and the adoption of the new constitution (December 2006). 
The new constitution stipulates that Serbian Armed Forces are under democrat-
ic and civilian control (art. 141), whereas parliament has competencies to decide 
on war and peace, proclaim state of war or state of emergency, control the work 
of the security intelligence services and to adopt a defence strategy (art. 99). 
Nevertheless legislative activity was the most intense in the entire history of 
Serbian parliamentarism.471 From February 2004 to December 2006, the Com-
mittee held 24 sittings. A sub-committee was also formed to investigate the 
respect of human rights during the ‘Saber’ action of 2003. The sub-committee 
held seven sittings.472  Regarding the reports of security sector actors submitted 
to parliament and the Committee on Defence and Security, the situation was as 
follows: In 2004, the Security Intelligence Agency (SIA) submitted two reports 
and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) four reports; in 2005, the MoI and SIA submit-
ted two reports respectively and in 2006, one report was submitted by the MoI 
and two by the SIA. All reports were approved and adopted, except the Report 
on the work of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia in 2003.473 
469 The Council of Republics of the Parliament of FRY, The Rules of Procedure with Amendments 
and Additions 2001.
470 Pavlović and Antonić, Consolidation of democratic institutions in Serbia after 2000, 112.
471 260 laws were adopted, out of which 70 per cent were laws regulating completely new areas. 
For more information see The Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, 1000 days of the work of the 
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia: Regular Report for 2004-2006, December 2006. The re-
port is available at http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/lat/aktivnosti/predsednicke_detalji.
asp?Id=155&t=P 
472 Section for the Activities of the Working Bodies of the Parliament, Report on the Work of the 
Committees 2004-2006, December 2006, 56. The report is available at:
http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/lat/akta/izvestaji.asp
473Report on the Work of the Committees  2004-2006, 56-61.
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Parliamentary control and oversight of the security 
sector in 2007 and in the first eight months of 2008
In 2007 and 2008, parliamentary activity faced the consequences of tumultuous 
political life. Firstly, after the constitution was passed, new parliamentary elec-
tions were held on 21 January 2007 and the new parliament was established on 
14 February 2007. The second recess occurred after Kosovo declared independ-
ence on 17 February 2008 and Koštunica’s government fell. New parliamentary 
elections took place on 11 May 2008 and, after the new parliament was estab-
lished on 11 June, Mirko Cvetković’s government was nominated on 27 June 
2008. Despite these developments, this period saw great progress in respect to 
security sector legislative regulation, primarily as a result of the adoption of the 
three key laws on 11 December 2007. These are: The Law on defence, the Law 
on the Serbian Armed Forces and Law on the basic organisation of security and 
intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia. During 2007, the Committee on De-
fence and Security held eleven sittings and considered two reports which were 
submitted by the MoI and SIA on their work. In 2008, the Committee held seven 
sittings only. It is important to note that the Ministry of Defence (MoD), since 
it came under jurisdiction of parliament in June 2006 until the end of August 
2008, did not submit a single report.474 Apart from that, the Committee on De-
fence and Security proposed nine amendments out of thirty, which parliamen-
tary committees proposed regarding various motions.475 During this period, 
the Committee did not deal with the public procurement of arms and military 
equipment. Furthermore, in 2006, 2007 and during the first eight months of 
2008, Committee members did not carry out any visits to the institutions of the 
security sector nor to the military or police institutions. 
474 It should be mentioned that the MoD does not have this obligation in terms of law, which is a 
big shortcoming in the system of democratic civilian control of armed forces. The MoD submit-
ted reports to the Commissioner for the Information of Public Importance and Personal Data 
Protection (February 2008), as well as the Report to the Public on first 200 days of the work of MoD 
(June 2008). However, the reports are part of the control and oversight of independent authori-
ties and the public, not the parliamentary control and oversight. 
475 This fact is illustrative of the activity of this committee as compared to other committees. 
Parliament, Report on the Work of Parliamentary Committees in 2007, February Available at http://
www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/lat/akta/izvestaji.asp
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PACE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REFORM
COMPETENCIES
The adoption of the constitution in 2006 and a set of defence and security re-
lated laws in December 2007 created a legal environment conducive to demo-
cratic civilian control, and, consequently, parliamentary control and oversight 
over the security sector. Parliament’s ‘Rules of Procedure’, which regulate the 
competencies of the Committee on Defence and Security, was considerably en-
larged in September 2006, to the extent that its competencies now include civil-
ian democratic control of Serbian Armed Forces, consideration of the defence 
strategy, control, production and transport of weapons, as well as integrated 
border management. 
Despite the fact that constitutional and legal competencies of the Serbian 
parliament were considerably improved, some shortcomings are still present. 
Although article 141 of the constitution clearly stipulates that the ‘’Serbian 
Armed Forces shall be subject to democratic and civilian control’’, article 99, 
which regulates the competencies of parliament, stipulates that it supervises 
the work of the security and intelligence services, but not other security sector 
actors who use force, such as the police, military and private security compa-
nies. Similarly, the constitution stipulates that Parliament adopts only the de-
fence strategy, while the Law on defence stipulates the adoption of the National 
Security Strategy as well, which, being a more comprehensive document, is also 
more significant. Furthermore, according to the Law on Serbian Armed Forces, 
parliament, the Ombudsperson and other government authorities in accord-
ance with their competencies, as well as the public carry out democratic and 
civilian control of the military (art. 29).476 Nonetheless, the Law on defence stip-
ulates that only parliament exercises democratic and civilian control over the 
military, without mentioning any government or non-government actors. Still, 
the Law on defence stipulates that parliament should have competencies on the 
use of the military in foreign countries, which the Law on Serbian Armed Forces 
does not contain.477 Finally, parliament ‘Rules of Procedure’ stipulate that only 
the MoI should submit reports, but not other government institutions, such as 
the SIA and MoD.478 
476 Provision in art. 29 of the Law on Serbian Armed Forces stipulates that the public and citizens 
also participate in the democratic-civil control, was included upon the proposal of the CCMR 
during a public debate in the summer of 2007. See in Đorđe Popović,’’Commentary on the Draft 
Law on the Defence and  
Draft Law on Military”, Western Balkans Security Observer, No.7-8 (2008): 121-130.
477 Especially in art. 40 of the Law on Defence.
478 The Parliament Rules of Procedure is generally too long and complex, out of the need to 
record all legislative alterations. This is the reason for the incompatibilities.
270
According to the Law on police, the MoI should submit one regular report 
annually (more if necessary, or if requested by parliament). However, parliament 
‘Rules of Procedure’ stipulate that the MoI must submit reports only upon the 
request of parliament. It is also worth noting that MPs do not use all the com-
petencies at their disposal. For example, MPs have never applied the powerful 
mechanism of interpellation in the field of defence and security. In 2007 and in 
first eight months of 2008, the MPs did not use the mechanism of committees 
of inquiry, MPs’ questions to executive authorities or field visits to sites belong-
ing to the security sector.479 This is partly due a dispute which arose regarding 
interpretation of article 19 of the Law on the Basic organisation of security and 
intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia which regulates direct control and 
oversight. According to this article, the head of the Agency must allow Com-
mittee members, and upon the Committee’s request, ‘’free access to agency 
premises and documentation, provide data and information on the work of 
the agency and answer their questions.’’480 The opposition interprets this article 
rather widely, while government authorities have a restrictive view of what ‘’di-
rect control and oversight’’ means. It also remains unclear to whom and in what 
form the committee members report.481 Therefore, throughout 2008, there was 
no direct control and oversight of the security and intelligence services by the 
Committee on Defence and Security, regardless of its formal competencies.482 
The Committee did not fully use its competencies with regard to the control of 
police either.  For example, the Committee did not request a report on internal 
control from the MoI, though it is authorised to do so according to the current 
Law on the police.483
Though parliament’s competencies for security sector control and oversight 
in 2007 and 2008 were not ideal and could be strengthened or harmonised, 
the implementation of the existing competencies in practice represents a much 
bigger problem. In brief, parliament’s competencies over the security sector are 
awarded 
grade 3 (three). 
479 Information obtained from the National Parliament, 30 July  2008.
480 Art. 19 of the Law on the Basic Organisation of  Security and  Intelligence System of the 
Republic of Serebia.
481 The Law on Classification of Data is also missing.
482 At the tenth sitting held on April 9, 2009, the Committee members agreed on a first visit to 
Military Security Agency, Military Intelligence Agency and Security Intelligence Agency, which 
should take place in May 2009.
483 “Upon request of the Government and the working body of the National Parliament compe-
tent for the security and police work, the minister shall file a report on the work of the Depart-
ment of Internal Afafirs of the police”, Law on the Police, art. 179.
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The Law on the basic organisation of security and intelligence serv-
ices of the Republic of Serbia (The Official Gazette of RS, No. 116/2007) 
in article 16 stipulates: ‘’Parliament performs control and oversight of the 
work of security and intelligence services directly and through the com-
petent parliamentary committee [...] The Committee shall in particular:
- oversee the lawfulness and constitutionality of the work of security and 
intelligence services;
- oversee the compliance of the work of security and intelligence services 
with the National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and security-intelli-
gence policy of the Republic of Serbia;
- oversee the political, ideological and interest neutrality of the work of 
security intelligence services;
- oversee the lawfulness of the implementation of special investigative 
measures and measures for secret collection of data;
- oversee the lawfulness of budgetary spending and other assets;
- review and adopt reports on security and intelligence agencies’ work;
- consider Bills, other regulations and general acts within the jurisdiction 
of security and intelligence services;
- start initiatives and proposes bills and draft laws within the agencies’ ju-
risdiction;
- consider proposals, petitions and complaints of citizens lodged to parlia-
ment regarding the work of security and intelligence services and pro-
pose measures for their solution and inform the petitioner or complain-
ant on the decision;
- determine facts on perceived unlawfulness or irregularities in the work of 
the agencies and their officers and make decisions upon them;
- report to parliament on its conclusions and proposals”.
Parliamentary Rules of Procedure (Official Gazette of RS, No. 53/05) in 
article 46 stipulate that the Committee on Defence and Security: “shall 
consider bills, other regulations and general acts, and other issues rel-
evant to the Serbian Armed Forces, the defence of the Republic of Ser-
bia, integrated border management, production, output and transport of 
arms; shall consider Defence Strategy, issues related to exercising demo-
cratic and civilian control and oversight of the Serbian Armed Forces and 
defence system, as well as issues in the field of  public and state security; 
shall review the report on work of the Ministry of Interior on the state 
of security in Serbia submitted to the parliament upon its request; shall 
monitor the work of security and intelligence services and other issues in 
the field of security, in accordance with the law. 
Entrefilet 3: Competencies of parliament for the Serbian security sector control and 
control and oversight. 
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RESOURCES
In this section we analyse human and time resources that parliament, espe-
cially the Committee on Defence and Security, had in exercising control and 
oversight of the security sector in 2007 and 2008. Regarding time resources, the 
Committee did not devote much time to the consideration of bills at the time 
when key systemic laws were adopted in December 2007. Actually, the citizens 
of Serbia and their organisations had much more time to consider the bills than 
their representatives in parliament or in the Committee for Defence and Securi-
ty.484 These bills were put into parliamentary procedure in early December 2007, 
and were adopted by 11 December 2007. During this period, the Committee on 
Defence and Security met twice, first on 3 December (10th sitting) when repre-
sentatives of the executive power presented the bills, and on 5 December (11th 
sitting) when MPs reviewed the amendments to the bills.
It is striking that the fifth session of the second regular sitting of parliament, 
with three above-mentioned bills on the agenda, started on 3 December at 
10 am.485 On the same day, the first sitting of the Committee was held, when 
the bills were presented to MPs for the first time. The sitting began at 9:20 am 
and ended at 11:25 am. Thus, the Committee on Defence and Security had 40 
minutes to consider the three bills before the sitting at the parliament plena-
ry began, which had the same bills on the agenda. The reason for this speed 
was that the Law on implementation of the constitution of the Republic of Serbia 
(The Official Gazette 98/06) stipulated that the laws pertaining to the military 
and the police should be adopted at the latest within a year from the day the 
constitution was adopted. The adoption of the laws was also a pre-requisite for 
presidential elections. Nevertheless, the time devoted by the Committee to the 
consideration of the bills was unacceptably short. 
The Committee is comprised of seventeen members. The chairman of the 
Committee is a representative of the opposition while the vice-chairman is cho-
sen from the ruling coalition. Analysis of members’ professional qualifications 
and education shows that so far the political parties have not paid attention to 
484 The Laws on the Armed Forces of Serbia, Defence and Security Services are rare examples of 
positive practice, not only in the security sector but in Serbia in general, as the draft laws can be 
put to public debate ex ante. The interest of the public to participate in the debate is well illus-
trated by the fact that between 1-31August, during the debate on draft laws, these documents 
were viewed by 65,576 visitors and nearly 75 per cent of proposals put forth by the public were 
accepted 
http://www.mod.gov.yu/novi_lat.php?action=fullnews&showcomments=1&id=590 and  
http://www.mod.gov.yu/novi_lat.php?action=fullnews&showcomments=1&id=606 [accessed 
28 August  2008].
485 ‘The fifth sitting of the Second regular session of the Assembly convened in 2007’ National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 
http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/aktivnosti/skupstinske_detalji.asp?Id=664&t=I 
(accessed on 28 August  2008].
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the professionalism and experience of MPs elected to the Committee. For exam-
ple, in 2008, only one deputy had professional qualifications and experience in 
the security sector (a retired general), one deputy was a lawyer and a former MoI 
deputy minister, three were lawyers and two had degrees in economics and po-
litical science. Other MPs were engineers, managers, tourist guides, IT manag-
ers, writers and well-known artists and entertainers. These shortcomings could 
be overcome with the support of expert and administrative staff. Unfortunately, 
only one person is permanently employed in the administrative department of 
the Committee, assisted by two employees assigned from the Department of 
Defence and Security (one of whom is an intern).486 In 2007 and 2008, the Com-
mittee did not set up any sub-committees nor did it hold joined sittings with 
other committees.
Due to the fact that limited human and time resources were available to the 
parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security during 2007 and 2008, this 
indicator is awarded grade 2 (two).
PRACTICE
On the basis of the Committee’s activities, and the number of laws and other 
decisions related to the field of defence and security that parliament adopted in 
2007 and 2008, the practice of parliamentary control and oversight of the secu-
rity sector is quite good. The Committee on Defence and Security met eighteen 
times, almost once a month, and three systemic laws pertaining to this field 
were adopted, as well as several acts that directly regulate the field of defence 
and security. These laws are; the Law on foreign affairs (11 December 2007), the 
Law on ratification of the agreement between the Republic of Serbia and the EU 
on readmission of persons residing illegally (7 November 2007), the Law on travel 
documents (24 September 2007), the Law on asylum (24 November 2007) and 
the Law on the ratification of the convention on police cooperation in South-East 
Europe (23 July 2007). In this period the Resolution of the Parliament of the Repub-
lic of Serbia on the protection of the sovereignity, territorial integrity and constitu-
tional order of the Republic of Serbia (26 December 2007) which proclaimed the 
military neutrality of Serbia until citizens decide on this issue in the referendum, 
was also adopted. However, parliament did not discuss nor adopt any strategic 
documents, such as the National Defence Strategy or Defence Strategy. Parlia-
ment did not discuss the possibility of sending the Armed Forces abroad either, 
not because the government had prevented parliament from discussing this 
issue, but because the government had not forwarded requests of this kind to 
486 Out of this number, two persons had higher education and one had secondary education. 
Data obtained from parliament on 30 July 2008.
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parliament.
The last time when the issue of sending Serbian soldiers abroad was con-
sidered was in 2006, when a medical team of the Serbian Armed Forces was 
supposed to be sent to Afghanistan, as a part of a Norwegian contingent within 
ISAF. After that there was a gradual intensification of securitisation of relations 
with NATO member states over the disagreement on the status of Kosovo. The 
issue of sending Serbian soldiers to international military missions was put ad 
acta. During this period, on 3 December 2007, parliament held a debate on mili-
tary and defence regarding the adoption of the mentioned systemic laws.487 In 
this period MPs did not table questions or interpellations to executive power 
representatives in the security sector. Parliamentary inquiries were not con-
ducted nor were committees of inquiry set up. The Committee on Defence and 
Security did not specifically deal with budgetary control in the security sector. 
Furthermore, it was evident that all bodies from the security sector did not sub-
mit reports to the Committee (the Ministry of Defence did not submit a single 
report in this period), while others did so irregularly.488 The last, sixth, sitting 
of the Committee on Defence and Security, held on 25 December 2008, was 
especially interesting. The Committee mainly discussed the public statement 
made on this occasion by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-General Zdravko 
Ponos, who had said that Serbia did not have a defence policy and added that 
“civilian control is not a holy cow.” In the presence of General Ponos, but in the 
absence of Minister of Defence, Dragan Sutanovac, who had also been invited 
to the sitting, the Committee discussed the statements made by General Ponos 
and concluded that “the current situation in the relations between the MoD and 
Serbian Armed Forces could pose a serious threat to the stability of Serbian de-
fence system and jeopardise the entire civilian control of the Armed Forces.” The 
Committee demanded that the parliamentary chairperson request a report on 
the state of readiness for the defence of the country from the government.489
In 2007 and 2008, parliament adopted the key and long expected laws 
pertaining to defence and security, and the Committee on Defence and Secu-
rity was very active. Nevertheless, many competencies were not implemented, 
mostly those related to budgetary control, control of the Armed Forces and of 
private security companies. When all circumstances are considered, parliamen-
487 “Fifth sitting of the second regular session of parliament in 2007” Website of parliament
 http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/aktivnosti/skupstinske_detalji.asp?Id=1432&t=A 
[accessed on  3 September 2008]. 
488  We note that, according to the Law on police, the MoI is obliged to submit reports to the 
Committee at least once a year, and more often if necessary. On the other hand, according to 
parliamentary ‘Rules of Procedure’, the Committee is to consider only the MoI report submitted 
upon request of the parliament. 
489 ‘Sixth sitting of the Committee on Defence and Security’ The parliament of the Repub-
lic of Serbia,  http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/lat/aktivnosti/skupstinske_detalji.
asp?Id=1707&t=A [accessed on 14 January 2009]
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tary practice in the domain of security sector control and oversight in 2007 and 
2008 is awarded a grade 3 (three).
LEgITIMACY
 
The legitimacy of parliament can be assessed by analysing public trust and the 
representativeness of different social and political groups. Unlike institutions 
such as the church or the military, the public traditionally has not had great 
trust in parliament. Furthermore, public trust in the institution of parliament has 
been on a downward trend. According to research conducted in 2008, only 2.2 
per cent of citizens fully trust parliament and 4.6 per cent only partly. Total dis-
trust was expressed by 35.3 per cent and partial distrust by 16.4 per cent of citi-
zens.490 According to a survey conducted in June 2007, only 18 per cent (3 per 
cent had full trust) of citizens expressed trust in parliament, which is relatively 
low compared to other institutions like the church (62 per cent), the military 
(43 per cent), the police (31 per cent), the president (31 per cent), the judiciary 
(23 per cent) and the prime minister (22 per cent). This is considerably lower 
compared to 2005 when 27 per cent of citizens trusted parliament (total trust 
expressed by 4 per cent).491 There are several reasons for such an alarming lack 
of public trust. The main reason is the relatively weak role of the parliament in 
the Serbian political system. The Constitution of Serbia (article 102) introduced 
the practice of ‘blank resignations’ by which MPs’ terms of office are put at the 
disposal of the political parties who have supported their election. In case of 
disagreements with party officials, MPs can be dismissed and political parties 
can replace them with other party members. Second, political parties, especially 
ruling ones, still delegate ‘the second team’ or ‘reserve players’ to parliament, 
while top party officials and leaders obtain positions in the executive authori-
ties. Third, in the observed period parliament was often used as a place for ex-
pressing libels, insults and for using the language of hatred. Since the sittings 
are broadcast on state television, it is not surprising that the public does not 
trust the institution enough. Finally, parliament has not done enough to pro-
mote positive outcomes of its work, which contributes to the preservation of 
the negative image that the parliament has had in the past. 
The picture is much brighter when it comes to representativeness. Al-
though there are no binding regulations stipulating the necessary percentage 
490 Though public trust in other state institutions is also low, other security sector institutions 
have scored higher than parliament. Total or partial trust in the police was expressed by 19.1 per 
cent of citizens and in the military 25.1 per cent: Resource CESID, 2008.
491 ‘The results of the public poll, June 2007’, CESID, 
http://www.cesid.org/articles/download/files/saopstenje%20za%20javnost.doc?id=52 [accessed 
3 September 2008).
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of women in the parliament, in 2007 and 2008 the percentage of women more 
than doubled. Until January 2007 only 11 per cent of MPs were women, but 
when the new parliament was constituted in February 2007 20 per cent of the 
250 MPs were women (50). In the most recent  parliament the percentage of 
women increased again. There are 53 women, which represents 23.3 per cent.492 
Although this is still far from the ratio proposed by the OSCE of 30 per cent, it is 
higher than the global average (18.8 per cent) and European average (21.2 per 
cent), as well as the ratio of most countries in the region.493 However, in the new 
Committee on Defence and Security the representation is unbalanced, as there 
is only one woman among seventeen MPs (5.8 per cent). The number of MPs 
who are under the age of 30 has been on the increase, however, there is only 
one MP under this age in the Committee. With regard to the representation of 
minority parties, two representatives of parties from Sandzak are on the Com-
mittee, but, unfortunately none from the Roma, Hungarian or Albanian ethnic 
minorities. Political parties are equally represented in the Committee. The oppo-
sition representative chairs the Committee and the vice chairperson is a ruling 
coalition representative. Two women and one man are employed in the admin-
istrative department of the Committee. No member from an ethnic minorities is 
employed in the department.494
 Due to extremely low public trust in parliament, as well as for the insuf-
ficient gender and ethnic representativeness in the Committee on Defence and 
Security, the legitimacy of parliament has been awarded grade 2 (two).
TRANSPARENCY
General transparency of the work of parliament in the observed period has 
been very good. Parliamentary sittings are broadcast live on the state television. 
All Committee on Defence and Security sittings are recorded in short-hand and 
all deputies who are members of the Committee sign a statement on the non-
disclosure of classified information obtained in performing security sector con-
trol and oversight.495 During the observed period, only eight complaints were 
lodged to the Commissioner for the Free Access to Information regarding free 
access to information of public importance. They were all rejected for formal 
492 ‘The list of MPs’, Parliament’s website  http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/sastav/
poslanici.asp [accessed 3 September 2008]
493 Croatia (20.9 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.9 per cent), Montenegro (11.1 per cent), 
Macedonia (31.7 per cent), Romania (9.4 per cent), Bulgaria (21.4 per cent). ‘World Classification’, 
Women in parliaments, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm [accessed 3 September 2008]
494 Information obtained from parliament on 30 July 2008
495 ‘Druga sednica Odbora za odbranu i bezbednost’, Narodna Skupština Republike Srbije, http://
www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/aktivnosti/skupstinske_detalji.asp?Id=1524&t=A 
[accessed 3 September 2008].
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reasons, as the Law on the free access to information of public interest (The Official 
Gazette 120/04 i 54/07) stipulates that complaints on the work of parliament 
and the other five top executive authorities cannot be lodged to the Commis-
sioner.496 The Serbian parliament has a high quality and regularly up-dated web 
presentation containing detailed information on parliamentary and commit-
tees activities. Parliament has the capacity to provide timely and efficent infor-
mation of public interest.
Owing to general transparency of the work of parliament and its committees, 
this indicator is awarded the highest grade 5 (five).
496 Informacije dobijene od Poverenika za informacije od javnog značaja 4. 8. 2008. godine.
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2. The Judiciary
Bogoljub Milosavljević,
 Jelena Unijat
The courts and public prosecution have two important functions within the se-
curity sector. The first is to combat crime by means of prosecution and punish-
ment of criminal offenders. The second is judicial control over executive actors 
in the security sector. The control function is especially important with regard to 
police work, though its significance applies to the activities of the intelligence 
services and the military as well. If these tasks are to be carried out effectively 
and the entire judicial system is to become efficient, it is essential that a mini-
mum of basic principles, set forth in the Constitution, are fulfilled.497 
The aim of this chapter is not to provide an analysis of the entire Serbian ju-
diciary reform, but to shed more light on areas reform which are directly linked 
to the above-mentioned functions of the judiciary in the security sector. In or-
der to get a deeper insight, we first look at the general characteristics of the 
courts and prosecutors during the 1990s. Then we review organisational and 
other changes that occured to the security sector after 5 October 2000. Next, 
we examine aspects of the judiciary and provide recommendations for the im-
provement of this actor’s role in the security sector. 
The status of the judiciary in the 1990s
The 1990s saw a serious detorioration of the status of the judiciary, with judicial 
officials being completely dependent on political power structures. This was 
partly a consequence of the inadequate position of the judiciary, since judges 
and prosecutors had been elected by the parliaments (federal and republic), ac-
cording to the constitutional provisions (The Constitution of FRY from 1992 and 
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 1990). The mandate of judges 
in Serbia was permanent, whereas it amounted to nine years in office at the 
497 The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006 contains a number of principles aimed 
at securing the independence of courts and judges (the unity of judicial power principle, 
the independence principle, the principles of legality, transparency of court-trials, immunity, 
permanence of judges’ office, etc.) The Constitution also regulates the High Judicial Council as 
a body which ensures and guarantees the independence of judges and courts, and stipulates 
basic rules on the election of judges and termination of judge’s office. See articles 142-155 of 
the Constitution. The principles of independence and organisation of public prosecution are set 
forth in art. 156-165 of the Constitution.
279
federation level. In this period, the party in power (SPS with JUL) had a crucial 
impact in the election and dismissal of judges, and its power over the courts 
was exercised by executive power and its Ministry of Justice.498 In both the elec-
tion and dismissal of judges, the guiding criteria were not professionalism and 
integrity, but political or party ’allegiance’ and loyalty. Climbing the career lad-
der and receiving various perks and benefits (for instance getting a flat) were 
mostly conditioned by doing favours to the ruling political elite. For instance, 
there is clear evidence that the Ministry of Justice alloted flats and favourable 
bank credits to all judges who had taken part in the electoral frauds in 1996 and 
1997.499 
The influence of the ruling political elites in the work of the judiciary as well 
as poor material conditions500 made a large number (one third) of judges quit 
the judiciary and start a more profitable career as lawyers. By the same token, 
the judiciary became a fertile ground for corruption. Only those individuals who 
had no political backing were tried in courts, while law enforcement ’turned a 
blind eye’ to organised crime and other types of crimes that were flourishing at 
the time. Conversely, the prosecution and judges did not dare to take measures 
against criminal offenders among the security sector staff. This is illustrated by 
the fact that the number of individuals convicted for criminal abuse of authority 
dropped more than three times in six-year period (from 2903 in 1989 to 909 in 
1995).501 
The situation in the military judiciary system was no better. Military court 
judges were appointed and dismissed by the president of the FRY. Thus ap-
pointed judges kept the status of military officers who, by default, could not 
be independent arbiters in court trials in which the object of protection was 
the military. These courts were particularly active after NATO bombing in 1999 
when approximately 20,000 proceedings were pending on criminal charges for 
draft evasion.502 The minimal penalty for draft evasion, after very brief proceed-
ings, was a two-year prison sentence.503
498 Slobodan Vučetić ’The System of the distribution of power in Serbia and the FRY in the light 
of forthcoming reforms’, Legal Information Booklet, No.4 (2001) 
499 Bruno Vekarić, ‘Institutional suppression of corruption’, in Openly about corruption- Judiciary, 
ed. Radojka Nikolić. (Belgrade: Friedrich Ebert Stifung, 2002), 17.
500 An average judge’s salary in 1998 was 200 DM for municipal court judges, and 250 DM for 
district court judges. Due to poor financial conditions, 700 judges (one third of a total number) 
left the judiciary within four years. In Vojin Dimitrijević, ed., Human rights in Yugoslavia 1998, 
(Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 1999): 216. The salaries at the time were not any 
better in the entire public administration sector (BM)
501 The position of public prosecutors – Statistcal Analysis (Belgrade: Centre for Peace and Develop-
ment of Democracy, July 2006): 10.
502 Vojin Dimitrijević, ed., Human rights in Yugoslavia 1998, (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Human 
Rights, 1999): 212.
503 Dimitrijević, 213.
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The 2000 – 2008 period
After 5 October 2000, gradual reform of the judiciary began, culminating in the 
adoption of the National Judiciary Reform Strategy in 2006.504 In 2001, parlia-
ment adopted five fundamental regulations in relation to the judiciary: the Law 
on the organisation of courts, the Law on judges, the Law on high judicial council, 
the Law on public prosecution and the Law on the seats and territorial jurisdiction of 
courts and Public Prosecutors’ Office, which were published in The Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Serbia, no. 63/2001. The greatest novelty was the formation of 
the High Judicial Council, which was responsible for proposing the election of 
judges, presidents of courts, public prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors 
to parliament, as well as the appointment of lay judges. On the other hand, the 
Administrative Court and the courts of appeal have not yet been established.
Certain personnel changes were also undertaken. Between 2000 and 2002, 
150 out of 165 presidents of courts were changed and 166 new judges were 
appointed.505 The financial status of judges improved in 2002 when the Law on 
amendments and additions to the Law on court taxes was adopted, envisaging an 
independent court budget up to 50 per cent out of total court taxes. 
In this period there were strong demands for the lustration of judges and 
prosecutors, as the majority of the Serbian public was angered by the participa-
tion of judges in electoral frauds during the Milosevic regime, by the extremely 
slow operation of courts, overly lenient penal policy towards criminals connect-
ed to the previous regime, as well as by the absence of criminal prosecutions 
of accountable high-ranking members of the previous regime. The public was 
especially dissatisfied with poor results achieved in the domain of human rights 
and protection of freedom, and with the absence of prosecution and convic-
tion of police and intelligence service officers who had participated in the beat-
ings and deaths of hundreds of citizens or had been otherwise connected to 
the criminal syndicates. Nevertheless, the idea of lustration met with fierce op-
position from the judiciary, which claimed independence of the judge’s office, 
thus neglecting their own accountability in the past events. This opposition was 
strengthened by disagreements within the democratic coalition DOS, one sec-
tion of which was strongly critical of the Minister of Justice and the advocates of 
lustration. In the end the idea of lustration was abandoned.
In brief, the changes introduced in the courts and public prosecution, which 
were carried out by the end of 2002 and afterwards, were far below expecta-
tions and real needs. Thus it is not surprising that public trust in the functioning 
of the judiciary remained at a low level. According to a public poll conducted by 
CCMR in 2003,506 46.9 per cent of citizens stated that they did not trust the judi-
504 Official Gazette of RS, No. 44/06.
505 Vekarić,’Institutional suppression of corruption’, 17.
506 The SaM public on military reform (Belgrade: CCMR, 2003).
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ciary. The biggest problems of the courts were: inefficacy, resulting in the viola-
tion of other rights, apart from the right to fair trial; the inefficiency of exisiting 
legal remedies and the slow execution of court judgements. One of the greatest 
impediments is the slow pace of the proceedings. There are many reasons for 
this, including inefficiency and incompetence of judges, deliberate procrastina-
tion accompanied by corruption, overburdening with cases and poor working 
conditions.507 
The inefficiency of courts is still one of the biggest problems in the judiciary. 
This confirms the analysis of seventeen judgements passed by the European 
Court of Human Rights in cases involving Serbian citizens. These judgments 
clearly show that the prolongation of court proceedings is the central problem 
which also entails the violation of other human rights, apart from the right to 
fair trial. In fourteen judgements, out of seventeen, violation of the right to trial 
within a reasonable period of time was confirmed. The other three cases in-
volved, the violation of the right to the freedom of expression, the right to quiet 
enjoyment of property and the disregard of the presumption of innocence.508 
The same problem is illustrated by the data on citizens’ complaints and petitions 
regarding the work of the courts. The Department of Complaints and Petitions 
within the Supreme Court of the Republic of Serbia received 1629 complaints in 
2007, out of which 963 were resolved. The public’s biggest demand is that court 
proceedings are sped up.509
There is one reason, among many objective reasons for court delays, that 
is attributable to the neglect of legislative power. The election and dismissal of 
judicial officials in parliament has been at a standstill since August 2005. As no 
judge has been dismissed, not even those who fulfilled the requirements for 
mandatory dismissal due to retirement, new ones cannot be elected. The fact 
that judges who are due for retirement (but not allowed to carry out judicial 
duties) are still fully paid, has added to the bad reputation of the judiciary. The 
reputation has been further damaged by the fact that judges whose dismissal 
was proposed by the Grand Personnel Council are still in office, due to uncon-
scientious and unprofessional performance. To top it all, although one judge 
(from the Supreme Court of Serbia), was given a six–month prison sentence for 
corruption, parliament has not yet terminated his office. 
As for the public prosecutors’ offices and their reform since 5 October 2000, 
507 For example: “In the Palace of Justice three judges are still sharing one office and have trials 
every third day“ (The SaM public on military reform, 5); “20 to 30 per cent of their working hours 
the judges spend in dictating for the minutes“, that is, ‘’the judges spend more time on minutes 
than on judging’’, Glas javnosti, 7 October 2004.
508 ‘We need more efficient legal solutions (Interview with Slavoljub Caric, representative of 
Serbia at The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg),’ Portal Argus, 
http://www.korupcija.org/intervjui/8866.html 
509 Report on the activities of the Supreme Court of Serbia with the summary of the activities of 
courts with general jurisdiction in the year 2007.
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it is evident that there has been a downward trend in efficiency. Along with the 
political changes of 2000, changes in quantity and quality of criminal charg-
es submitted to the public prosecutors’ offices also occurred. The number of 
charges increased (quantitative change), but they were very complex and often 
written off-hand or were used against political opponents in order to disqualify 
them (qualitative change).510 The public was under the impression that only 
those without any political support were charged and tried. That is, those who 
could not avoid criminal prosecution and conviction.511 It is a common knowl-
edge that public prosecution can become a powerful tool in the hands of poli-
ticians and ruling elites and this could explain the fact why the Law on public 
prosecution has been amended and added to five times in the five years from 
its adoption in 2001.512 As the efficiency of the prosecutor’s office is of vital im-
portance for the entire criminal judiciary, it is hoped that they will become truly 
independent bodies and that the state will give full attention to reform.
The adoption of the new Constitution in November 2006 also brought the 
changes in the judiciary and public prosecution. Instead of one body (the High 
Judicial Council) that was responsible for the courts and public prosecution, two 
separate bodies were formed – the High Judicial Council and the State Council 
of Prosecutors. The new way of electing and appointing judges and prosecu-
tors is also significant. Judges and deputy public prosecutors appointed for the 
first time are elected by parliament upon recommendation of the High Judi-
cial Council (for a term of three years). The High Judicial Council then appoints 
judges for the permanent judge’s function and decides on termination of office 
as well. Public Prosecutors are appointed by parliament upon the government’s 
recommendation (for a term of six years), while deputy public prosecutors for 
permanent office are appointed by the State Council of Prosecutors. These two 
bodies also decide on the termination of their office. By establishing the Su-
preme Court of Cassation, in place of the existing Supreme Court of the Repub-
lic of Serbia, the new Constitution has stipulated the need for organisational 
changes in the regular judiciary network. Such changes, along with some in-
novations which should encourage true reform of the judiciary, are reflected 
in a new set of judiciary laws, adopted on 22 December 2008 (Official Gazette, 
No. 116/08). As for the network of regular courts, it consists of (apart from the 
Supreme Court of Cassation): regular courts, higher courts and courts of appeal 
that should start working on 1 January 2010. Specialised courts are commercial 
courts, magistrate courts and administrative courts.  
510 The position of public prosecutors – statistical analysis (Belgrade: Centre for Peace and Develop-
ment of Democracy, July 2006), 7.
511 The position of public prosecutors – statistical analysis, 9.
512 Momčilo Grubač ‘The directions and setbacks of the public prosecution reform in Serbia,“ Law 
and Social Sciences Archive XCII, No. 3–4 (2006): 1273–1300.
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Changes of special interest for the security sector
Of all the changes in the judiciary (in the period 2000-2008), organisational 
changes have had the greatest relevance for the security sector. The most im-
portant organisational changes are: The establishment of the Special Division of 
Belgrade District Court for Acting in Cases of Criminal Offences with Elements of 
Organised Crime; the establishment of War Crimes Panel, and; the affilation of 
the military judiciary to the civilian judiciary.  
The Special Division of Belgrade District Court for Acting in Cases of Crimi-
nal Offences with Elements of Organised Crime and the Special Prosecutor’s Of-
fice for Prosecution of the Perpetrators of Criminal Offences with Elements of 
Organised Crime, were both established on 1 May 2003.513 In the past few years, 
their work has been high profile due to the trial of defendants charged with the 
assassination of Zoran Djindjic and the members of the so-called ’Zemun Clan’, 
as well as a series of indictments raised against the members of the so-called 
’bankruptcy, toll-booth and customs crime syndicate’, and later against some 
other crime syndicates as well.
This Division has been granted so-called concentrated jurisdiction, that is, 
jurisdiction over the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. This was done 
because of the nature of organised crime, which is trans-national and trans-re-
gional. The Special Court also tries cases against foreign citizens. For instance, 
the ’Zemun Clan’ used to smuggle drugs from abroad, it had a wide distribu-
tion network throughout Serbia, and some members were involved in murders 
that had been committed outside of Belgrade, (where the crime syndicate was 
based).514
In the first two years of office, the judges of this division handed down 20 
judgements,515 out of which two thirds were final judgements. These judge-
ments were met with public approval and they encouraged renewed trust in 
the judiciary. One of the human trafficking judgements was handed down in 
only six days, which is an indication of the high efficiency of this division. For 
the first time in the history of Serbian judiciary a Supreme Court judge has been 
convicted for corruption and the proceedings are pending in the case of the 
Commercial Court president. 
The War Crimes Panel at the District Court in Belgrade was established on 1 
October 2003.516 The Panel is competent to rule in the second instance for:
513 The Law on organisation and jurisdiction of state authorities in the supression of organised crime, 
Official Gazette of RS, No. 39/03, 67/03 i 29/04
514 http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2006/07/14/srpski/T06071302.shtml
515 ‘The court abolished in secret’, Glas javnosti
http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2006/07/14/srpski/T06071302.shtml
516 Law on organisation and jurisdiction of government authorities in court proceedings for war 
crimes, Official Gazette, No. 67/03 i 135/04.
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•	 Criminal offences against humanity and international law prescribed in 
the Penal Code; 
•	 Serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the 
territory of former Yugoslavia from 1 January 1991 stated in the Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
The president of the Court appoints judges to the War Crimes Panel with 
their consent for a period of four years. The offenders who committed the 
above-mentioned crimes on the territory of the former SFRY, regardless of their 
own citizenship or the citizenship of the victims, can also be tried by this Panel.
The military judiciary was put under the jurisdiction of regular courts on 1 
January 2005.517 The military courts, military prosecution and Military Attorney 
General’s Office were abolished. This meant that the so-called ‘French model’ 
was adopted, as the jurisdiction of the military courts was transferred to civilian 
district courts. The public was under a wrong impression that the work of the 
military courts was conducted in some special way. However, the Penal Code 
and the Criminal Procedure Code were applied in military courts, the only dif-
ference being in their competencies (for criminal offences against the Yugoslav 
Armed Forces) and the lack of full independence (this issue has already been 
tackled).
The rationale for this reorganisation was to make court rulings and judge-
ments  more independent and purposeful. It is hoped that the forthcoming pro-
fessionalisation of the Serbian Armed Forces will result in a drop in numbers 
of perpetrators committing criminal offences against the military, while some 
offences, such as national military service evasion, will disappear once compul-
sory military service is abolished. Similarly, there are few cases where specifici-
ties regarding proving guilt occur, although this problem can also be solved 
by appointing a court expert-advisor. It was therefore, decided that it was un-
necessary to allot special funds to a specialised military judiciary and that the 
competencies of this judiciary could be incorporated into the competencies of 
courts with general jurisdiction.
The control function of the judiciary in the 
security sector
The strengthening of the control function of the courts over the police, mili-
tary and intelligence services is one of the key goals of security sector reform. 
This type of control was very loose before 2000. It must be improved to better 
517 This was accomplished by the Law on transfer of the military courts, Military Prosecutor’s Offi-
ce and Military Attorney General’s Office jurisdictions to the member states’ governmental bodies 
The official Gazette of SaM, No.  55/04 and by the Law on the transfer of Military Courts, Military 
Prosecutor’s Office and Military Attorney General’s Office jurisdictions, The Official Gazette of Serbia, 
No.  137/04.
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legally regulate the work of the police, the military and intelligence services, 
which would in turn strengthen the rule of law. The police and intelligence serv-
ices have powers to infringe upon certain human rights and these rights are 
best protected by the judiciary, which must ensure that the exercising of these 
powers is in compliance with the law. It must also protect individuals against 
any violation of their rights. The courts should also oversee the military police 
and other military bodies if they violate the human rights of individuals who are 
in the ‘military domain’. In addition, all public administration actors that are au-
thorised to exercise certain police powers (prison guards, customs officers, fiscal 
police), including  bailiffs, should be under judiciary control.
Judicial control over the police should be comprehensive, as the police not 
only have a wide range of regular powers in investigating criminal offences and 
their perpetrators, but also in keeping public law and order, including exclu-
sive power to exert direct coercive measures towards citizens, under conditions 
stipulated by the law. Similarly, the military should also be closely controlled by 
the judiciary, especially because of the specifities of military organisation, i.e. its 
closed and hierarchical structure and the inherent obligation of obedience to 
superiors, as well as the tendency of this organisation to prioritise its goals over 
the goals and values of society. The military police, which operates within the 
military and away from the public eye, exerts all regular police powers towards 
military staff. Two out of the three intelligence services (the SIA and MoI) have 
the same (police) powers. The fact that the intelligence services operate in se-
cret, when exercising powers for gathering intelligence by resorting to special 
investigative measures and mechanisms that temporarily limit certain human 
rights and freedoms, only adds to the importance of efficient judicial control. 
In keeping with the significance of judicial control in the security sector, the 
courts have a number of control mechanisms at their disposal, the most impor-
tant being:
•	 Control by the judiciary (and prosecutors) over the work of the police and 
the application of their powers in pre-criminal proceedings (particularly 
the power to search apartments and vehicles, to seize or confiscate objects 
temporarily, to deprive persons of liberty, the power to detain persons and 
the power to apply trgeted search measures); 
•	 Approval and control and oversight of the use of special investigative meas-
ures and mechanisms for the secret collection of data undertaken by the 
police and intelligence services (surveillance and other measures which rep-
resent a temporary infringement upon guaranteed rights and freedoms);
•	 Decision-making regarding the liability for the criminal abuse of authority 
committed by the police, military or intelligence services officers;
•	 Decision-making regarding the legality of final administrative acts passed 
by the police or military authorities (administrative disputes);
•	 Providing judicial (and constitutional-judicial) protection to entities whose 
rights and freedoms have been violated by unlawful actions of the police, 
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military or intelligence services; 
•	 Deciding on damages to be paid to citizens and legal entities, caused by the 
unlawful and improper actions of the police, military or intelligence agen-
cies, and; 
•	 Providing court protection to the police, military or intelligence services of-
ficers in case their rights are violated in the institutions where they work, as 
well as offering protection to other entities working permanently or tempo-
rarily in the military. 
The basic shortcomings of the judicial control system inherited in 2000 were 
partly the result of a lack of clear legal competencies and procedures for exer-
cising control. However, it was mostly reluctance on the part of the courts to 
exercise this control. 
Criminal legislation dealt with criminal abuse of authority and the criminal 
procedural legislation provisions allowed both the courts and public prosecu-
tors to control the actions of the police in pre-criminal proceedings. However, 
due to excessive political influence, control powers were not exercised and the 
police ignored judicial or prosecutors’ orders, positioning itself to influence the 
outcome of court preoceedings.  In that period, public prosecutors did not dare 
to bring criminal proceedings against police officers, which resulted in a dras-
tic drop of judgements passed for the criminal abuse of authority. Complaints 
lodged by citizens for compensation of damages caused to them by unlawful 
or improper police actions were mostly ignored, not only because of links be-
tween the police, prosecutor’s offices and the courts, but also because com-
plaints were mostly lodged by members of opposition parties and movements. 
As for the control of the military, it seems that the purpose of the military ju-
diciary was not to control the military, but to protect the interests of the military 
from others (disobedient civilians and perpetrators of criminal offences against 
the military), whereas the civilian judiciary did not have competencies in this 
area. Judicial control over the intelligence services (where it was was regulated) 
was totally non-existant, as it was under the sole authority of the Supreme Court 
president, who had to comply with, without exception, all requests from the 
State Security Service for the surveillance of citizens.  
Among the first measures undertaken in order to strengthen judicial con-
trol after 2000, was the legal regulation of the procedure for authorising the use 
of special investigative measures and mechanisms by the intelligence services 
and the police during the secret collection of data, the use of which represents 
an infringement upon the right to privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. This 
issue was regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code from 2001, as well as by the 
Law on Security Services of FRY and the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency 
from 2002. Though these legal acts had certain deficiences,518 they gave the ju-
518 More about the quality and deficiences of such solutions can be found in the chapter on the 
intelligence services.
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diciary a more significant role than previously, and enabled it to contribute to 
the protection of rights. This is a significant, although not completely satisfac-
tory improvement.519
The number of criminal charges and finalised criminal proceedings in which 
the liability of the police and intelligence service officers for committing crimi-
nal offences related to abuse of authority has considerably increased. This in-
cludes the number of judgements concerning compensation of the damages 
caused to citizens by the unlawful and improper work of the police, the military 
and the intelligence services. Although most final judgements relate to criminal 
offences and damages from before 2000, a considerable number of judgements 
have been passed in recent times (especially in relation to the ‘Saber’ action). It 
can be concluded that the judiciary and public prosecution have become more 
willing to initiate and finalise court proceedings in all cases where security and 
intelligence staff have broken the law. This is a considerable improvement in the 
performance of their control function. Nevertheless, totally efficient control is 
still hampered by the mentioned obstacles in relation to the general evaluation 
of judicial reform, such as the inefficiency of courts and a lack of guaranteed in-
dependence. In this regard, it should be noted that court cases dealing with the 
liability of security and intelligence staff are typical in terms of exerting influ-
ence on prosecution and court rulings, a phenomenon common even in highly 
developed democracies. 
An additional ’issue’ typical of such cases is the fact that judgements passed 
in favour of citizens often entail compensation for damages paid out of the state 
budget.
International instruments for the protection of human rights have been in-
troduced in order to compensate for weaknesses in the work of the national 
judiciary. These include violations committed by security and intelligence ac-
tors. In Europe, the most important instrument is the European Court of Human 
Rights, which has passed judgement in many cases of human rights violations 
by the security and intelligence services. With the ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (on 26 December 2003), Serbian citizens were 
granted the right to appeal to the court, whose rulings should also have a posi-
tive impact on the work of the national judiciary.
The introduction of the institution of constitutional appeal, stipulated by 
the 2006 Constitution, is one of the positive changes in judicial control over 
the security sector. A constitutional appeal may be lodged against individual 
519 For more information, see Momčilo Grubač, ’Special competencies of the criminal prosecu-
tion authorities, constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens’ and Bogoljub Milosavljević, ’The 
competencies of the police and other statutory actors for secret collection of data: national 
regulations and European standards’ and in Vučko Mirčić, ’The role of the judiciary in using 
special investigative measures by different state institutions’ in Democratic control and oversight 
of using special investigative measures and powers, eds. Miroslav Hadžić and Predrag Petrović. 
(Belgrade: CCMR, 2008).
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general acts or actions performed by state authorities and organisations exer-
cising delegated public powers which violate or deny human or minority rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, if other legal remedies for their 
protection have already been applied or are not specified.520 It is this latter pos-
sibility of constitutional appeal (when other legal remedies for the protection of 
human rights and freedoms are not specified) that is of special importance for 
security sector control, as the regular courts have still not provided protection 
against a considerable number of acts and actions undertaken by the military, 
intelligence agencies and the police.  
Lastly, an important function of the judicial control system should be con-
trol of the legality of final administrative acts passed by the military and police. 
These acts regulate many rights, obligations and legal interests of citizens and 
legal entities. The same type of legal acts also regulates the rights and duties 
of the military, police and intelligence services officers. However, dealing with 
administrative disputes in Serbia suffers from certain weaknesses which should 
be overcome by the work of the Administrative Court and amendment of le-
gal decisions in administrative disputes. Apart from common inefficiency of the 
courts, specific problems arise in the cases of administrative complaints lodged 
by military staff against decisions relating to their rights and duties. When the 
Supreme Military Court and the Court of the State Union of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro (which had been competent for the administrative disputes of military 
officers) were dissolved, all administrative cases were put under jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Serbia. By the end of 2006, the Adminis-
trative Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia received 4605 cases from the 
Court of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (which had never been truly 
operational) and the Supreme Military Court, all in one single day. In 2007, the 
number of cases in the Administrative Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia 
amounted to 26,069 cases.521 Out of the total number of cases, 9657 (41.6 per 
cent) were solved, whereas 16,412 (58.8 per cent) remained unsolved. Out of the 
total number of cases received from the Military Supreme Court and the Court 
of the State Union of SaM, 975 were solved and 3730 remained unsolved. The 
conclusions are that the work of this Division is slow, hampered by an overload 
of cases, and that military officers have a very slow access to justice.  
In addition to aspects of judicial control over the security sector, it is impor-
tant to remember that, apart from the police, military and intelligence services, 
prisons and detention units should also be under judicial control. This also ap-
plies to state administration bodies with certain police powers, such as customs 
and fiscal police.  Human rights violations (as serious as those committed by the 
military, police or intelligence service) are likely to occur in the work of these 
520 Article 170 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.
521 Report on the activities of the Supreme Court of Serbia with an overview of the work of the courts 
with general jurisdiction in 2007, p.1.
289
bodies which are a part of the security sector and possess the powers to use the 
coercive measures or some other police powers. 
THE PACE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORM
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representation of women
The representation of women is regulated by the Constitution and the Law on 
civil servants (see analysis of other security system actors) and by the Labour law 
(articles 18-23).522 On the other hand, gender equality is not mentioned in a sin-
gle article of the Law on judges and the Law on public prosecutors.523 
The representation of women in the judicial system is quite satisfactory al-
though they hold relatively few high-rank positions and are fewer in number 
than men in criminal councils. Women were court presidents in 61 courts, out of 
total 146 courts with general jurisdiction and 18 commercial courts, including 
the Supreme Court of Serbia. In 103 courts the presidents were men (data for 
2005).524 
grade: 4 (four)
Representation of Ethnic Minorities
The Constitution provides a detailed list of human rights and freedoms (arti-
cles 18-81). Article 76, paragraph 3 stipulates the possibility of passing special 
regulations and measures to ensure full equality. Article 77 guarantees equality 
to members of ethnic minorities in administering public affairs and for employ-
ment in state bodies, public services, bodies of the autonomous province and 
local self-government units. Equally, the Law on civil servants (articles 7, 9 and 11) 
and the Labour Law (articles 18-23) prohibit discrimination on any grounds. How-
ever, the Law on judges and the Law on public prosecutors do not regulate these 
issues separately, meaning that general regulations of other laws are applied. 
522 Labour law, Official Gazette of RS, No. 24/05, 61/05. 
523 As the laws on the judiciary from 2001 were in force during the observed period, these laws 
were evaluated and graded.
524 Judicial reform index for Serbia (Washington: ABA/CEELI, 2005), 23.
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Members of ethnic minorities are employed in some courts but it was not 
possible to  obtain information regarding their numbers and the functions they 
perform. One indicator of the unsatisfactory situation is the problem of con-
ducting court proceedings in the Albanian and Hungarian languages.525
grade: 3 (three)
TRANSPARENCY
general Transparency
Apart from the Constitution and the Law on free access to information of public 
importance,526 procedural laws (the Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Procedure 
Code,  the Law on enforcement procedure and the Law on minor offences proce-
dure, and others), as well as the Law on personal data protection, constitute the 
legal framework for transparent work of the judiciary. Procedural laws contain 
provisions stipulating access to information related to court proceedings only 
to some individuals (e.g., parties in the proceedings and their defence lawyers), 
or this access is proved by the existence of a ’justified’ or ’well-grounded’ inter-
est. This type of restrictiveness is justified and conducive to the need for unin-
terrupted court proceedings and the protection of personal data, though some-
times it hampers access to other information that are not of this type but are of 
public importance.
According to article 39 of the Law on free access to information of public im-
portance and the ‘Reference guide for publishing of the Information Bulletin on 
the work of state authorities’, all state and public authorities that this law refers 
to are obliged to make brochures or booklets in electronic form and to publish 
them (for instance on the Internet). According to a report issued by the Commis-
sioner for Information of Public Importance for the year 2007, the brochures or 
booklets were published by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court of Serbia, 
ten district courts, nineteen municipal courts, one district public prosecutor’s of-
fice, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office and eight municipal public prosecutors. 
The following authorities also made information booklets or brochures, but did 
not yet published it on-line: six district and 46 municipal courts, the Republic 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, seventeen district and 47 municipal public prosecu-
tor’s offices. The Commissioner for Information of Public Importance points out 
that, despite problems regarding technical resources of the judiciary, the situa-
tion is improving and the number of e-brochures published on the authorities’ 
525 Index of judicial reform in Serbia
526 Law on free Access to Information of Public Importance, Official Gazette of RS, br. 120/04.
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websites is increasing, along with the increased number of brochures or book-
lets that appeared in print.527 The public prosecutor’s offices and misdemean-
ours authorities have made considerable progress in this respect since last year.
According to data obtained by the Commissioner for Information of Public 
Interest, 1396 appeals have been lodged to judicial authorities, out of which 
1170 have been accepted, 58 denied and 61 rejected. In 2007, the Commission-
er received 237 complaints against judicial authorities, of which 161 complaints 
were ruled and 76 are on-going. The Commissioner’s general observation is that 
the majority of complaints against the judiciary refer to the judicial budget and 
capacities, statistical data on specific types of criminal offences, copies of case 
lists (predominantly criminal cases), proceedings in certain cases and the fulfil-
ment of certain pre-requisites for some judges.
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Serbia issued 250 press releases, organised 
three press conferences and published thirteen interviews with the Court presi-
dent. On average, approximately 200 stories on the work of the Supreme Court 
are published daily in weekly and daily newspapers and on-line. Four persons 
are authorised at the Supreme Court to deal with appeals and complaints of citi-
zens, persuant to the Law on free access to the information of public importance. 
In 2007, 93 persons lodged appeals to the Supreme Court of Serbia, of which 80 
were fully accepted, nine partly and four were rejected. All appeals were dealt 
with within the legal deadline of 15 days, that is, within 40 days from the date 
when the appeal was lodged.
grade: 3 (three)
Financial Transparency
The report on the execution of budgets of courts and public prosecutor’s offices 
for 2007 has been published on the Ministry of Justice’s web-site, but has not 
been considered by parliament, nor has it been the subject of an independ-
ent audit. According to this report, total budgetary funds alloted to judicial 
bodies amounted to RSD 1,637,789,000, and tax revenues amounted to RSD 
3,906,334,018. The largest share was alloted to municipal courts (the largest in 
number), then to district courts and to the Supreme Court of Serbia. With regard 
to public prosecutor’s offices, municipal public prosecutor’s offices were alloted 
the biggest funds, then district offices and finally, the Republic Public Prosecu-
tor’s Office. 
grade: 3 (three)
527 Report on the implementation of the Law on free access to information of public importance, 
2007.
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PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORgANISATIONS
Participation in Policy-Making (strategic and legal 
framework)
According to article 77 of the Law on state administration,528 ministries and spe-
cial organisations are obliged to undertake public debate during the prepara-
tion of a law which changes the legal regime in one area or which regulates 
issues of particular relevance for the public. It has already been mentioned that 
during 2008 (on 22 December), new laws on the judiciary were adopted and 
public debate on these laws was organised. Although the laws in question did 
change the legal regime and did regulate issues of particular public relevance, 
the public was not included in the debate. The dialogue was held mostly be-
tween judges and Ministry of Justice officials. The public was left behind. 
grade: 2 (two)
Participation in implementation and evaluation of policy
Public and civil society organisations generally have very limited influence on 
the implementation and evaluation of security sector reform policies, except 
for the right granted by the constitution to lodge proposals or petitions, or on 
rare occassions when the Minister of Justice receives telephone messages from 
citizens and answers their questions (this occurred only once in 2007).  On the 
other hand, civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly non-governmental 
organisations dealing with human rights, have tried to draw attention to short-
comings in the work of the judiciary, especially regarding the protection of citi-
zens’ rights, freedoms in courts and the prolonged duration of court proceed-
ings. However, the judiciary and executive authorities have hardly reacted to 
initiatives, proposals and evaluations coming from CSOs. 
grade: 3 (three)
528 Official gazette of RS, No. 79/05 i 101/07.
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ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC CIVIL 
CONTROL AND PUBLIC Control and over-
sight
Control by the executive authorities
Within the Ministry of Justice operates the Court Control Division (part of the 
Sector for the Judiciary and Minor Offences) which deals with judicial admin-
istrative activities. The Division monitors whether court cases are dealt with 
within prescribed deadlines and how public complaints and petitions are dealt 
with.529 After an assessment has been conducted, the Division sends a report to 
the president of the court in question, the president of the next instance court 
and to the president of the Supreme Court of Serbia. The deadline for rectifying 
detected shortcomings is fifteen days, and the deadline for submitting a report 
on the measures undertaken is eight days.
Internal organisation and work of the courts are regulated by the Court 
Rules of Procedure530 issued by the Minister of Justice, upon approval of the 
president of the Supreme Court of Serbia. According to article 2 of the Rules, 
internal organisation and the work of courts (court administration) are separate 
from court trials and include administrative, technical, professional, informa-
tional, financial and other affairs relevant to the judiciary. The court president 
is in charge of implementation of the Rules, while the Ministry of Justice over-
sees its implementation. According to article 4 of the Rules, the Ministry, via a 
supervisor, controls affairs related to court administration, office management 
within courts and other activities related to internal organisation and the work 
of courts. The supervisor collects reports written by the court president or exer-
cises direct supervision. The Supervisory Divison has eight executives, including 
a head of the Division.
The control and oversight exercised by the Ministry of Justice, despite its 
positive impact, has had made little progress in the most significant domain; 
courts actions within the deadlines stipulated by the law, regardless of cirum-
stances. This is a huge problem for the Serbian judiciary. 
grade: 2 (two)
529  Law on  organisation of courts, article 66 and 71, Official Gazette of RS, No.  63/01, 42/02, 
27/03, 29/04, 101/05, 46/06.
530 Court Rules of Procedure, Official Gazette of RS, No. 65/03, 115/05, 4/06.
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Parliamentary control and control and oversight
Parliamentary control and oversight is carried out by the Justice and Admin-
istration Committee. The competencies of the Committee are stipulated in ar-
ticle 48 of the parliamentary Rules of Procedure.531 The Committee considers 
bills, proposals, regulations and other issues in the field of organisation of ju-
dicial authorities and actions taken by such authorities and magistrates such 
as enforcement of sentences, international legal aid, organisation and work of 
government agencies and performance of public duties, organisation of admin-
istrative bodies, the electoral system, and the association of citizens. The Com-
mittee gives its opinion on the appointment of presiding court judges, of public 
prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors and of other judicial and adminis-
trative officials foreseen by law. It also proposes decisions on the termination 
of their office, or dismissal. The Chairman of the Committee is a member of the 
High Judicial Council and the Committee is made up of seventeen members. 
Committee members do not have the right of access to court decisions order-
ing the implementation of special investigative techniques nor are such data 
submitted to Committee members or the public for review. In 2007, the Justice 
and Administration Committe held twelve sittings. The Ministry of Justice has 
not yet submitted the report on its work to the Committee. 
Parliament influences the work of the judiciary by providing a legal frame-
work (regulation of the organisation and competencies of judicial bodies, court 
proceedings, the position of judicial officials, and other matters), as well as by 
appointing and dismissing judges and public prosecutors upon the proposal of 
the High Judicial Council. Members of Parliament also vote on judicial officials’ 
stripping of immunity. The unreasonable delays in parliament’s work on deci-
sions regarding the dismissal and election of judicial officials has been men-
tioned earlier.
grade: 2 (two)
Judicial Control
The control of lower-instance courts and their conduct in matters which are 
within judicial competence is carried out solely by means of procedures in cases 
of regular and extraordinary legal remedies in higher-instance courts, which 
means that no other authority can change court decisions (the principle of in-
dependence of judicial authority). According to data on the review of court rul-
ings, higher-instance courts confirm about 60 per cent of lower-instance court 
rulings, while the other 40 per cent are either rejected or reconsidered. On the 
531 Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Official Gazette of RS, No.56/05 –  new version and 81/06.
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other hand, within the judicial system there is a system of internal control which 
is of great relevance to the proper functioning of courts. The court president is 
responsible for the regular and proper work of the court and is authorised to 
demand lawfulness, order and timeliness in court, to correct irregularities and 
to make sure that independence of judges and respect of the court are main-
tained. As the court system is based on hierarchy, a higher-instance court presi-
dent is authorised to control the court administration of a lower-instance court, 
to demand information on the implementation of regulations and problems oc-
curing during court trials, request data on the work of the lower-instance court, 
and to order direct inspection of the court’s activities. The president of the high-
est court in the country also holds the most responsible for the condition of the 
judiciary.
Public appeals are one means that court presidents’ can use to correct ir-
regularities in the work of judges. When a party or another participant in the 
proceedings files an appeal, the court president is obliged to consider it and to 
inform the appellant if the appeal is considered grounded and what measures 
will be taken with regard to it within fifteen days from the date when the appeal 
was received. If the appeal is filed via the Ministry of Justice or a higher-instance 
court, both the Minister of Justice and the president of a higher-instance court 
are notified whether there are grounds for the appeal or not. In 2007, the De-
partment for Complaints and Petitions at the Supreme Court of Serbia received 
1629 complaints and appeals. Of this number, 963 cases were solved and 82 
were transferred from 2006. The Court President considered and ruled in 584 
appeals, while 82 cases were still being processed. The majority of requests 
were for court proceedings to be sped up. Therefore, it can be concluded that a 
major shortcoming is delays in court proceedings 
The Supervisory Board, set up at the Supreme Court of Serbia, also has an 
important role in securing the regularity of work of lower-instance courts. In 
2007, the Board received 1835 cases. With 1624 cases transfered from 2006, it 
dealt with 3459 cases. Less than half the cases (1703) were solved, while 1756 
remained unsolved. The Supervisory Board held 35 sessions where decisions 
were made about the grounds for complaints, based on reports submitted by 
presidents of courts. In case of incomplete reports, new ones were requested, 
and the Board also requested insight into a large number of court cases. Once 
court case control is finished, the Board may initiate before the Grand Personnel 
Council a procedure for dismissal of a judge on the grounds of unconscientious 
or unprofessional performance of duty or it may propose  disciplinary measures. 
grade: 2 (two)
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Public control and oversight
The function of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance has al-
ready been described (see the section on transparency). The ombudsperson is 
not authorised to control the work of the judiciary and in 2007 his office re-
ceived 119 complaints (29.3 per cent of the total number of complaints) con-
cerning the work of  judicial authorities.532 The complaints were lodged against: 
The public prosecutor’s office, two complaints (0.5 per cent); non-enforcement 
of court rulings, seventeen (4.2 per cent); violation of right to a fair trial, seventy 
(17.2 per cent); violation of right to legal protection, eleven (2.7 per cent), and; 
right to a trial within a reasonable period of time, thirteen complaints (3.2 per 
cent).
The Committee on the Prevention of Conflict of Interests has no compe-
tencies over judicial officials. The Law on prevention of conflict of interests in dis-
charge of public office533 (article 2, paragraph 2) stipulates that conflict of interest 
for judges, public prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors will be regulated 
by special laws. There is an act which regulates the inventory and control of 
property owned by judges and prosecutors working in special organisational 
units for the suppression of organised crime.534
grade: 2 (two)
RULE OF LAW 
Legal state (Rechstaat)
The status of judicial power is regulated by the Constitution (articles 142-155). 
The separate and independent work of judges and courts, the permanence of 
judges’ tenure of office, non-transferability of judges and other modern princi-
ples on which judicial power in democratic systems is based, are guaranteed 
in the Constitution. Judicial power is unique and belongs to courts of general 
and special jurisdiction, whose establishment, organisation and jurisdiction are 
regulated by the law. The establishment of provisional courts, courts martial or 
special courts is strictly prohibited. The establishment of the High Judicial Coun-
cil, which shall guarantee the independence of judges and courts, is prescribed.
532 The Ombudsman’s Report for 2007, 29
533 Official Gazette of RS, No. 43/04.
534 Decree on making lists of property of persons working in or performing a function in special 
units from the Law on organisation and jurisdiction of government authorities in suppression of 
organised crime,Official Gazette of RS, No 72/03.
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The status of the Public Prosecutor’s Office is regulated by the Constitution 
(articles 156-165). The Public Prosecutor’s Office is an independent state author-
ity which is authorised to prosecute perpetrators of criminal offences and other 
punishable actions, and take measures to protect constutionality and legality. 
The Public Prosecutor’s Office performs its function according to the Constitu-
tion, ratified international treaties and regulations. The State Prosecutor’s Coun-
cil protects the independence of Public Prosecutor’s Office.  
In 2001, parliament passed a set of reform laws on the judiciary (Law on 
organisation of courts, Law on judges, Law on High Judicial Council, Law on Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, Law on the seats and territorial jurisdiction of courts and Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and Law on the State Prosecutorial Council). However, the most 
important reform measures prescribed by these laws have not been realised in 
the past seven years. In accordance with the Constitutional Act on the implemen-
tation of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, at the very end of 2008 new 
judicial laws were passed (Law on organisation of courts, Law on judges, Law on 
High Judicial Council, Law on Public Prosecutor’s Office, Law on the seats and ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of courts and Public Prosecutor’s Office and Law on the State 
Prosecutorial Council). Parliament should elect the members of the High Judicial 
Council and State Prosecutorial Council within three months. Most provisions 
contained in the laws will be in effect from 1 January 2010.
A long-term goal of all countries in transition is the rule of law, in particular 
the fundamental requirement of this principle that the judiciary must be truly 
independent of other authorities. Serbia has made some progress in this area, 
but there is still work to be done. Nevertheless, progress is now more visible on 
a regulatory than on a practical level, and to make it more substantial will re-
quire real and continued efforts of all three branches of state authority, includ-
ing civil society organisations. In this regard, it is vital that judicial officials realise 
that their independence does not imply only that they are free from unlawful in-
fluences and that they have autonomy in using the court budget, but primarily 
that they should be fully accountable for lawful, professional and regular per-
formance. Such performance of judge’s function is fundamental for the respect 
of the rule of law in the activities of all security sector actors.  
grade: 3 (three)
Protection of human rights 
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, as has already been mentioned, con-
tains a long list of human and minority rights and freedoms and regulates the 
mechanisms for their protection. Judicial protection of these rights is a primary 
form of protection, meaning that any person has the right to this protection if 
his or her human or minority rights guaranteed by the Constitution have been 
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violated or denied, as well as the right to elimination of consequences arising 
from the violation (article 22 of the Constitution). If security sector reform is to 
make any progress, it is important that judicial protection of human rights is ef-
fective in all cases of human rights violations committed by the police, military, 
intelligence services and other security system actors. As stated earlier, some 
progress is evident, but it still does not match real needs. If the courts are to be-
come a truly reliable instrument of human rights protection, they must become 
aware of the value of human rights and that they are the main protector of these 
rights. This awareness must be shared by all judicial officials. Certain obstacles 
to more efficient judicial protection of human rights have also been discussed, 
as well as the general shortcomings of courts in this area of their work. 
grade: 2 (two)
EFFICIENCY
Serbia has about 2300 judges535 working in all courts, and over 18,000 other 
judicial personnel. In 2007, there were eight judges fewer in the Supreme Court 
of Serbia than in 2006. While representatives of the judiciary frequently claim 
that the number of judges is insufficient and that they are overloaded with 
work. However representatives of executive authorities and the public often 
remark that the number of judges in Serbia exceeds the number of judges in 
other countries with a similar size of population, and that there are many judges 
whose performance is unprofessional and unconscientious. It is also true that 
there are certain duties and functions which are currently under the jurisdiction 
of the judiciary but which could be performed by other, non-judiciary authori-
ties (for instance by notaries). The total number of public prosecutors and depu-
ties in Serbia is nearly 1000.536 
Criteria for measuring judges’ professionalism and dilligence are: The 
number of court cases processed by each judge; the type and complexity of cas-
es; the number of cases that each judge should process on a monthly basis; the 
number of dismissed, confirmed or reversed decisions or rulings; the number 
of cases where a hearing was held before a second-instance court based on an 
appeal filed against the ruling of the first-instance court; the time taken to pass 
a ruling; timely and efficient processing of cases, and; conduct with involved 
535 ‘Constitutional status of the judiciary: Constitutional principles, structure and status of courts 
and judges’, Serbian Association of Judges 
http://www.sudije.org.yu/static_content/forum/public/481971887437 [accessed 28 July 2007]
536 The status of public prosecutors – statistical  analysis (Belgrade:Centre for Peace and Develop-
ment of Democracy, July 2006), 12.
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parties.537 
The Judicial Training Centre was established in 2001, to provide continuous 
professional training for judicial officials. The Centre has trained nearly 15,000 
people; approximately 2400 judges, over 700 prosecutors and deputies, around 
1000 officials elected for the first time, court and prosecutors’ assistants and ad-
visors, and nearly 11,000 employees of the judicial administration. The Law on 
training of judges, public prosecutors and deputy public prosecutors and court and 
prosecutor’s assistants regulates the type and manner of training. According to 
the plan of the National Judicial Reform Strategy, the Judicial Training Centre 
will be reorganised by establishing the National Judicial Training System. 
grade: 2 (two)
EFFECTIVNESS
Integratedness
The principle of uniqueness of judicial power is set forth as a basic principle of 
the organisation and functioning of this branch of state authority (article 142, 
paragraph 1). It provides a clear division of jurisdiction among courts. It also 
means that the relationship between lower and higher instance courts is regu-
lated, and that the harmonising of law implementation is obligatory. The es-
tablishment, jurisdiction, structure and organisation of the courts are stipulated 
by law. Courts are permanent institutions established by law and provisional 
courts, special courts or courts martial cannot be established. The Constitution 
regulates the highest court of the Republic of Serbia – The Supreme Court of 
Cassation, whereas the regulation of other courts (courts of general jurisdiction 
and special courts) is in the domain of legislation.
At the onset of reforms, the inherited judicial system was deemed inade-
quate. As early as 2001, a law was adopted which redefined the organisation 
and jurisdiction of the courts (by introducing of courts of appeal, the Adminis-
trative Court, and by changing the jurisdictions of all courts). The Law on minor 
offences, adopted in 2005, stipulated that new magistrate courts would replace 
the current authorities for minor offences. However, the reorganisation of court 
system had not been carried out until the adoption of the new Constitution, 
and new laws on court organisation and jurisdictions were passed by the end 
of 2008. In the meantime (2006), the National Judiciary Reform Strategy was 
537 Criteria for measuring minimum effectivness of performing judicial duites which is in effect 
temporarily until the provisions of articles 21-28 of the Law on organisation of courts are en-
forced, Official Gazette of RS, No. 80/05, art. 1.
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launched,538 aimed at reform of the entire judicial system. However, implemen-
tation of the Strategy has been slow, with the result that the goals of reform 
have been fully realised on a regulatory level, rather than in practice.  
grade: 2 (two)
The ratio between aims, resources and outcomes
Most of the goals set out in the National Judicial Reform Strategy (the com-
pletion of which was planned for the end of 2007 and 2008) have not been 
reached. The High Judicial Council and State Prosecutors Council have not been 
established because new laws on the judicial system have not been adopted. 
The realisation of other goals was blocked (such as transfering the competen-
cies of the Grand Personnel Council and the Supervisory Board at the Supreme 
Court of Serbia to the High Judicial Council. Also the formation of a transitional 
budget model, in which the High Judicial Council is supposed to participate). 
Similarly, goals for more efficient and active participation of public prosecutors 
in investigations, which would contribute to more efficient criminal proceed-
ings, are also not realised because implementation of the new Criminal Proce-
dure Code is constantly being postponed. At the same time, a new law which 
would establish a uniform system of legal aid has not been passed.   
Contrary to the goals which were not realised due to the lack of appropriate 
legislation, two goals set in the National Judicial Reform Strategy were partly re-
alised. First, transparency has improved by adopting rules and procedures which 
enable broader public insight of the public into court proceedings and deci-
sions. This was achieved by posting selected decisions of the Supreme Court on 
the institution’s website. Second, information desks were set up in some courts, 
where citizens can get over 10,000 pieces of information each month.539 On the 
other hand, an information desk or a Public Relations Office at the High Judicial 
Council have not been set up.
The lack of legislative activity in parliament and of funding are considered 
the most important factors preventing the achievement of these goals of ju-
dicial reform. Delays in the implementation of reforms are also caused by pre-
dictable resistance within the judicial system to changes and innovations of the 
existing status.
grade: 2 (two)
538 National Judicial Reform Strategy, Official Gazette of RS  44/06.
539 Golubović, 20.
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Legitimacy
In terms of public trust, the legitimacy of courts appears to be rather low, as 
61 per cent of citizens have a negative impression of the judiciary.540 This nega-
tive attitude is partly a reflection of the previous regime (up to 2000). The public 
continues to doubt that all citizens are equal in court. It believes that some peo-
ple are privileged and others are not, and that the road to justice is very hard 
and complicated. Of special significance for this analysis is the attitude of a large 
number of citizens that courts and public prosecutors are not willing enough 
to protect citizens when their rights have been violated by state authorities, es-
pecially those that represent the apparatus of force. In addition, the judiciary 
receives a poor score in terms of the public’s attitude with regard to corruption 
of state institutions. 
540 Mirjana Golubović, Public relations in courts (Belgrade: Secretariat for the Implementation of 
National Judicial Reform Strategy , 2007), 8.
302
3. Prisons
Bogoljub Milosavljević i Jelena Unijat
Prisons are security system actors for two reasons. First, prisons are charged 
with the responsibility of resocialising convicts, namely teaching them respect 
for social norms and preparing them for life in the community after they com-
plete their sentence.541 Prisons can therefore contribute to security situation if 
inmates, or at least a large majority of them, are able to successfully integrate 
into the community and not recommit crime. Considering high recidivism rates 
(65 per cent), it is debatable to what extent this is achieved in Serbia.
Second, all prison inmates must be protected from torture, and they must 
be treated humanely by prison administration and prison staff. Humane treat-
ment of prisoners and detainees in prisons means that rules must be strictly 
respected with regard to the use of instruments of force and disciplinary meas-
ures, and external control and oversight and control must be in place. Moreover, 
prison authorities must ensure personal safety and health of prison inmates and 
prevent any conflicts and violence among them. They must prevent suicide at-
tempts or self-injury, use of drugs and other behaviour that compromises per-
sonal safety and health. Finally, prisons should be ‘safe places’; there should be 
no riots and escapes, and should not be a places to plan or commit criminal 
offences. The situation in Serbia, however, does not meet these requirements, 
as will be shown  below.
A general overview of prisons in Serbia
The legal framework for the treatment of prisoners and detainees in prisons 
is provided by the Constitution, the Law on execution of criminal sanctions, the 
Criminal Procedure Code, and in some specific laws and by-laws. The Consti-
tution prohibits discrimination and torture and proclaims a number of rights 
related to the position of persons deprived of liberty (article 27–35). Article 28 
of the Constitution specifically provides that persons deprived of liberty must 
be treated humanely and with respect to the dignity of their person. It prohibits 
violence towards such persons, as well as extorting statements from them. Any 
sentence which includes deprivation of liberty may be proclaimed solely by the 
court (article 27, paragraph 4). A person may be remanded to detention only 
541 Resocalisation as the purpose of serving the sentence of imprisonment replaced the old 
‘personal reform’ approach that prevailed during socialism. The remnants of the old approach, 
however, are yet to be eliminated in a thorough reform process. 
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upon the decision of the court, and if the detainee has not been questioned the 
decision on detention is made, the detainee must be brought before the com-
petent court within 48 hours. All detainees are entitled to lodge appeal against 
the court decision on detention and the court shall decide on such appeals and 
service it detainees within 48 hours (article 30). On the whole, constitutional 
provisions offer a modern general legal framework for treatment of sentenced 
and untried prison inmates in compliance with the European Convention on 
Human Rights and other international documents.
The current Law on execution of criminal sanctions (henceforth LECS) was 
adopted in 2005.542 It resulted from the firm commitment to introduce reforms 
and establish a modern system for the execution of sanctions in line with Euro-
pean standards. The law introduces a system of alternative punishments, such 
as community work and probation. Similar guiding principles were applied for 
the execution of criminal sanctions for minors in the Law on minor perpetrators 
of criminal offences and criminal-law protection of juveniles.543 Both these laws 
came into force on 1 January 2006 but their full implementation (implementa-
tion of their essential elements) will take time. This is especially true for evaluat-
ing the effects of their implementation. In order to shorten the required time, 
it is important to meet certain material, personnel, spatial and other require-
ments necessary for the introduction of crucial novelties. In this regard it should 
be highlighted that it is almost inexplicable that the drafting of by-laws for the 
implementation of these laws takes such a long time.  This is perhaps a sign of a 
lack of commitment from the executive branch of government. Some of these 
legal acts can be disputed even in regard with their compliance with the Con-
stitution.
In respect to organisational structure, prisons fall under the Administration 
for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions within the Ministry of Justice. Serbia has 
28 prison and detention facilities: 
•	 Eight penitentiary-correctional institutions (one of which is of a strict prison 
type – KPZ in Požarevac/Zabela; three of which are of a prison type – KPZ in 
Sremska Mitrovica, KPZ in Niš, and KPZ for minors in Valjevo; four are open 
prisions – KPZ in Belgrade/Padinska Skela, KPZ in Sombor, KPZ in Ćuprija, 
and KPZ in Šabac);
•	 Three special institutions (Penitentiary Hospital in Belgrade, Correctional 
Facility in Kruševac (semi-open), and Penitentiary-Correctional Institution 
for Women in Požarevac (semi-open), and;
•	 70 county prisons.544
According to local criteria, Serbia has suitable accommodation for about 
542 Official Gazette of RS, No. 85/05.
543 Official Gazette of RS, No. 85/05.
544 In Belgrade, Vranje, Zaječar, Zrenjanin, Kragujevac, Kraljevo, Kruševac, Leskovac, Negotiu, 
Novi Pazar, Novi Sad, Pančevo, Prokuplje, Smederevo, Subotica, Užice, and Čačak.
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6000 persons. According to European Union standards (four square metres and 
eight cubic metres per a prisoner), however, only about 4500 prisoners could be 
accommodated.545  In 2007, Serbian prisons held 8532 inmates, of which 6057 
were sentenced individuals, 1863 were detainees, and 212 persons had sen-
tences for minor offence.546 There are 168 underage persons placed under re-
habilitative treatment, 35 of which served sentences in juvenile prisons. In spe-
cialised institutions, treatment is provided for 509 persons who have required 
security measures of mandatory psychiatric treatment and confinement. A total 
of 187 convicted women served their sentence in the Penitentiary-Correctional 
Institution for Women. The average age of prisoners is below 30.  By the end 
of 2008, the number of convicts and detainees rose by approximately 1700. 
Due to this overcrowding547 some convicted individuals have had the start of 
their sentence delayed. Since 2003 the prison numbers have been increasing 
each year by approximately 1000.  The total prison population has grown by 60 
per cent in the past five years. Daily fluctuations (admission to and discharge 
from prisons) amount to between 250 and 300 and between 5500 and 6000 
convicted persons are now waiting to serve their imprisonment sentences in 
Serbia. One solution is alternative sanctions and simplifying conditional release 
procedures on the one hand, and building new prison facilities on the other. 
Two years ago a special purpose facility was built in Zabela to accommodate 
individuals convicted for organised crime offences and war crimes (capacity 
150–200 convicts).548 Construction of a maximum-security prison in Padinska 
Skela for about 450 prisoners is expected to be completed before the autumn 
of 2009. There are also plans to build facilities in Prokuplje, Pančevo, Kragujevac 
and Kruševac, each with the capacity to accommodate 400 to 500 prisoners.549    
 The Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions employs 3687 
persons to work with different categories of sentenced and detained persons. 
However, at least a thousand more guards are needed than the 2200 at present. 
The conclusion would be that this administration most likely has redundancy of 
other staff. 
The Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions is a major item 
545 ‘Interview of Damir Joka, Head of the Department for Treatment and Alternative Sanctions 
in the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions within the Ministry of Justice,“ 
Politika, 8 February 2009, 12–13.
546 Ministry of Justice, http://mpravde.mvcore.net/active/sr-latin/home/zatvori/statistika_za-
tvori.html, [accessed on  6 December 2007]
547 For example, the number of convicted and detained persons in KPZ Niš exceeds the optimum 
capacity by about 500 (statement of the Director of KPZ Niš, Politika, 8 February 2009, 12).
548 This facility is still not being used since it is necessary to first adopt amendments to the law to 
provide for the possibility of serving sentences in special prison departments.
549 ‘Interview of Damir Joka, Head of the Department for Treatment and Alternative Sanctions 
in the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions within the Ministry of Justice,“ 
Politika, 8 February 8 2009, 12–13.
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in the state budget.  It is calculated that a prisoner costs the state a minimum 
RSD 1000 a day. Minor prisoners cost around RSD 5000 a day.550 Shortages in the 
funds needed to support prisoners are partly offset by some economic activity 
organised in prisons. Most prisons have their own cattle farms and arable land 
for cultivating vegetables. In some prisons prisoners produce small craft prod-
ucts and some have their own production plants (‘Deligrad’ in Niš, ‘Preporod’ 
in Zabela, ‘Dubrava’ in Sremska Mitrovica). Although this production has little 
economic value (because it is not competitive on the market), it has retained 
an educational purpose (enabling prisoners to find a job more easily once they 
leave the prison).551
Some problems, as well as progress made in the reform process, are pre-
sented below (for each of the indicators).
PACE AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF REFORM
REPRESENTATIVENESS
Representativeness of women
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the laws defining the prohibition 
of discrimination (the Law on civil servants and the Labour law) deal with gender 
equality in respect to employment in the prison service. In the case of employ-
ment of prison guard, there are no special dilemmas related to gender equality 
considering that only women can work in the security service of female prisons 
and only men can work in male prisons. The issue of women representativeness, 
however, becomes an issue when looking at promotion policy, leadership posi-
tions, and the recruitment of women for other services. Regrettably, we could 
not obtain information and the grade attributed to this criterion is strictly con-
ditional. 
grade: 4 (four)
Representativeness of ethnic minorities
The Constitution and relevant laws (the Law on civil servants and the Labour law) 
define obligations regarding ethnic representation within government authori-
550 Interview, 12-13.
551 Interview, 12-13.
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ties, as well as the possibility of introducing affirmative action arrangements to 
achieve appropriate representativeness of members of ethnic minorities. Such 
arrangements, however, do not exist. Considering that data on ethnic affilia-
tion of individuals employed in the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary 
Sanctions could not be obtained, the grade here is also conditional. 
grade: 3 (three)
TRANSPARENCY
general transparency
Operational transparency is obliged by the Constitution and the Law on free ac-
cess to information of public importance.552 Based on this law, the Commissioner 
passed the ‘Reference guide for publishing of the Information Bulletin on the 
work of state authorities’,553 and subsequently a law implementation manual ‘A 
guide through the law’554 published in Serbian and six languages of ethnic mi-
norities. Nine complaints were submitted to the Commissioner against the Min-
istry of Justice’s Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions. Eight 
were resolved and one is still pending. In relation to the submitted complaints, 
the Commissioner issued three administrative orders for access to information 
be allowed.  In two of these cases there was full compliance and in one com-
pliance was partial.  In other cases the procedure was discontinued because 
the requests were fully complied with after the complaints were submitted and 
intervention from the Commissioner. In general, the requests concerned access 
to (or receiving copies of ) documents relevant for individual prisoners, in con-
nection to treatment, health care, and exercising rights (such as voting).
Transparency is specifically provided for in the Law on the execution of penal 
sanctions. Article 29 prescribes that the operation of the Administration for Exe-
cution of Penitentiary Sanctions shall be publicly visible. The Ministry of Justice’s 
website, in the section dealing with the operations of this Administration, offers 
sufficient information and is regularly updated. The Minister of Justice and the 
Director of the Administration, whether directly or indirectly through the direc-
tors of prisons, inform the public about execution of sanctions if by doing it they 
do not prejudice professional secrecy or seriously imperil the safety or peace 
and order in the facility. Article 30 of the law prescribes that individual or group 
552 Law on free access to information of public importance, Official Gazette of RS, No. 120/04.
553 Instructions for the publication of Information Booklet on the operation of government authori-
ties, Official Gazette of RS, No. 57/05. 
554 Guide through the law, Official Gazette of RS, Nos. 67/05 and 74/06.
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visits can be granted by the director of the Administration. Visitors are allowed 
to talk with an inmate with or without the presence of prison guards.
The Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions is under obliga-
tion to submit its annual progress reports to parliament, the competent parlia-
mentary working body, and the Minister of Justice. Reports on the operation of 
the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions were publicly pre-
sented in 2007 and 2008.555
grade: 3 (three)
Financial transparency
Although competent authorities and the public are allowed access to data on 
the budget of the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions, as well 
as data on other budget beneficiaries, parliament has not considered the budg-
etary final accounts in the past several years. Moreover, because of delays with 
the State Audit Institution, an independent external audit of spending has not 
been carried out. This audit is even more important in view of the fact that pris-
ons are being allocated considerable funds from the budget. Thus, during 2007 
alone, RSD 80 million were allocated from the National Investment Plan for the 
construction of a Drug Free Department. The same funds are used for the con-
struction of two annexes to the Sremska Mitrovica facility for which three mil-
lion euros will be allocated.556  RSD 160 million was invested in a special prison 
unit constructed for prisoners convicted for organised crime offences and war 
crimes.557  In addition, prisons obtain some proceeds from the work done by the 
prisoners; control and oversight of their financial operations is important from 
this aspect too. This is especially important considering that this aspect of pris-
ons’ business is regulated by a law (Law on organisation of business units within 
the facilities for execution of penal sanctions558). This law was adopted during a 
time when different rules of business prevailed and the criteria for operational 
transparency were much lower.  
grade: 2 (two)
555 ‘Annual report of the administration for the execution of penitentiary sanctions’, Danas, 6 July 
2007, http://www.danas.co.yu/20070706/hronika1.html, [accessed 31 July 2008]
556 ‘Investicije u zatvore’, B92, http://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=268271 [accessed 
17 October 2007] 
557 ‘Osuđene za ubistvo Đinđića čeka novi zatvor’, Glas javnosti, 
http://www.glas javnosti.co.yu/danas/srpski/T07052402.shtml  [accessed 20 July 2008]
558 Official Gazette of RS, No. 12/98.
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PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS AND ThEIR 
ASSOCIATIONS
Participation in policy creation (strategic and legal 
framework)
As in other fields, the possibilities for public participation and their associa-
tions in policy creation are relatively few, or underdeveloped. Moreover, in 2007 
and 2008 the legal procedure saw no regulations which would bring any ma-
jor change to the operation of the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary 
Sanctions, or the position of prisoners. Nevertheless, the issues related to peni-
tentiary sanctions are a focal point of interest for a number of professional as-
sociations and these associations often initiate or propose changes considered 
by the competent Ministry.
grade: 2 (two)
Participation in policy implementation and evaluation
Similiarly, except through motions and petitions, the public does not have 
many opportunities to influence the implementation and evaluation of policy 
application. However, citizens’ associations, and particularly non-governmental 
organisations involved in the protection of human rights, as well as media, have 
attempted to draw attention to deficiencies in the sentencing system, partic-
ularly by drawing attention to the position of detained persons and convicts. 
However, public initiatives, motions, and assessments are generally met with 
silence from the executive government and judicial authorities. In contrast, the 
media has demonstrated that it is a more powerful means for exerting influ-
ence. 
grade: 2 (two)
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ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC 
CIVILIAN CONTROL AND PUBLIC Control 
and oversight
Controlling role of the executive branch of government
As part of the public administration system, the Administration for Execution of 
Penitentiary Sanctions is under the control and influence of the government. 
The director of the Administration is accountable directly to the Minister of Jus-
tice. An Control and oversight Department has been set up within the Admin-
istration to oversee the operation of penitentiary institutions, control planning 
and operation of all services and employees of penitentiary institutions propose 
remedies for any observed flaws and control its implementation. Based on the 
control and oversight that was carried out, the Department analyses and evalu-
ates the functioning of the penitentiary, supervises the implementation of the 
treatment service’s plan and programmes, orders measures to improve and en-
sure uniformity of the work on treatment of sentenced persons, oversees the 
classification and reclassification of convicts, oversees the way in which facilities 
ensure safety and organise their security services, oversees physical and work-
ing capability of persons employed in the security service, oversees implemen-
tation of the regulations on uniform, emblems, titles, ranks, arms and use of 
force, and regulations on prisoners’ involvement in work activity, oversees the 
material-financial operations of the institution and oversees the spending of in-
vestment funds and maintenance of facilities..
Inspection control of medical services in penitentiary-correctional institu-
tions is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health (article 276 of LECS). The in-
spectors enjoy free access to prisons, and prisoners have the right to contact 
them directly.
Because of the lack of specified data, it was impossible to analyse the effects 
of the implementation of above control and oversight and supervisory powers. 
Consequently the grade is based on the regulation of these powers as well as on 
analysis of data about general condition in prisons, which is less sound. 
grade: 3 (three)
Parliamentary control
Because of the importance of independent control and oversight of prisons, 
this issue is specifically regulated in article 278 of LECS. Accordingly upon the 
recommendation of the Committee for Judiciary and Administration, parlia-
310
ment should set up a commission composed of five expert members (but not 
employees of the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions). The 
Commission operates autonomously and the Administration is obliged to pro-
vide all relevant information for its work. At least once a year, the Commission 
submits a status report on penal sanctions to parliament and the Minister re-
sponsible for judiciary. This parliamentary commission has not been appointed 
and its rules of procedures have not been defined. 
To date, the parliamentary Committee for Judiciary and Administration has 
realised its role of overseeing prisons only to a certain extent. It deals with pris-
oners’ complaints and, in 2006, processed more than 200 such complaints and 
requests.559 In 2006, members of the Committee visited the Central Prison in 
Belgrade with the aim of performing direct control and oversight. 
grade: 2 (two)
Judicial control
The Supreme Court of Serbia has jurisdiction in administrative disputes that are 
related to administrative decisions of the Administration for Execution of Peni-
tentiary Sanctions. An appeal may be filed with the Administrative Department 
of the Supreme Court against the decision of the director of the Administration 
for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions. If the decision is rejected and the di-
rector of the Administration fails to comply, the Supreme Court can decide on 
the appeal too.  Eight separate cases appeared in front of the Supreme Court 
in 2006.  Four decisions issued by the director of the Administration were sup-
ported, and four were rejected.560 Prisoners are not sufficiently informed about 
administrative proceedings conducted in front of the Supreme Court, and even 
when they are informed, they cannot obtain the kind of protection if they are 
not provided adequate legal assistance.
According to a statement given by an Administration representative, a doz-
en proceedings against prison guards were conducted in mid-2008, all of them 
concerning excessive use of force.561
Judicial control is also present for decisions on conditional release. Accord-
ing to provisions of the Criminal Code,562 conditional release is decided by the 
court.  Formerly this was the jurisdiction of the Administration. In making a 
decision on conditional release, the court considers reports on the prisoner’s 
559 System of complaints and inspection controls of prisons in Serbia, Visit of 9–10 October 2006, 
Belgrade and Novi Sad, Izveštaj eksperata Saveta Evrope, 18 December 2006, 21.
560 Ibid., 14.
561 ‘Nema torture u zatvorima u Srbiji’, Dnevnik, 27 June 2008, 8.
562 Criminal Code, Official Gazette of RS, Nos. 85/05, 88/05, 107/05 (Art. 46).
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conduct during his sentence. When the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 
visited prisons in Serbia, prison staff stressed that the court often rejects their 
motions for conditional release.563 There are also complaints related to the com-
plexity of the legal procedure and to the small number of the Administration’s 
proposals that were accepted.564 However, these kinds of objections can be in-
terpreted as staff discontent with the fact that the Administration has lost its 
competences and that they are now in the hands of judicial authorities.
grade: 3 (three)
Public control and oversight
Certain government institutions, international institutions, and local non-gov-
ernment organisations are also involved in public control and oversight. 
Launched in 2007, the Protector of Citizens, inter alia, deals with the prison-
ers’ problems. The Protector has free access to prisoners. In 2007, the Protector 
received twelve complaints (2.96 per cent of total number of complaints) relat-
ed to the rights of prisoners565 and the same complaints were present in 2008.566
The Province’s Ombudsman controls prisons in the Autonomous Province 
of Vojvodina. According to his report, a considerable number of prisoners’ com-
plaints relate to the protracted extradition procedure, duration of sentences, 
and unfair guilty verdicts, while a smaller number of complaints concern poor 
prison food, a lack of Halal food for Muslims, a shortage of orthopaedic aids, and 
poorly supplied prisons’ shops. Prisoners of Roma nationality often complain 
about their treatment. Many complaints are filed by prisoners who are under-
going pre-trial proceedings and need a permit from the investigatory judge for 
any communication outside prision. This category of prisoners also complains 
that prison guards use excessive force. It is difficult to instigate disciplinary pro-
ceedings against prison guards because they are never willing to testify against 
each other. The Province’s Ombudsman receives about one hundred complaints 
a year, and most of them come from a group. Resolving one complaint takes 
about a month. Almost half of complaints were resolved positively, but there is 
no feedback on whether prison authorities comply with the Ombudsman’s deci-
sions and recommendations.
The Helsinki Committee was the only one to visit all 28 penitentiary-correc-
tional facilities. It also often contacts prisoners and deals with their complaints. 
563 Jelić Marija, Zatvori u Srbiji 2004–2005 (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 2005) 
154. 
564 Statement of the Director of KPZ Niš, Politika, 8 February 2009, 12.
565 Report for 2007,  March 15, 2008, 29.
566 The Protector’s of Citizen Report for 2008, March 2009.
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Prisoners’ Problems are often the focus of other non-governmental organisa-
tions too. Independent and efficient inspections are performed by the Europe-
an Committee for the Prevention of Torture and international organisations of 
the Red Cross. Their findings will be discussed in the following pages.
grade: 3 (three)
RULE OF LAW
Legal state (Rechtsstaadt)
As has been mentioned, legislative regulation of the operation of penitentiary-
correctional facilities is founded on the Constitution, the Law on execution of 
penal sanctions, the Law on minor perpetrators of criminal offences and criminal 
law protection of juveniles (both these laws were adopted in 2005), the Law on 
organisation of business units within the facilities for execution of criminal sanc-
tions (1998), and a large number of by-laws (the Decree on the establishment of 
the Institution for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions in the Republic of Serbia, the 
Rulebook on house rules in penitentiary-correctional facilities and county prisons, 
the Rulebook on house rules for implementation of detention, the Rulebook for 
maintenance of peace and safety in the facilities for execution of penitentiary sanc-
tions, the Rulebook on implementation of the programme for protection of par-
ticipants in criminal proceedings in the facilities for execution of penitentiary sanc-
tions, the Rulebook on house rules in penitentiary-correctional facility for juveniles, 
the Rulebook on organisation, operation, and treatment of detainees in a special 
detention unit, the Rulebook on house rules in juvenile correctional/education facil-
ity, and the Rulebook on keeping records on pronounced educational/correctional 
measures and juvenile prison sentence, etc). There are also the by-laws pertaining 
to the internal structure of the Administration of Execution of Penitentiary Sanc-
tions, such as the Rulebook for definition of the tasks the performance of which 
is unacceptable when working in the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary 
Sanctions, the Rulebook on official identification documents of the security staff of 
the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions, the Rulebook on uni-
form and designation of titles of the members of security staff of the Administration 
for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions. Most of the above by-laws (although not 
all of them) comply with the provisions of the new LECS, and it can generally be 
said that the legal framework for prisons is in place and is sound. On the other 
hand, (as with other areas in Serbia) there are certain discrepancies between 
the regulatory and actual situation. To be precise, application of the laws and 
the rules provided by the by-laws is not always correct. Further its guiding prin-
ciple is not that guaranteed by Constitution, namely respect for sentenced and 
313
untried individuals in prison. This is illustrated by the data on submitted com-
plaints, as well as by the outcome of the controls implemented by independent 
bodies. 
grade: 2 (two)
Protection of human rights
The Constitution, and particularly LECS, contains detailed provisions governing 
the position of prisoners and defining standards for humane treatment. Dur-
ing a visit to Serbia,567 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman Treatment and Punishment found that overcrowded prisons and 
inadequate accommodation space were the main problems. Moreover, it found 
that the system for complaining is underdeveloped and that prisoners are not 
given a possibility to contact the ombudsman.  There are no records about the 
use of the means of force in prisons, no action is taken against prison guards 
who exceed their powers, and there is no system of alternative sanctions. In 
addition, there were several incidents of maltreatment of prisoners, and Roma, 
foreign citizens and members of ethnic minorities are the most exposed to tor-
ture. With regard to language, religion or diet, there is still a question mark over 
the level to which the rights of prisoners from ethnic minorities are respected. 
Prisoners who are foreign citizens are placed separately, in Sremska Mitrovica 
prison. Poor conditions in some facilities and the absence of a specific law that 
would govern persons with mental impairments were among other things that 
were mentioned. 
For the most part, the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanc-
tions implemented the Committee’s recommendations. The Ministry for Human 
and Minority Rights, however, responded that, taking into account the lack of 
material resources, the main objection put forward by the Committee relating 
to prison overcrowding and poor  accommodation, cannot be easily or quickly 
remedied. The truth is that most buildings used as prison facilities were built 
over 70 years ago.
A further problem is that there is no by-law to regulate procedures for filing 
and resolving complaints. Even though the law does not prescribe it, an appeal 
must be filed in writing. Illiterate prisoners must completely depend on other 
prisoners. Prisoners are provided with standard forms for complaints and ap-
peals. Prisoners can use their own language when they write complaints. From 
567 Report to the Government of Serbia and Montenegro on the visit to Serbia and Montenegro car-
ried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment (CPT) from 16 to 28 September 2004, Strasbourg 2006, p. 41.
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January 2005 to 1 October 2005 a total of 150 complaints were filed568 because 
of infringement of prisoners’ rights.  Most of them were related to the non-pro-
vision of suitable medical care. During the same period, 31 appeals were lodged 
against the Director of the Administration’s decisions on those complaints. 
grade: 2 (two)
EFFICIENCY
The ratio between the number of persons deprived of liberty and those em-
ployed in prisons is about three to one. As was mentioned before, of the to-
tal number of employees of the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary 
Sanctions (3687), only 2200 are guards.  In Austria, for instance, members of the 
security services account for 85 per cent of employees. A reason for this unfa-
vourable situation in Serbia is not hard to imagine considering that domestic 
administration structures often have a disproportionately large number of peo-
ple performing ancillary or support tasks compared to those performing core 
activities. LECS envisages the establishment of a Training Centre for Employees 
of the Administration for Execution of Penitentiary Sanctions, designed to rem-
edy inadequate levels of staff training. Also, there is an insufficient number of 
available vehicles, worn out and obsolete equipment and an absence of video-
surveillance systems.
Twenty-seven people in prisons were identified as being HIV positive, 1931 
with hepatitis B or C and 83 with TBC. Surveys also showed that 91 per cent of 
minors in the Education/Correctional Facility in Kruševac had used opiates or 
psychostimulants. Fourteen escapes from prisons were recorded in 2007. This 
includes a group of eight detainees who escaped from the Vršac Detention 
Unit at the same time. A much larger number of convicts abuse the privileges 
granted to them. This includes individuals who do not come back to prison after 
weekend visits or who abandon construction or business sites, as happened 
254 times in 2007.
In 2007, 414 conflicts were recorded, involving 596 people. 72 people were 
lightly injured, and eight seriously. 106 cold weapons (knives, etc) were seized 
as well as 514 mobile phones (which are frequently a reason for conflict). Au-
thorities also seized 470 grams of heroin and cocaine, 520 grams of marihuana 
and hashish, 22 litres of alcoholic beverages, and more than four thousand psy-
choactive medications.
There were nine suicides in prison, sixty-eight suicide attempts and 215 
cases of self-injury. There were 352 incidents of hunger strike, the reason for 
568 Sistem pritužbi i inspekcije zatvora u Srbiji, 14.
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which in the majority of cases is protest against the slow progress of court pro-
ceedings.
One of the largest security problems are prison riots, although there were 
no riots in 2008. Judging by the consequences, the largest riot took place in 
November 2000 in which, according to the statement of the Minister of Justice, 
there were 36 victims. This riot took place in the prisons of Sremska Mitrovica, 
Niš, Zabela, and Padinska Skela. In July 2006, about 70 prisoners protested in 
the County Prison in Belgrade. They stitched up their mouths using thread and 
springs from their beds. In October of the same year, prisoners in the prisons 
in Niš, Zabela, Sremska Mitrovica, Prokuplje, and Valjevo went on hunger strike 
demanding the adoption of the amnesty law. The following month saw also ex-
tensive riots in a number of prisons (Niš, Zabela, Sremska Mitrovica, Zrenjanin, 
Valjevo, Novi Sad, Sombor, Subotica, and Leskovac). It was suppressed by the 
gendarmerie (there were more than 55 injured prisoners, 20 self-injured, and 
considerable damage to the facilities). In July 2007, 125 prisoners protested in 
Zabela by refusing to take food, again demanding the adoption of the amnesty 
law. 
grade: 2 (two)
EFFECTIVENESS
Integratedness of the system
If regarded only in view of prison operation, the system of prison sentence serv-
ing is built on the principle of integratedness and, in the framework therein, 
common classification of prisons is implemented. No specific suggestions are 
made for improvement of the system in this regard. However, considering that 
functional relations between this system and the systems contingent on it are 
missing, it seems that prisons constitute a system per se and pro se. Some serious 
objections were made concerning the lack of adequate (programme-defined 
and institutionalised) cooperation between the Administration for Execution 
of Penitentiary Sanctions, the courts that decide on conditional release, social 
welfare departments, local self-government units, and other institutions which 
are supposed to contribute to the achievement of the final goal of the sentence 
of deprivation of liberty – resocialisation of persons who have served their sen-
tences.
grade: 2 (two)
316
Lawfulness of the penal/correctional system
There are no public opinion surveys with regard to prisons. The media only spo-
radically address the situation in prisons and then only with regard to corrup-
tion, riots, escapes, violent deaths and suicides in prisons, or some aspect about 
the prison life of a celebrity (for instance special privileges and visits).
grade: 1 (one)
Collation of goals, resources and outcomes
The recidivism rate in our system is approximately 65 per cent. In view of reso-
cialisation this is an extremely negative indicator. Despite the very high recidi-
vism rate, the system leans towards semi-open or open facilities. This problem, 
as well as the problem of overcrowded prisons, could be alleviated by opting for 
alternatives to prison, as is common in other countries. For these reasons, leg-
islation (LECS) now provides for a probation system and community work. With 
the application of these measures prison maintenance costs could be reduced 
by approximately EUR 2.5 million a year.569  Probation and community sentenc-
ing, however, is still not practically implemented.
grade: 2 (two)
569 ‘System of alternative sanctions’, B92, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=04&nav_id=307051&nav_
category=12 [accessed 31 July 2008]
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1. Private security 
companies
Marko Milošević
Private security companies (PSCs) in Serbia have been active since the early 
1990s. PSCs fall under the category of non-state actors authorised to use force. It 
is estimated that these companies today employ between 20 and 60 thousand 
people in Serbia. These companies are providing services of physical–technical 
protection, cash in transit (CIT) and detective business. Regardless of this, com-
petences and activities of PSCs in Serbia are not regulated by any specific law. 
What is more, none of the country’s strategic documents has recognised private 
security companies as a security system actor. 
The security privatisation process in Serbia can be divided into three peri-
ods: The period before 1993 when activities were performed within the frame-
work of the law;570 between 1993 and 2000 during which the Law on all people’s 
defence and civilian self-protection was rescinded and PSCs therefore operated in 
a legislatively under-regulated environment of UN economic embargo on Ser-
bia; and the period after 2000 which is a time of political transition, economic 
liberalisation and the opening of the country.
Political/institutional heritage before 2000
There are no systematised data about the number and type of PSCs in the pe-
riod 1990 - 2000. These companies were not forbidden by any law and were 
registered as business operators.  
The crawling militarisation of Yugoslav society, manifested in the adoption 
of the Law on civilian self-protection in 1973 and, subsequently, the adoption of 
the Law on the civilian self-protection system in 1986, led to the creation of self-
protection services that operated within large companies. In the process of eco-
nomic transformation in the 1990s, privatisation of these self-protection servic-
es led to the creation of the first PSCs.571 The first law placed the idea of security 
on the broadest social platform by lowering it from the national level to the 
corporate level. The second law, by including citizens, their associations, and pri-
vate security institutions in the security system, enabled further development 
570 Law on all people’s defence and the Law on civilian self-protection system of 1973.
571 ‘Sigurnost Vračar’ and ‘Sigurnost Beograd’ are some of them.
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of the non-state security sector in the new market economy environment.572 
In accordance with this law created in the time of self-management socialism, 
members of so-called ‘physical security’ had the power to manage corporate 
security functions, including the power to replace corporate leaders because of 
security failures. However, they did not have the same powers as police officers 
(which would enable them to arrest and detain people). Also, their right to use 
arms did not exceed that of other citizens.573  This self-protection service was 
also known as the ‘industrial police’.574 In 1993, parliament rescinded the Law on 
all people’s defence and civilian self-protection. From then on, the private security 
sector was not regulated by a specific law, but rather by ten general laws and a 
large number of by-laws and internal rules.575
The second period in the development of the private security sector in Ser-
bia is between 1993 and 2000. During this period the laws on All people’s defence 
and Civilian self-protection (from 1973 and 1986 respectively) were abolished 
and economic activity was burdened by the introduction of international eco-
nomic sanctions and hyperinflation. It was during this period that the first pri-
vate security companies were established.576 Even though the situation in Ser-
bia in the 1990s was characterised by a lack of security, due to an atmosphere 
of civil war in neighbouring territories and criminalisation of society, private 
security companies did not have any larger workload. The Yugoslav wars and 
the economic downturn led to the appearance of some other non-statutory se-
curity actors. Besides private security companies (which were to some extent 
legislatively covered577), there were paramilitary formations and criminal groups 
operating as extra-legal security actors578 (organised crime). At that time, in the 
atmosphere of civil war, there were many paramilitary formations579 close to 
organised crime. This contributed to the perception that PSCs were inefficient 
actors incapable of providing security. With the cessation of fighting, paramili-
tary formations diminished580 and some members left to join PSCs. The precise 
572 Zoran Keković, ‘Predgovor’ in Hrestomatija Sistemi bezbednosti, ed. Zoran Keković. (Beograd: 
Fakultet bezbednosti Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2007).
573 Without any specific powers vested in members of police and military
574 Data obtained in an interview in the course of the research Private Security Companies – a 
friend or a foe?, CCMR, Belgrade 2008.
575 See entrefilet with the laws governing PSCs.
576 ‘Progard’
577 Entrefilet  – existing legislative regulations governing the operation of private security com-
panies
578 Petrović Predrag, ‘Privatizing Security In Serbia’, Western Balkans Security Observer, Number 4 
(2007): 18
579 ’Osvetnici’, ’Tigrovi’, ’Beli orlovi’ 
http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2001/10/24/srpski/H01102309.html 
580 Arkan’s ‘Tigers’ are an exception, since they were incorporated in the Special Operation Unit.
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number of such transfers is unknown. PSCs existed during the Yugoslav wars 
but they did not operate as military companies, nor did they take part in the 
fighting as is common for such companies around the world.581
For sixteen years no law has been in place to regulate the specific character 
of the private security sector. Private security companies operate based on ten 
laws and regulations, and most important among these are the Law on weapons 
and ammunition, Labour Law and the Law on fire protection.  These laws consider 
PSCs to be economic actors, but the specific nature of their operation, such as 
the use of weapons, application of special investigative techniques, control and 
control and oversight of these companies, are still not regulated. The laws and 
regulations governing the private security sector are presented below:
Laws
•	 Labour law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 24/05
•	 Law on weapons and ammunition, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, 44/98
•	 Law on amendments to the Law on weapons and ammunition, Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 39/03
•	 Company law, Official Gazette of FRY, Nos. 29/96, 33/96 –corr., 29/97, 
59/98, 74/99, 9/2001 – Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court 
and 36/2002
•	 Criminal Code, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 85/05
•	 Law on fire protection, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
48/94
•	 Law on occupational health and safety, Official Gazette of the Repub-
lic of Serbia, 101/05
•	 Law on amendments to the Law on the prevention of violence and 
inappropriate conduct at sporting events, Official Gazette of the Re-
public of Serbia, 90/07
•	 Law on transport by road, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
32/90
•	 Law on amendments to the Law on transport by road, Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Serbia, 62/06
•	 Law on telecommunications, Official Gazette of the Republic of Ser-
bia, 44/03
•	 Law on planning and construction, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, 47/03
•	 Law on explosive matter, inflammable fluids and gases, Official Ga-
581 Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, Privatizing Security: Law, practice and governance of private 
military and security companies (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
2005), 1.
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zette of the Republic of Serbia,  44/77, 45/84, 18/89
•	 Law on natural gas transportation, distribution and use, Official Ga-
zette of the Republic of Serbia 66/91, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 12/96
•	 Law on transportation of dangerous matter, official Gazette of SFRY, 
27/90, 45/90, Official Gazette of FRY, 24/94, 28/96, 21/99, 68/02
Box 4: Existing relevant regulations governing private security companies
•	 Final rules of business ethics
•	 Standard preparation programme
•	 Service quality level determination programme 
•	 Decision on setting of service minimum prices 
•	 Decision on service minimum prices
Box 5: Internal rules of PTS Association in the Serbian Chamber of Commerce
•	 Decree on the transport of dangerous matter by road and rail, Official 
Gazette of FRY, 35/95
•	 Rulebook on the manner of transporting dangerous matter by rail, 
Official Gazette of SFRY, 25/92
•	 Rulebook on the manner of transporting dangerous matter by road, 
Official Gazette of SFRY 82/90
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for warehouse protection against 
fire and explosion, Official Gazette of SFRY, 24/87
•	 Rulebook on technical Regulations for protection of high-rise build-
ings against fire, Official Gazette of SFRY, 7/84
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for fire hydrant systems, Official 
Gazette of SFRY, 30/91
•	 Rulebook on mandatory fire resistance attestation for typical struc-
tural elements and the requirements to be met by associated labour 
organisations authorised for such product attestation, Official Ga-
zette of SFRY, 24/90
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for construction, finishing works 
design and execution, Official Gazette of SFRY, 21/90
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for access roads, turntables, and 
erecting fire vehicle platforms in the vicinity of buildings presenting 
a high fire risk, Official Gazette of FRY 8/95
•	 Rulebook on technical requirements and norms for safe transporta-
tion of liquid hydrocarbon and gaseous hydrocarbons via trunk gas 
pipelines and oil pipelines and international gas pipelines, Official 
Gazette of SFRY, 26/85
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•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for internal gas installations, Of-
ficial Gazette of FRY, 20/92, 33/92
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for low voltage installations, Of-
ficial Gazette of SFRY, 53/88, 54/88, 28/95
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for static electricity protection, 
Official Gazette of SFRY, 62/73
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for the development of manda-
tory technical documentation to accompany the systems, equipment 
and fire detection and alarm devices, Official Gazette of FRY, 30/95
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for stable fire alarm system, Offi-
cial Gazette of FRY, 87/93
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for stable installations for detec-
tion of explosive gases and vapours, Official Gazette of FRY, 24/93
•	 Rulebook on technical regulations for fire protection of electric 
plants and devices, Official Gazette of SFRY, 74/90
•	 Rulebook on detailed requirements for implementation, manner of 
implementation, and programme of training for use of firearms, Of-
ficial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 1/99, 30/2000
•	 Rulebook on detailed requirements and manner for storing and safe-
guarding weapons and ammunition, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Serbia, 1/99
Box 6: By-laws regulating PSCs
The situation since 5 October 2000 
The political changes of October 2000 had an impact on the Serbian PSC mar-
ket. An increasing number of foreign companies began to appear on the Serbian 
market as the investment potential rose. Most important for the development 
of PSCs, however, was the arrival of foreign banks. The banks needed physical-
technical protection (man guarding and technical security) which they could 
not get from political parties,582 paramilitary formations, or criminal groups 
(as was the case during the 1990s), but rather from lawfully operating entities, 
namely PSCs. Provision of these services to banks all their branches in Serbia 
meant an increase in the volume of work and, consequently, an increase in the 
recruitment of staff. This has additionally highlighted the need for regulation, 
and in 2003 the Ministry of Interior (MoI) forwarded a draft law on PSCs to parlia-
582 The Serbian Unity Party, a political party founded by Željko ‘Arkan’ Ražnatović, used to pro-
vide, inter alia, services of protecting motor vehicles. 
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ment for consideration.583 This draft was soon withdrawn to be further elaborat-
ed but has not been seen since.584 The increased number of companies and the 
increased number of employees in those companies, fed by growing demand, 
now led to the articulation of common interests in the private security sector. 
At the end of 2005, the Association of Companies for Physical-Technical Se-
curity within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce (PTS Association) was estab-
lished. The Association gathered representatives of PSCs, detectives, companies 
involved in self-protection service,585 and for a time,586 bank security managers. 
The Association drafted a proposal for a law on the private security sector in 
2006, and two civil society organisations drafted their own versions of the law 
on private security sector587 in that same period.
Key actors in private security sector
Key actors with regard to the activity of PSCs include the Security and Defence 
Committee, parliament, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), clients, and insurance 
companies. There are two different types of influence on the private security 
sector; legislative and market influence. According to the Law on weapons and 
ammunition, the MoI plays an executive role in the control and oversight of 
PSCs. The Parliamentary Committee for Security and Defence oversees the pri-
vate security sector indirectly, by overseeing the MoI. However, the Committee 
has never taken advantage of this theoretical opportunity.588 The PSCs’ clients 
and insurance companies are the exponents of market influence on private se-
curity sector. The clients shape the types and quality of PSC services by putting 
forward their requests while insurance companies supposedly stimulate the 
provision of good services and sanction the failures and poor quality of PSC 
services with their policy.
583 Statement of a respondent who is a member of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence 
and Security, in the interview given within the project Private security companies in Serbia – a 
friend or a foe? in late 2007.
584 Statement of a respondent who is a member of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence 
and Security, in the interview given within the project named Private security companies in Serbia 
– a friend or a foe? in late 2007.
585 Self-protection service is the activity of providing security within large companies.
586 At first, bank security managers were a part (actually a section) of the PTS Association. Later, 
however, because of conflicting business interests, this section of managers detached from the 
Association and joined the Banking and Insurance Division.
587 Draft law on private companies providing personal and property, security services and detective 
companies, League of Experts – LEX, 2006, and Model law on private security sector, Centre for 
Civil-Military Relations, 2006.
588 Statement of a respondent who is a member of the Parliamentary Committee for Defence 
and Security, in the interview given within the project named Private security companies in Serbia 
– a friend or a foe? in late 2007.
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Graph 5: Environment of PTS companies in Serbia
Private security companies
There are approximately 3000 private security companies now operating in Ser-
bia.589 Considering that, under the Enterpreneur law, private security companies 
register to provide different services and thus appear under a number of differ-
ent activity codes in the register, it is difficult to determine the exact number 
of registered companies. The number of employees varies between 20 and 60 
thousand,590 depending on the image the company wishes to create.591 It is es-
timated that there are 47 thousand small arms in this sector. The companies 
register in the municipalities and therefore fall within the competences of the 
municipal police stations. The MoI does not have a centralised list of companies 
589 Statement of a respondent belonging to the private security sector, in an interview given 
within the project named Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? in late 2007.
590 Data obtained during the research Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? in 
late 2007.
591 Statements of experts are closer to the lower of the two mentioned figures, but representa-
tives of PSCs  present a higher figure and so highlight the importance of these companies and 
the necessity of having this sector properly regulated.
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and employees, nor data about the quantity of weapons.592 The only body gath-
ering together the companies from this sector is the Serbian Chamber of Com-
merce PTS Association. Since it is not obligatory for a company to be a member 
of this professional association, some companies choose not to be members 
because they do not consider the membership fee cost-effective. Although it 
is voluntary-based, this body gathers a largest number of companies and al-
most all larger companies involved in this business are members of this Asso-
ciation.593 The Association has taken part in drafting two proposals of the law on 
the private security sector and, along with representatives of insurance compa-
nies and bank security managers, it was consulted on the development of the 
standards for the private security sector. These law proposals envisage that the 
Association should be the licensing body for companies and their employees.
Statutory actors
Considering that the private security sector is inadequately regulated, it is im-
portant to take into account the actors who influence or can influence the sec-
tor. The Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security and the Ministry of 
Interior are the relevant government authorities.
According to the Law on weapons and ammunition, control and control and 
oversight of PSCs is implemented by the MoI. The MoI is the only body who has 
a role in security checks594 of employees in these companies, as well as in issu-
ing licences to procure weapons (to companies) and licences to carry weapons, 
to employees. The problem between the MoI and PSCs arises from the fact that 
the MoI is entitled to obtain additional revenues595 on the market by providing 
certain services, such as providing security for the transport of money or secu-
rity services at events. Since PSCs provide the same services, there is a potential 
for a conflict of interest and also a possibility of discrimination against when 
issuing licences for weapons procurement or when performing security checks 
of employees, so as to ensure preferential treatment to its own services on the 
592 Data obtained within the research Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? The 
respondents at the MoI did not have the requested data and the respondents from PSCs stated 
where they register and recommended that it is better to go to several municipalities when you 
want to register because there is no unified list.
593 More about the Association and its members see the website:
http://pks.komora.net/PrivredauSrbiji/Privrednegrane/Privatnoobezbedjenje/tabid/1717/De-
fault.aspx 
594 Law on weapons and ammunition, Art. 6, Official Gazette of RS, Nos. 9/92, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 
44/98, 39/2003, 101/2005 – other law, and 85/2005 – other law.
595 Rulebook on the types of services which the Ministry of Interior may provide in order to 
obtain additional proceeds, Official Gazette of RS, Nos. 64/2006, 71/2007, and 14/2008
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market.596 
The Defence and Security Committee has a possibility to implement con-
tinuous control and oversight of the private security sector. Namely, the Par-
liamentary Committee for Security controls and oversees the MoI and, since 
the MoI oversees the security sector, the Committee can gain insight into the 
private security sector. In real life, however,597 the Committee has never asked 
for information about this sector.598 Members of the Committee are not ade-
quately informed about the issue and, consequently, the possibility of control 
is reduced.599 Since it does not have other legal powers, the Committee is not 
in a position to perform direct control of the private security sector. Since 2003, 
when the MoI’s law proposal was withdrawn, not a single proposal of a law on 
PSCs has been introduced into parliamentary procedure or considered in the 
committees.600
Non-statutory actors
Clients of PSCs have had a key role in the development of the private security 
sector. Market principles of supply and demand have contributed to the profes-
sionalisation of this sector more than any legislative or regulatory provisions so 
far.  When foreign companies (primarily banks) entered the Serbian market, the 
596 Data obtained for the research Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? A 
respondent from a PSC complained about the conduct of the MoI explaining that the police 
was repeatedly stopping the transport of money being performed for banks and referring the 
vehicle concerned for extraordinary check-ups. The bank terminated the contract with that PSC. 
A PSC may be obstructed in this way, either to favour another PSC or to favour the MoI, consider-
ing that the MoI is a market actor too.
597 Statements of two respondents belonging to the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and 
Security, in the interview given for the project Private Security Companies in Serbia – a Friend or a 
Foe? in late 2007.
598 Sonja Stojanović, ed., Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? (Belgrade: Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, 2007).
599 Sonja Stojanović, ed., Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? (Belgrade: Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, 2007).
600 Viewpoint of a representative of the Defence and Security Committee, expressed in the pub-
lic debate Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? Organised in Media Centre on 10 
June 2008.
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demand for specialised security services increased. Several larger companies601 
were capable of providing proper services but they too had to adjust to clients’ 
requirements. The militarised appearance of their employees at the beginning 
(overalls, boots, sometimes even ‘long barrels’602) was subsequently replaced by 
a civil wardrobe (shirt, tie and ID). Clients requested that employees become 
more professional and this meant the submission of daily and monthly reports 
and increased the importance of technical security systems.603 The novelties 
intoduced in some companies included unarmed security staff. These staff are 
not authorised to use firearms and would be subject to criminal prosecution if 
they used a weapon. If armed staff were in place, potential robbers would usu-
ally also be armed to an equal or a larger extent, which increases the risk that 
firearms will be used. Paradoxically, the presence of armed security staff reduces 
the safety of bank customers and employees instead of increasing it. 
Insurance companies are the second non-statutory actor influencing PSCs. 
State-owned insurance companies (Dunav and, before the end of 2007, DDOR 
Novi Sad) accounted for approximately 90 per cent of the Serbian market.604 
Representatives of PSCs and security managers of banks agreed605 both that in-
surance companies can contribute considerably to raising the quality of private 
security services, but that the potential had not been fulfilled. Insurance pre-
miums are the same, regardless of the sum spent on the protection of insured 
assets, i.e. in the quality of security. Some market actors simply did not find it 
cost-effective to invest in security. There are two factors that may influence the 
inadequate involvement of insurance companies. One is privatisation (before 
its privatisation, DDOR Novi Sad’s market share was about 30 per cent), and the 
other is the drawing up of standards for private security services, with the par-
ticipation of the PTS Association, as well as the insurance companies.
Unions are still not recognised in the Serbian private security sector. A union 
of PSC employees is active in Europe606 but in Serbia the union exists only in 
companies that offer self-protection services, and this is a relic from socialism. 
601 Large companies had enough employees to be awarded contracts in the tender procedure. 
Contracts with banks are usually made in Belgrade, at the bank’s principal office, and it cov-
ers provision of security services related to the bank’s property in the entire territory of Serbia. 
These requirements favoured larger companies and the companies with smaller number of em-
ployees were not able to meet the tender requirements. See more in: Marko Milošević, ‘Influence 
of the Market on the Private Security Sector’, in Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a 
foe?, ed. Sonja Stojanović. (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008), 62.
602 Assault rifles or shotguns
603 Sonja Stojanović, ed., Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? (Belgrade: Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, 2007).
604 Sonja Stojanović, ed., Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe? (Belgrade: Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, 2007).
605 Data obtained within the research Private security companies in Serbia – a friend or a foe?
606 UNI Property Services Global Union, http://www.union-network.org/unipropertyn.nsf
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Since the role of unions in the private security sector is marginalised, union or-
ganisation of employees is missing in all PSCs, expect state-owned companies 
for self-protection. Employees in PSCs are poorly paid and they often leave to 
work in other sectors despite the fact that higher salaries and better work condi-
tions can be ensured through union activity only. 
In the same way that clients set the standards the security service provid-
ers, foreign PSCs also introduced their own standards when they came onto the 
market. The way foreign PSCs entered the Serbian market is similar to foreign 
banks. Namely, they bought local PSCs or majority interests in companies. The 
two largest foreign PSCs in Serbia are G4S and Securitas. British company G4S 
bought ‘DMD alarm’ and acquired a majority interest in ‘Progard’. This company 
has a huge budget and more than half million employees call around the world. 
Securitas entered the Serbian market in 2008 by acquiring ‘SCP Internacional’. It 
employs about 250,000 people around the world and is one of the leading com-
panies in the field. Foreign companies can influence the development of PSCs in 
Serbia in two ways. The first is to continue to use cheap labour and extract profit 
from the Serbian market, especially since there is no obligation to invest in the 
training of employees in order to acquire operating licences607 for companies 
or for employees. The second way is to apply existing company standards to 
their operations in Serbia. This would incur a loss in the short-term. In long term, 
however, clients would begin appreciate higher quality services and other PSCs 
would have to follow suit in order to survive on the market. 
- Between 20,000 and 60,000 persons are employed in PTS sector
- 47,000 personal weapons in this sector
- Approximately 3,000 companies registered
- Serbian market at valued at an annual level of  EUR 148 million
Box 7: Key statistics in the private security system
Sistem FTO, G4S (Progard and DMD alarm), Sigurnost 
Vračar, SCP Internacional (Securitas), Telus 
Box 8: The largest PTS companies in Serbia
607 Currently, employees have no obligation to hold a licence to provide these services. The 
only required certificates are medical certification, certification that the candidate was never 
convicted, and certification of the completion of training in firearms.
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Security capacity of private security companies
Mapping and evaluation of the dimensions of the private security sector in Ser-
bia presents a great challenge. On one hand, this is an innovative task since re-
form in this sector in Serbia has not been tackled before. On the other hand, 
the absence of regulations specifically related to this sector is an impediment 
for building the foundations for longitudinal monitoring of progress, and, there-
fore, progress in the reform of the private security sector. We have taken into 
account only publicly available data; legislation and scientific research. The 
greatest obstacle for mapping efforts is the absence of a law on private secu-
rity companies. The absence of the Law on data classification also impedes the 
control and control and oversight over the implementation of special investiga-
tive techniques and procedures. It was noted that the Law on police, the Law on 
weapons and ammunition, and the Law on personal data protection need to be 
amended. The second valuable data source are scientific research which, either 
directly or indirectly, address the private security sector. An important source is 
the pioneering research Private security companies in Serbia – a Friend or a Foe?, 
but also information obtained in an omnibus public opinion survey conducted 
by CeSID, Resource Autumn 2008. It was the first examinination of public trust in 
PSCs. 
TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency in the private security sector concerns aspects that are of public 
interest, such as the number of members, quantity of arms, control and over-
sight over the implementation of special investigative techniques and proce-
dures, authorisations and licences, and employee trainings.
The PSCs are not obliged, by the Constitution or by law, to ensure transpar-
ency. They have only obligations stemming from their capacity of business enti-
ties, such as the Labour law (Official Gazette 24/05) and the Law on tax procedure 
and tax administration (Official Gazette 80/02). The Law on access to information 
of public importance mainly concerns statutory actors and not the bodies dis-
charging public functions (Article 3). Accordingly, some information about PSCs 
can be requested from the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance. 
The laws to regulate this field, taking into account the specific character of the 
private sector, include laws on the private security sector and on data classifica-
tion. However, neither has been adopted. 
Also, the absence of these laws makes information about authorisations, li-
cences, training, equipment, and weapons used by private actors, inaccessible 
(although they are  sometimes put on companies’ websites).  The situation is 
made more difficult by the absence of legal obligations on one hand, and the 
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large number of companies (3000) that register for different activities but pro-
vide security services, on the other. In the absence of a law on the private secu-
rity sector, companies in Serbia do not require operating licences (employees 
do not need licences). Data about the number and types of weapons held by 
PSCs can be obtained only from the MoI since no legal obligation is in place for 
PSCs to publicly disclose information about the weapons they use, their opera-
tions, training, or licences. A specific problem is that the data available to the 
MoI about the weapons and the number of private security companies are not 
centralised; PSCs apply for permits to procure or carry weapons with local police 
stations. 
Since the implementation of special investigative techniques is not regulat-
ed, there is no obligation to allow access to data about the use of special inves-
tigative techniques, or about classification, maintenance and provision of data 
collected about citizens or other entities. The level of abuse of data acquired 
through lawful interception is not known, nor do we know which law protects 
citizens against such abuse.
Transparency in private security sector was graded 2 (two). No specific law 
governs this field and, consequently, there is no legal obligation to ensure trans-
parency. On the other hand, private security companies have demonstrated 
openness through their participation in public debates, work with civil society 
organisations on drafting a proposed Law on the private security sector, and in 
their willingness to take part in research. 
grade: 2 (two)
ACCOUNTABILITY – DEMOCRATIC 
CIVILIAN CONTROL AND PUBLIC Control 
and oversight OF ThE PRIVATE SECURITY 
SECTOR
Public control and oversight and control of the private security sector in Serbia 
exists over those elements of the sector which are of public interest. On the oth-
er hand, the private security sector is not as uniform as other statutory security 
actors. It consists of approximately 3000 private companies and, with the lack of 
a body to keep unified records about these companies, control and control and 
oversight is much impeded. 
The Constitution and laws do not regard the private security sector as a 
specific actor. Rather, general laws apply, as they apply to other citizens or eco-
nomic operators. The control and oversight which government authorities im-
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plement over PSCs is exercised through the MoI, tax police and labour inspec-
torate. According to article 6 of the Law on weapons and ammunition, the MoI 
exercises control over the private security sector. This article envisages control 
and oversight of procurement, storage, and the use of weapons but it does not 
define PSCs as a specific actor over which control and oversight is implemented. 
The government also implements customary measures over PSCs which are rel-
evant for all companies. This control does not touch upon security functions. Tax 
control is performed by the tax police, in accordance with the Law on tax pro-
cedure and tax administration (Official Gazette of RS, nos. 80/02, art. 135–139), 
and the labour inspectorate carries out control and oversight according to the 
Labour law (Official Gazette of RS, nos. 24/05 and 61/05, art. 268–272). 
Legislation regards PSCs as businesses, while the specific element of this 
sector – the carrying and use of weapons – is regulated by the Law on weap-
ons and ammunition. This law does not contain provisions to regulate members 
PSCs in respect to carrying or using weapons. The same provisions applying to 
citizen with firearms also apply to PSC employees. Control and control and over-
sight by the MoI is carried out in accordance with articles 17, 19, and according 
to article 35, paragraph 7 of the above law. Existing legal grounds do not envis-
age any special procedures for the control of the use of force or firearms. The 
fact that PSC employees are not authorised to use weapons has meant that they 
become ‘bystanders in robbery’ since their only responsibilities are to provide 
information to the police and secure the scene of the crime pending the arrival 
of the police. Apart from controlling the issuance of licences for carrying and 
procuring weapons, MoI does not perform any systematic or periodic controls 
of this sector. More precisely, checks carried out by the MoI when processing 
applications are the only type of control that the MoI performs on the private 
security sector. 
The only law regulating the use of special investigative techniques and pro-
cedures is the Criminal procedure code. However, provisions of the code only con-
cern statutory actors and do not touch private and legal personalities. The term 
‘special investigative techniques’ denotes data interception techniques that 
sometimes infringe upon constitutional rights and freedoms. These include:608 
1. Lawful interception of telecommunication services, activities and traffic:
a) Lawful interception of the content of communication
b) Lawful interception of data about telecommunications traffic
c) Lawful interception of user’s location
d) Lawful interception of international telecommunication connec-
tions;
2. Lawful interception of mail and other shipments;
3. Video surveillance and recording of premises, closed spaces and objects;
608 Miroslav Hadžić and Predrag Petrović, ed., Demokratski nadzor nad primenom posebnih 
ovlašćenja (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2008).
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4. Secret search of suspect(s)’ residence;
5. Secret surveillance and monitoring of persons in open spaces and in pub-
lic places;
6. Video surveillance and recording of persons in open space and in public 
spaces;
7. Secret purchase of documents and objects.
No law regulates the manner and the events in which special investigative 
techniques can be used by private security companies. Also, it is not known to 
what extent and in what manner these measures are used, regardless of the fact 
that the absence of regulation leaves plenty of room for misuse. Regulation of 
the use of special investigative techniques should be in accordance with the 
laws on private security sector and data classification, but none of these laws 
have been adopted so far. The only law which addresses the issues of the appli-
cation of special investigative techniques to some extent is the Law on personal 
data protection (Official Gazette of RS, no. 97/08), which prescribes the control 
and oversight over implementation and enforcement of laws, as performed by 
the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance, and protection of per-
sonal data. 
There are no bodies in charge of comprehensive and systematic analysis of 
the findings of control and control and oversight. Municipal MoI departments 
have control and oversight of companies registered in their municipalities, but 
a central MoI register of these companies does not exist. Consequently, com-
prehensive and systematic information about control and control and oversight 
of this sector is not available. Information about control and control and over-
sight of the public security sector is not publicly available.609 The Commissioner 
for Information of Public Importance’s report for 2007 did not record any case 
concerning PSCs.610 Parliament has never (as has already been mentioned) im-
plemented the possibility of indirectly overseeing the private security sector. 
Democratic civilian control and public control and oversight of the private 
security sector receives 1.5 (one point five). There are no specific laws to regu-
late this sector and control and control and oversight are therefore implement-
ed the same way as for all citizens. There is no single body through which the 
public can perform control and oversight over the private sector. 
grade: 1.5 (one point five)
609 In the course of the research Private Security Companies in Serbia – a Friend or a Foe?, the MoI 
was asked for information about the number of employees in the private security sector, the 
number of weapons in possession of these companies, and the number of armed incidents in 
which members of these companies were involved. The MoI replied that they do not have a 
central register and that such information is not available. 
610 The Commissioner’s Report for 2008 on the occasion of the adoption of the Law on personal 
data protection, is still not publicly available.
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RULE OF LAW
Legal state (Rechtstaat)
The private security sector has not been recognised in legislative or strategic 
terms. The Constitution, the Constitutional law for implementation of the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Serbia, the Law on free access to information of public 
importance, the Law on defence, and the Criminal procedure code do not mention 
the private security sector and it has already been underlined that this sector is 
not regulated by any specific law (as is customary in Europe).611 Strategic docu-
ments the Defence strategy and the White Book do not recognise the private se-
curity sector as an actor. The document that last integrated the private security 
sector into the security system, the Law on all people’s defence and civilian self-
protection was rescinded in 1993. According to how they are regulated, during 
the past sixteen years Serbian private security companies have been economic 
rather than security actors. 
The existing regulations of the private security sector are part of the legal 
system but they do not govern security-related competences. Namely, this sec-
tor is governed by a dozen general laws which also apply to other actors. Some 
of the laws are unsuitable for the sector. The Law on weapons and ammunition, 
for instance, does not prescribe deadlines for issuing weapon procurement 
and carry permits and protracted timeframes prejudice PSCs operation on the 
market. Due to the absence of valid legal provisions, authorisations of persons 
employed in PSCs are identical to the authorisation of other citizens and, fre-
quently, when it is necessary to use force, employees in this sector find that their 
‘hands are tied’. Internal regulations are adopted and applied within individual 
companies but often their purpose is only to ‘fill the legal gaps’.612 It is not known 
whether any body exists to control compliance with the Constitution and laws 
of Serbia. Internal regulation in the private sector are not a part of the legal 
system but have been developed according to laws governing the private se-
curity sector abroad, to the Law on weapons and ammunition and according to 
the Law on police. Accordingly, there is a possibility that integration will follow 
once the Law on the private security sector is adopted. PSC employees have the 
611 Sonja Stojanović, ed., Private Security Companies in Serbia – a Friend or a  a Foe? (Belgrade: 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2007). See tabular overview of legislation. Besides Serbia, the 
absence of private security sector legislation also exists in the Czech Republic.
612 In the course of the research Private Security Companies in Serbia – a Friend or a Foe? we 
learned that employees in one company received instruction on how to act in the event of using 
the firearms They were told to shoot another bullet so as to ensure that, at the reconstruction, 
they could maintain that they fired a warning shot, in line with obligations imposed on the 
military and police.
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same rights as other citizens with regard to weapon-related powers and use of 
weapons, in contrast to police officers who can use weapons in events set out 
by the law (e.g., the Law on police, art. 38), persons employed within PSCs can 
use weapons the same as other citizens, such as for self-defence purposes (and 
are also criminally liable). 
Private security companies do not have the legal right to use special investi-
gative techniques and powers. Statutory actors implement these measures and 
procedures in accordance with the Criminal procedure code, in clearly defined 
circumstances and within a specified timeframe. Absence of a law on PSCs, and 
a law on data classification, has resulted in under-regulation of the application 
of these techniques and has left room for misuse. Because of the non-existence 
of regulations to limit and determine the scope and reach of special investiga-
tive techniques, private security companies have the opportunity to abuse in-
dividual privacy. Data about individuals collected in this way (namely without a 
court order) cannot be used in court, but can be used for blackmail. 
Control and control and oversight of the private security sector is imple-
mented by the MoI according to the Law on weapons and ammunition, and then 
by the tax police with regard to finances, and the Labour Inspectorate in terms 
of adherence to the Labour law. However, there is no control over the security 
aspect of PSCs operations, such as weapon procurement, carrying, storage and 
use, compliance with procedures, and use of the data collected by video surveil-
lance of public spaces. 
Adoption of a law on the private security sector and on data classification 
is the first and necessary step towards harmonisation with international regula-
tions and standards. Considering that key laws are not in place, we cannot dis-
cuss harmonisation of laws that are more general in character but are applicable 
to this sector. 
Considering the above, the ‘legal state’ indicator is given the lowest grade 
since neither the Constitution, the laws, nor strategic documents regulate the 
private security sector. The small number of laws that do apply to this sector 
do not address specific characteristics (time required for security checks) and 
capacity (possibility for using special investigative techniques). There is clearly 
room for improvement.
grade: 1 (one)
Protection of human rights
Protection of human rights is not specifically defined in the private security sec-
tor. Absence of a law on the private security sector means that human rights of 
citizens and employees in this sector are protected only by the Constitution, 
and not by specific laws. 
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Private security companies are not only businesses; their operations affect 
citizens other than those who hire their services. In public places, when certain 
tasks are performed by PSCs,613 citizens’ human rights may be impinged. The 
Law on personal data protection (Official Gazette 97/08, art. 8–16) guarantee that 
no unauthorised use of audio-video recordings can be made by cameras in pub-
lic places, or in spaces under security. 
An absence of licences means that training of company employees is not 
standardised. It is often undemanding and does not include protection of hu-
man rights. Employees must complete firearms training. Depending on the 
scope and type of the activities in which they are involved, the company can 
send employees to additional courses, such as fire protection, first aid and trans-
portation of money. On the other hand, employees do not receive any instruc-
tion on human rights even though it is part of their job to ask for identification 
documents from people within the area where they are providing security. They 
also restrict freedom of movement and to search personal belongings. These 
activities are relevant for human rights and, according to the law, they can be 
performed only by police officers. 
There are no specific regulations of the procedures, methods and instru-
ments for protection of human rights in the PSC sector. The protection of hu-
man rights of employees and citizens is to an extent regulated by the Criminal 
procedure code (CPC) (arts. 81 and 111) and the Law on weapons and ammu-
nition (arts. 13, 27, and 35). An absence of laws on the private security sector 
and data classification also influences the non-existence of legal determinants 
for the protection of human rights in the events of use of special investigative 
techniques and procedures. Moreover, the CPC protects citizens only against 
the acts of statutory actors. There is no evidence about the frequency, type and 
forms of human rights’ violation of citizens and employees in the sector. Data 
about human right are not publicly available. This is a consequence of the ab-
sence of a law, the existence of a large number of companies, and a lack of ef-
ficient control and control and oversight of this sector. 
The protection of human rights in the private sector can be given a positive 
assessment. Human rights in this sector are protected only by the Constitution. 
Consequently, procedures for the protection of human rights are not prescribed 
and PSC employees enjoy the same protection as other citizens, including for 
the use of arms and the application of special investigative techniques. 
grade: 2 (two)
613 During the transportation of money, the ‘usurpation’ of public space takes place when the ve-
hicle is parked outside the building from where money is being taken and members of security 
temporarily prevent access to the vehicle, thus restricting freedom of movement in public space. 
The police or military are authorised to perform these activities.
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INTEgRATEDNESS OF ThE PRIVATE 
SECURITY SECTOR
 
The private security sector in Serbia is a so-called grey zone. Strategic docu-
ments do not recognise this sector and since 1993 this sector has not been reg-
ulated by a specific law. Absence of regulation means that the private security 
sector is not formally integrated in the Serbian security system. Different types 
of companies operate and they can be classified according to their size, type of 
activity, and ownership structure. Serbia currently has six large companies with 
the largest market share and over 1000 employees. Smaller companies employ 
50–200 people and are less visible on the market. The smallest companies, with 
only several employees, provide detective or technical protection services. In 
terms of ownership structure, a few companies providing self-protection servic-
es are the exception614 since they are state-owned, namely they are sub-systems 
of public enterprises. According to the activities they perform, and the powers 
vested in them, these companies are no different from other PSCs. 
Functional integratedness of PSCs in the security system is the exception 
rather than the rule. There are examples that suggest that government institu-
tions hire private security companies,615 but this does not mean that PSC em-
ployees in government institutions have greater powers than their colleagues 
who work in private companies. Integration in the security system is further im-
peded by an overlapping of competences that is by unfair competition. Namely, 
with the Decree on the types of services, the police was given the opportunity to 
make additional income (Official Gazette of RS, nos. 64/06, 71/07, and 14/08) 
and provide the same services on the market as PSCs. However, the police is 
funded from the state budget (from the taxpayer), and thus uses public resourc-
es to make profit on the market. A further problem arises because the police can 
exercise control of these companies. The police has the opportunity to abuse 
its powers in order to gain profit.616 There are no bodies, competences or pro-
cedures for coordination between the private security sector and state security 
sector. 
The efficiency of private security companies should be gauged in terms of 
their capability to take part in the maintenance and enhancement of individual 
614 ’NIS’, ’Kolubara usluge’, ’Telus’, ’JKP’ and ’Vodovod’
615 PSCs services are used by the VMA, many museums, institutes and public institutions.
616 Statement of one respondent in the course of the research Private Security Companies in Ser-
bia –a Friend or a Foe? According to the respondent, vehicles transporting money for clients were 
repeatedly stopped by the police and given extraordinary checks. Because of these delays, the 
company lost its contract. Considering that the MoI can provide services of escorting the trans-
portation of money, this abuse of powers is aimed at taking business from the private sector.
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and national security. Some 3000 PSCs operate in Serbia, employing between 
20,000 and 60,000 people. These companies compete for contracts which im-
pede their functional cooperation. The only organisation representing the 
viewpoints and interests of these companies is the Association of Companies 
for Physical Technical Security within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce. This 
association is based on the principle of voluntary participation and, accordingly, 
decisions of this body are not binding to all PSCs. The absence of legislative and 
strategic guidelines does not encourage integration (formal and functional) of 
PSCs in the national security system and, therefore, it is harder to measure the 
contribution of these companies in the field of national and individual security. 
Measuring the efficiency of the private security sector is impeded by the 
versatility of companies, by private ownership, and by their position on the mar-
ket. The market will has the final say about the soundness of PSCs’ organisa-
tional structure, their functionality and rationality, just as an owner will decide 
on changes which PSCs will introduce based on that decision.
The level of PSCs integratedness in the security system is affected by the 
absence of relevant laws, as well as by the non-existence of a uniform training 
system for employees. One company has its own academy for employees, and 
there was a training programme at the Police College. The absence of an educa-
tional system and legal obligations to possess particular knowledge (confirmed 
by a certificate issued by an educational institution) indicates that it is necessary 
to have a system of continual education, as well as training and evaluation of 
employees for the entire private security sector. Such a system would increase 
functional integratedness of the private security sector, as well as its integrated-
ness into the security sector. PSCs’ integration into the national security system 
is impeded by the absence of a law that would prescribe criteria and, conse-
quently, a long-term and uniform education system. Private security companies 
are market actors and their management depends on size. Good management 
is also market-oriented because contracts are awarded according to the quality 
of services provided. Low level of professionalism, typical for physical security 
staff, is a consequence of the lack of mandatory education.
grade: 1 (one)
LEgITIMACY
When measuring the legitimacy of PSCs we must take into acccount private 
ownership, and competition to which these companies are exposed on the mar-
ket. Statutory actors are funded from the state budget, by the taxpayer, and they 
discharge security duties necessary for the functioning of the state, regardless 
338
of whether their operations are cost-effective or not. This is why legitimacy is 
important. On the other hand, PSCs are only employed by those who can afford 
them. Since PSCs are driven by profit, a lack of legitimacy would mean business 
failure. Consequently, it is possible to say that the volume of work (measured by 
the number of persons employed or by annual corporate profit) confirms the 
legitimacy of PSCs in Serbia. Private ownership and market orientation are the 
specificities of these companies, and as such PSCs are more concerned about 
clients than about public image, especially since “they are paid by the clients 
and not by the citizens paying their taxes.”617 On the other hand, as far as we 
can tell, there has been only one public opinion survey that examined citizens’ 
trust in these companies conducted in 2008. According to this survey,618 only 25 
per cent of citizens trust PSCs and 44 per cent of them believe that PSCs reduce 
public security. This could be explained by the non-integratedness of PSCs in 
the national security system, as citizens do not perceive PSCs as legitimate na-
tional security actors (as a body with the right and obligations to take part in 
maintaining of national security).
grade: 1.5 (one point five)
The total grade for security sector reform relating to private security compa-
nies is 1.5 (one point five). There are no main preconditions for better optimal 
functioning of this sector, and responsibility for this lies with the government 
and its legislative bodies. Deprived of appropriate legal guidelines, the private 
sector takes initiative and creates its own business strategies that differ from 
one company to another.
617 Viewpoint of a representative of one PSC put forward in the public debate Private Security 
Companies in Serbia – a Friend or a Foe?, held in the Media Centre on 10 June 2008
618 Survey RESOURCE 2008, conducted by CeSID in September 2008 in Serbia
Chapter IV
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NOT USE FORCE
340
1. Civil society 
organisations
Zorana Atanasović
Civil society is, in most general terms, a corpus of different, national and tran-
snational, non-statutory, non-political, and non-profit organisations and institu-
tions, founded by individuals or groups of people with the purpose to jointly 
achieve and/or protect particular individual, group, and/or collective inter-
ests.619 This corpus includes a variety of citizens’ associations, media, unions, 
educational institutions, research institutes, pressure groups, religious commu-
nities and sports associations.620  
Consistent with this, civil society organisations (CSOs) can be defined as 
a form of self-organisation of civil society with the purpose of achieving and/
or protecting specific interests or needs. The goal of their activity is not profit 
and, if they do, or when they do, they should invest these proceeds into future 
development. Also, their intention is not to win political power, or at least it is 
not in words. This makes them institutionally and functionally detached from 
government and political parties. However, this does not mean that they do not 
have significant political influence. Civil society organisations have flexible or-
ganisational structures and their members act autonomously in deciding about 
internal structure, control, and management.621 
During the last couple of decades, civil society organisations have be-
came actors in the security sector. Good governance of the security sector is 
not only effective exercise of the economic, political and administrative com-
petences of government, but also requires the involvement of non-statutory 
actors in the control and oversight of state institutions.622 This provides for a 
dialogue between government and citizens, which can raise public trust in the 
state and state institutions and authorities. Actors participating in public con-
619 For more details about the concept of civil society, see: Marina Caparini, “Civil Society and 
Democratic Control and oversight of the Security Sector: A Preliminary Investigation,” in Source-
book on Security Sector Reform, eds., Philip Flury and Miroslav Hadžić (Geneva, Belgrade: DCAF, 
CCMR, 2004), 176-177.
620 Broader definitions include the business community too. 
621 For more details, see: Srećko Mihailović, ‘Kako NVO vide političku moć i kako politička moć 
vidi  NVO u’, u Stručni skup: Analiza NVO okruženja - izazovi tranzicije. (Beograd: ProConcept, Fond 
za otvoreno društvo-Srbija, 2005), 25-48.
622 Caparini, Civil society and democratic control and oversight of the security sector: A prelimi-
nary investigation, 178–179.
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trol and oversight of the security sector should, in synergy with governmen-
tal bodies vested with control and control and oversight powers, contribute to 
the achievement and maintenance of human and national security as a public 
good, and to the establishment of good governance in the political community 
(state) in question. For this purpose, CSOs oversee whether state enforcement 
apparatuses respect, and to what extent they operate in conformity with, the 
principles of constitutionality and lawfulness, and whether they comply with 
the requirements of professionalism and neutrality with regard to political par-
ties and different interests. This in turn should help prevent the politicisation of 
state enforcement apparatuses, namely it should help prevent them becoming 
closed, self-sufficient and alienated centres of power.623  
Below is an analysis the role of civil society organisations in the control and 
oversight of the security sector in Serbia. These organisations fall under the cat-
egory of non-statutory actors that do not use force. They occupy Box D of the 
holistic matrix.
The role of civil society organisation in the Serbian 
security sector (before 2000)
First civil society organisations in Serbia appeared at the beginning of the 
1990s, after the introduction of political pluralism.624 Their development could 
be conditionally divided into three periods. The same periodisation applies to 
civil society organisations specialised in security issues. The first period covers 
the beginning of the 1990s when the first civil society organisations emerged. 
The second period took place between 1997 and 2000, when the number of 
CSOs increased considerably and the majority developed and acted as an oppo-
sition to the authoritarian regime. The third period began in the year 2000 and 
it is marked by efforts of the increasingly more developed civil society to take 
active part in the process of democratisation of Serbia.
Civil society organisations in Serbia were established based on the 1990 
Law on citizens’ associations, social organisations and political organisations that 
are being founded on the territory of the SFRY.625  This new pace of the develop-
ment of civil society in Serbia was accelerated by the wars in the former repub-
623 According to: Nicole Ball, Tsjeard Bouta and Luc van de Goor, Enhancing democratic gov-
ernance of the security sector: An institutional assessment framework (The Hague: Clingendael 
Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003), 67.
624 According to: Žarko Paunović, ’Deset godina NVO u SR Jugoslaviji: od ilegalaca i neprijatelja 
do važnih aktera društvenih promena,’ Civilno društvo website, http://www.civilnodrustvo.org/
Tekstovi-za-sajt/Deset-godina-NVO-u-Srbiji.pdf  [accessed 22 July 2008]
625 Ibid, http://www.civilnodrustvo.org/Tekstovi-za-sajt/Deset-godina-NVO-u-Srbiji.pdf [accessed 
22 July 2008]
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lics of the SFRY, since the first initiatives of civil society were a response to these 
conflicts. The first initiatives of civil society from the beginning of the 1990s 
were related to safety issues, namely public desire to express, in an organised 
manner, their disagreement with government policy and to protest against the 
war. These initiatives were informal at first, but from these the first organisations 
sprouted (for instance, the Action for peace in Subotica in 1990, the Centre for 
anti-war action, the Vojvodina movement for peace founded in 1991 and the 
Fund for peace and crisis resolution from 1992). Civil society organisations op-
posed the war, violence and militarisation. Through their activities they devel-
oped an autonomous public sphere for debate and expression of civil disobedi-
ence in opposition to government policy. Moreover, they strived to raise public 
awareness on the importance of participation in debate concerning issues of 
interest for society.626   
Illustration 1: ‘Women in Black’ during an anti-war protest in Belgrade627
At the time there was no consensus among political elites, government 
institutions, and civil society about the goals of social changes and how they 
could be achieved. Democratisation of Serbia, which most CSOs advocated 
since their foundation, was not a priority for government institutions. Conse-
quently, government institutions and CSOs did not work together. Political elit-
es and government institutions perceived civil society organisations as enemies 
and competition.
During the second period civil society organisations developed further and 
CSOs specialised in security issues appeared. Cooperation between govern-
ment institutions and civil society organisations was absent during this period 
as well. The media called them enemies, traitors and spying organisations.628 
Frequent fiscal controls, police raids, and similar methods of obstruction and 
626 Ibid, http://www.civilnodrustvo.org/Tekstovi-za-sajt/Deset-godina-NVO-u-Srbiji.pdf  (ac-
cessed 22 July 2008).
627 Photograph taken from the website of the CSO ‘Women in Black’, http://www.zeneucrnom.
org/ 
628 Prema Tatjana Andrijašević, Gordana Popović, Ana Stanković, and Nada Veljković, ‘Nevladine 
organizacije pre i posle 5. oktobra 2000: Nepotrebni prijatelji,’ Vreme 678, Jan. 1, 2004.
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intimidation were common. Regardless of this, CSOs continued to operate and 
the primary focus of their activities was the protection of human rights and 
minorities and informal education about democracy. By 1994, 196 CSOs were 
registered and in the course of 1997 their number increased to 695.  In the end 
of 1990s, the number of CSOs rose at a greater pace and in 2000 there were 
about 2000.629 During this period civil society organisations turned their atten-
tion to security topics.630 Protection of human and minority rights and peaceful 
resolution of conflict were introduced in the political discourse. Thanks to CSOs, 
topics about which the public had little information before the late 1990s, such 
as civilian democratic control and oversight over the armed forces, civil-military 
relations, and civil-police relations, now became part of the political discourse. 
In this period they began to build capacity for overseeing the security sector, as 
well as mechanisms for the protection of human rights which the government 
was not able to provide for its citizens.631 
Civil society organisations played an important role in the democratic over-
throw in 2000. Besides motivating citizens (especially the young) to go out and 
vote, they established a partnership with opposition political parties fighting 
for political changes. 
The third period commenced in 2000 and is still ongoing. The overthrow of 
the government in 2000 provided an opportunity to redefine relations between 
CSOs and government institutions. After government changes, the new politi-
cal elite has included civil society representatives in government institutions 
and many experts have passed from the non-governmental to the governmen-
tal sector. Expert knowledge that existed in civil society has been incorporated 
into many laws and strategic documents.632 
Eight years afterwards, however, the legal status of CSOs is still not properly 
regulated. The latest draft proposal for regulation of the sector was the Law on 
associations prepared in 2007 by the Ministry for Public Administration and Lo-
cal Self-Government, in addition to a working group, alliances and associations, 
and representatives of CSOs. This draft has not yet reached parliamentary pro-
cedure. The work of CSOs is further impeded by the fact that laws applicable to 
629 Andrijašević, Popović, Stanković and Veljković
630 In this paper we use a broad definition where security is perceived as striving for freedom 
from threats.
631 For instance, Group 484 has been providing humanitarian, psycho-social, legal, and informa-
tional assistance to refugees since 1995. A larger number of organisations, such as the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Human Rights (YUCOM), the Fund for Humanitarian Law, Centre for Civil-Military 
Relations, the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection, and a larger number of organisa-
tions for human rights protection throughout Serbia, provide legal assistance and legal advice 
to citizens in specific situations (e.g. refugees, conscientious objectors, citizens subject to police 
torture, etc).
632 For more information, see Miljenko Dereta, ‘Civilno društvo i demokratija’, Mreža – specijalno 
izdanje, no. 45 (May 2005).
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their activities are the same laws that apply to the profit sector. In addition, the 
profit sector is not encouraged to invest in the activities of civil society.
 It seems that, in the eight years since the democratic changes, the attitude 
of the public towards CSOs is still negative. According to a survey conducted 
by Smart kolektiv (Belgrade) in November 2006, in cooperation with Strategic 
Marketing, the public had poor understanding of CSOs’ work and attitudes to-
wards these organisations were ambivalent.633 Just over half of respondents (54 
per cent) knew what the phrase ‘civil society organisation’ meant, and almost 
half (47 per cent) had negative associations when this phrase was mentioned. A 
small proportion (14 per cent) believes that civil society organisations act in the 
best interest of Serbia. Moreover, they perceive CSO work as the least beneficial 
for affecting everyday life, and most beneficial in the provision of assistance to 
vulnerable populations (such as persons with specific needs and victims of do-
mestic violence). 
Civil society organisations are also unhappy with their working environ-
ment and their opportunities to influence reforms in society. According to a sur-
vey conducted by Civic Initiatives in 2005 on a sample of 516 CSOs,634 more than 
half of these organisations (54 per cent) think that the current political climate 
in the country is highly unfavourable for the development of the non-govern-
mental sector and 60 per cent consider cooperation between the government 
(at the time) and the NGO sector to be poor or very poor. One of the conclu-
sions of the survey was that the NGO sector was not sufficiently interconnected 
and lacked a clear structure, as well as that intra-sectoral communication was 
under-developed. These inadequacies probably limit the influence that these 
organisations have on government policy. However, it was encouraging to learn 
that most donors taking part in the survey (41) believed that the situation in the 
NGO sector was similar to that in other countries in the region.635 
After 2000, civil society organisations continued their research and educa-
tional work, as well as public advocacy in the security sector. Non-formal educa-
tion programmes developed by civil society organisations offer citizens, media, 
and also representatives from the government sector the opportunity to gain 
further insight into security sector reform. During this period civil society or-
ganisations started to work together with representatives of government in-
stitutions. There are many examples of good practice. Since 2003, ISAC Fund 
(Belgrade) has organised ten one-week trainings entitled ‘Security sector reform 
school’ aimed at giving professionals to the opportunity broaden their knowl-
edge and keep up with the trends. The Centre for Management  (Belgrade) has 
633 ‘Javno mnjenje o organizacijama civilnog društva u Srbiji – Smart kolektiv i Strateški market-
ing,’ (2006): http://www.smartkolektiv.org 
634 NVO sektor u Srbiji (Beograd: Građanske inicijative, 2005). This publication is available at: 
http://www.gradjanske.org/admin/download/files/cms/attach?id=94. 
635 NVO sektor u Srbiji, 82-93.
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since 2001 organised ten modern anti-corruption methodology trainings with 
the aim of enabling employees who face corruption everyday to familiarise 
themselves with ways of recognising and tackling it. The Centre for Civil-Military 
Relations was the first CSO to organise, in 2004 and 2005, seminars on security 
sector reform in garrisons of Serbia and Montenegro, and European security ar-
chitecture for the Ministry of Defence of SaM and SaM Armed Forces. Several 
CSOs organised post-graduate studies at the University of Belgrade. 
Civil society organisations continue to develop research capacity and initi-
ate major theoretical research. A good example of academic research is the re-
search ‘Mapping and monitoring of the security sector’ conducted by the Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations in 2007–2008 to develop methods and instruments 
for measuring and overseeing security reform sector and its integration into 
Euro-Atlantic structures. Among research conducted with the aim of improving 
practical policy, a good example is research conducted by the European Move-
ment in Serbia and KIPRED in 2005 ‘Joint European Vision’. This research ad-
dressed the issues of free movement of goods and people in Kosovo and Serbia. 
It was designed to encourage public debate and to act as a platform for shared 
paths towards reaching European standards and regional integration.636 The 
Victimology Society of Serbia publishes an academic magazine, Temida, deal-
ing with victimisation, human rights and gender. There are four issues a year.637 
In the field of public advocacy, the period after 2000 saw examples of good 
practice in cooperation between CSOs and the security sector. One example 
was the educational promotional campaign ‘November – the month of security’, 
which Zaječar Initiative implemented in cooperation with the Police Directorate 
of Zaječar in November 2007. Joint action is still very important for success. An 
example is the joint initiative launched by 29 NGOs and members of acadeMoI. 
In late 2008 they asked the Ministry of Defence to extend the time limit envis-
aged for the public debate on the draft National Security Strategy and draft 
Strategy for Defence from the original insufficient 15 days to 45 days. The joint 
action by a large number of actors contributed to the Ministry of Defence’s ap-
proval of this initiative. 
Representatives of CSOs who participated in the research conducted by the 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations ‘Increasing citizens’ participation in security 
policy’, noted that not enough CSOs in Serbia are interested in security matters. 
Most organisations dealing with security matters are located in Belgrade and 
civil society does not monitor the activities of some actors in the security sector 
(such as institutions having some police characteristics). Institutionalised coop-
eration between CSOs and government institutions is absent. According to the 
636 For more information, see the European Movement in Serbia website: 
http://www.emins.org/publikacije/knjige/index.htm
637 See more information, see the Victimology Society website, http://www.vds.org.yu/temida.
htm
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experience of CSOs, it depends on personal contacts with representatives of the 
institutions. 
Role of CSOs in Serbian security sector
In principle, CSOs in Serbia have several functions in the security sector. First 
of all, they support government institutions in the implementation of security 
sector reforms, which means that they are involved in drafting and in the public 
debate on constitutional-conceptual documents. They also organise the imple-
mentation of educational activities. Civil society organisations are among the 
sources of civil expertise and they provide expert support to government in-
stitutions in security policy creation and implementation. Several examples of 
good practice were noted with regard to the participation of CSOs in the legal 
drafting and organisation of different kinds of training.638 Serbian CSO expertise 
also actively contributes to public debate on existing legislation.639 As an alter-
native source of knowledge, civil society organisations may and should play an 
important role in education, i.e. in the process of acquiring new knowledge on 
security matters. To date civil society organisations have organised a number 
of different training programmes, from one-day seminars for representatives of 
ministries forming part of the security sector, to specialist and post-graduate 
studies at the University of Belgrade attended by representatives from the se-
curity sector.640 
638 Civil society organisations attempted to compensate for legal voids in the regulation of the 
security sector by preparing model laws. Thus, for instance, CSOs noted that private security 
companies in Serbia are not legislatively regulated and that there is a need for a law regulat-
ing their activities. Two organisations contributed to the achievement of this goal; the Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, which prepared a model law on private security activities 
in 2005 (see more detail at: www.ccmr-bg.org); and the League of Experts, Belgrade, which 
prepared a model law on the private activity of protecting persons and property and detective 
activity 2006 (see more detail at: www.lex.org.yu). 
639 At the initiative of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, for instance, the Law on the Armed 
Forces of Serbia (adopted in December 2007) was amended to ensure that, besides parliament, 
the Protector of Citizens and other government authorities in accordance with their respective 
competences, as well as citizens and public at large could be included in the democratic and 
civilian control and oversight of the Armed Forces of Serbia. For more information, see Đorđe 
Popović, ‘Komentar Nacrta zakona o odbrani i o vojsci,’ Bezbednost zapadnog Balkana, No. 7-8 
(October 2007- March 2008): 120-131.
640 Precise data about the number of seminars organised by CSOs are not available. The Centre 
for Civil-Military Relations has, since it was founded in 1997, organised about 70 seminars, at-
tended by more than 1500 people. So far the Centre has organised two series of seminars for 
members of the military with a total of 700 participants. With regard to academic education, the 
Belgrade Centre for Human Rights has organised post-graduate studies ‘Specijalističke struko-
vne studije humanitarnog prava i ljudskih prava’ for three generations at the School of Political 
Sciences. At the same school, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations organised the ’Studies of 
Global and National Safety’ for four generations of students.  
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The second role played by civil society organisations is to exercise public 
control and oversight of security policy. CSOs monitor developments in the se-
curity sector and ensure that security policy is a subject of public debate. There 
are two reasons why systematic public control and oversight of the security sec-
tor in Serbia is not developed. No individual CSO has the capacity to monitor 
the entire security sector on its own. Likewise, continuous monitoring of larger 
security sector institutions, such as the military or police, is not in place, and 
control and oversight of less visible government authorities (for instance cus-
toms) or non-government bodies (companies that provide the services of phys-
ical-technical security) is not even mentioned. The defence and security sector 
was the first to be subject to control and oversight and it was even part of a 
report on the control and oversight of government institutions. In these reports, 
information about the security sector or individual institutions occupied one 
or several chapters.641 CSOs have developed control and oversight of specific 
areas. Since 1997, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights has published a syn-
thetic report on the human rights situation in the country, including judicial 
and police functions which affect human rights. Several organisations attend 
trials related to the protection of human rights and transitional justice in front 
of domestic and international courts.642 There are other examples of overseeing 
security matters. In 2007, the Centre for Politics and Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
drew up an ‘Overview of the situation of human security in Serbia.643 Another 
example is the monitoring of how the National Anti-Corruption Strategy is im-
plemented in parliament, conducted by Transparency Serbia. 644
The third and equally important activity of CSOs is public advocacy for se-
curity sector reform implementation. Advocacy of security sector reforms has 
been marked with the activities of CSOs from the date they were founded to this 
date. Two examples are the right to conscientious objection and introduction of 
the institute of civilian service, following efforts by CSOs. After public pressure, 
the right to conscientious objection was regulated (admittedly with a by-law) 
by the adoption of the Decree on Military Service (27 August 2003).  With this 
decree, a category of civilian service as an alternative to military service was offi-
cially introduced. Representatives from the European Bureau for Conscientious 
641 A.g., Godišnji izveštaj: Srbija 2007, Samoizolacija: realnost i cilj (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za 
ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2007). Publication available at: http://www.helsinki.org.yu/serbian/doc/
izvestaj2007.pdf  
642 Monitoring of the trial is performed by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (for more 
details, see: http://bgcentar.placebo.co.yu/page_sr?tag=47@sr), Lawyers’ Committee for Human 
Rights (for more details, see: http://www.yucom.org.yu), and the Fund for Humanitarian Law (for 
more details, see:  http://www.hlc-rdc.org/)..
643 For more information, see the Centre for Politics and Euro-Atlantic Partnership website,:
http://www.atlanticpartnership.org.rs
644 See more information at the Transparency Serbia website: http://www.transparentnost.org.
rs/
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Objection (EBCO) Balkan Section and civil society organisations from Belgrade 
took part in drafting the document. 
Civil society organisations often advocate reforms in cooperation with relat-
ed organisations and with media support. A successful example is the Coalition 
for Free Access to Information, founded in 2005.  It was created in response to 
the need, by joint action, to exert pressure on the authorities– the government 
and parliament – to promptly pass the law on free access to information. The 
Coalition is made up of the following organisations: Belgrade Centre for Human 
Rights, Centre for Anti-war Action, Centre for Advanced Legal Studies, Fund for 
an Open Society, Citizens’ Initiatives, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights–Yu-
com and Transparency Serbia. With time, organisations from towns throughout 
Serbia have joined in the Coalition’s activities. The Coalition has contributed to 
greater responsibility in implementation of the law, and also helped to make 
this topic relevant for the democratic process. This was done by drawing up the 
‘Guide for the implementation of law’,645 preparing a proposal of amendments 
to the existing law, preparing a law proposal on the classification of information 
and personal data protection which will render the existing law more efficient, 
proposing practical polices to contribute to better accessibility of information, 
organising debates, and informing the public about these issues. 
Illustration 2: Poster of EBCO Balkan
645 The Guide is available at:
      http://www.spikoalicija.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=48
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Supervisory roles of CSOs
The role of civil society organisations in the security sector is primarily super-
visory. Control and oversight and control are related terms. They imply subor-
dination of the parties implementing them as well as specific subject matter. 
They also involve the influence of an control and oversight or control body on 
the person subject to control and oversight or control.646 The difference is that 
control and oversight implies a continuous activity and control takes place once 
or more than once in the course of the control and oversight process.647 The sec-
ond difference is that control was envisaged and regulated in legislative regula-
tions. A controller is vested with legal powers in respect of the controlled entity, 
as regards the matter being controlled.648 This means that the control decision 
is legally binding for the institution subjected to the control, as opposed to con-
trol and oversight which results in non-binding recommendations. Accordingly, 
civil society organisations perform non-formal control of the security sector.649
Civil society organisations perform their control and oversight function by 
constantly bringing significant security related topics to public attention. This 
includes the writing of criticisms, proposals, objections and complaints about 
security sector institutions.650 This helps promote accountability of all actors in 
the security sector.  
Assessment of the control and oversight function 
of Serbian CSOs
An assessment of the capability of CSOs to oversee the security sector was made 
based on several dimensions, including capacity, the rule-of-law, transparency, 
integration of these organisations in the security sector, and legitimacy. 
We evaluate the indicated dimensions based on available data on CSOs and 
empirical material collected as part of an independent survey conducted by the 
Centre for Civil-Military Relations conducted ‘Increasing citizens’ participation in 
the security policy’ in 2007 and 2008.  Forty-four civil society organisations iden-
tified by researchers in the NGO directory of the Centre for the Development 
646 According to: Zoran R. Tomić, ’Normativna polazišta za civilnu kontrolu vojske i policije,’ in De-
mokratska kontrola vojske i policije, ed. Miroslav Hadžić. (Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 
2001), 11-34.
647 According to: Tomić, 12.
648 According to: Tomić, 13.
649 Bogoljub Milosavljević, Građanski nadzor nad policijom: Mogući model za Srbiju (Beograd: 
Centar za antiratnu akciju, 2004), 62-65.
650 Milosavljević, 64.
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of Non-Profit Sector651 took part in this research. As the first empirical research 
conducted on CSOs involved in security, it comes with limitations. First of all, the 
sample of CSOs is, statistically speaking, small and as a result the conclusions 
are not completely reliable. Also, the CSOs themselves spoke about their ac-
tivities, which put a question mark over the objectivity of findings. Considering 
available resources, this was the only way to collect this information. Another 
limitation is that right-wing movements and organisations did not take part in 
the survey and they are the ones most interested in security matters in Serbia. 
Moreover, limited resources prevented the inclusion of a larger number of 
organisations outside Belgrade. Please note that this survey was a part of a pilot 
project and the experience gained on this occasion is a good basis for future 
research.
CIVIL SOCIETY’S CAPACITY TO OVERSEE 
ThE SECURITY SECTOR
Several indicators were used to assess CSO control and oversight capacities, 
such as; the number of specialised CSOs and their fields of operation; size, per-
sonnel and technical capacity; neutrality in respect of political parties, ideology 
and interest (independence); funding sources and sustainability; existence of 
networks – national and cross-border, and; presence in the public and media. 
The first indicator – the existence of CSOs interested in security – is a main 
precondition for inclusion of these organisations among non-statutory actors 
in the security sector. The broadness of these organisations’ field of work is in-
dicative of the development of the sector and the preconditions that should 
be met to enable participation in the debate on security issues and control and 
oversight of the security sector.
According to some estimates, Serbia now has more than 30,000 CSOs.652 
A large number of these organisations, however, are not active. The ‘Directory 
of non-government organisations’ made by the Centre for the Development 
of Non-Profit Sector is a dependable source of information about civil society. 
CSOs voluntarily apply for registration in the directory and, at present, there 
are 2041 registered organisations.653 Of this number, 286 CSOs mention security 
matters, according to name or mission. This includes CSOs focused on the pro-
tection of human rights. This number does not include CSOs dealing with social-
humanitarian problems (586). Research by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations 
651 For more information, see: http://www.crnps.org.yu/direktorijum
652 According to Žarko Paunović, Nevladine organizacije: potreba ili zavera (Beograd: Demokrats-
ka stranka/istraživačko-izdavački centar, 2007), 8.
653 For more information ,see: http://www.crnps.org/
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has identified 44 CSOs dealing with security. Slightly less than one third (13) of 
CSOs stated that security is the main field of their interest. More than half (23) 
said that security is one field of interest. Eight CSOs which sporadically imple-
ment some activities in which security topics are represented also took part in 
the research. These CSOs address the most significant security issues, including; 
human rights, minority groups, military, police, security-intelligence communi-
ty, corruption, organised crime, energy safety, terrorism, security co-operation 
and integration. Most CSOs focus on human rights and minority groups. This 
suggests that they were created because the public needed to organise itself to 
protect their rights. More than a third of CSOs are interested in security issues 
such as monitoring the military, police, and security-intelligence community. 
Interestingly, CSOs are also interested in highly specialised fields, such as in the 
energy security, for instance. This shows that these organisations are willing to 
specialise further. The fact that a large number of CSOs are interested in security 
issues and the fact that they monitor the most important actors in the security 
sector suggests that a prerequisite is in place for CSOs to take part in control and 
oversight of the security sector. This is only the first prerequisite considering 
that the number of organisations says nothing about the quality of their work.
Area No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Human rights 38 86
Minority groups 
(women, Roma)
27 61
Military 16 36
Police 18 41
Security-intelligence 
community
15 34
Corruption 19 43
Organised crime 16 36
Energy security 7 16
Terrorism 10 23
Security cooperation 
and integration
8 18
352
Table 22: Areas covered by civil society organisations654
A small number of CSOs conduct regular research, educational programmes, 
and public advocacy activities. These organisations’ main field of interest is se-
curity. 
 
Frequency of activities No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Security issues are regularly 
present in the research 
conducted by our CSO
13 29.5
Security issues are regularly 
a part of our public advocacy 
activities
23 52.3
Security issues are a part 
of educational activities 
regularly implemented by our 
CSO
8 18.2
Total 44 100
Table 23: Frequency of security related activities regularly implemented by CSOs
Almost all CSOs interviewed in this survey have done some security related 
research. The least frequently conducted is academic research, probably be-
cause of high scientific-methodological criteria, a lack of experts and/or knowl-
edge, or due to orientation towards public advocacy, lobbying, and exerting 
pressure on authorities. Nine CSOs interviewed for the survey had conducted 
academic research. For instance, the Victimology Society of Serbia conducted 
research People trafficking in Serbia. This was the first research aimed at closer 
and more comprehensive insight into trafficking.655 More than four fifths of CSOs 
carried out research with the goal of conducting analysis and providing recom-
mendations for practical application. These included, for instance, public opin-
ion surveys organised by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations and the Atlantic 
Council of Serbia which, at the time when they were conducted, were the only 
public opinion surveys addressing security related issues. Two thirds of CSOs 
have conducted research designed to draw up policy proposals and whose rec-
ommendations became part of documents drafted by the government. Recom-
mendations of research conducted by the Centre for Minority Rights, Protec-
tion of the Rights of Roma, for instance, are included in action plans for Roma 
654 Overview of how security issues rank among the activities of individual organisations can be 
seen in the publication Direktorijum organizacija i institucija zainteresovanih za bezbednosne teme 
(Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, 2008), 17-19.
655 For more information, see:  http://www.vds.org.yu/
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adopted by the government in January 2005, and the Centre for Minority Rights 
is mentioned as a CSO responsible for overseeing their implementation. 
Type of research activity No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Scientific / academic research 12 27,3
Practical research 37 84,1
Practical policy 
recommendations 21 67,4
Total 70 178.8
Table 24: Types of research activities implemented by CSOs656
Almost every CSO included in the sample has some form of educational 
activity, suggesting that organisations, as well as donors, recognise the impor-
tance of education. CSOs did not develop capacity to autonomously conduct 
training programmes since, as they themselves indicate, they normally out-
source when they perform these activities. Evaluation of target groups, pro-
grammes and lecturers, and the number and profile of the participants in these 
programmes could provide information about the capacity of respective CSOs. 
This information goes beyond the content of the questionnaire used in this sur-
vey and the results below are only a starting point for future research of CSOs 
educational capacity.
Forms of educational 
capacity
No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Trainings lasting                   
more than five days 15 34.1
Seminars lasting                       
up to five days 37 84.1
Conferences 30 68.2
Round tables 37 84.1
Total 119 270.5
Table 25: Forms of educational activities implemented by CSOs
Publications enable CSOs to share findings with large number of beneficiar-
656 Sum total percentages in the columns equals more than 100 per cent because CSOs were 
given the option to chose more than one answer.
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ies. Information collected in this survey relates only to the type of publications 
issued by CSOs. Almost all CSOs involved in this survey have issued some type 
of publication that refers to security topics. 
Types of publication No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Books 26 59.1
Model laws 14 31.8
Analysis – scientific and 
practical 32 72.7
Journals 14 31.8
Bulletins 19 43.2
Brochures 28 63.6
Manuals 19 43.2
Total 152
Table 26: Type of security related publications issued by CSOs
The results reveal that every CSO with any interest in security has publicly 
advocated security sector reform. More than half of CSOs have appeared in TV 
and radio programmes, and more than a third of them have participated in pro-
motional activities, conferences and media releases. This leads to the conclu-
sion that CSOs have the experience and capability to publicly initiate topics of 
interest for security. There is no doubt government institutions can count on 
co-operation with CSOs to inform the public about important security issues. 
Petitions to amend laws are the least frequently used method. The reasons are 
many. Besides getting the required number of signatures, the process of law 
adoption and amendments is protracted. Moreover, CSOs probably believe that 
some other public advocacy methods offer them more opportunity to achieve 
their goals and ensure results. 
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Forms of public advocacy No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Petitions for amendments to 
laws 4 9.1
Law proposals/drafts 18 40.9
Policy change campaigns 28 63.6
Promotional activity 30 68.2
Communications, media 
conferences 32 72.7
TV and radio programmes 25 56.8
Total 137
Table 27: Forms of public advocacy implemented by CSOs
The second indicator is important because CSOs capacity is determined by 
the people who work for them. In our survey we tried to find out the profile 
of leaders, members, and associates of CSOs interested in security. According 
to CSO representatives, the number of associates varies depending on current 
projects and a reliable estimate would be hard to make. Most employees are 
university educated and are solely employed by the CSO. Teachers and/or re-
searchers employed by universities or institutes account for more than half of 
CSO associates, increasing the likelihood that CSOs will be competent to over-
see the security sector. According to the results of the survey, former members 
of the armed forces are willing to take part in the activities of these organisa-
tions. Their participation has a positive effect on raising capacity and capability 
in the CSO sector, considering that former members of the armed forces have 
knowledge of the security system ‘from the inside’.
Technical facilities are prerequisites for efficiency and, due to a large number 
of CSOs, it is hard to appraise these competencies. Representatives of CSOs in-
terviewed were content with their technical environment.
The third indicator – neutrality from political parties, ideology, or interest – 
is one of the preconditions for independent control and oversight. Cooperation 
between CSOs and political parties has existed ever since CSOs were founded. In 
the early 1990s, some CSOs joined together with opposition political parties to 
fight for democratisation and implementation of reforms in society. At the same 
time, ethno-nationalistic movements developed whose anti-democratic incli-
nations657 were, inter alia, expressed by their view that civil society should not 
657 Vukašin Pavlović, ’Civilno društvo i politika’ in Između autoritarizma i demokratije: Srbija, Crna 
Gora, Hrvatska (Knjiga. 2, Civilno društvo i politička kultura), ed. Dragica Vujadinović, Lino Veljak, 
Vladimir Goati, Veselin Pavićević. (Beograd: CEDET, 2004)
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oversee the security sector. The process of civil society development was similar 
in other ex-republics of SFRY.658 A large number of CSOs supported opposition 
parties before 5 October 2000, either directly or indirectly. After the democratic 
changes, a number of people from the ‘non-government’ sector joined the ’gov-
ernment’ sector.  In this way, political parties were a channel through which the 
CSO ‘elite’ passed to the government elite.659 Some organisations, such as G17 or 
Otpor, transformed into political parties, more or less successfully. Civil society 
organisations still support political parties’ initiatives and their members belong 
to political parties. In this survey, about a quarter of CSOs stated that their asso-
ciates are present or former political activists. Informal influence from political 
parties on CSOs is almost impossible to estimate.
Staff structure No. of CSOs % of CSOs
Teachers and/or researchers 
employed with universities 
or institutes
24 54,5
University-educated 
individuals to whom this is 
the only employment
39 88,6
Former members of             
the armed forces 5 11,6
Present or former political 
activists/political party 
activists
12 27,3
Journalists 9 20,5
Total 89 202,5
Table 28: Staff structure of CSOs interested in security issues
The fourth indicator concerns funding sources and sustainability. Data from 
the tables below suggest that CSOs rely primarily on foreign funding sources. 
Less than a third of CSOs have taken funds from Serbian government institu-
tions and more than four fifths have received funds from foreign governments. 
658 Compare with Lino Veljak, ”Civilno društvo i politika u Hrvatskoj“, in Između autoritarizma i 
demokratije: Srbija, Crna Gora, Hrvatska (Knjiga. 2, Civilno društvo i politička kultura), ed. Dragica 
Vujadinović, Lino Veljak, Vladimir Goati, Veselin Pavićević. (Beograd: CEDET, 2004)
659 According to: Vladimir Goati, ’Partije i akteri civilnog društva u Srbiji,’ in Između autoritarizma 
i demokratije: Srbija, Crna Gora, Hrvatska (Knjiga. 2, Civilno društvo i politička kultura), ed. Dragica 
Vujadinović, Lino Veljak, Vladimir Goati, Veselin Pavićević. (Beograd: CEDET, 2004), 260.
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CSOs’ dependence on foreign funding sources, however, may result in their 
activities being directed by the interests of foreign donors. They may have to 
adjust their activities to priorities forced on them from outside. Another conse-
quence may be that the local community perceive CSOs as ‘foreign mercenaries’. 
This is why it is important for government institutions to understand the im-
portance of independent control and oversight and to allocate funds for CSOs. 
These organisations do not plan their funding sources and they do not normally 
make five-year plans. A developed fund-raising plan is important for effective 
control and oversight of the security sector, considering that control and over-
sight is a long-term effort.
Domestic funding sources No. of CSOs % of CSOs
NGOs 10 22,7
Government institutions 12 27,3
Academic institutions 4 9,1
International institutions and 
organisations established in  
Serbia
34 77,3
Private foundations 8 18,2
Total 68
Table 29: Domestic funding sources used by CSOs
Foreign funding sources No. of CSOs % of CSOs
NGOs 30 68,2
Governments 36 81,8
Academic institutions 12 27,3
International institutions and 
organisations 39 88,6
Private foundations 26 59,1
Total 143
Table 30: Foreign funding sources used by CSOs
The fifth indicator relates to national and cross-border interconnectedness. 
Implementation of joint initiatives and activities increases the impact of CSOs 
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on processes and reforms in society. Almost half of CSOs taking part in the sur-
vey have continuous, and two fifths sporadic, cooperation with other organisa-
tions. About a third of organisations have formalised cooperation. Implementa-
tion of joint projects in which CSOs share responsibilities is still quite rare, which 
suggests that CSOs have failed to establish mutual trust.
Most CSOs acknowledge the importance of interconnectedness, consid-
ering that it increases visibility, impact, and the lawfulness of their activities. 
This is confirmed by data suggests that most CSOs (80 per cent) are members 
of mostly informal networks. Networks and coalitions are most represented 
in the activities of public advocacy, and examples of successful networks and 
collations include the Coalition for Free Access to Information, the Coalition of 
Women for Peace (which supports the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325/2000660) and the Network of the Committees for Human Rights 
in Serbia (which provides free legal assistance to citizens in six towns of Serbia). 
Most CSOs taking part in this survey are members of the Federation of Non-
Governmental Organisations (FENS), the largest domestic network with 519 
member organisations. The Federation calls for the improvement of the posi-
tion of CSOs. Joining the network is probably also a result of prevailing trends, 
taking into account that donors support joint action. A high percentage of CSOs 
belong to cross-border networks – international (55 per cent) and regional (25 
per cent). However, almost half (45 per cent) belong to a domestic network. This 
data is not unusual considering foreign grants almost always specify affiliation 
to specific networks. 
Membership No. of CSOs % of CSOs
CSO is a member of a 
network of institutions and/
or organisations
35 80
CSO is not a member of a 
network of institutions and/
or organisations
9 20
Total 44 100
Table 31: Membership in networks of institutions and/or organisations
The sixth indicator – presence in the public and media – is important con-
sidering that media constitute the most significant channel for the transmission 
660 This Resolution recommends that states build mechanisms for conflict resolution based on 
gender equality. For more information, see Women in Black website: http://www.zeneucrnom.
org/
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of information. Most CSOs had cooperation with the media. However, there is 
no regular empirical research about the CSOs presence in the media in Serbia. A 
good illustration of this is research conducted by Pro Concept in 2004 and 2005, 
analysing CSO work environments.661 This research observed and analysed me-
dia reporting about CSOs. According to the results, CSOs receive only marginal 
publicity in the printed media. This is confirmed by the number of published 
articles (an average ten texts per journal in a month), and their structure (mostly 
short forms). Connotative value of the texts was negative in a high proportion 
(29 per cent), as opposed to affirmative (15 per cent). More than half of texts (56 
per cent) transmitted the information neutrally. The context of reporting was 
especially negative with regard to CSOs dealing with war crimes and trials at the 
Hague War Crimes Tribunal. The above results lead to the conclusion that pres-
ence of these organisations in the media is not adequate and, therefore, their 
work is not fully accessible to the public.  
 
grade:  3 (three)
ThE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law can be used to assess the legal status of CSOs. In other words, 
does it facilitate or impede control and oversight over the security sector, and 
what legal recourses are available to CSOs? For this purpose we have tried to 
evaluate whether provisions regulating the operation of CSOs comply with the 
legal system, whether constitutional and legal authorisations for participating 
in the control and oversight of the security sector are in place, whether legisla-
tive norms are in line with international standards, and how CSO funding and 
taxation are regulated.
CSOs are regulated by the Law on social organisations and citizens’ associa-
tions of 1990.  The law is outdated, inappropriate, and derives from the present 
Constitution and laws that refer to business activity in general terms (the Ac-
counting and auditing law, the Law on payment transactions and the Labour law). 
It can be therefore said that legislation concerning the CSO sector is not harmo-
nised with the legal system. 
The Constitution does not explicitly define the right for civil society to take 
part in control and oversight of the security sector. Laws adopted after 2000 of-
fer some instruments that enabled society and citizens to participate in control 
and oversight of the security sector. The Law on Armed Forces is the only law that 
661 ProConcpt and Open Society Fund – Serbia, Professional Gathering ‘Analysing the NGO 
Environment – Challenges and Transitions’ (June 2005); http://www.proconcept.rs/prog-civilno/
zbirna_analiza.pdf
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contains a provision on citizens’ democratic control and oversight.662 The Law 
on defence663 and the Law on police664 also introduced a possibility for including 
citizens in the implementation of security policy and control and oversight of 
the security sector. The Law on free access to information of public importance 
as well as the Law on public procurements offer CSOs and citizens some instru-
ments that enable them to exercise public control and oversight. The Law on 
public procurements defines the transparency of public procurements, and the 
Law on free access to information of public importance introduces the term ‘in-
formation of public importance.’ A claimant can turn to the Commissioner for 
Information if he is not provided with suitable information. However, these laws 
have some deficiencies. The Law on Armed Forces provision relating to citizen 
inclusion is overly generalised and is unclear what mechanism can be used to 
exercise this control and oversight. The Law on free access to information does 
not contain any penal provisions to sanction non-observance and it therefore 
common that institutions fail to respond to requests from civil society.665 Data 
presented by the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance confirms 
that the security sector is the least transparent part of the public administra-
tion. According to this information, the two institutions which have disregarded 
the most citizens’ requests and failed to provide information to the public are 
the Security Intelligence Agency and the Ministry of Interior.666 Secondly, the 
absence of legislation on the classification of secret information means that in-
formation is unnecessarily designated as secret. This limits the participation of 
civil society in public control and oversight.667 According to research conducted 
by the Coalition for Free Access to Information, the law on data classification 
662 According to Zakon o vojsci, čl. 29, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 116–07.
663 Compare with: Zakon o odbrani, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije 116-07, član 76
664 Compare with: Zakon o policiji, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 101-2005, Art. 6, 180, and 188
665 In 12 months of monitoring the implementation of the Law on free access to information of 
public importance, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights submitted 747 requests for free access 
to information and 214 complaints to the Commissioner because of incompliance with the Law. 
Based on these submissions, the Initiative initiated ten minor offence proceedings, inter alia, 
against the Security Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice. For 
more information,  see the Youth Initiative for Human Rights website: http://www.yi.org.yu/ac-
tions.php?id=5&lang=_bhs
666 For more information, see the annual reports of the Commissioner for Information of Public 
Importance at the Commissioner’s website: http://www.poverenik.org.yu/dokumentacija.
asp?ID=6
667 One example is the rejected request from B92 TV to the Ministry of Interior for the official 
record of the interview with Milorad Ulemek, the first defendant in the assassination of Zoran 
Djindjic, given on the night of his surrender.  The Minister of Police stated that the record could 
not be presented while court proceedings are still in progress. The spokesperson for the District 
Court Special Department, however, stated that this official record is of no value since the court 
does not address issues outside those contained in the bill of indictment for the assassination. 
For more information, see the Coalition for Free Access to Information website:
http://www.spikoalicija.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=71&Itemi
d=59&limit=9&limitstart=18 
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is needed to enable full legislative regulation in this field.668 The Law on public 
procurements (article 7) defines confidential procurements which are exempt 
from public insight.669  
The following international regulations the activities of civil society; the UN 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International Pact on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. The 
operational standards for CSOs are defined in the OSCE Code of Conduct on 
Politico-Military Aspects of Security. 670
The right of association is the first standard recognised by the UN Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Freedom 
of association is incorporated in article 55 of the Serbian Constitution, which 
reads; “Freedom of political, union and any other forms of association shall be 
guaranteed, as well as the right to stay out of any association.“ Secondly, the 
right to take action and for action to be free and protected from government in-
terference, is provided for by the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights 
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. This right is 
also regulated in article 55 of the Constitution. It spells out that; “Associations 
shall be formed without prior approval and entered in the register kept by a 
state body, in accordance with the law.” Thirdly, there is the right to freedom 
of expression and communication with domestic and international partners. 
In Serbia, respect for this right is confirmed by data presented in this chapter 
about CSOs co-operation and networks. Fourth is the right for organisations 
to request and provide operating funds from legal sources. More precisely, it 
provides that regulations do not prevent organisations receiving funds from 
abroad. Although this is not incorporated into domestic regulations, it can be 
concluded from the survey of CSOs interested in security issues that the govern-
ment does not prevent organisations from seeking operating funds. Most of the 
organisations receive funds through foreign grants and the government does 
not encourage any funding of civil society activities.
668 Analysis is available at the Coalition for Free Access to Information website:
 http://www.spikoalicija.org/ 
669 Article 7, paragraph 4 reads that “procurements for which specific regulations provide that 
they can be declared confidential and with regard to which the competent authority, based on 
its powers referred to in the specific regulation, has issued a decision to designate them confi-
dential, in view of the fact that security of the state or citizens could be affected by unauthorised 
persons’ knowledge that such procurements are being implemented or knowledge that the 
objects of procurement have particular specifications or that procurement is implemented from 
a particular bidder.” 
670 More detailed analysis of internationally-recognised rights can be found in the report of 
the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the World Movement for Democracy 
Secretariat at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED); Defending civil society: A report of 
the World Movement for Democracy (February 2008):http://www.wmd.org/documents/Defend-
ing%20Civil%20Society%20-%20English.pdf
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The OSCE ‘Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security’ lists 
international standards in the field of security. Part VII of the Code (paragraph 
20) recommends integration of the armed forces with civil society as a key ex-
pression of democracy. Although general in nature the provision underlines the 
importance of democratic legitimacy of the security sector. The participation 
of civil society in democratic civic control, understood in general terms, is rec-
ognised in the Law on Armed Forces. Article 29 states that “democratic and civil-
ian control of the Armed Forces of Serbia shall be exercised by the parliament, 
the Protector of Citizens, and other government authorities, in accordance with 
their respective competences, citizens and the public.” International norms pro-
vide a general framework for enabling CSOs to act freely and express their inter-
est in security issues. 
Legislative provisions governing the funding and taxation of CSOs are iden-
tical to regulations applying to any legal person. They oblige organisations to 
open a bank account, to maintain funds and make payments through that ac-
count, in accordance with the Law on payment transactions. All legal persons are 
obliged to keep business books. They must prepare financial reports according 
to the Accounting and auditing law. A CSO that employs people for specific jobs 
has, according to the Labour law, all the rights and obligations as any other em-
ployer. The law does not regulate nor stimulate funding (by exempting donors 
from tax liability) and does not provide tax discounts for CSOs.
grade:  2 (two)
TRANSPARENCY
CSOs are not subject to the provisions of the Law on free access to information, 
since they are not founded or funded by government bodies. All CSOs taking 
part in this survey are citizens’ associations and, therefore, do not fall within the 
scope of the law. 
Financial transparency is guaranteed by legislative provisions which oblige 
CSOs to keep business books and to prepare financial reports prescribed for all 
legal persons (the Accounting and auditing law). 
Transparency of CSOs is important because, by disclosing information about 
their activities and business operations, they set a good example of business 
practices, avoid secrecy, and the build trust of both actors in the security sec-
tor and the general public. To observe transparency of CSOs we have included 
the following indicators; public accessibility of information about CSO missions, 
competences, and scope, as well as about projects and actions. In addition, 
there is also public accessibility to information about CSO funding sources and 
about the way grants are spent.
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A large number of CSOs in Serbia have websites which provide information 
about their aims and work. Only two (out of 44) CSOs covered by this research 
do not have a website. The websites provide information about organisational 
structure, mission, and activities. In most cases it is also possible to download 
publications, and some of them offer the data about the number of hits.
In most cases donors oblige CSOs to present the information about where 
they receive support. CSOs are accountable to donors with regard to the use 
of resources and the public is usually not allowed insight into funding sources 
and the way in which the funds are spent. Independent audits are not legal 
obligations and there is practically no information about which CSOs have im-
plemented such financial scrutiny. Information on CSOs budgets is not publicly 
available.
Information about CSO activities is generally available through their indi-
vidual websites but CSOs are still not financially transparent.
grade:  2.5 (two point five)
INTEgRATEDNESS OF CSOs IN ThE SECU-
RITY SECTOR
Integratedness of CSOs was measured by two indicators. The first implies that the 
position of CSO in the security sector must be recognised and defined in regula-
tory and strategic documents. The second indicator relates to the actual partici-
pation of CSOs in the process of security policy creation and implementation. 
The existing laws governing the security sector require the Armed Forces to 
consult civil society when creating and implementing security policy. Through 
interviews with the Serbian Ministry of Defence we have learnt that there are 
no internal rulebooks that specify cooperation between the Ministry and CSOs. 
Cooperation normally depends on informal contacts. There is no institutional-
ised cooperation involving CSOs and the authorities. The Government of the 
Republic of Serbia Office for EU Integration has, however, signed ‘Memoran-
dums on cooperation in the European integration process’ with more than 30 
CSOs, and has designated priorities as cooperation in education and training, 
agriculture, youth policy issues, protection of human rights, and environmental 
protection.671 
Initiatives for cooperation almost always originate from CSOs and their suc-
cess is usually determined by daily politics. Some attempts have been made to 
build mechanisms for institutionalising cooperation between government and 
671 See more detail at the Office for EU Integration website:
 http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=192
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civil society, such the ‘National Covenant on the EU’, which is intended to gath-
er together all actors involved in the process of EU integration. Moreover, this 
should enable dialogue between the government and the non-government 
sector. The Covenant has a working group dealing with the judiciary, freedom 
and safety.672 The Covenant was launched in 2006, but the idea did not progress 
due to the existence of ‘technical’ government and interruption of EU negotia-
tions. It was launched again in late 2008. The Covenant will make recommenda-
tions to the government in regard to taking positions, implementing actions, 
and preparing strategies related to particular issues.
Accordingly, we conclude that civil society organisations are not integrated 
into the security sector. However, the grade for this indicator takes into account 
efforts to institutionalise cooperation since 2000. 
grade:  2 (two)
Chart 17: Trust in NGOs 673
672 See more detail about the structure and work groups of the National Convention on Euro-
pean Union in Serbia at the European Movement in Serbia website: http://www.emins.org/pro-
jekti/aktivni/nkeu/index.htm
673 Note: The result for 2007 was based on the integrated results about trust in domestic and 
foreign NGOs. The graph shows results of a survey conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences 
Centre for Politicological Research and Public Opinion, Belgrade. Source: http://www.idn.org.yu
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LEgITIMACY
 
The Serbian public expresses extremely low levels of trust in civil society or-
ganisations. Since 2000, surveys conducted by the Institute for Political Sciences 
have shown that distrust exceeds trust.674
There are many reasons for this situation. A survey conducted in late 2006 
suggested that distrust is caused partially by a lack of information about the ac-
tivities of CSOs. According to the survey, only 16 per cent of respondents know 
about the issues tackled by CSOs and more than two fifths cannot name a single 
CSO. The survey also found that the citizens do not believe that CSOs have a 
deep impact on society and do not recognise them as actors in security sector 
reform. Further, citizens tend to associate the work of CSOs with human rights 
and assistance to vulnerable groups. It is, however, not possible to grade the 
neutrality or independence of these organisations since they were not covered 
by the public opinion survey. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that the negative 
image of CSOs in the media has contributed much to this negative image. 
grade:  2 (two)
674 See more detail at the Centre for Politicological Research and Public Opinion website:
 http://www.cpijm.org.yu/

PART FOUR
368
1. Chronology of Security 
Sector Reform in 
Serbia 2000–2008675
2000
October
5. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) organises huge demonstra-
tions in Belgrade and other cities and towns between 24 September and 5 Oc-
tober following fraudulent presidential elections. As a result President Slobodan 
Milosevic resigns and Vojislav Kostunica becomes president. According to of-
ficial results, Kostunica receives 2,470,304 votes (50.24 per cent) compared to 
1,826,799 votes (37.15 per cent) for Milosevic.
7.  The FRY parliament is constituted and Vojislav Koštunica is sworn in. Over 
the following days Kostunica meets with numerous statesmen. The EU and USA 
abolish economic sanctions, starting a process of reconciliation and normalisa-
tion of relations with the West and neighbouring countries. 
9. Parliament passes a vote of no confidence in the government and a new 
transitional government is formed. New parliamentary elections for Serbia are 
also declared. A coalition government is formed and signed on 16 October by 
the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) and 
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). Senior SPS member Milomir Minic 
becomes prime minister and Nebojsa Covic (DOS) and Spasoje Krunic (SRM) be-
come vice presidents. The Ministry of Interior is ‘divided equally’ between three 
equally responsible co-ministers, Slobodan Tomovic (SPS), Stevan Nikcevic 
(SRM) and Bozidar Prelevic (DOS).
25. The FRY officially becomes a full member of the Stability Pact for South-
East Europe.
31.   At the request of the SRM, the Supreme Court Judge Balsa Govedarica 
and Chief Republic Prosecutor Dragisa Krsmanovic are replaced. However, Ra-
domir Markovic remains director of the security services, generating a crisis in 
the newly formed transitional government. The SRM and DOS threaten to with-
draw from the government if Markovic is not replaced. This move is strongly 
opposed by President Vojislav Kostunica.  
675 Prepared by Iztok Bojović
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November
1. The FRY joins the UN as a new state.     
4. During a joint session of both upper and lower parliamentary houses, the 
new federal government is elected, containing ministers from the DOS, Socialist 
People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP), Serbian People’s Party of Montenegro and 
Group 17 Plus (G17 Plus). Zoran Zizic from the SNP is elected president.
10. The FRY is accepted as a member of the OSCE.
24.  At a summit of EU and Western Balkan states held in Zagreb, the FRY is 
invited to start accession talks for the Process of Stability and Accession. During 
the same meeting a ‘Final Declaration’ is adopted, representing a key turning 
point in the development of political and economic relations with the EU.
December
14. The FRY government establishes the National Defence Council. Federal 
Prime Minister Zoran Zizic is elected as president of the council. Defence Minis-
ter Slobodan Krapovic also becomes a member of the council. Federal Finance 
Minister Dragisa Pesic announces that the council is an operational body of the 
government, whose main role is advisory and the council will not interfere with 
the work of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC).      
23. With 176 seats out of 250, the DOS wins a landslide victory in the first 
parliamentary elections of the post-Milosevic era. The SPS receives 37 seats, the 
SRS 23 and the Party of Serbian Unity 14.
26.  The Supreme Defence Council, chaired by Vojislav Kostunica, adopts 
new arrangements for state border security, disbanding the Supreme Army 
Command, and transforming the organisation of the Yugoslav Armed Forces 
(VJ). Protection of confidential defence data is adopted. 
26.    Both houses of the Yugoslav parliament pass the budget for 2002. De-
fence receives RSD 43.5 billion, out a total of RSD 65.9 billion. During the same 
session the Law on the Yugoslav Armed Forces is passed, shortening military serv-
ice to nine months and reducing civilian service from 24 to 13 months.
2001
January
11. The OSCE mission in the FRY is established.
22.  The constitution of the New National Assembly of Republic of Serbia.
25. The Serbian parliament elects a new government. Zoran Djindjic be-
comes prime minister.
25. The head of the Secret Service (RDB) Rade Markovic resigns and is re-
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placed by Goran Petrovic, who was officially dismissed on 20 May 1999 for dis-
closing state secrets. 
30. Following the dismissals of the chief of public security (RJB) General-
Colonel Vlastimira Djordjevica and the head of the Police Directorate Obrad Ste-
vanovic, the government appoints Lieutenant-General Sreten Lukic (who was in 
charge of all Ministry of Interior units engaged in Kosovo since 1998, and both 
deputy chief of the Public Security Directorate and head of the Department of 
Border Police within the MoI since June 1999) as chief of the RJB and as aid to 
the Minister of Interior. Charges are later brought against both Sreten Lukic and 
Vlastimir Djordjevic at the Hague Tribunal for crimes in Kosovo.  
February
24. Radomir Markovic (former chief of the Secret Service) is arrested, along 
with two other suspects, in relation to the deaths of four SRM members and the 
injuring of SRM leader Vuk Draskovic in October 1999.
March
4. The Yugoslav Armed Forces enter the Ground Safety Zone, after success-
ful cooperation between Yugoslav authorities and NATO in south Serbia.
April
4. A department for combatting organised crime is created (UBPOK). Ra-
dovan Knezevic is appointed chief and Captain Dragan Karleusa becomes deputy. 
May
22. and 30. Following a public outcry, the Serbian government adopts the 
By-law (ordinance) on the removal of the confidentiality seal from the dossiers held 
on citizens of the Republic of Serbia in the state Security Service, as promised be-
fore the election. The name of the by-law is subsequently changed to the By-law 
on the look-for of certain dossiers held on citizens of the Republic of Serbia in the 
State Security Service. This change means that all ‘open’ dossiers which relate to 
internal enemies, or internal extremism and terrorism, are state secrets. They 
cannot be removed from the premises, photocopied, copied, or spoken about 
to others.  
June
25. The Gendarmerie is established as a unit of the Ministry of Interior. 
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28. Former president of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic is extradited to the 
Hague Tribunal, following a decree from the Serbian government. Slobodan Mi-
losevic, along with four other highly ranked officials, were indicted on 24 May 
1999 for crimes against humanity committed during the first half of 1999. FRY 
President Vojislav Kostunica calls the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic uncon-
stitutional. Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic and Prime Minister Filip Vu-
janovic express their support for the extradition. 
July
14. The Serbian government announces that 50-60 bodies have been found 
in a refrigerator truck which surfaced in an artificial lake at the Perucac hydro-
power plant.
24. The FRY parliament elects a new federal government. Dragisa Peric of 
the Socialist Peoples Party of Montenegro is elected prime minister.
August
3. Momir Gavrilovic of the RDB is murdered in Belgrade. The assassination 
creates a political crisis in relations between FRY President Kostunica and Ser-
bian Prime Minister Djindjic, as well as between the two ruling parties - DOS-
DS and DSS. Media stories appear saying that just before his murder, Gavrilovic 
was handed information, about the links between organised crime and officials 
within the Serbian government. 
31. A parliamentary commission adopts a report on the ‘Pavkovic affair’. The 
report states that on 5 June 2001 the Special Forces of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) 
attempted to take over the Serbian government’s Bureau for Communication, 
because of alleged phone tapping ordered by President Kostunica. Athough the 
President and his advisers refuse to give testimony, according to retired Chief 
of Staff General Nebojsa Pavkovic, it is concluded that an adviser of President 
Gradimir Nalic issued the order.  
  
September
24. The FRY rejoins Interpol. The country was expelled in 1993 because 
membership could not be automatically transferred from the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
November
9. The Special Operations Unit (SOU) blocks the road to their training base in 
Kula in protest against the arrest and extradition of the Banovic brothers to the 
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Hague. The protesters fear further arrests within their ranks. After unsuccessful 
negotiations with Prime Minister Djindjic, the blockade extends to the whole 
training base as well as partially to the highway through Belgrade. An additional 
reason for the rebellion is the first court hearing of Miodrag ‘Legija’ Lukovic as a 
witness in the ‘Ibar highway’ case. There are calls for the resignations of the Min-
ister of Interior, Dusan Mihajlovic and the RDB chief Goran Mihajlovic. Minister 
Mihajlovic offers to resign but is refused by the government. Milorad Ulemek 
plays a key role in organising the protests. Since leaving his post as commander 
of the SOU, Ulemek still commands huge respect and influence among crimi-
nal elements. Velimir Ilic, minister and president of the New Serbia party sup-
ports the protests and calls their requests justified. Vojislav Kostunica does not 
condemn the protests, indirectly condones the actions of the SOU and officially 
states that the security of the citizens is not endangered.
14. The Serbian government accepts the resignations of RDB chief Goran 
Petrovic and his deputy Zoran Mijatovic, but refuses to accept the resignation 
of the Minister of Police, Dusan Mihailovic. It is also decided that the unit will be 
put under the command and responsibility of Public Security section of the MoI. 
27. A compromise is found to end the SOU protests. Andrija Savic becomes 
chief of the RDB and Milorad Bracanovic (former aid to the commander and 
head of the Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Department of the SOU) his 
deputy. The former chief of the RDB is appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs as head of the Department for Research and Documentation. Milorad Bra-
canovic was previously head of the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence De-
partment in the SOU and Miodrag ‘Legija’ Lukovic’s deputy in 1999 and 2000, 
during which time Ivan Stambolic and Slavko Curuvija were assassinated and 
an assassination attempt was made on Vuk Draskovic. Milorad Bracanovic’s ap-
pointment is a condition of the SOU protesters. After the protests end, com-
mand of the SOU moves from the auspices of the RDB to the Ministry of Interior. 
The government thus loses control over the RDB, and with the appointment of 
Bracanovic, ‘Legija’ and the other members of ‘Zemun clan’ secure the influx of 
the confidential information from the highest level. 
2002
January.
11. The Serbian government form the National Council for State Security. 
Zoran Djindjic becomes president. The council will oversee the operational 
actions of the RDB until the full implementation of parliamentary control and 
oversight.
15. The SOU is transferred from the RDB and becomes a separate unit, solely 
responsible to the MoI.            
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29. Both houses of the federal parliament elect Velimir Radojevic, from the 
Socialist People Party of Montenegro as defence minister, following the resigna-
tion of his predecessor, Slobodan Krapovic on 16 January. 
February
2. Efforts to create a National Council for State Security at the federal level, 
as called for by President Vojislav Kostunuca, fail due to a lack of political will 
and declarations from Montenegro that the FRY president does not have the 
authority to form such a body.
27. As part of the rationalisation and reorganisation process, the Air Com-
mand, the Command of PVO and the Naval Command, as well as the Command 
of the Second Army of Yugoslav Army in the city of Nis cease to exist. The new 
organisational scheme introduces nine corps (six ground corps in Novi Sad, 
Belgrade, Uzice, Podgorica, Nis and Pristina, and air corps, PVO corps and na-
val corps), the Guard Brigade and army services brigades. The reorganisation is 
based on the decision of Supreme Defence Council made in December 2001.
March
14. In Belgrade, FRY President Vojislav Kostunica, Montenegrin President 
Milo Djukanovic, vice President Miroljub Labus, the prime ministers of both re-
publics Zoran Djindjic and Filip Vujanovic and EU High Representative Xavier 
Solana sign an agreement to change the name of the state union to Serbia and 
Montenegro.       
14–16. Several arrests are made on charges of spying and disclosing con-
fidential information. Those arrested include members of the Military Intelli-
gence Agency of the Yugoslav Army, the Vice President of the Republic Govern-
ment and the President of the Movement for Democratic Serbia Momcilo Peri-
sic, Lieutenant-Colonel Miodrag Sekulic, Federal Ministry of Interior employee 
Vladimira Vlajkovica, and John David Neibour, staff member in the US Embassy 
in Belgrade. President Kostunica declares the legality of the procedure in the 
‘Perisic case’.  This is disputed by Zoran Djindjic who questions not only civil-
ian control over the Military Intelligence Agency, but also control within the 
military itself, given that neither civilian top officials nor military official receive 
any advance knowledge about the arrests. The US strongly protests against the 
arrest of a high ranking diplomat. Since republic and federal officials are not 
informed about the arrests, the ‘Perisic case’ is held up as evidence of the lack of 
civilian control over the armed forces. There are calls to bring forward the Law of 
Security Services currently being drafted. 
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April
10. The FRY parliament, passes a law on cooperation with the Hague Tribu-
nal which allows for the extradition of citizens accused of war crimes.
25.  The federal government announces that the FRY will join the Partner-
ship for Peace programme (PfP).
June
10. General-Major Bosko Buha, assistant to the head of RJB within the Ser-
bian Ministry of Interior, is assassinated in Belgrade. 
24. President of the FRY Vojislav Kostunica fires the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Yugoslav Army Nebojsa Pavkovic due to charges against him at the 
Hague Tribunal of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ko-
sovo during the spring and summer of 1999. General-lieutenant Branko Krga 
is appointed Chief of General Staff. Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic declares that 
Vojislav Kostunica should not have acted without the agreement of VSO, which 
is disputed by Goran Svilanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs.            
July
2. The Law on the Security Services of the FRY is adopted, regulating the work 
of the Military Security Service and the Military Intelligence Agency within the 
federal government, as well as the work of the Agency for Research and Docu-
mentation and Security Service within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The law 
regulates the Security Services for the first time under democratic and civilian 
control.      
18. The Law on the Security Intelligence Agency (SIA) is passed. The RDB 
changes its name to SIA and becomes an autonomous body directly under the 
command of the Serbian government. However, according to local and foreign 
experts as well as the European Commission, the law does not satisfactorily reg-
ulate democratic and civilian control and control and oversight of the SIA, nor 
human rights.     
August
28. The Serbian Ministry of Interior announces that more that 340 bodies 
have been found. 
September 
18. A court in Belgrade announces at least 269 bodies - mostly Albanian 
nationals - have been found in a mass grave in Batajnica, near Belgrade. 
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December
6. After several months of negotiation, The Constitutional Commission uni-
formly adopts the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro.
20. NATO and the FRY reach an agreement for the use of Yugoslav airspace 
for the needs of NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. A NATO/FRY Technical 
Committee is founded. 
24. The director of the SIA and Minister of Interior produce clearly defined 
methods of cooperation; Instructions about obligatory procedures and ways of 
cooperation between the Serbian Intelligence Agency and Ministry of Interior. 
2003 
January
23.  Andrija Savic, director of the SIA and deputy Milorad Bracanovic are 
removed from their positions. Prime minister, Zoran Djincic is dissatisfied with 
changes in the security sector, particularly in the SIA, as well as in the police. He 
is also dissatisfied with the failure to locate and arrest Hague Tribunal inditees 
and the lack of success in the fight against organised crime. Misa Milicevic and 
Goran Zivaljevic are appointed respectively as director and deputy.
February
4. The new Constitutional Charter of the FRY establishes the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro (SaM). According to the charter, the Armed Forces of 
Serbia and Montenegro are under democratic and civilian control. Their task is 
the defence of the state in accordance with the Constitutional Charter and the 
principles of international law which regulate the use of force. The Supreme De-
fence Council comprises the SaM president and the presidents of the member 
republics. Conscripts are to serve on the territories of their respective repub-
lics, with a possibility to serve in other member state. The SaM Constitutional 
Charter does not foresee parliamentary control and oversight of the security 
services.  
21. An assassination attempt is made against Zoran Djindjic in Belgrade. The 
driver of the lorry, Dejan Milemkovic Bagzi (a member of the ‘Zemun clan’), tries 
to escape, but is apprehended. After only 24 hours in custody, Bagzi is released 
by the District Court. The official explanation given is a lack of legal grounds for 
further detention.
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March
12. Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic is assassinated. A state of emergency is de-
clared by Natasa Micic, acting president of Serbia. The state of emergency gives 
the director of the MoI the right to order special measures such as (telephone) 
tapping and the opening of private correspondence without court authorisa-
tion.   
18. Zoran Živković, deputy president of the DS, is elected prime minister.
25. The Special Operations Unit of the MoI is disbanded. The investigation 
into the assassination reveals the involvement of the commanding elite and a 
large number of its members.
April
2. The Law on Ministries is adopted, which removes discrepancies between 
the authorities of the MoI and SIA.
3.  The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro becames a full member of the 
Council of Europe.
6. Milorad Bracanovic, former deputy director of SIA, is arrested. He served 
as deputy director between November 2001 and January 2003.
8. General Aco Tomic, former chief of military intelligence is arrested along-
side Rade Bulatovic, former security advisor to Vojislav Kostunica. Both are 
charged with collaboration with the ‘Zemun clan’. Vojislav Kostunica declares 
that Rade Bulatovic is a political prisoner.
15. The Supreme Defence Council adopts a decision to form the Military Se-
curity Services under the auspices of the MoD of SaM. This puts military security 
under civilian control, i.e. under the jurisdiction of MoD, for the first time since 
1945. 
19. The SaM parliament establishes the ‘Commission for control of security 
services of SaM’. 
22. The state of emergency ends. In the meantime more than ten thousand 
people have been apprehended and more than four thousand detained.  
May
6. The Supreme Defence Council adopts a decision that declares that the 
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro is to become an 
organisational unit of the MoD. The new ’organisational jurisdiction of the MoD’ 
is a key element in the reform of the Armed Forces. As a result, all employees in 
the Armed Forces become employees of the MoD.    
22. At the Regional Conference of Border Security in Ohrid (Macedonia) or-
ganised by the EU, OSCE, NATO and PfP for South-East Europe, the document 
Common platform of the Ohrid regional conference on border security and man-
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agement is unanimously adopted. States in the region commit themselves to 
the establishment of open but controlled and safe borders, and the strengthen-
ing of regional ties within the framework of EU accession.
June
19. The Serbian Constitutional Court declares that the Governmental Decree 
by the Government of Republic of Serbia about the possibility of inspection of some 
of the secret files about the citizens of the Republic of Serbia in the Security Service 
is unconstitutional. The court rules that the government has exceeded its au-
thority by adopting the decree, stating that it has only the power to adopt legal 
documents which regulate execution of the law, and not those which regulate 
specific areas. Following the ruling, the legislation regulating the opening of the 
secret files is not adopted.  
July
4. Rade Bulatovic is released from detention following his arrest during the 
‘Sabre’ police operation for alleged connections with the ‘Zemun clan’.
17. General Nebojsa Pavlovic, former chief of staff of the Yugoslav Army is 
released from detention following his arrest for alleged involvement in the as-
sassination attempt on Vuk Draskovic in Budva.
17. Minister of Defence Boris Tadic and head of the UN Development Pro-
gramme in SaM Francis O’Donnell sign an agreement on civilian control and 
reform of the MoD. The agreement creates reform teams within the MoD and 
Armed Forces, whose task it is to build “institutional and human capacities 
though further training in civilian control of the armed forces and the public 
management of finances and means in the Army.”  
23. Milorad Bracanović, former deputy director of SIA, is released from de-
tention.
August
11. The Ministerial Council of Serbia and Montenegro approves the partici-
pation of MoD personnel and the Armed Forces in peace operations and UN 
missions.  The decision is adopted “in accordance with the determination of Ser-
bia and Montenegro to participate in the enhancement of international peace 
and security. Serbia and Montenegro, as a full member of the UN, fully supports 
the concept of peace missions that are in accordance with the UN Charter. With 
its decision, the Ministerial Council has confirmed the readiness of the members 
of the Armed Forces, under the UN flag, to actively participate in the role of 
peace keepers in crisis-stricken areas of the world.” 
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22. The SaM Ministerial Council adopts a decree on national service. The fi-
nal text is drafted after consultations organised by the Ministry of Defence with 
the participation of prominent experts, representatives of civil society organisa-
tions, religious groups, other governmental bodies and the media. The Decree 
on national service gives conscientious objectors the right to carry out their na-
tional service obligations without the use of weapons. Serbia and Montenegro 
is consequently no longer in the “company of very few remaining states who did 
not recognise this right.”
Decembar
26. The MoI of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro becomes subor-
dinate to the MoD. The director of the MoI, Colonel Miomir Stjanovic, states that 
the MoI has been created in accordance with modern principles, is under civil-
ian control and has counter-intelligence duties. The Military Police remains un-
der the command of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. The MoI has centres in Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad, Kraljevo and Podgorica, 
and is also responsible for organised crime.                     
28. Parliamentary elections are held in Serbia.
29. In the parliamentary elections the SPS receive 81 seats, the DSS 53, the 
DS 37, G17+ 34, the SRM 23 and the SPS 22.  
2004
March
3. The Serbian parliament elects a new government with Volislav Kostunica 
as prime minister.
6. The Serbian government removes both MoI director Misa Milicevic and 
his deputy Goran Zivaljevic. Rade Bulatovic (former security advisor to Volislav 
Kostunica, and former detainee during the ‘Sabre’ operation in April 2003) is ap-
pointed director.  
April
17. The Law on the change of law of the security services of FRY is adopted. The 
number of members on the commission for the control of the security services 
is increased from eight to fourteen (nine from Serbia and five from Montene-
gro). To date, this commission has been inactive.    
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May
14. The Supreme Military Court returns General Aca Tomic, former chief of 
military intelligence to active service, having discharged him from the army on 
29 March 2003. The Supreme Defence Council dismisses the director of the MoI, 
Colonel Momir Stojanovic, citing “un-authorised media appearance” in relation 
to his statement that the MoI was operationally present in Kosovo. The Supreme 
Defence Council also adopts the Strategy of Defence of SaM, and recommenda-
tions for the reorganisation of the MoD.
July
9. The Serbian Constitutional Court confirms that the state of emergency in 
Serbia in 2003 was in accordance with the constitution, but several actions are 
found to be unconstitutional and illegal. These include forced detention by the 
police for up to 30 days without court order, media and legal measures imposed 
by the defence attorney, and un-authorised tapping and surveillance carried 
out by the MoI without court orders.
October
13. The Serbian parliament adpots the Resolution of accession to the EU. The 
resolution states that Serbia’s accession to the EU and the Partnership for Peace 
programme are strategic and national goals.
 November
2. Parliament adopts the Law on free access to information of public impor-
tance.
3. The Supreme Defence Council adopts the bases of future organisation of 
the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro. Responsibility for border security 
is transferred to the MoI. 
18. The parliament of Serbia and Montenegro passes the White book of de-
fence and the Strategy of defence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The 
documents specify the general direction of defence and security issues, basic 
security challenges, the need for transformation and modernization of the mili-
tary, as well as the need for implementation of Euro-Atlantic integrations. 
18. The parliament of Serbia and Montenegro passes the Law on the transfer 
of authorities of the military courts to the civilian judiciary. Civilian juridiaries take 
over all responsibilities from the Military Juridical system. Authority is trans-
ferred to the District Prosecutor’s Offices in Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad. Military 
Defence Office cases are transferred to the Republic Public Defence Office. 
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December
22. Parliament passes the Draft law on volunteer involvement of the profes-
sional members of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro in peace operations 
abroad.
24. The Law on the transfer of authorities of the military courts to the civilian 
judiciary is adopted. Instead of abolishing military courts, special military de-
partments are created within the District Courts in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Nis, 
whilst a Military Section is created in the Supreme Court of Serbia. Authority is 
given to the Public Prosecutor’s Offices in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Nis, and pend-
ing cases in the Military Supreme Court are transferred to the Republic Public 
Defence Office. Military Judiciary, in accordance with the Law on Security Serv-
ices, was permitted to use special methods by the former Military Intelligence 
Service (now the MoI).      
  
2005
January
14. Lieutenant-General Dragan Paskas officially becomes chief of staff of the 
General Staff of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, taking over from General-
Colonel, Branko Krga, who retires along with eleven senior personnel. 
February
23. SaM Defence Minister, Prvoslav Davinic and Serbian Minister of Interior 
Dragan Jocic, sign an agreement to transfer border control from the army to the 
police. The MoI estimates that the transfer process will last approximately two 
and half years, during which the army border units are to be disbanded. The first 
transfer of control is to take place on the Hungarian border.
April
5. The White Book of the Defence of SaM is promoted. This document con-
firms the intention towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The White Book states that 
it is in the interests of SaM to establish full institutional cooperation with NATO. 
Foreign policy priority is given to accession to the PfP programme.   
8. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro, Lieutenant-
general Dragan Paskas, unveils plans for the reorganisation of the Armed Forces, 
under which the General Staff will have four deputies and seven directorates. 
Paskas declares that full professionalisation of the army will occur by 2010. 
7. EU High Commissioner, Xavier Solana and senior governmental officials 
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sign the Agreement on the change of Constitutional Charter, and with that act, the 
constitutional crisis was removed along with blockade of the work of the Parlia-
ment of SaM. This agreement also gave frame for continuation of the mandate 
of the MPs of the Parliament of SaM.
12. Following the positive findings of a feasibility study, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro receives a green light to begin negotiations for stabilisation and asso-
ciation to the EU. At a meeting of the European Commission Collegium held in 
Strasbourg, Oli Rehn, commissioner responsible for EU enlargement, comments 
that this represents the beginning of the process for Serbia and Montenegro.
June
17. The Serbian government adopts the National strategy for accession to the 
EU. The strategy reiterates the strategic determination of Serbia to join the EU 
and defines the roles of all actors in the accession process. It also clearly defines 
Serbia’s obligations. Reform of the Armed Forces and new definitions of the pa-
rameters of security policies are priorities for the process of democratisation. 
The strategy also calls for decentralisation of the police. Terrorism, organised 
crime and drugs, human and arms trafficking are highlighted as security chal-
lenges facing the country.  
July
18. SaM Minister for Foreign Affairs and NATO Secretary General sign an 
agreement between Serbia and NATO on transit arrangements for peace opera-
tions, in order to facilitate NATO logistical operations in the Western Balkans. The 
agreement allows NATO forces to pass on land, water and air without hindrance 
and provides for free access to telecommunication systems. NATO troops are 
made exempt from passport and visa regime regulations, and NATO staff carries 
diplomatic immunity status. Similar agreements exist with all member states of 
the PfP programme. On 4 November, the parliament of Serbia and Montenegro 
ratifies the agreement.     
18. Milorad Ulemek is charged with first degree murder for the assassina-
tion of Zoran Djindjic and the attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic. His three ac-
complices each receive jail sentences of 40 years. Radomir Makovic receives a 15 
year sentence. The judgements are passed down by presiding judge Dragoljub 
Albijanic of the Special Department of the Court, 
September
1. Serbian Minister for Finance Mladjan Dinkic makes a public announce-
ment about the ‘Pancir’ scandal, in connection to the procurement of military 
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equipment from Zrenjanin company ‘Mile Dragic’. He publicly accuses Defence 
Minister Prvoslav Davinic of signing dubious contracts with the company. The 
Ministerial Council annuls all contracts with the company. The scandal is one of 
the main reasons for Davinic’s resignation. Accusations of corruption against 
SaM president Svetozar Marovic cause friction between Serbia and Montene-
gro.       
October
3. EU diplomatic chiefs approve the the beginning of negotiations for stabi-
lisation and association of SaM starting with ‘contractual relations’ with the EU.  
21.  The SaM parliament elects retired general Zoran Stankovic as Defence 
Minister, following the resignation of Prvoslav Davinic on 9 September. 
November
4. The SaM parliament ratifies an agreement with NATO. The agreement 
regulates the transit of NATO forces through SaM, and voids previous individual 
agreements (annex 1-A of the Dayton agreement, the arrangement of  KFOR 
transit dated August 2001, the agreement over NATO access to airspace dated 
September 2002, and bilateral agreements with Belgium, Germany and USA). 
The status of stationary NATO forces in SaM is also regulated.           
14. The Serbian parliament passes the Law on the police which introduce 
important organisational changes to the MoI. The law replaces the principle of 
citizen protection with that of all persons, including foreigners. In addition, the 
Minister of Interior is no longer the director of the police. This position is to be 
publicly advertised, limited to five-year terms and candidates are to be chosen 
according to their expertise. The law also abolishes the military style rank sys-
tem and the police reserve, and introduces a new concept of auxiliary, voluntary 
police. 
2006
January
12. The Serbian government forms the National Security Council, made up 
of representatives from all security-related state organs. The presidency rotates 
between the Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic. Tadic 
immediately challenges the rotating presidency because of concerns that the 
constitutional authority of the president is undermined. This appeal is rejected 
by the government, and the law comes into effect on 13 January. 
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26. A strategy of IBM is adopted in Serbia. This strategy allows for the es-
tablishment, maintenance and control of state borders; open for the free flow 
of people and goods but closed to all kinds of cross-border criminal activities. 
March
16. The Supreme Defence Council adopts a doctrine of the Armed Forces 
of Serbia and Montenegro. The doctrine presents organisational changes in 
the direction of European integrations. Until full professionalisation, the Armed 
Forces are to consist of professional soldiers, conscripts and reserve units. The 
doctrine is implemented with the help of foreign experts in accordance with EU 
standards and regional integrations. It is decided that this doctrine will not be 
applied in Montenegro until after the results of the referendum there.
April
17. The Serbian parliament adopts the Law on Amnesty which pardons all 
persons who have been charged with refusal to use firearms, avoidance of na-
tional service and offences such as unauthorised absence or escape during na-
tional service between the period 7 October 2000 until the day the law comes 
into effect. The law affects 2500 people.  
May
21. In Montenegro, 55.5 per cent vote in favour of independence in a ref-
erendum. Turnout is 86.3 per cent. The Independence Block celebrates the re-
sults which drop the curtain on the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The 
leader of the Social Democrats of Vojvodina, Nenad Canak, comments that the 
results are evidence that no one wishes to live in a union with Serbia. 
 
June
2. Following Montenegro’s independence, the Supreme Defence Council 
holds its last session which brings to an end the Armed Forces of Serbia and 
Montenegro. Command of the two armed forces is transferred to the presidents 
of both republics, in accordance with the Constitutional Charter.   
3. The National Assembly of Montenegro formally approves the results of 
the referendum and adopts a declaration which officially announces the inde-
pendence of the newest European state.   
7. The Ministry of Defence adopts the Strategic analysis of defence of the 
Republic of Serbia, the most important document for the planning and imple-
mentation of defence reforms. It defines the needs and priorities of the devel-
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opment of the Serbian Armed Forces up to 2010, and presents a vision for the 
functioning and restructuring of the Serbian Armed Forces by 2015.   
15. The Serbian government recognises the independence of Montenegro, 
and offers all Montenegrin citizens living in Serbia the option to apply for Ser-
bian citizenship. On the same day, the government recalls all members of the 
diplomatic core from the former State Union and appoints Milorad Veljovic for 
the Police Director.  
September
7. President Boris Tadic and US State Secretary Condoleeza Rice sign the Sta-
tus of the forces agreement. The agreement defines the legal status of US military 
forces (in relation to taxation, customs and criminal acts) and property which 
is temporarily on Serbian territory. This agreement also facilitates the planning 
and implementation of bilateral military activities, joint exercises and exchange 
of staff and expert visits. 
30. With 242 votes in favour, parliament passes the new constitution. The 
following day, Parliamentary Speaker Predrag Markovic announces that a refer-
endum will be held on 28 and 29 October. 
October
28–29. The new constitution is supported by 3,521,724 voters (53.04 per 
cent) opposed to 97,497 (1.47 per cent) against. A late surge in turnout on the 
referendum day contributes to the results in favour. 
November
8. At the House of Guards in Topcider, Defence Minister Zoran Stankovic 
and the Deputy Commander of the European Command of US Armed Forces, 
General William Ward signs an agreement on procurement and mutual services. 
The agreement is intended to ease mutual bilateral cooperation between Ser-
bia and the US, particularly during peace missions.
29. During a NATO summit in Riga, Serbia is invited to join the PfP pro-
gramme.
December
14. At NATO headquaters in Brussels Serbia’s membership of the PfP pro-
gramme is formally signed by President Boris Tadic. 
18. Defence Minister Zoran Stankovic and NATO Deputy General Secretary 
Alesandro Minuti-Rico open a NATO Military Office for liaison purposes in Bel-
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grade. The office is designed to establish connections between NATO and mili-
tary and state leaders, in order to facilitate the transit of troops (signed on 18 
July 2005), to assist Group Serbia-NATO  defence reform, to enable better co-
operation between NATO and Serbia within the PfP programme and also for 
providing support of the activities of public diplomacy of NATO in the region. 
The office is located in the Defence Ministry, with a staff comprising nine mili-
tary staff from NATO and local staff from Serbia. Brigadier-General of the French 
Army, Yannick Asset, becomes head.  
18. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vuk Draskovic, announces the regulation of 
the opening of secret files kept on employees since 1945 by the security sector 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2007
January
21.  Following parliamentary elections, the SRS receives the largest number 
of seats with 81, followed by the DS with 64. The DSS-NS receive 47, G17 Plus 19, 
the SPS 16 and the LDP – 15 seats.
February
1. Protection and control of state borders officially comes under the author-
ity of the police, completing the process of demilitarisation of the state bor-
ders, which has taken a year and a half.  This is marked by a symbolic exchange 
of charters between Defence Minister Zoran Stankovic and Minister of Interior 
Dragan Jocic. Demilitarisation of the state borders and the formation of border 
police are important milestones on the road towards European Union member-
ship.
May
15. Parliament elects a new government, led by Vojislav Kostunica as prime 
minister, just half an hour before the constitutional deadline for forming a gov-
ernment.
23. Former deputy commander of the Special Operations Unit (SOU), 
Zvezdan Jovanovic and former commander Milorad ‘Legija’ Ulemek are found 
guilty for the murder of Zoran Djindjic and sentenced to forty years of prison. 
The Special Court also finds twelve members of the SOU guilty. Zeljko Tojaga is 
given a thirty years prison sentence and Sasa Pejakovic eight years. Branislav 
Berzarevic, employee of the SIA, receives a thirty year sentence. 
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September
5. Minister for Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic hands a document concerning 
the aims of Serbia in the PfP programme to NATO headquarters. The document 
does not specify whether Serbia will become a member of NATO. Each state 
when joining the PfP programme delivers this kind of document, in which it 
identifies its intentions while fulfilling its goals of the PfP.   
2008
February
3. Boris Tadić is re-elected president, beating Tomislav Nikolic of the SRS by 
more than 100,000 votes (2 per cent) in the second round of the presidential 
elections. Although Tadic’s second term as president, it is his first under the new 
constitution. 
May
17. The parliament of Kosovo passes a declaration of independence. The 
authorities in Serbia officially refuse to recognise the declaration. The next day 
Afghanistan, USA, France, Albania, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Senegal rec-
ogniae Kosovo as an independent state.  
April
29. Despite opposition from the Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica,, Vice 
President of the Government Bozidar Djelic, signs a stabilisation and association 
agreement with the  EU, and as well as an interim trade agreement.
May
11. During parliamentary elections, Boris Tadic’s coalition For a European 
Serbia receives 102 seats (1,590,200 votes). The SRS receives 70 seats (1,219,436 
votes). The DSS group New Serbia receive 30 seats (480,987 votes), and the SPS-
PUPS-JS coalition 20 seats (313,896 votes). The LDP secures thirteen seats, the 
Hungarian coalition two, and the coalition of Albanians of Presevo valley one. 
July
7. The Serbian government is elected. It comprises a coalition of For a Eu-
ropean Serbia, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) the Party of United Pensioners 
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of Serbia (PUPS), United Serbia (JS) and parties representing ethnic minorities. 
17. The government appoints Sasa Vukadinovic as Director of SIA.
September
18. The first Vice President of the Government, the Deputy of the President 
and Minister of Interior Ivica Dacic, and the director of Interpol sign the agree-
ment on strategic cooperation between the Serbian government and the Euro-
pean police office. The agreement presents a legal framework for the enhance-
ment of cooperation with Europol in the fight against organised crime, terror-
ism, human trafficking, illegal migration and other serious forms of cross-border 
criminal activities. 
October
1. Serbian Defence Minister Dragan Sutanovac, signs an agreement on secu-
rity of information with NATO, which regulates the security, dissemination and 
exchange of confidential data. The agreement is signed by Minister Sutanovac 
and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Brussels. The agreements 
are similar to those signed by other states and international organisations. Min-
ister Sutanovac also announces that Belgrade will initiate the process of open-
ing a NATO office.
23. Parliament passes three laws on police reform; the Law on protection of 
the state border, the Law on protection of personal data and the Law on the requi-
sition of property gained by criminal activity.
December
11. After a public debate which lasted from the end of August until the end 
of September 2007, parliament passes a new law on defence and a law on the 
Armed Forces.
26. Following calls from civil society organisations, (including CCMR), the 
Ministry of Defence extends the period for public debate on the drafts on the 
defence strategy and the strategy for national security. The Ministry extends the 
debate for fourteen days.   
30. Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Zdravko Ponos is relieved of duty by 
President Boris Tadic, thus ending the dispute between Ponos and Defence Min-
ister Sutanovac, which was accompanied by numerous public exchanges and 
accusations. The Lieutenant-General accused the Ministry of lacking a defence 
policy and having inadequate reforms of the defence system. Minister Sutano-
vac had criticised the chief of staff for failing to respect the principle of subordi-
nation and civil control of the military. 
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2. INDEX
Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies
Access to the Information of the Public Importance
Accountability- Democratic Civilian Control and Public Control and oversight
Actions, decisions
Administration for the Enforcement of Penal Sanctions
Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering
Administrative Procedure (Proceedings)
Analysis
Apartment/Vehicle search
Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro
Authorised Police Officer
Banks
Basic police training centre
Belgrade Treaty
Budget
Budget line
Case, topic, matter, unit, focuses 
Cash in Transit (CIT)
Civil service, Conscientious objection
Civil society
Civil Society Organisations
CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement)
Chain of command
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protec-
tion
Community
Community Policing 
Context analysis
Conflict
Consolidation
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Context
Control
Convict
Control by the Executive
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Corruption
Council for National Minorities 
Court
Court Proceedings
Criminalisation and militarisation of security services
Crime syndicates
Criminal charge
Criminal proceedings
Criminal Procedure Act
Criminal Code
Criteria
Customs Administration
Customs Enforcement Network (CEN)
Customs law
Customs procedure
Customs violation
Decentralisation
De-concentration
Defence inspectorate
Defence Strategy 
Demand for reform
Democratisation
Democratic civilian control
Democratic control
Democratic changes overturn
Democratic governance
Department of Internal Affairs
Department of Internal control of the Ministry of Interior
Depolitisation
Desecuritisation
Detectives
Detention
Development
Developmental context
Directorate for police education, training, professional development and sci-
ence
Discrimination
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Ethnic minorities
European Agency for Reconstruction
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European Commission (EC)
European Court of Human Rights
Evaluation, Grade, Assessment
Excise commodities, Luxury goods
Federal Customs Administration
Financial Intelligence Service
Financial transparency
First generation of the reform 
Fiscal police
Functions of Security Intelligence Services
Funds for special purposes (Funds allocated for special purposes)
General Staff
General Transparency
Good governance
Government of the Republic of Serbia
Grounded theory
Gross domestic product
 
Health and Safety/ Counter Intelligence
High politics 
High Judicial Council
Holistic approach
Human resources
Human rights
Human Rights Violations
Human Resources Management
Indicator
Information Booklet
Instruments, measures, policies
Insurance companies
Intelligence Services
Intelligence Services Reform
Instruction for Publishing of Information Booklets on Public Authority Work  
Integration
Internal Affairs
Investigation (Special investigation measures)
Judges
Judicial control
Justice and Public Administration Committee
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Key political actors analysis
Law
Law on Associations 
Law on the Basic Organisation of Security and Intelligence System
Law on the Budget of the Republic of Serbia for 2008.
Law on Civil Servants
Law on Classification of Data
Law on Civil Self-defence
Law on Defence, Defence Law
Law on Free Access to the Information of Public Importance
Laws on Intelligence Services
Law on Labour
Law on Military
Law on Ministries
Law on Personal Data Protection
Law on Police
Law on Public Procurement
Law on Private Security Companies
Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering (2005)
Law on Serbian Armed Forces
Law on Security - Intelligence Agency
Law on Security Services of SRJ
Law on the Tax Procedure and Administration
Law on Yugoslav Armed Forces
Law on Weapons and Ammunition
Legal State (Rechtstaat)
Legislative (re)organisation of security services
Legitimacy
Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac (UCPBM)
Licence
Logic of appropriateness 
Long-term defence development plan 
Market
Material Resources Management
Measurement, monitoring
Military
Military Reform 
Military Academy
Military doctrine
Military Judiciary
Military Intelligence Agency
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Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Justice
Minister of Interior
Ministry of Interior
Minor
Money laundering
Montenegro Customs Administration
National Assembly, Parliament
National Security Strategy
NATO 
Networking
NPI/ National Programme for Integration of the Republic of Serbia with the Eu-
ropean Union
Ombudsperson
Operational forces
Organised crime
Control and oversight
Control and oversight of the Security Sector
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
OECD/ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Paramilitary 
Parliamentary control and oversight
Partnership for Peace
Police
Political Agenda 
Police Director General
Physical-technical security, Private Security Companies
Public
Public advocacy for security sector reform
Public control and oversight of the security sector
Police Officer/staff/law enforcement officer 
Public procurement
Powers
Police officer, police officer’s
Police College
Police reform
Police Academy 
Political police
Political assassinations 
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Political will
Political actors
Post-Authoritarian Context
Post-Conflict context
Pre-Conflict Context
President of the Republic
Privatisation
Privatisation of security 
Private security companies (PSC)
Professional military officers
Programmed budget
Prosecutors Office
Participation in policy making
Participation in Policy implementation and evaluation  
Prison
Prison guard
Protection of Human Rights
Ratio between Aims, Resources and Outcomes
Research methods
Resistance to reform
Restriction of the Freedom of Movement
Regulations, Laws
Reform
Region/Regional
Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices (RILOs)
Reorganisation
Representativeness of ethnic minorities 
Representativeness of woman
Rule of law
Sanctions
Security and Defence Committee
Security check
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Security Sector Reform Actors
Security Sector Reform Index SSRI
Security Intelligence services
Security
Security Intelligence Agency
Second generation of reform
Secret Files
Secret police 
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Sectoral Context Analysis
Securitisation
Serbian Armed Forces
Serbian Renewal Movement
Sociopolitical context of reform
Special Department of the District Court
Special Operations Unit
Statutory actors that have the right to use force
Statutory actors that do not use force
State-centred
State building
Strong state
Serbian Armed Forces Missions
State Security Service (DB)
Security Sector
Socialist Party of Serbia
Special Prosecutors Office
Stabilisation and Association Agreement
Strategic goals of the Defence System Reform
Strategic Defence Review
Supreme Audit Institution
Supreme Court of Cassation 
Supreme Court of Serbia
Supreme Defence Council
The Association of Companies for Physical- Technical Security 
The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
The Directorate for Analytics of the Ministry of Interior
The Ground Safety Zone
The Use of Fire Arms
Threat perception
The 5th October Overthrow
Torture 
Trade and transport Facilitation in South East Europe (TTFSE)
Transformation
Transparency
Transition
Turning points
Verdicts
War Crimes Chamber
World Bank
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World Customs Organisation
Yugoslav Armed Forces
Yugoslav People’s Army
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3. Research Team
The Research Team
Miroslav Hadžić is President of the Executive Board of CCMR. He graduated 
from the Air Force Military Academy in Zadar in 1966. Mr Hadzic also graduated 
from the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade in 1973. He took his M.A. in 
1979 and Ph.D. in 1983 at the Faculty of Political Science. During 1972-1973 he 
worked as a research associate at the Army Centre for Andragogic, Psychologi-
cal and Sociological Research in Belgrade. He has spent most of his career as a 
lecturer at the Higher Military Political School of Yugoslav Armed Forces (1972-
1994). From 1992 to 1994 he was an Associate Professor of Military Sociology at 
the Military Academy in Belgrade. In January 1994 he was discharged from the 
YAF as a colonel, at his own request. During the next five years he worked in the 
Department for Sociological Research at the Institute of Social Sciences in Bel-
grade. Since 2002, he has been a professor of Global and National Security and 
International Security at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. Mr Hadzic is 
the author of numerous books and articles. 
Milorad Timotić is a founding member of CCMR and Vice-President of the 
Executive Board of CCMR. Mr Timotic was born in 1935. He graduated from the 
Military Academy in 1957 and the Faculty of Political Science in 1965, where he 
also took his M.A. degree. He also graduated from the Royal College of Defence 
Studies in London in 1985. Mr Timotic served in the Yugoslav Armed Forces and 
worked at the Federal Secretariat for National Defence. He retired in 1992 while 
working at the centre for Strategic Studies of Armed Forces. Since 1997 he has 
actively participated in all projects and activities carried out by CCMR. 
Bogoljub Milosavljević graduated from the Faculty of Law in Belgrade in 
1976, where he also took his M.A. degree in 1981 and PhD in International Law 
in 1983. He worked in several government institutions, including the Federal 
Ministry of Justice where he was an advisor to the minister. From 1994 to 1999 
he worked as an assistant professor and associate professor at the Police Acad-
emy in Belgrade. Since 2003 he has taught at the Faculty of Law at Union Uni-
versity in Belgrade, and, since 2004 he has taught M.A. courses in International 
Security at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. He has authored numer-
ous books and articles. 
Đorđe Vuković graduated from the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade 
in 1999. He took his M.A. degree in Political Sociology at the same faculty in 
2004. For many years he has worked for CESID as a project coordinator and pro-
gramme director and is currently director. He was also an assistant lecturer for 
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the subjects Political Sociology and Political Sociology of the Contemporary So-
ciety at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade.
Filip Ejdus was born in 1979. He received his B.A. in International Studies 
at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade and two M.Sc. degrees, one at 
the Institute for Political Studies in Paris in 2005 and the other at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) in 2006. During 2006–2009 he was Executive Direc-
tor of CCMR and a Research Fellow in the Belgrade School of Security Studies. 
Mr Ejdus is currently working as an assistant at the Faculty of Political Science in 
Belgrade, teaching Global and National Security and International Security. His 
special interests are international security, the Middle East, the EU and theories 
of international politics.  
Sonja Stojanović was born in 1978. She received her B.A. in Japanese Lan-
guage and Literature at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade and her M.A. in 
Politics, Security and Integration at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University College London. During 2002-2005 she was Project Assistant 
at the Strategic Development Unit, Law Enforcement Department at the OSCE 
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro. Since 2006 she has worked as Director of 
CCMR and as a Research Fellow at the Belgrade School of Security Studies. Her 
special interests are police reform, comparative politics, enlargement and secu-
rity in the EU, public and political debate, and conflict resolution. 
Zorana Atanasović was born in 1976. She took her B.A. in Psychology at the 
Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade and completed post-graduate specialisation 
in National and Global Security at the Faculty of Political Science. She is cur-
rently working on her M.A. in Global and National Security at the same faculty. 
During 2004-2006 she was an associate at CCMR and since 2006 she has been a 
researcher at the Belgrade School of Security Studies. Her special interests are 
social research, public opinion on the security issues and political parties. 
Marko Milošević was born in 1977. He took his B.A. in sociology at the Fac-
ulty of Philosophy in Belgrade and completed his M.A. degree in Sociology at 
the same faculty in 2009. Since 2006 he has been a researcher at the Belgrade 
School of Security Studies. His special interests are social development and se-
curity. 
Jelena Petrović was born in 1982. She gained a B.A. in International Studies 
at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, where she also received her M.A. 
in the same field. She is currently working on her PhD thesis ‘The Effectiveness 
of NATO Conditioning in the West Balkans’, at the Department of Conflict Stud-
ies, King’s College, London. During 2006-2007 she was a research fellow at the 
Belgrade School of Security Studies. 
Predrag Petrović was born in 1976. He graduated from the Faculty of Po-
litical Science in Belgrade and is currently working on his M.A. in Political So-
ciology at the same faculty. Since 2006 he has been a research fellow in the 
Belgrade School of Security Studies. His interests are anti-corruption, security-
intelligence services and privatisation of security. 
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Đorđe Popović was born in 1978. He graduated from the Faculty of Law 
in Belgrade and took his M.A. at the Peace Studies Institute in Hamburg. Since 
2006 he has been a research fellow at the Belgrade School of Security Studies. 
His special interest is security sector reform. 
Jelena Radoman was born in 1981. She has a B.A. in International Studies 
from the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. She finished her M.A. studies 
in ‘Policy, Security and Integration’ at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University College London. Since 2006 he has been a research fellow 
at the Belgrade School of Security Studies. Her special interests are the security 
profile of South-East Europe and the West Balkans and security sector reform.
Marko Savković was born in 1980. He took his B.A. in International Studies 
at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. He is currently working on his M.A. 
degree in European Studies at the same faculty. His special interests are social 
development and security.                   
Jelena Unijat was born in 1976. She took her B.A. in Law at the Faculty of 
Law in Belgrade and is currently working on her M.A. degree in Criminology at 
the same faculty. During 2006-2008 she was a research fellow at the Belgrade 
School of Security Studies. She is working in the Office of the Ombudsperson 
Internship 
Ivan Dimitrijević graduated from the Faculty of Security in Belgrade. He 
is currently working on his M.A. degree in International Security at the Faculty 
of Political Science in Belgrade. Mr Dimitrijevic has written several articles and 
reviews for Human Safety and The Security magazines. 
Miljana Golubović has a B.A. in International Studies from the Faculty 
of Political Science in Belgrade where she is currently taking a post-graduate 
course in European Studies. She is employed in the Ministry of Trade in the In-
ternational Cooperation Sector, Department of European Integrations. 
Nikola Živković is a student of International Studies at the Faculty of Politi-
cal Science in Belgrade. Since 2006 he has been a research fellow at the Centre 
for European Integrations in the Belgrade Open School. 
Biljana Đorđević is currently an M.A. student of ‘Political Analytics and 
Management’ at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. She is also a teach-
ing assistant for Contemporary Political Theories. Her special interests are politi-
cal theory, migrations and security studies.
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About the Centre
The Centre for Civil-Military Relations is a non-profit organisation of citizens 
founded in Belgrade in 1997 with an overall aim of supporting the democrati-
sation of Serbia and advocating a radical reform of its security sector. The focal 
point of research and public activities of the Centre is the dynamics and scope 
of the reform, primarily of the state actors of force, as well as the problems relat-
ed to putting these actors under democratic civilian control and public control 
and oversight. An important segment of the Centre’s activities is focused on the 
research and public advocacy of the need and prospects for Serbia’s inclusion 
in the regional and global security cooperation and integrations. The Centre has 
thirteen full-time employees and a large number of associates working on vari-
ous projects. 
The Belgrade School of Security Studies (BSSS) is a research unit of the CCMR. 
It was founded in January 2006 with an overall aim of promoting systematic re-
search in the field of security and providing academic advancement for young 
researchers, in order to foster the further development of security studies in Ser-
bia. With these goals in mind, the Centre and the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Relations (NUPI) from Oslo jointly started a six-week academic training for 
BSSS researchers in NUPI in 2008, which will place place throughout 2009. Ten 
young researchers are working on various research and educational projects in 
the School. In addition, they participate in all public advocacy activities organ-
ised by the Centre. From the very onset the School has been financially support-
ed by the Government of Norway and the Balkan Trust for Democracy (BTD). 
The Centre has considerable experience in various academic research 
projects, as well as in alternative education and public advocacy. This has made 
the Centre one of the leading independent research organisations in the field of 
security, particularly in the research of the security sector reform in Serbia and 
the Western Balkan region.
This fact is supported by research carried out by the Centre:  Researching 
and raising the level of the security culture among the youth (2008-2009); Mapping 
and monitoring security sector reform in Serbia (2007-2009); Lessons Learned: The 
security sector reform and Euro-Atlantic integration of Slovakia and Serbia (2007-
2008); Private security companies in Serbia – friend or foe? (2007-2008), The Serbian 
and Montenegrin Armed Forces and the Serbian Orthodox Church – the search for 
a new identity (2005-2009); Public opinion and the media on the Serbian and Mon-
tenegrin Armed Forces (2003-2005); The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia: Causes, 
dynamics and effects (2004); Protection of human rights in the Armed Forces and 
the police of FRY (2003); Normative prerequisites for the civilian control of the Yugo-
slav Armed Forces (2001).
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The Centre is currently working with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of Armed Forces on a project entitled Raising the Capacity of the Civil So-
ciety Organisations for Measuring and Monitoring the Security Sector Reform in the 
Western Balkans 2009-2010. The aim of the project is to contribute to the raising 
of the capacity of civil society organisations in the states of the Western Balkans 
for an effective control and oversight of the local security sectors’ reform trends 
as well as the processes of the security cooperation in the region. The partners 
in the project are: The Institute of International Relations in Zagreb, The Centre 
for Security Studies in Sarajevo, The Centre for Democracy and Human Rights 
in Podgorica, Analytica from Skopje, The Institute of Democracy and Mediation 
in Tirana and The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies in Pristina. As a result, a 
regional network of specialised civil society organisations has been established 
which should contribute to the raising of transparency of the security sector 
reform process in the countries of the region.
The Centre’s experts and associates have devised the models for several 
laws in the field of security: the Model Law on Civilian Service, the Model Law on 
the Provision of Private Security-Related Activity, the Model Law on the Method 
of Determining and Handling Classified Information of Relevance to National 
Defence and the Model Law on the Supreme Defence Council.
 With regard to this, the Centre initiated a public debate on the necessity 
and importance of the overall and harmonious legal regulation of the national 
security system in Serbia. In addition, and upon request of the competent com-
mittee in the former Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, the Centre prepared 
a Draft Law on the democratic and civilian control of the military. Its experts also 
participated in drafting the Law on Security Services in SaM. Before that, they 
were a part of the team which worked on the Law on Security Services in FRY, 
adopted in July 2002. In September 2007, the Centre organised a public debate 
on the Draft Law on Defence and the Draft Law on the Armed Forces , while in 
January 2009 the Centre organised also a public debate on the draft versions of 
the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia
Various educational and informative programmes intended for the civil so-
ciety activists, national deputies, Serbian security sector employees and mem-
bers of academic community have formed a significant part of the activities car-
ried out by the Centre so far. More than 1800 participants have taken part in 
these programmes. The Centre, in cooperation with the Faculty of Political Sci-
ence, successfully organised and carried out two one-year post-graduate spe-
cialist courses in national and global security studies (2004/05; 2005/06). During 
2006-2007, Master Studies in National and Global Security were for the first time 
organised at the same faculty, and the Master Studies in International Security 
were later introduced later. Currently the second generation of M.A. students 
is attending these courses. Thanks to the support of donors, the Centre is able 
to provide for each generation at least 20 scholarships which are used mostly 
for training of the employees of public administration and its actors using force 
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(MoD, Ministry of Interior, security-intelligence agencies and the National Par-
liament), as well as representatives from acadeMoI, the media and civil society 
organisations. In order to increase the number of civilian researchers of the se-
curity sector, the Centre initiated the internship programme for national and 
foreign students in 2007. Twenty-seven local and six foreign interns have taken 
part in this programme so far. The rationale is to encourage a more active par-
ticipation of acadeMoI and civil society in the processes of the security sector 
reform in Serbia, in the region and in Europe.
During 2007-2008 the Centre carried out its first interactive project Video 
Questions of Citizens: Starting a Debate on Serbia’s Strategic Orientation, which 
was initiated to mark the anniversary of Serbia’s accession to the Partnership 
for Peace. A documentary entitled Should Serbia Be Military Neutral? was made 
as a part of the project, in which the representatives of the MoD, acadeMoI and 
security policy experts answered questions asked by citizens, such as those re-
lated to the price of Serbia’s military neutrality or Serbia’s strategic orientation. 
In the same period another project was initiated, Increasing Citizens’ Participa-
tion in the Security Policy, aimed at increasing the participation of civil society 
and citizens in the decision-making processes related to the security policy at 
the local and national levels. This resulted in establishment of the Network of 
National and Local Non-Governmental Organisations and Experts in Security Is-
sues, comprised of 44 civil society organisations from Serbia. The Network func-
tions as a group for public pressure aimed at speeding up the pace of the local 
security sector reform and the strengthening of the civilian democratic control.
Through the project Business and Security – The economic dimension of Ser-
bia’s membership in the PfP and possible integration into NATO (2008), the Centre 
initiated one of first public debates on the interconectedness of the economy, 
stability and security. The international conference, entitled ‘Business and Secu-
rity’, was organised in November 2008 and the topics covered included: theoret-
ical and methodological problems of calculating the price of security, the price 
of the proclaimed military neutrality of Serbia, as well as economic and social 
cost and profit of its possible integration into NATO. The conference participants 
included representatives of government institutions, civil society and Serbian 
acadeMoI, as well as a number of guests from the countries of the Western Bal-
kans and Central and East Europe.
The Centre also dealt with issues of the protection of human rights of the 
state actors who use force and the citizens when they are directly affected by 
their competencies. For this purpose, the Center organised legal counselling in 
the period 2005-2008. Top legal experts provided legal advice in the Centre’s 
premises in Belgrade. In addition, several counselling sessions were organised 
in other cities throughout Serbia. After the completion of the project, the Centre 
published the brochure Free Legal Counselling for Active and Retired Members of 
Armed Forces and the Police.  
With the aim of increasing and disseminating modern insights and knowl-
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edge in the field of security studies, the Centre published numerous original 
publications and analyses which were the result of its research, educational 
and public advocacy activities. Most publications and analyses are available at 
the Centre’s website www.ccmr-bg.org, where they can be downloaded free of 
charge. Thirty-eight publications – books, manuals, glossaries, bulletins – have 
been published so far, the majority of which has been translated into English 
and some into Hungarian and Albanian.
Since 2006 the Centre has been publishing regularly the professional mag-
azine Western Balkans Security Observer. Eleven issues have come out so far, 
available both in Serbian and English on the Centre’s website. 300 copies of the 
magazine are published in Serbian and 300 in English, while the total number of 
on-line subscribers has reached 2,000.
With the edition Belgrade Security Studies in 2007, the Centre started pub-
lishing translations of works of eminent foreign authors in the field. The first 
translation in the edition was Kenneth Waltz’s book The Theory of International 
Politics (1979), which laid a foundation for the contemporary academic discus-
sion in the field of international relations and security. Robert Kagan’s The Return 
of History and the End of Dreams will be published in the same edition during 
2009.
The CCMR’s library is the first academic library in Serbia specialised for se-
curity studies. The library is registered at the National Library of Serbia and all 
publications are available through the COBISS system (a unified regional system 
of library networks comprising over 500 libraries). The library currently has over 
1,800 titles and specialised local and foreign magazines. The Centre is a 
member and the initiator of several national and regional networks of civil so-
ciety organisations. It is a member of the Federation of the Non-Governmental 
Organisations, member of the network of partner non-governmental organi-
sations of the Office of the Government of Serbia for EU Accession and of the 
Information Forum of the Security Sector. The Centre’s representative is also a 
member of the DCAF International Advisory Board. The centre also signed the 
memoranda on mutual understanding, and thus formalised cooperation, with 
the Serbian Ministry of Defence, The Government Office for the EU Accession, 
The Institute of Comparative Law, the National Institute of Democracy, The As-
sociation for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Jagello 2000 from the Czech Republic, 
The Centre for European and North-Atlantic Affairs from Slovakia, the Centre 
for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) from Montenegro, the Centre for 
Security Cooperation (RACVIAC), The Institute of International Relations from 
Croatia, The Centre for Security Studies from BiH, Analytica from Macedonia and 
the Institute for Democracy and Mediation from Albania. The Centre also signed 
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